Additional Reading on Peacekeeping

(See more recent readings on this topic here.)

Securing Legitimate Stability in the DRC: External Assumptions and Local Perspectives

By Jaïr van der Lijn, Tim Glawion, and Nikki de Zwaan, Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, September 30, 2019

Surveys and interviews conducted in South Kivu examine the roles of the Armed Forces of the DRC (FARDC), MONUSCO, as well as NGOs and local militias in facilitating lasting peace. While MONUSCO has assisted the FARDC in stemming the militia threat, Congolese do not see a future for the mission in their communities and express frustration at what they perceive as inadequate responses to their security concerns. Many in conflict-stricken areas see the state as the principal security provider, despite considerable reservations about the FARDC. Phasing out MONUSCO and ensuring continued decentralization through local elections would strengthen the legitimacy of the state and its security forces and promote accountable governance.

Securing Legitimate Stability in CAR: External Assumptions and Local Perspectives

By Tim Glawion, Jair van der Lijn, and Nikki de Zwaan, Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, September 30, 2019

Researchers interviewed MINUSCA officials and more than 200 residents of four areas of the Central African Republic. Each locality provided a snapshot of residents’ impressions of the UN mission, the role of the state in providing security, the legitimacy of rebel groups and militias, and a lasting solution for peace. Respondents from unstable areas where UN peacekeepers are present wish to see MINUSCA exit and allow state armed forces to provide security. The vast majority of interviewees condemned the rebels—as well as anti-balaka forces—who they cite as the source of local instability. Little alignment exists between the framework of the Khartoum Agreement and citizens’ desires.

Transitioning to National Forces in Somalia: More Than an Exit for AMISOM

By Fiona Blyth, International Peace Institute, April 22, 2019

Somali and international efforts have shifted to planning for the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) to transition directly Somali security forces without an interim UN mission. The implementation of the Transition Plan will require new institutions, processes, and commitment to good governance, changing the Somali state and providing lessons for security sector reform. AMISOM’s eventual exit will influence how the AU and the UN mandate and authorize future missions.

Moving Toward Mobility: Providing Protection to Civilians Through Static Presence and Mobile Peacekeeping in South Sudan

By Center for Civilians in Conflict (CIVIC), March 21, 2019

The United Nations Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS)’s limited resources are insufficient to fulfill its mandate. Barriers to UNMISS effectiveness include inflexible human resources policies, lack of freedom of movement due to obstacles set by South Sudanese government, and issues engaging with local communities. The problem of inadequate troops and civilian staff deployed to such a large country could be alleviated by a more mobile and responsive approach to achieving the mission’s mandate. Increased mobility, including rapid response capability, long-range patrols, and temporary remote deployments, requires support from the UN Secretariat and member states’ to succeed.

Impact of EU Funding Dynamics on AMISOM

By Omar S. Mahmood and Ndubuisi Christian Ani, December 31, 2017

Responding to budgetary constraints, the European Union announced in January 2016 that it would decrease the amount of AMISOM contingent stipends from $1,028 per troop per month to $822 per month. The EU’s decision has motivated AMISOM leadership, along with EU and other partners, to develop a clearer strategy for AMISOM’s eventual withdrawal, including an increased focus on building the capacity of Somali security forces. The international community must find ways to avoid overburdening the EU, whose monthly support to AMISOM has increased from €5 million per month in 2010 to €25 million per month in 2017, so that donor fatigue does not contribute to mission failure.

Road to a Better UN? Peace Operations and the Reform Agenda

By Arthur Boutellis and Alexandra Novosseloff, November 30, 2017

The June 2015 report of the High Level Independent Panel on UN Peace Operations recommended numerous reforms to these operations. While steps have been taken to implement them, for instance by adopting phased and prioritized mandates for the missions in Mali and the Central African Republic, much remains to be done. In particular, the UN needs to create a financing mechanism for peace operations and adopt clear procedures for support to UN-endorsed African Union operations. But lack of political will from the UN Security Council, member states and troop contributing countries, as well bureaucratic resistance, and possible financial constraints remain significant obstacles.

