Sudan

  • At an Impasse: The Conflict in Blue Nile

    By Claudio Gramizzi, Small Arms Survey | December 2013 The conflict in Blue Nile, a Sudanese state located on the border with South Sudan, restarted in September 2011 as a result of renewed tension between the Khartoum government and the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement-North rebel group. Within weeks, tens of thousands of troops, including locally recruited, government-equipped militias, were mobilized and significant military resources and aerial bombardments were used in battle. Though the conflict has regional dimensions, including evidence that rebels enjoy some ties to the government in South Sudan, it is largely a product of widespread divisions and grievances internal to Sudan.

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  • Sudan’s Popular Protest Movement: Will the International Community Continue to Ignore It?

    By Dalia Haj-Omar, Open Democracy | November 2013 — A veteran activist from demonstrations that swept several cities in Sudan in 2010 and 2012 examines how the reemergence of protests in 2013 have changed the country’s power dynamics. In a sign of some weakness, the government has resorted to extraordinary measures such as the extended closure of universities, severing internet service, and the use of force by police to deter marchers. One significant factor driving Sudanese onto the streets has been a surge in the cost of living and basic goods, yet the extension of loans and investments from Qatar, the World Bank, and western businesses has provided the Khartoum government more flexibility to slow the expansion of popular discontent.

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  • Sudan’s Popular Protest Movement: Will the International Community Continue to Ignore It?

    By Dalia Haj-Omar, Open Democracy | November 2013 A veteran activist from demonstrations that swept several cities in Sudan in 2010 and 2012 examines how the reemergence of protests in 2013 have changed the country’s power dynamics. In a sign of some weakness, the government has resorted to extraordinary measures such as the extended closure of universities, severing internet service, and the use of force by police to deter marchers. One significant factor driving Sudanese onto the streets has been a surge in the cost of living and basic goods, yet the extension of loans and investments from Qatar, the World Bank, and western businesses has provided the Khartoum government more flexibility to slow the expansion of popular discontent.

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  • Making Sense of the Protests in Khartoum

    By Alex de Waal, African Futures | October 2013 — Bouts of protests in recent years, some violent, have drawn comparisons to the Arab Spring and to previous uprisings that toppled past governments in Khartoum. However, opposition groups lack the organizational structure or sympathy among key constituencies, such as large Islamic groups or the military or police, to achieve genuine political change. With opposition groups relatively weak and disconnected, the Sudanese regime will likely remain shaken but resistant to genuine reforms.

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  • Sudan: Anatomy of a Conflict

    Harvard Humanitarian Initiative | May 2013 — Archival satellite imagery and open-source data reveal that more dwellings and aid shipments were destroyed by armed militants in various areas of Sudan during fighting from 2010 to 2012 than previously reported. The resulting humanitarian crisis from this destruction is far starker than initially thought. Geospatial tracking has also indicated abuses and extrajudicial executions by Sudanese government forces, most notably through the movement of police vehicles. Additional data will provide a better understanding of the complete humanitarian implications, consequences, and perpetrators of violence and internal conflicts in Sudan.

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  • Major Reform or More War

    International Crisis Group | November 2012 — Chronic conflict, driven by the concentration of power and resources in Khartoum, continues to plague Sudan. A more inclusive government that addresses at least some of the grievances that have propelled rebellions in Darfur, the East, and the country’s new southern region are needed, but pledges to transform governance remain unfulfilled. A key hurdle – though not the only one – is President Bashir, who has further centralized authority in a small circle of trusted officials and appears unwilling to genuinely relinquish power. A managed transition to a government that includes but is not dominated by his National Congress Party (NCP) may provide the productive and broad-based reforms needed to prevent conflict and address the aspirations of Sudan’s many marginalized people.

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