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Mali’s Militant Islamist Insurgency at Bamako’s Doorstep
Militant Islamist group violence is accelerating in Mali, advancing a complex insurgency in north, central, and increasingly southern Mali that further threatens the country’s stability.
Strengthening Sahelian Counterinsurgency Strategy
Adapting Sahelian force structures to lighter, more mobile, and integrated units will better support the population-centric COIN practices needed to reverse the escalating trajectory of violent extremist attacks.
The Nduma Defence of Congo (NDC) and its offshoot, the NDC-Renove (NCD-R), are among the oldest armed groups in Eastern Congo, one of more than a hundred that operate in the region. After its 2008 creation, it grew into the group with the largest territorial control in the region. The NDC eventually served as a proxy for Congolese and Rwandan forces, notably in fighting the FDLR. It also set up governance structures, including taxation systems, a police force, and means to control mining revenues and trade. These security governance structures will need to be purged of corrupt leaders and patronage networks.
Army of Fake Fans Boosts China’s Messaging on Twitter
Chinese officials around the world use Twitter and Facebook, which are blocked in China, to post about their country’s initiatives and defend it against controversy. But the seeming popularity of many accounts, which the Communist Party controls and whose content is sourced from state-run media, and of their posts is artificially inflated by fake accounts that retweet posts thousands of times. These retweets violate Twitter rules on manipulation, leading to a high rate of account suspensions. Improving the labeling of government accounts to better indicate the likelihood of content being propaganda and helping social media implement their own rules will be key to mitigating these strategies.
What Role for the Multinational Joint Task Force?
The Multinational Joint Task Force’s (MNJTF) effectiveness has been hampered by the troop contributing countries’ refusal to establish a unified chain of command, confused priorities, and funding and procurement delay. But successfully defeating the insurgency in the Lake Chad basin will require improved planning, intelligence sharing, accountability, and working across the civil-military divide. This will enable building citizen trust in government, delivering services to populations, and eventually finding a path for militants to demobilize.
The Problem with Militias in Somalia: Almost Everyone Wants Them Despite Their Dangers
Militias can present an attractive alternative to state forces but they carry many risks. Somalia, which hosts many militias, reveals why states and their international partners should resist the urge to create and rely on militias. Some such groups prey on local communities, at times perpetrating serious human rights abuses and enabling mafia-like economic practices. Violent extremist organizations exploit clan and community conflicts and economic grievances. Supporting local conflict resolution within and across communities can begin to alleviate these problems.
By Omar S Mahmood and Ndubuisi Christian Ani, July 6, 2018
In August 2016, Boko Haram split into the groups Islamic State-West Africa (ISIS-WA) and Jama’atu Ahlis Sunna Lidda’awati (JAS) as a result of the internal divisions surrounding the succession of militant Abubakar Shekau as leader of the jihadist group, and a debate over whether Muslim civilians can be targeted. ISIS-WA decided to focus on large scale attacks on military targets, which reflects a more long-term vision for bringing civilians frustrated with the government into its fold. In contrast to the JAS focus on soft civilian targets, ISIS-WA‘s new approach poses a serious threat since it provides an alternative means of governance.
Unlike conflicts in eastern DRC where regional actors support non-state armed groups, the Kamuina Nsapu crisis in the Kasai region is a domestic insurgency that results from both the central government’s neglect and its manipulation of traditional clan affairs. The government’s response to the crisis has been heavy-handed—the result of Congolese officials seeking to gain favor with Kinshasa—and has minimized the possibility of a peaceful solution. Efforts at demobilization of combatants and prosecution of abuses by the Congolese military have been non-existent, a further sign of the perceived neglect by the state that helped spur the conflict. The politicization of the conflict along ethnic lines is a troubling sign ahead of elections scheduled for December 2018.
