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As terrorist groups and violent extremist organizations (VEOs) encroach on Coastal West Africa (CWA), defense and security forces (DSF) are adapting. This includes expanding, professionalizing, and specializing their units, improving multi-agency coordination, and strengthening ties with border communities. Yet critical gaps remain in force mobility, interoperability, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR), and civilian protection. Effective responses demand forces that can maneuver across difficult terrain, guided by timely intelligence and supported by aerial reconnaissance, mobile special operations units, and decentralized logistics. This analysis is grounded in my own academic research, the insight of African practitioners, as well as lessons learned from Africa Center-led workshops with uniformed and civilian officials from West Africa’s defense, law enforcement, and intelligence communities. Their frontline experiences inform what works—and what does not—in countering terrorism and preventing VEO incursions, so the recommendations reflect operational realities as well as policy intent.
Advancing Whole-of-Government Security
Governments across coastal West Africa have pursued a dual strategy for confronting violent militant groups: investing in development while overhauling militaries, reforming law enforcement, improving interagency coordination, and engaging local authorities, civil society, and communities. This recognizes that lasting security requires both stronger DSF and renewed trust among the populations that are most exposed to violence.
Encouraging progress in the domains of counterterrorism and prevention of violent extremism are visible across coastal West Africa. In Benin, Côte d’Ivoire, Ghana, Senegal, and Togo, interministerial and interagency mechanisms are beginning to anchor whole-of-government decision-making that links defense, security, justice, finance, and community actors. Countries are also institutionalizing integrated border management. Benin stands out with a border-governance framework that combines the strategic oversight of the Beninese Integrated Border Management Agency (ABeGIEF), the operational focus of the Special Border Surveillance Unit (USB), and the capacity-building mission of the Borders Academy, established in October 2023. Ghana has Joint Mobile Teams, contingency plans, and harmonized standard operating procedures (SOPs), while Côte d’Ivoire uses the National Border Commission (CNFCI) to align national policy with local practice. Togo is deploying biometric systems such as the Migration Information and Data Analysis System (MIDAS), strengthening infrastructure, and promoting citizen engagement. These steps reflect growing political will to coordinate among defense and security forces and with non-state stakeholders, though mandates and intelligence-sharing arrangements still require clarification.
Multi-agency operations are likewise taking root, especially in border zones vulnerable to incursions by terrorist groups, violent extremist organizations, and traffickers. Countries are fielding mixed units—combining military, police, gendarmerie, customs, intelligence, and forestry services—to deliver coordinated, adaptive responses. In Côte d’Ivoire, the special forces of the army, the Search and Assault Force of the National Police (FRAP), and the Intervention Unit of the National Gendarmerie (UIGN) operate jointly. In Benin, Operation Mirador, the country’s flagship security campaign launched in 2022 to secure the northern border regions— brings multiple branches under a unified field command for that theater. Challenges persist, including fragmented command structures and overlapping mandates, but practice is steadily moving toward unity of effort.
Governments are also upgrading intelligence capabilities to make these operations intelligence-led: strengthening engagement with local populations, building informant networks, improving evidence collection, and professionalizing investigators, research brigades, and data centers. Ghana’s National Counterterrorism Fusion Centre (NCTFC), Border Security Committees, and Early Warning and Early Response (EWER) systems are enhancing information-sharing and enabling timely, coordinated responses. Côte d’Ivoire’s Counterterrorism Operational Intelligence Center (CROAT) links collection, analysis, technology support, international cooperation, and operational coordination through five specialized cells—translating shared situational awareness into prevention, protection, and response. This helps break down silos, fuse intelligence across agencies and borders, and drive joint operations with a single operational picture.
Despite these advances in whole-of-government security, three specific areas require further coordination of strategic solutions: force mobility, intelligence/ISR integration, and community protection as a guiding doctrine.
Enhancing Mobility of Forces
Effective security responses require forces that move fluidly across difficult terrain, supported by aerial reconnaissance, mobile special forces, and decentralized logistics. Expanding and resourcing specialized units—trained in bush tracking, counter-ambush tactics, and night operations—gives militaries the agility to mirror VEOs tactics and anticipate their movement. This, in turn, necessitates empowering forward commanders with real decision authority and fielding interoperable units under unified command to enable faster, more adaptive responses. It also means redeploying assets closer to hotspots, decentralizing logistics and maintenance, and embedding aerial reconnaissance into routine patrols to strengthen rapid reaction. External partners can add value through technical expertise and drone training, but strategic direction and operational ownership must remain in national and regional hands.
Expanding Intelligence and ISR Capabilities
Success in countering VEOs depends on intelligence integration. Building open-source intelligence (OSINT) and geospatial intelligence (GEOINT) capacities within defense ministries, border agencies, and national intelligence services is essential to fuse data from drones, satellites, patrols, border posts, ranger units, and community alert networks into real-time, actionable operations. Forward surveillance outposts equipped with drones, mobile reconnaissance teams, and expanded community alert networks help close coverage gaps, while linking fusion centers to operational units improves coordination among armed forces, police, rangers, and border guards.
Institutionalizing intelligence training through military academies and specialized schools will improve usage of intelligence and ensure continuity. Embedding modules on geospatial mapping, encrypted communications, and intelligence-led planning across new recruits—while drawing on international training partnerships—will strengthen the officer corps and supports adaptive leadership in the field.
Placing Community Protection at the Heart of the Effort
Ultimately, countering VEOs is not only about neutralizing them but about safeguarding populations most exposed to their violence. Embedding community-centered security into doctrine is therefore essential. By integrating modules on community engagement, non-kinetic threat mitigation, interagency coordination, and local conflict resolution, academies can instill the principle that protecting civilians is the organizing logic of operations, not a byproduct. Anchoring military education in this way aligns modernization with legitimacy. Effectiveness should be measured not only by battlefield outcomes but also by the safety and resilience of communities. VEOs thrive where the state is absent or resented; reversing this dynamic requires DSF to act as both protectors and partners in stability.
Conclusion
Coastal West African states have laid the groundwork to counter terrorism and blunt the advance of VEOs into their territories. The task now is to consolidate and scale reforms into effective security policies that translate capacity into operational effectiveness. Priorities are clear: strengthen border security; increase force mobility and interoperability; integrate ISR capabilities; and embed civilian protection in doctrine and practice. External partners can contribute training, equipment, and technical expertise, but leadership and accountability must remain with regional governments. With momentum on their side, sustained political will and operational effectiveness will neutralize VEOs threats and safeguard at-risk communities—reinforcing stability and state legitimacy across the region.
Dr. Anouar Boukhars is Professor of Counterterrorism and Countering Violent Extremism at the Africa Center for Strategic Studies. With Dr. Daisy Muibu, he is the faculty lead for the Africa Center’s academic programs on these issues. He can be reached here.