Search our video library for "Cap Vert"
Senegal's recent parliamentary election continued a tradition of robust multiparty competition—the results have unprecedented implications for democratic oversight.
Illegal logging is a growing feature of transnational organized crime in Africa, often facilitated by the collusion of senior officials, with far-reaching security and environmental implications for the countries affected.
Adapting Sahelian force structures to lighter, more mobile, and integrated units will better support the population-centric COIN practices needed to reverse the escalating trajectory of violent extremist attacks.
The seeming rapid deterioration of security in the eastern DRC and resurgence of M23 are an outcome of longstanding regional rivalries between Rwanda and Uganda.
Violent extremism remains one of Africa’s most pressing security threats. The following publications provide a series of resources for countering violent extremism initiatives in Africa.
Loss of munitions and other lethal materiel from African armed forces and peace operations is a key factor sustaining militant groups driving instability on the continent.
Sahelian militant Islamist groups are threatening border areas of littoral states where grievances held by pastoralist communities may provide an entry point for extremist interests.
The invasion of Ukraine is a wake-up call to the implications of Russia’s attempts to export its governance model to Africa—with sobering consequences for African sovereignty and stability.
Extremist group violence against civilians is driven by context-specific factors—outgroup grievances, intimidation to control territory, and a response to heavy-handed security responses—that require enhanced community-level mitigation and military professionalism.
Most illicit markets in Mali are, in fact, part of an informal economy run by communities seeking economic opportunities in a highly insecure environment. Nevertheless, stabilization efforts mistakenly view them as linked to organized crime or terrorist activities. Militarized responses have added to, not mitigated, instability in the region. Interventions should better support Malian communities and help them mitigate the negative impact of criminal agendas.
Sixteen years of a militarized approach toward al Shabaab has resulted in a stalemate. Negotiation between the two sides has yet to be explored in earnest. There are several barriers impeding negotiations, and there would need to be sufficient deterrents (such as limiting al Shabaab’s ability to extract taxes from the population) and incentives (such as ensuring that the Somali government can make good on its promises) to keep the parties engaged. Nevertheless, negotiations must be on the table.
Youth are disproportionately at risk from extremism, particularly in situations where they have little to lose. In northern Mozambique, poverty, unemployment, low levels of participation in governance and the lack of inclusive development stand out. The Islamist insurgency in northern Mozambique has gained some traction due to its members’ promises of material benefits such as food, employment, and community. It is critical that youth be actively engaged by local officials on a continual basis.