English | Français | Português
Our last Alumni newsletter briefly touched on an aspect of military professionalism that is worth digging deeper into in this edition: the duty to minimize civilian harm during military operations. Although this obligation and set of practices is not a new aspect of military professionalism, it has taken on heightened significance as civilians often bear the costs of complex conflicts—at times as a result of actions taken by state security forces.
At its core, the military profession—like that of the law, medicine, academia, and religion—exists to provide specialized knowledge and services to a client. In the domain of defense and security, the military provides the service of collective defense to its parent society on behalf and at the direction of the state. The specific ways that the military professional exercises the use of force becomes a marker of the effectiveness and legitimacy of the broader military in its service to not only the state, but also society. As threats to the state shift from other states (and their armed forces) to non-state armed groups, militaries increasingly find themselves operating amid civilian populations. In these circumstances, it is difficult for military members to distinguish between civilians and legitimate combatants, control the effects of their weapons, and thereby fulfill their duty to protect civilians in a way that is aligned with national and international laws. All too often, these situations lead to the harm of civilian populations and infrastructure – whether intentional or unintentional – during military operations. As a well-known Kikuyu proverb notes, “When elephants fight, it is the grass that suffers.” So too do civilians bear the brunt of the consequences of fighting between belligerents. The worldwide trend of increased harm to civilians during military operations has led many governments and international organizations to re-evaluate military tactics, equipment, procedures, and laws as a means of searching for ways to reduce and mitigate harm to civilians.
This effort—commonly known as Civilian Harm Mitigation (CHM)—includes “all steps [taken by militaries] to avoid, minimize, and respond to civilian harm resulting from their military operations.” States have two major reasons to incorporate CHM concepts into their militaries. First, states have legal obligations through treaties, customary law, and national practices to protect civilians during conflict. Although international law prohibits indiscriminate attacks on civilians and civilian objects, the notion of ‘collateral damage’ leaves areas where civilians can be harmed. This has led to weakened adherence to International Humanitarian Law’s (IHL) charge to protect civilians from harm in recent conflicts, particularly those where discrimination between civilians and combatants becomes ever more complicated. In this light, CHM represents an active set of measures to restore the ability of IHL to protect civilians from harm during times of conflict.
From a strategic perspective, CHM efforts can be used by governments to regain an advantage over opponents, particularly in lopsided, asymmetric conflicts between states and insurgents, rebels, and terrorists. In these conflicts, militarily weak actors resort to strategies that overcome their weaknesses to challenge the state’s control. As Mao Tse Tung noted, “in guerrilla strategy, the enemy’s rear, flanks, and other vulnerable spots are his vital points, and there he must be harassed, attacked, dispersed, exhausted, and annihilated [emphasis added].” This insurgent strategy not only allows minor tactical wins by striking government weaknesses, but it aims to catalyze popular opposition to the government through the “propaganda of the deed.” However, when government forces respond to attacks in a heavy-handed, indiscriminate, and disproportionate manner, governments lose their moral authority. Civilians can then be more easily radicalized into supporting the causes of insurgents, rebels, and terrorists. Thus, to counter the insurgent’s strategic approach to coax an overreaction, governments that incorporate CHM approaches can neutralize portions of their opponents’ polarizing tactics and regain a strategic advantage.
Practices for reducing and mitigating civilian harm are emerging out of conflicts around the globe. Both the AU’s mission in Somalia and the G5 Sahel Joint Force incorporated cells focused on tracking, analyzing, and responding to incidents involving civilian harm. This helped both forces to not only understand the impact of military operations on the civilian population, but to account for civilian injuries and casualties during conflict. During the conflict in Afghanistan, the International Security Assistance Force undertook a number of actions in response to incidents of civilian harm, including: providing written or spoken acknowledgements of blame; providing condolence or ex gratia payments; providing medical care; conducting repairs to damaged civilian structures or infrastructure; and removing ordnance. Based on lessons learned about CHM in the fight against ISIS, the Netherlands and the United States are taking steps to address their own gaps in processes, doctrine, and policy to mitigate the risk of civilian harm in their military operations.
The Africa Center’s work on rule of law and security sector governance seeks to foster contextualized analysis of a range of formal and informal institutions, internal and external to the state, that influence how the defense and security sector is governed. In this large domain, CHM is one of many tools that can help practitioners ensure that rule of law prevails in the security sector. It does so in a way that addresses relevant threats while building the security services’ legitimacy with citizens.
Some of the Africa Center’s most direct work on CHM has been “Strengthening Rule of Law to Mitigate Harm,” a 2023 Africa Center experts’ roundtable that culled insights from the Central African Republic, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Liberia, Sierra Leone, and The Gambia. The roundtable generated analyses of how African states’ strategic decisions about the sequencing, methodology, and coordination of security and justice service provision can affect the mitigation of civilian harm and the delivery of sustainable citizen security. Additional programs and publications have touched upon specific processes and practices of security sector governance that are complementary to CHM. A number of virtual and in-person forums in Western and Southern Africa have brought together defense and security policymakers, defense and security focused parliamentarians, and parliamentary committee staff to discuss the ways that legislative oversight of the defense and security sector can yield improved outcomes for civilian security.
Brigadier General Dan Kuwali of the Malawi Defence Force has highlighted the importance of internal and external oversight mechanisms within security forces to provide better security to citizens in his Africa Security Brief, “Oversight and Accountability to Improve Security Sector Governance in Africa,” as well as in “Smart Operations: Rethinking Operational Art to Effectively Protect Civilians” published by the Social Science Research Council. Similarly, the Africa Center publication “Recalibrating Coastal West Africa’s Response to Violent Extremism” looks at how governments are improving their approaches to building trust between civilians and security forces in response to increasing levels of militancy.
As these initiatives have highlighted, the professionalism of security services, as well as citizens’ perceptions of that professionalism, hinges upon having a system of accountability that ensures all actors (especially the military) respect civil liberties, human rights, and the rule of law. Within the domain of military operations, CHM is a prime tool for achieving such outcomes. However, CHM alone is insufficient. It attains greatest impact when it is pursued as part of a broader range of measures leaders take to foster checks and balances across the three branches of government, solidify sound civil-military relations for improved inter-agency coordination, and enable people-centered governance practices in the security sector.
Africa Center alumni interested in discussing any of these issues further can reach out to me or Dr. Catherine Lena Kelly (Associate Dean and Associate Professor of Justice and Rule of Law) via the Community, Alumni, Partnerships, and Engagement team.