The Nigerian government has undertaken a range of actions to combat Boko Haram’s asymmetric insurgency in the country’s northeast: roadblocks, raids, surveillance, patrols, and deradicalization. Nearly all have followed an enemy-centric rather than population-centric approach, despite the fact that many of the factors constraining success are tied directly to the security forces’ operational capacity. For instance, poor coordination, inability to effectively deliver appropriated funds and equipment, enemy penetration, and porous borders all hindered successful counter-enemy actions. However, if Nigeria had instead emphasized a population-centric approach to counterinsurgency, it is possible that such efforts would not have faced as many headwinds.
Armed Non-State Actors and Displacement in Armed Conflict
Armed nonstate actors, be they insurgents, vigilantes, or criminal groups, are a common challenge in many African countries. Despite being illegal and clandestine, such groups often develop a mutual dependency with communities and civilians for security or economic relations. This has broadened strategies to manage these threats. Inclusive approaches spearheaded by non-military actors to instill respect for basic norms of combat and human rights within state and nonstate forces alike are valuable parts of comprehensive efforts to mitigate irregular conflict and improve prospects for demobilization.
Optimizing Africa’s Security Force Structures
When a country becomes host to an insurgency, a prospect many African states face, what counterinsurgency approaches offer the best chance of prevailing? There are roughly 20 approaches that are commonly employed, including amnesties, strategic communication, or rigorous suppressive operations. An analysis of 30 insurgencies finds that successful strategies tend to employ multiple approaches and favor those that enhance the legitimacy of the government and security forces. Reliance on repressive measures more often led to failure.
Victory Has a Thousand Fathers: Evidence of Effective Approaches to Counterinsurgency, 1978–2008
When a country becomes host to an insurgency, a prospect many African states face, what counterinsurgency approaches offer the best chance of prevailing? There are roughly 20 approaches that are commonly employed, including amnesties, strategic communication, or rigorous suppressive operations. An analysis of 30 insurgencies finds that successful strategies tend to employ multiple approaches and favor those that enhance the legitimacy of the government and security forces. Reliance on repressive measures more often led to failure.
Militias, Rebels, and Islamist Militants: Human Security and State Crises in Africa
Armed nonstate groups able to cultivate disillusionment with existing regimes and successfully evade defense forces increasingly dominate the threat landscape across Africa. Such groups in Nigeria, Sudan, Angola, and elsewhere indicate a need for better policies to reverse emergent violent youth cultures, monitor transborder areas, and population-centric security and governance strategies.
Why Uganda Has Failed to Defeat the Lord’s Resistance Army
A devastating insurgency against the Ugandan government and people is now well into its third decade. How has the battle between the relatively small and under-equipped Lord’s Resistance Army and the Ugandan People’s Defense Forces continued so long? Several causes for this surprising persistence may lie in the very structures and strategies of the LRA and UPDF as well as the irregular tactics used by both groups.
Are Africa’s Wars Part of a Fourth Generation of Warfare?
Kiwanja refugee campFourth Generation Warfare (4GW) – models of asymmetric warfare that emphasize culture, politics, economics, non-state actors, and targeting of civilians – has a growing applicability for understanding Africa’s complex conflicts. In particular, 4GW frameworks underscore the need for comprehensive, as opposed to purely military, solutions to conflict on the continent.
Counterinsurgency Field Manual (FM 3-24)
The “paradigm-setting” revision of U.S. military doctrine published based on the fundamental premise that the key to counterinsurgency operations is protecting civilians. This document is the main reference work informing modern U.S. military operations.
African Militaries and Rebellion: The Political Economy of Threat and Combat Effectiveness
Few African armies have shown an aptitude for counter-insurgency strategies. Instead, respones to rebellions are delayed, rely on blunt military strikes and exclude vital political strategies to complement security operations. Competent police forces and domestic intelligence agencies rather than expansion of the military will better enhance counter-insurgency capabilities in Africa’s democracies.
Security Topics: Irregular and Asymmetric Warfare