Africa’s dynamic security environment is characterized by great diversity – from conventional challenges such as insurgencies, resource and identity conflicts, and post-conflict stabilization to growing threats from piracy, narcotics trafficking, violent extremism, and organized crime taking root in Africa’s urban slums, among others.
In an effort to help readers stay on top of this extensive array of security issues, ACSS has compiled and regularly updates a selective list of “must read” analyses of priority Africa security topics. The views expressed are those of the authors and do not represent an endorsement by ACSS or the Department of Defense. Please click on a link below to learn more.
Africa Security Challenges
Sifting Through the Layers of Insecurity in the Sahel: The Case of Mauritania
By Cédric Jourde. Africa Center for Strategic Studies, September 2011.
Increasing narcotraffic and a more active AQIM are elevating concerns over instability in the Sahel. However, the region’s threats are more complex than what is observable on the surface. Rather, security concerns are typically characterized by multiple, competing, and fluctuating interests at the local, national, and regional levels. Effectively responding to these threats requires in-depth understanding of the multiple contextual layers in which illicit actors operate.
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African Futures 2050: The Next Forty Years
By Jakkie Cilliers, Barry Hughes, and Jonathan Moyer. Institute for Security Studies, January 2011.
Major transitions are rapidly reshaping Africa. Economic growth has accelerated, longstanding conflicts are being addressed, and support for democracy is widespread. However, rapid urbanization and changing economic structures are amplifying sociopolitical disruption and crime and domestic militancy are growing. These challenges are typically complex and intertwined. Reversing them will ultimately require building more effective and accountable state institutions.
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West Africa: Governance and Security in a Changing Region
By Abdel Fatau Musah. International Peace Institute, 2009.
Militant and terrorist groups are a prime source of insecurity in West Africa, but the management of natural resources, market for illicit goods, border administration, and other factors drive and shape the sub-region’s threats. To more effectively confront them, governments and civil society within the ECOWAS sub-regional bloc must collaborate to ensure both national ownership and the strengthening of collective security. [PDF]
Security and Development in Sub-Saharan Africa - Looking to the Future
By Moeletsi Mbeki. Speech delivered at Commander's Speaker Program at the U.S. Africa Command, January 2010.Africa’s intra-state conflicts and their cross-border consequences continue to hobble development of social anchors that are critical to state stability. These social and development hurdles are hindering Africa's ability to establish secure, democratic, and economically prosperous states. At bottom, "the challenge facing Sub-Saharan Africa is not State building as many analysts believe. The immediate challenge most of Africa faces is society building. more
U.S. Security Engagement in Africa
By William M. Bellamy. Africa Center for Strategic Studies, 2009.
A significant development in Africa over the past decade has been the generalized lessening of violent conflict. Revitalized, expanded international peacekeeping, bolstered by a newly launched African Union (AU) determination to tackle security challenges, has reinforced this trend. But, much more cohesive interagency coordination under strong White House direction is required if the United States is to contribute to Africa’s sustained stability given the region’s persistent conditions of poverty, inequality, and weak governance. [PDF] English; [PDF] French; [PDF] Portuguese For additional reading go to: Africa Security ChallengesAfrica: Confronting Complex Threats
Africa: Confronting Complex Threats. By Kwesi Aning. International Peace Institute, 2007.
Africa’s security challenges are increasingly defined by fragmentation of political authority, mounting political influence of armed sub-state actors, and increased vigilantism. The reliance of non-state combatants on external sources of funding and logistical support, meanwhile, underscores that peace and security on the continent is closely linked to the cooperation of contiguous countries. [PDF]
For additional reading go to: Africa Security ChallengesConflict Trends in Africa, 1946-2004
By Monty Marshall. Center for Systemic Peace; Africa Conflict Prevention Pool, 2005. Evidenced-based analysis of Africa's conflict trends over the past 60 years. Captures overall decline and shifts in types of conflict facing Africa over this time. Highlights the challenges of state formation instability and the politics of ethnic exclusion. [PDF]
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Combating Organized Crime
Justice for Forests: Improving Criminal Justice Efforts to Combat Illegal Logging
By Marilyne Pereira Goncalves, Melissa Panjer, Theodore S. Greenberg, and William B. Magrath. World Bank, March 2012. Large-scale illegal logging operations are often linked to transnational organized criminal networks that rely on high-level corruption, intimidation, and violence. In some countries, as much as 90 percent of logging is illegal, threatening biodiversity, livelihoods, and economic development. States can better use existing information on business transactions collected by financial institutions to increase understanding of these logging networks and strengthen criminal investigations of offenders. Download the article: [PDF]
Termites at Work: Transnational Organized Crime and State Erosion in Kenya
By Peter Gastrow. International Peace Institute, September 2011.