Nontraditional Actors: China and Russia in African Peace Operations

By Elor Nkereuwem, The Stimson Center, March 31, 2017

China and Russia (the P2), both permanent members of the UN Security Council, are playing increasing roles in the design and conduct of UN peace operations in Africa. This analysis of the P2’s voting patterns in the Security Council, reflects a shift from a pattern of abstentions to voting for the resolution. The analysis also shows a shift in China’s personnel contributions to these missions, the country has moved from not contributing personnel, to being the largest contributor of troops among the permanent members of the Council. Nonetheless, while the P2 provide strong rhetorical support for African voices to be heard, this does not translate to systematic on the ground support. China’s troop contributions are largely confined to South Sudan. Moreover, support for the resolutions highlights successful P2 efforts to limit the scope of the mandates in question. P2 interests on the continent will continue to align and be reflected in mission mandates and resources.

Rentier Peacekeeping in Neo-Patrimonial Systems: The Examples of Burundi and Kenya

By Malte Brosig, Contemporary Security Policy, February 6, 2017

African countries contribute the most peacekeepers to missions on the continent. However, many troop-contributing countries are hybrid democratic/autocratic political systems—characterized as neopatrimonial—and some are accused of using peacekeeping missions as a means to generate rents for their regimes to retain control at home. Others send their troops only to find them partaking in the recipient country’s neo-patrimonial system—their troops exploiting the system to extract economic rents. In both cases, the purpose of peacekeeping has been undermined and the conflict perhaps prolonged.

The Surge to Stabilize: Lessons for the UN from the AU’s Experience in Somalia

By Water Lotze and Paul D. Williams, International Peace Institute, May 10, 2016

Once principally a war-fighting operation, the AMISOM peacekeeping mission in Somalia now has a mandate of “stabilization.” AMISOM continues to expand government-controlled territory and degrade al-Shabaab, but now also pursues more political aims like establishing partners throughout the country and developing national security forces. To achieve success and develop effective strategies for AMISOM and future peacekeeping missions, “stabilization” and its political and military elements need better definition.

Enhancing U.S. Support for Peace Operations in Africa

By Paul D. Williams, George Washington University, May 19, 2015

Contemporary UN mandates have often blurred the lines separating peacekeeping, stabilization, counterinsurgency, counterterrorism, atrocity prevention, and state-building. Peacekeepers are rarely trained or equipped to deal with such challenges. Given its growing interest in fostering a stable and prosperous Africa, the United States should articulate a strategic approach to peace operations in Africa and to clarify its interagency processes and funding authorities on this issue. The United States should also selectively invest in African partners that share its conflict-management objectives and are themselves building locally sustainable peacekeeping institutions.

State Building and Peacebuilding in Contexts of Identity-related Conflicts: A Necessary Collaboration

By Dorcas Ettang, February 28, 2015

State capacity is not the same as state legitimacy. Though it is essential to build and strengthen the institutions of governance in post-conflict societies to provide for its citizens, the people of a country must feel that the government is endeavoring to protect and provide for all constituents—all races, religions, and ethnicities. To demonstrate this, a government must decentralize to the level where the impact of the conflict was mostly felt. It must create policy informed by the needs of actual citizens its civil service has met. Until it does this, it has not earned legitimacy among its people.

Creating Sustainable Peacekeeping Capability in Africa

By Daniel Hampton, April 30, 2014

Nearly half of all uniformed peacekeepers are African and countries like Ghana, Rwanda, Senegal, and South Africa have provided troops to UN and AU missions almost continuously over the past decade. Despite such vast experience, African peacekeepers are often reliant on international partners for training before they can deploy on these missions. Institutionalizing a capacity-building model within African defense forces is a more sustainable approach that maintains a higher level of readiness to respond to emerging crises and contingencies on the continent.

Upgrading Peacekeeping to Counter Transnational Conflict Drivers: Five Essential Actions

By Erwin van Veen, Clingendael, September 30, 2014

Many of today’s conflicts cannot be resolved without taking into account transnational drivers as well. From franchised terrorism to financing from international criminal networks, diaspora groups, and multinational resource extraction—transnational conflict drivers penetrated one-third of all intrastate conflicts in 2013. Peacekeeping missions must improve their transnational situational awareness so that they may focus on insulating domestic political processes from corruptive transnational influences.

