Borders, Security, and Regional Integration: A Perspective from Guinea-Bissau
Dr. Demba Baldé is Vice President and Permanent Researcher at Guinea-Bissau’s National Defense Institute. An international relations specialist, he has extensive experience in defense, security, and peacebuilding. He also serves as the Ministry of National Defense’s focal point to the West Africa Network for Peacebuilding (WANEP), helping strengthen regional cooperation and develop strategic security policies in West Africa.
Luisa Chau (LC): In your assessment, what are currently the main challenges and the greatest advances in border security in West Africa?
Dr. Demba Baldé (DB): Border security in West Africa faces a critical tension between the expansion of transnational threats and regional integration efforts. While violent extremism and organized crime exploit weak institutions, Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) is moving forward with the harmonization of biometric data to modernize border control.
In terms of cross-border threats, violent extremism (linked to Al-Qaeda and the Islamic State) has expanded from the Sahel countries to the coastal states of the Gulf of Guinea, taking advantage of hard-to-reach forests and artisanal mining corridors to finance its criminal activities. Large portions of the borders are difficult to control because rapid-access resources are lacking, which facilitates the smuggling of weapons, drugs, and mineral resources. This is compounded by gaps in intelligence cooperation among Member States and by intercommunity tensions. In addition, political and institutional instability—constitutional crises, coups d’état, and internal governance tensions in inland countries—has weakened public security mechanisms and military coordination in the region, as in the case of Guinea-Bissau, for example.
The greatest advances in border security include the creation of integrated information platforms to make border-management systems interoperable and improve data storage and sharing; these systems have been approved by the governments of ECOWAS. The ECOWAS Biometric Identity Card was a commendable initiative that facilitates harmonized migration governance and the secure free movement of goods and people within the ECOWAS and West African Monetary Union (WAEMU) areas.
LC: Guinea-Bissau shares borders with Senegal and Guinea and is part of a highly interconnected regional space. How do you assess the role of cooperation among these countries in strengthening border security?
DB: Guinea-Bissau, Senegal, and Guinea-Conakry share borders as well as historical and cultural ties that unite them. In this area, cooperation is essential to ensuring stability in the region. However, efforts to strengthen border security face complex challenges, with effectiveness varying between institutional dialogue and operational weaknesses on the ground.
Along the border with Senegal, Guinea-Bissau has adopted cooperation mechanisms by creating National Commissions that work with neighboring countries on the joint management and monitoring of border areas in the north and east of the country. With neighboring Guinea, good agreements have existed since the earliest days of the Armed Struggle for National Liberation to ensure the security, peace, and socioeconomic development of the population. Within the framework of regional integration, Guinea-Bissau cooperates through WAEMU security programs, participating in projects that connect border police posts and enable them to share information (for example, the Cambadju and Npack posts).
Crime and trafficking are the main border vulnerabilities among the three countries. Porous borders facilitate transnational threats such as cattle theft, the plundering of resources, and the illegal export of cashew nuts. Political instability is another destabilizing factor. At times, political crises and military tensions in neighboring states—particularly to the north, along the border with Senegal—have been heightened by the presence of MFDC separatist rebels, which has generated tensions and refugees for more than forty years. This has required Bissau to unilaterally strengthen border patrols to protect its territorial integrity. In addition, historical issues and territorial disputes, both maritime and land-based, have required reviews to correct inaccuracies in border lines.
To overcome these barriers, security in the region depends on fully implementing joint mechanisms, moving beyond a militarized approach and focusing on the development of local communities.
LC: In which areas have multilateral cooperation among neighboring countries been most effective in preventing terrorism, drug trafficking, and other forms of organized crime? Where are there still opportunities for improvement?
DB: In my humble opinion, the most promising area for improving multilateral cooperation is intelligence sharing, especially the tracking of illicit financial flows—money laundering and the financing of terrorism—along with cross-border operational capacity building and the creation of task forces. Neighboring countries still have opportunities to improve legal standardization, cybersecurity, and the control of institutional corruption at borders. Improving systems for monitoring money laundering through data sharing among national Financial Intelligence Units would help disrupt the financing of terrorist groups and drug-trafficking networks. Countries should expand and improve joint police surveillance at ports and land borders and cooperate with INTERPOL and other international counterpart organizations, enabling coordinated interdictions of drugs and other forms of organized crime. Implementing mutual legal assistance agreements would facilitate the extradition of suspects and the freezing of assets abroad, reducing impunity arising from jurisdictional barriers. Another important issue is the harmonization of conflicting laws in neighboring countries’ legal systems—for example, the debate over how to classify criminal factions—which creates friction and delays extradition and cooperation. Additionally, criminal networks’ use of cryptocurrencies and encrypted communications requires greater joint investment in technology and digital forensics. In terms of addressing corruption, more robust transparency and integrated oversight mechanisms must be implemented to combat corruption among government and customs officials, which facilitates cross-border smuggling.
LC: Which information-sharing and intelligence-cooperation mechanisms do you consider priorities for strengthening regional security?
DB: Strengthening regional security requires an integrated and agile intelligence system that prioritizes data-system interoperability, joint preventive-analysis protocols, and secure communication channels. These should include integrated information systems that create unified platforms for the real-time sharing of databases on individuals involved in drug trafficking and terrorism, as well as lost firearms and stolen vehicles; a stronger early-warning system equipped with analytical capacity to anticipate transnational threats (trafficking in drugs and other goods, money laundering, and terrorism) through harmonized reports among Member States; multinational command-and-control centers—joint operational hubs to coordinate simultaneous actions and operations at borders and ensure the rapid flow of data among law-enforcement agencies; information sharing on incidents and threats in cyberspace; promoting cooperation through common frameworks; and structured education and training programs to foster mutual understanding and institutional trust among intelligence analysts and officers from different countries.