For many African states, powerful transnational criminal networks constitute a direct threat to the state itself, not only through open confrontation but also by penetrating state institutions through corruption and subverting them from within. With a sharp rise in narcotics and illicit trafficking, countries risk becoming criminalized or captured states. Advanced investigative law enforcement units are needed to stem transnational crime and oversight of government agencies and regulations should be made more rigorous.
Download the article: [PDF]
Urban Fragility and Security in Africa
Estimates are that more than half of all Africans will live in cities by 2025. This rapid pace of urbanization is creating a new locus of fragility in many African states – as evidenced by the burgeoning slums around many of the continent’s urban areas – and the accompanying rise in violence, organized crime, and the potential for instability. These evolving threats, in turn, have profound implications for Africa’s security sector. Download the Brief in [ENGLISH] [FRANÇAIS] [PORTUGUESE]
Nonstate Policing: Expanding the Scope for Tackling Africa’s Urban Violence
By Bruce Baker. Africa Center for Strategic Studies, 2010.
The increasingly internal nature of Africa's security threats is placing ever greater pressures on Africa's police forces. Yet severe resource and capacity limitations, combined with high levels of public distrust, leave most African police forces incapable of effectively addressing these expanding urban-based threats in the near term. This Security Brief examines the potential of nonstate policing organizations - community-based groups with local credibility and knowledge - to help fill this gap.
Crime and Instability: Case Studies of Transnational Threats
UN Office on Drugs and Crime, 2010.
Organized crime and attendant illicit trafficking has undermined the rule of law in various regions around Africa and become both cause and symptom of instability and conflict. Efforts to confront these challenges are too often merely national or bilateral in scope, against which the transnational complexity and sophistication of criminal networks has proven very resilient. [PDF]Organized Crime in South Africa
By STRATFOR, 2008.
An in-depth analysis of the history, structure, and geography of organized crime in South Africa. While cognizant of the tremendous strides the South African government has made from the apartheid days when organized crime formed a key role in many industries, the article emphasizes the continued attraction of South Africa as an attractive destination for organized crime. [HTML]
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Conflict Prevention or Mitigation
Alternative Dispute Resolution in Africa: Preventing Conflict and Enhancing Stability
By Ernest Uwazie. Africa Center for Strategic Studies, November 2011.
Low-level disputes in Africa can spiral into violence and conflict due to the lack of effective judicial systems that can provide a credible and timely process for resolving differences. Alternative Dispute Resolution techniques can strengthen dispute settlement systems and bridge the gap between formal legal systems and traditional modes of African justice. They may have particular value in stabilization and statebuilding efforts when judicial institutions are weak and social tensions are high.
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Conflict-Sensitive Land Policy and Land Governance in Africa
By Joost Van Der Zwan. International Alert, April 2011.
Competing claims, inequitable access, and mismanagement of land and natural resources is a source of conflict in many African states. Prevention is critical since disputes are often entangled with complex factors such as demographic pressures and food insecurity and are therefore difficult to resolve. Identifying incremental reforms can quickly reduce conflict drivers, but should be supported by thorough analysis for unobservable flashpoints and dispute mediation mechanisms.
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Local Justice in Southern Sudan
By Cherry Leonardi, Leben Nelson Moro, Martina Santschi and Deborah H. Isser. Rift Valley Institute and the U.S. Institute of Peace, 2010.
Favoritism, corruption, and political interference in South Sudan’s emerging justice system have lowered confidence in its ability to resolve disputes and address revenge killings and inter-communal conflict. However, local and traditional justice mechanisms have established records of consensual dispute resolution within and across ethnic lines and could be better integrated with newly formed southern governance structures. [PDF]
Pastoralists at war: Violence and Security in the Kenya-Sudan-Uganda Border Region.
By Jonah Leff. International Journal of Conflict and Violence, 2009.