Peace Operations in Africa: Lessons Learned Since 2000

By Paul D. Williams, July 31, 2013

More than 50 peace operations have deployed in Africa since 2000, including multiple African-led or hybrid African Union/United Nations initiatives. The frequency of these deployments underscores the ongoing importance of these operations in the playbook of regional and multilateral bodies to prevent conflict, protect civilians, and enforce ceasefires and peace agreements. Recent operations have featured increasingly ambitious goals and complex institutional partnerships. The achievements and shortcomings of these operations offer vital lessons for optimizing this increasingly central but still evolving tool for addressing conflict and instability.

The Elephant in the Room: How Can Peace Operations Deal with Organized Crime?

By Walter Kemp, Mark Shaw, and Arthur Boutellis, International Peace Institute, June 30, 2013

Organized crime often surges in post-conflict contexts, becoming a major source of funds for competing factions within emerging governance structures. Moreover, once organized crime becomes deeply entrenched in a post-conflict political economy, it typically delays the recovery process, weakens the political transition, and complicates peacekeeping interventions. Peace operations need to confront these dangers early by embedding more investigative and intelligence expertise in missions to better assess and track illicit activities while deploying more robust policing capacity to disrupt organized criminal networks.

Lessons Learned from Peace Operations in Africa

By Paul D. Williams, Africa Center for Strategic Studies, March 2010

Peace operations have been a principal tool used to curb conflict in Africa over the past decade, with over 40 operations deployed since 2000. This article takes stock of lessons learned from these experiences and the implications they hold for improving the effectiveness of future peace operations in Africa. Other languages available here.

The African Standby Force: An Update on Progress

By Jakkie Cilliers, Institute for Security Studies, 2009

A detailed update on the growth of the continental (AU) and regional (RECs) institutions designed to execute strategy and operations for the five African peace brigades. Includes information on the logistical plans, command and control, equipment, and mandates of the ASF.

UN Panels of Experts and UN Peace Operations: Exploiting Synergies for Peacebuilding

By Alix Boucher, The Stimson Center, 2010

The small investigative teams appointed to monitor sanctions, analyze conflict trends, and identify governance gaps and institutional weaknesses in many conflict-affected countries present powerful complements to peacekeeping operations. Clarifying and coordinating roles, responsibilities, and strategies between these panels of experts and peacekeeping operations will produce mutual benefits and strengthen overall peace and post-conflict reconstruction processes.

Implications of a Comprehensive or Integrated Approach for Training in United Nations and African Union Peace Operations

By Cedric de Coning, Norwegian Institute of International Affairs, 2009

Since 2004 the UN has sought to better align security, political, development, governance, and humanitarian activities within peace operations toward common strategic objectives. This “Integrated Approach” concept will require additional training for mission personnel regarding the peace and political process governing a particular post-conflict setting, the sequence of reconstruction strategies, and special coordination mechanisms with bilateral donors, the AU, and NGOs.

Keeping the Peace in Africa: Why “African” Solutions Are Not Enough

By Paul D. Williams, Carnegie Council for Ethics in International Affairs, 2008

While security in Africa depends on African stakeholders assuming ownership over stabilization strategies, demands for “African solutions to African problems” oversimplify the resources and partnerships necessary to ensure peace. Using this mantra, autocrats can thwart democracy promotion and the priority the UN gives to African security efforts may be downgraded.

The AU in Sudan: Lessons for the African Standby Force

By Catherine Guicherd, International Peace Institute, 2007

Fifty military, police, and civilian representatives from African states and organizations reviewed the AU’s peacekeeping mission in Darfur and proposed strategic- and operational-level recommendations regarding African-led peacekeeping mission structures, planning, operations, and resource allocations. Specific aims were also developed for African states, the AU, regional organizations and international partners.

UN Peacekeeping in Civil Wars

By Lise Morjé Howard, Cambridge University Press, 2008

Chapter on peacekeeping failures in Somalia, Rwanda, Angola, and Bosnia takes the less conventional view that the UN record actually includes a number of important, though understudied, success stories. Howard argues that UN peacekeeping succeeds when field missions establish significant autonomy from UN headquarters, allowing civilian and military staff to adjust to the post-civil war environment. Howard recommends future reforms be oriented toward devolving decision-making power to the field missions.

Security Topics:  Peacekeeping