LC : What are the internal security management structures in your country that are involved?
DB: The Internal Security System consists of several bodies that contribute to the country’s internal security. Various police structures are divided into security forces and security services. The existing police forces are the Public Order Police (POP), National Guard (GN), Military Police (PM), and Prison Guard (GP). The security services include the Judicial Police, National Civil Protection Service, Security Intelligence Service, Center for Defense Intelligence and Strategic Analysis, Central Military Intelligence Division, and National Financial Intelligence Unit.
The POP, GN, and SNPC fall under the Ministry of the Interior. The Military Police (PM), Center for Defense Intelligence and Strategic Analysis (CIAED), and Central Military Intelligence Division (DCIM) fall under the Ministry of Defense. The GP, PJ, and INTERPOL/National Central Bureau–Guinea-Bissau (BCN-GB) fall under the Ministry of Justice, while the National Financial Intelligence Unit (CENTIF) falls under the Ministry of Finance.
Other structures remain to be created, namely the Aeronautical Authority System (SAA) and the National Maritime Authority System (SAMN).
LC: How does Guinea-Bissau’s National Defense Institute contribute to strengthening border security and regional cooperation? Which initiatives or programs would you highlight?
DB: Like the defense institutes of other Community of Portuguese Language Countries (CPLP), the National Defense Institute (IDN) does not directly conduct physical border enforcement; its role centers on strategic thinking, research, and education. The IDN contributes to border security by providing civilians and military personnel with critical knowledge of geopolitics and interdisciplinary institutional cooperation.
The principal contributions made by Guinea-Bissau’s institute over the years include things like strategic capacity building, which promotes courses, conferences, and seminars that bring together the armed forces, security forces (POP and GN), students, and policymakers, fostering the systemic coordination needed for integrated border management and addressing issues such as the illegal exploitation of natural resources and the erosion of borders.
Through conferences, seminars, and training, the IDN raises awareness among society and government officials about the vital importance of territorial sovereignty and border protection.
LC: Considering your experience in addressing the illegal exploitation of natural resources, how do environmental crimes, such as illegal logging, relate to border security in West Africa?
DB: Illegal logging serves as a financial engine for rebels and criminal groups in West Africa, increasing border vulnerability. These crimes destroy forests, deprive states of critical revenue, and finance militias and terrorism. Those groups use illicit trade networks, corruption, and porous cross-border routes to launder products and move weapons. The trade in illegally sourced timber, charcoal, and gold injects billions of dollars into shadow economies. These funds are used by criminal factions and terrorist groups to recruit fighters and purchase heavy weapons.
Land borders in the region are vast and often poorly patrolled. Criminal networks bribe authorities and exploit weak enforcement of protocols such as the ECOWAS/WAEMU free-movement protocol to smuggle timber and other illicit goods.
Deforestation and logging serve as gateways to other forms of trafficking. Routes are opened or controlled by illegal loggers with the assistance of politicians in power and high-ranking military leaders.
LC: Which good practices or initiatives could be replicated in other countries in the region?
DB: Some countries and economic blocs have implemented measures that could serve as models for replication throughout West Africa. First, there are military actions and joint patrols (for example, Operation Faxass). In border regions, such as those between Senegal and The Gambia, operations coordinated by the armed forces have been essential to suppressing the cutting and trafficking of protected timber species. Furthermore, harmonizing laws and data (the African Union approach) is important. Cooperative efforts to standardize criminal laws and forestry regulations among neighboring countries make it more difficult for illegal loggers to exploit legal loopholes across different systems, such as those of Anglophone and Francophone countries. Finally, there are the mechanisms of the Bamako Agreement or the Lomé Convention.
LC: What lessons has Guinea-Bissau learned through cooperation with its neighbors and with regional organizations? Are there good practices that could be replicated in other countries in the region?
DB: Guinea-Bissau has learned that political stability is an essential prerequisite for regional integration and economic development. Cooperation with neighbors and organizations such as ECOWAS and WAEMU has highlighted the importance of joint structural reforms, border security, and crisis management based on prevention and shared responsibility.
The lessons Guinea-Bissau has learned through successive political crises—which caused macroeconomic setbacks and regional dependence—have demonstrated that military interventions are no substitute for deep domestic political reforms. The country has also faced challenges in aligning its laws and economy with WAEMU directives. The principal lesson is that integration requires continuous oversight, adaptation to the local context, and political will. Porous borders have made the country vulnerable to organized crime. Early-warning mechanisms and joint patrols have proven essential to combating transnational threats.
In terms of replicable good practices, I would underscore three things. First, integrated border posts. The project to link police posts and establish joint controls—such as at the Cambadju post—with WAEMU support is a successful model that improves security, facilitates free movement, and optimizes customs-revenue collection. Second, environmental conservation and protected areas. Guinea-Bissau’s model for managing the National System of Protected Areas (SNAP), involving the Institute for Biodiversity and Protected Areas (IBAP), combines biodiversity conservation, including mangrove conservation, with the sustainable development of local communities. Another key element is diaspora engagement strategy: The creation of consultation mechanisms between the government and the Bissau-Guinean diaspora, with support from the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), allows remittances and investments to be channeled more strategically toward the country’s economic development.
LC: In your opinion, how can Africa Center alumni help strengthen regional cooperation, build trust among institutions, and support more secure borders in West Africa?
DB: By creating a platform for exchanging ideas and opinions that can bring together civilians, legislators, the armed forces, security forces and services, and civil society to align security strategies within a rule-of-law framework. This would improve transparency and public trust in security and defense institutions.
LC: Is there any final message you would like to share with the Africa Center alumni community about the future of regional cooperation on border security?
DB: The future of regional cooperation depends on shifting from security focused purely on the state to security centered on people and goods.