Low-level tensions between pastoralist groups in East Africa’s border regions frequently erupt into deadly confrontations. Government responses have relied too heavily on coercive disarmament campaigns, generating mistrust and prompting violent reprisals. Instead, efforts by civil society groups and inter-governmental efforts to build alternative dispute mechanisms should be replicated. [PDF]Peace and Power Sharing in Africa: A Not So Obvious Relationship
By Andreas Mehler. African Affairs, 2009.
Crises in Africa are often resolved through power-sharing arrangements. In Cote d’Ivoire, Kenya, and Liberia, however, these have tended only to address elite concerns and interests. As a result, conflict drivers remain unresolved and incentives to subvert or “spoil” democratic or peace processes are strengthened. A “bottom up” approach featuring public engagement with genuine local representatives and the effective functioning of oversight institutions provide more sustainable solutions. [PDF]
Burundi’s Transition: Training Leaders for Peace
Burundi’s Transition: Training Leaders for Peace. By Howard Wolpe and Steve McDonald. Journal of Democracy, 2006. An account of the Burundi Leadership Training Program that the Woodrow Wilson Center has led since late 2002. The piece focuses on explaining the relative merits of the so-called Ngozi process, whereby representatives from various groups in conflict are brought together to engage in cooperation-building interactive exercises. Their experience may offer useful lessons for others engaged in conflict mitigation work. [PDF]
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Counter Narcotics
Termites at Work: Transnational Organized Crime and State Erosion in Kenya
By Peter Gastrow. International Peace Institute, September 2011.
For many African states, powerful transnational criminal networks constitute a direct threat to the state itself, not only through open confrontation but also by penetrating state institutions through corruption and subverting them from within. With a sharp rise in narcotics and illicit trafficking, countries risk becoming criminalized or captured states. Advanced investigative law enforcement units are needed to stem transnational crime and oversight of government agencies and regulations should be made more rigorous.
Download the article: [PDF]
The Global Afghan Opium Trade: A Threat Assessment
By the UN Office on Drugs and Crime, July 2011.Africa features prominently in the global heroin trade as a transshipment point and a significant consumer market. Traffic to and through the continent is dominated by Africans, who account for 50 percent of all drug arrests in Pakistan. Sharply higher traffic through African commercial air and seaports suggest a need for more robust customs regimes and stronger investigative and judicial follow through to better understand and frustrate smuggling networks.
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Cocaine and Instability in Africa: Lessons from Latin America and the Caribbean
By Davin O'Regan. Africa Center for Strategic Studies, 2010.
Africa is facing an increasingly menacing threat of cocaine trafficking that risks undermining its security structures, nascent democratic institutions, and development progress. Latin America has long faced similar challenges and its experience provides important lessons that can be applied before this expanding threat becomes more deeply entrenched on the continent - and costly to reverse. Download the Article: [ENGLISH] [FRANÇAIS] [PORTUGUESE]The Invisible Tide: Towards an International Strategy to Deal with Drug Trafficking Through West Africa
By James Cockayne and Phil Williams. International Peace Institute, 2009.
Narcotics trafficking in West Africa threatens to destabilize the sub-region by corrupting its courts, barracks and other public offices. The international community can help West Africa through the UN Peacebuilding Commission and the UN Office on Drugs and Crime. Meanwhile, ECOWAS should establish a Forum on West African Drug Trafficking to facilitate information-sharing and intra-regional coordination. [PDF]West Africa's International Drug Trade
West Africa's International Drug Trade. By Stephen Ellis. African Affairs, 2009.
Recent large-scale hauls of Europe-bound cocaine in West Africa have prompted calls for enhanced counternarcotics efforts to stem a rising tide of destabilization. Yet sophisticated, resilient and effective West African organized crime syndicates have trafficked drugs globally for decades. Counternarcotics strategies face an entrenched threat to security rather than a new phenomenon. [HTML]
Countering Extremism
Islamism in the Horn of Africa: Assessing Ideology, Actors, and Objectives
By Terje Østebø. International Law and Policy Institute, June 2010.
Islamism has been present in the Horn of Africa for decades and is currently making significant impacts across the region. Encompassing a variety of actors and ideological traits, it is a heterogeneous phenomenon with political and reformists groups as well as violent extremist elements. Stability in the region, from the community to the national level, will hinge on engagement strategies that incorporate the non-violent elements of this diversity into the public sphere.
Download the Article:[PDF]Playing Ostrich: Lessons Learned from South Africa’s Response to Terrorism
By Hussein Solomon. Africa Center for Strategic Studies, 2011.
While not often considered a hub in global terrorist networks, South Africa has seen a steady and growing pattern of domestic and al-Qaeda-linked terrorist activity over the past decade. Coinciding with the creeping expansion of terrorist threats in other parts of the continent, this Security Brief examines lessons learned from South Africa's experience and their potential relevance to other African countries and their security sectors."
[ENGLISH] [FRENCH] [PORTUGUESE]
A Chronology of Terrorism in South Africa: [ENGLISH] [FRENCH] [PORTUGUESE]
Africa's Fragile States: Empowering Extremists, Exporting Terrorism
By Zachary Devlin-Foltz. Africa Center for Strategic Studies, 2010.
Persistent reports of extremist activity from across Africa have deepened concern over the spread of radicalism on the continent. Extremists capitalize on political and security vacuums within Africa’s fragile states to grow their support base and consolidate their strength. Stable states that provide opportunities for political participation empower moderates while delegitimating extremists’ use of violence. Download the Article: [ENGLISH][FRENCH][PORTUGUESE]
Money Laundering and Terrorism Financing Risks in Botswana
By Jackson Madzima. Institute for Security Studies, March 2009.
Most countries in Southern Africa lack comprehensive legal frameworks that criminalize terrorism and the methods to finance it. However, as numerous local arrests of international terrorists suggest, the sub-region is attracting terrorist networks. To prevent such activity, states should institute legal reforms and better coordinate anti-money laundering efforts through available international and sub-regional working groups. [PDF]Islamists in Politics: The Dynamics of Participation
By Marina Ottaway and Amr Hamzawy Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2008.
On-going ideological debates within Islamic parties often pit hard-line elements against reformers. When allowed to operate openly, most Islamist parties gradually moderate their agendas in order to widen their base of support. In contrast, politically constricted environments provide few opportunities to win new supporters, leaving Islamist parties to appeal to their base.[PDF]
African Counterterrorism Cooperation: Assessing Regional and Sub-regional Initiatives.
African Counterterrorism Cooperation: Assessing Regional and Sub-regional Initiatives. Edited by Andre Le Sage, Potomac Books, 2007.
As transnational terrorism expands in several regions of Africa, it has yielded distinctive threats and vulnerabilities, demanding tailored responses. This compendium of works analyzing terrorism in Africa and efforts to confront it provides valuable insights to evolving counterterrorism policies. Link to Publisher
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Democratization
Africa's Militaries: A Missing Link in Democratic Transitions
By Mathurin C. Houngnikpo. Africa Center for Strategic Studies, January 2012.
The institutionalization of democratic norms in Africa's militaries is often lagging behind advances made in civilian institutions and civil society. In some situations, security sectors have actively aligned themselves with incumbent leaders seeking to stay in power or directly intervened in politics, thereby discrediting the entire security sector and marginalizing its role when transitions do occur. With national elections becoming increasingly routine and subject to stricter oversight, such dilemmas will continue to be front and center in Africa's political development.
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Africa and the Arab Spring: A New Era of Democratic Expectations
By Africa Center for Strategic Studies, November 2011.
Military coups in Mali and Guinea-Bissau have overshadowed a deepening institutionalization of democratic processes in Africa over the past decade. These advances have been augmented by a growing commitment by Africa's regional bodies to uphold emerging democratic standards. The Arab Spring, likewise, sparked a broader debate about the legitimate claims on authority across the continent. These crosscurrents reflect an ongoing struggle for governance norms in Africa that will require active engagement from African reformers and international partners to sustain Africa's democratic trajectory.
Social Networks and Democratic Transitions
By Joseph Siegle. Developing Alternatives, 2008.
The success and stability of democratic transitions is often a function of the strength of prevailing social networks. Such transitions often face active resistance from vested interests. Yet, the cohesion of networks of civic groups, labor unions, business associations, and others with robust information-sharing systems permit the flexibility and resilience needed to realize genuine reforms and ensure stable transitions. [PDF]
Assessing Electoral Fraud in New Democracies: A Strategic Approach
By Staffan Darnolf. IFES, March 2011. Recent and upcoming elections around Africa demonstrate that transparent and well-managed electoral systems are key to advancing transitional states, consolidating democratic progress, and avoiding destabilizing disputes. Current electoral management methods, however, frequently lack focused strategies that integrate electoral commissions, political parties, and civil society monitors to effectively assess, deter, detect, and mitigate fraud. [PDF]Progress and Retreat in Africa: Legislatures on the Rise?
By Joel Barkan. Journal of Democracy, 2008.
Legislatures in Africa are becoming more assertive and securing a more equal distribution of political and decision-making power within the continent's young multi-party democracies. Particularly notable improvements have been achieved in Kenya and Ghana and reveal 10 parameters that determine the balance of authority between branches of government.
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Electoral Security
DR Congo: 24 Killed since Election Results Announced
By Human Rights Watch, December 2011.
Congolese security forces, particularly the presidential guard, have killed and detained dozens of civilians prior to recent presidential elections and during subsequent protests against the results. The deployment of the presidential guard, however, appeared to violate Congolese law. The election has undercut the legitimacy of the government and the stability this would bring the Democratic Republic of the Congo.
View the Article: [English][French]Election-Related Disputes and Political Violence: Strengthening the Role of the African Union in Preventing, Managing, and Resolving Conflict
By African Union Panel of the Wise and International Peace Institute, 2010.
Elections are competitive processes that if not constructively managed can potentially foment destabilizing disputes. Africa should make deliberate efforts to progressively and creatively move toward electoral systems that broaden representation, recognize diversity, and respect majority rule while at the same time protecting minority rights. When conflicts do emerge external actors such as the African Union have a range of dispute resolution and confidence-building mechanisms that can defuse the escalation of violence.
Download the Article: [PDF]Preventing and Managing Violent Election-Related Conflicts in Africa: Exploring Good Practices
By Khabele Matlosa, Victor Shale and Dimpho Motsamai. Electoral Institute for Sustainability of Democracy in Africa, 2010.
Violence during elections tends to be an outgrowth of elite struggles for control of state power and resources and is much more likely when rules and institutions to manage political competition are weak or manipulable. Political party liaison mechanisms and more autonomous electoral commissions can mitigate triggers of violence, but genuine prevention requires that the African Union and Regional Economic Communities pressure political elites to support and observe legitimate electoral processes.
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Colloquium on African Elections: Best Practices and Cross-Sectoral Collaboration
Colloquium on African Elections: Best Practices and Cross-Sectoral Collaboration
The National Democratic Institute, 2010.
Elections are complex multi-stage cycles that require close coordination among many partners. The security services play a vital role in such collaborative efforts by performing pre-election threat assessments and response plans, actively participating in electoral coordinating bodies, and providing a safe and secure environment that supports the process in an impartial manner. [PDF]Focus on Elections and Security
Equitable and dependable security is essential to maintain an electorate’s confidence and commitment to democratic contests. This sometimes heightens tensions, however. Advanced planning, training, and extensive coordination are just as critical to free, fair, and safe elections as appropriate deployments of security personnel. [LINK]
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Identity Conflict
Nigeria's Pernicious Drivers of Ethno-Religious Conflict
By Chris Kwaja. Africa Center for Strategic Studies, July 2011.
Nigeria's long-running "indigene-settler" conflict in and around Jos, Plateau State has escalated in recent years and may spread to other ethnically mixed regions of the country, heightening instability. Navigating such inter-communal fault lines is a common challenge for many African societies that requires looking past symptoms to address systemic drivers. In Nigeria, this will entail measures that directly mitigate violence as well as realize constitutional reform.
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Preventing Identity Conflicts Leading to Genocide and Mass Killings
By I. William Zartman. International Peace Institute, November 2010.
Mass killings do not break out unannounced, but rather are preceded by identity-based tensions stoked by political entrepreneurs to rally support for their narrow objectives and designs. The resulting spoils of such incitement can be subverted through sustained and early efforts to manage ethnic relations, protect minority rights, uphold accountable governance, and exercise the responsibility to protect. [PDF]
Islam and Christianity in Sub-Saharan Africa
By, Pew Forum on Religion and Public Life, 2010. Despite high levels of religious diversity and adherence in many African countries, most African Christians and Muslims are unfamiliar with each other’s faith and believe they share few commonalities. In fact, concerns about religious conflict are modest compared with those of poverty, corruption, and other political and socioeconomic issues. [PDF]Misinterpreting Ethnic Conflicts in Africa
By Fr. Clement Mweyang Aapenguo. Africa Center for Strategic Studies, April 2010.
Ethnic conflicts in Africa are often portrayed as having ages-old origins with little prospects for resolution. This article challenges that notion arguing that a re-diagnosis of the underlying drivers to ethnic violence can lead to more effective and sustainable responses.
Download the Paper: [ENGLISH][FRANÇAIS][PORTUGUESE]Ethnocentrism and Communal Conflict in Africa
Ethnocentrism and Communal Conflict in Africa. York Shaw-Taylor, Racism Review, 2009. Civil wars and communal conflict in Africa are often attributed to the strength and prevalence of ethnic identity over national or civic identity and its attendant affect on political and social allegiances. Yet a review of recent survey data in several African countries is unable to validate this popular proposition. [HTML]
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Irregular Warfare
Victory Has a Thousand Fathers: Evidence of Effective Approaches to Counterinsurgency, 1978-2008
By Christopher Paul, Colin P. Clarke, and Beth Grill. Small Wars Journal, January 2011.
When a country becomes host to an insurgency, a prospect many African states face, what counterinsurgency approaches offer the best chance of prevailing? There are roughly 20 common approaches, including amnesties, strategic communication, or rigorous suppressive operations. An analysis of 30 insurgencies finds that successful strategies tend to employ multiple approaches and favored those that enhanced the legitimacy of the government and security forces, while repressive measures more often led to failure.
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Optimizing Africa's Security Force Structures
By Helmoed Heitman. Africa Center for Strategic Studies, May 2011.
Combating irregular forces has become a common feature of the contemporary African security landscape. However, the security sector in most African countries is ill-prepared to conduct effective counter-insurgency operations. Realigning force structures to address these threats while building security sector professionalism to gain the trust of local populations is needed to do so.
Download the Article in [ENGLISH] [FRANÇAIS] [PORTUGUESE]Militias, Rebels, and Islamist Militants: Human Security and State Crises in Africa
Edited by Wafula Okumu and Augustine Ikelegbe. Institute for Security Studies, 2010.
Armed nonstate groups able to cultivate disillusionment with existing regimes and successfully evade defense forces increasingly dominate the threat landscape across Africa. Such groups in Nigeria, Sudan, Angola, and elsewhere indicate a need for better policies to reverse emergent violent youth cultures, monitor transborder areas, and population-centric security and governance strategies. [PDF]
African Militaries and Rebellion: The Political Economy of Threat and Combat Effectiveness
By: Jeffrey Herbst. Journal of Peace Research, 2004.
Few African armies have shown an aptitude for counter-insurgency strategies. Instead, respones to rebellions are delayed, rely on blunt military strikes and exclude vital political strategies to complement security operations. Competent police forces and domestic intelligence agencies rather than expansion of the military will better enhance counter-insurgency capabilities in Africa's democracies. [PDF]Are Africa's Wars Part of a Fourth Generation of Warfare?
Are Africa's Wars Part of a Fourth Generation of Warfare? By Paul Jackson. Contemporary Security Policy, 2007.
Fourth Generation Warfare (4GW) – models of asymmetric warfare that emphasize culture, politics, economics, non-state actors, and targeting of civilians – has a growing applicability for understanding Africa’s complex conflicts. In particular, 4GW frameworks underscore the need for comprehensive, as opposed to purely military, solutions to conflict on the continent. PDF
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Maritime Security
Toward an African Maritime Economy: Empowering the African Union to Revolutionize the African Maritime Sector
By Commander Michael Baker. Naval War College Review, 2011. Africa suffers from fragmented maritime governance regimes, contributing to insecurity and lost development potential. For example, while some countries may make progress improving port efficiency, gains are offset by rising piracy – or vice versa. Through its ongoing integrated maritime strategy development efforts, the African Union should work in partnership with member states and international actors to align disparate African maritime laws and better integrate the continent’s five maritime early warning centers, among other improvements. Download the Article: [PDF]Maritime Security and International Law in Africa
By John Gibson. Africa Security Review, 2009.
Coastal states hold sovereignty over their territorial seas, but there are restrictions on governments’ ability to enforce criminal laws against foreign ships. For instance, distinctions between various criminal acts such as piracy and hijacking govern states’ response options. Effective use of maritime laws is essential to maritime security because they determine what nations may or may not do and provide mechanisms to facilitate cooperation.
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Investing in Science and Technology to Meet Africa’s Maritime Security Challenges
By Augustus Vogel. Africa Center for Strategic Studies, 2011.
A growing number of Africa's security challenges - narcotics trafficking, piracy, illegal fishing, and armed robberies, among others - take place at sea. Illicit actors exploit Africa's maritime space given its expansiveness and the limited number of vessels African governments can field to interdict this activity. Technology can dramatically improve Africa's maritime security coverage. However, to do so will require engaging Africa's scientists who can guide and sustain these efforts. This will yield not only security but environmental and meteorological benefits for the continent.
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Maritime Development in Africa: An Independent Specialists’ Framework
The African Union Commission, the Brenthurst Foundation, and the Africa Center for Strategic Studies, 2010.Africa’s maritime domain is a critical source of food security, the conduit for 90 percent of continental trade, and vital to its future growth. However, Africa is also the only major region lacking a maritime strategy. Readily available guidelines and legal frameworks should be integrated into Africa’s Common Defense and Security Policy to facilitate an African-led collective security strategy for the maritime domain. [PDF]
Navies versus Coast Guards: Defining the Roles of African Maritime Security Forces
By August Vogel. Africa Center for Strategic Studies, 2009.
Piracy, illegal fishing, and narcotics and human trafficking are growing rapidly in Africa and represent an increasingly central component of the threat matrix facing the continent. However, African states’ maritime security structures are often misaligned with the challenges posed and need coast guard capabilities and an array of intra-governmental partnerships. [PDF]Bad Order at Sea: From the Gulf of Aden to the Gulf of Guinea
By François Vreÿ. African Security Review, 2009.
Africa's western and eastern coasts host the world's highest number of attacks at sea. However, the nature of these maritime security environments differ markedly in terms of targets, levels of violence, and links to onshore politics. International response in East Africa has been substantial, but the mechanisms for maritime governance in West Africa in some ways bear more promise for sustainable security.
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Natural Resources and Conflict
Understanding Natural Resource Conflict Dynamics: The Case of the Tuareg in North Africa and the Sahel
By Muna A. Abdalla. Institute for Security Studies, August 2009.
Migration, extractive industry investments, and disputes over land tenure have for decades complicated dynamics within Tuareg communities and their relations with governments in the Sahel. As this region undergoes immense changes and many Tuaregs once again move across borders, conflicts are reemerging. Initiatives that integrate Tuareg concerns over land and livelihood opportunities through inclusive political engagement will be necessary to address these recurring regional conflict drivers.
Download the Article: [PDF]Conflict Minerals in the Democratic Republic of the Congo: Aligning Trade and Security Interventions
By Ruben de Koning. Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, June 2011.Unless authorities re-establish administrative control over mines, competition between armed groups and wayward military units over access to lucrative minerals will continue to destabilize the DRC. Fortunately, new schemes to formalize, regulate, and trace mineral products are improving the prospects to do so. This will be contingent, however, on other governance enhancements, including security sector reform.
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Calming the Waters: The East African Community and Conflict Over the Nile Resources
By Peter Kagwanja. Journal of Eastern African Studies, 2007.
Disputes over the Nile River have at times prompted bellicose diplomatic exchanges since its management is a vital strategic interest for the 10 mainly arid countries that use its water to irrigate crops, power hydroelectric dams, and sustain growing populations. Work by the East African Community has fostered confidence in collaboration between states and AU action plans provide successful models to avoid disputes and promote cooperation elsewhere. [PDF]From Greed to Grievance: Natural Resources and Conflict in Africa
"Chapter 8: From Greed to Grievance: Natural Resources and Conflict in Africa" in African Environmental and Human Security in the 21st Century. By Elisabeth Feleke. Cambria Press, December 2009.
Resource endowments have played a prominent role in numerous African conflicts. Controlling these resources is a strategic priority for both gvernments as well as armed non-state actors who use these revenues to finance their military operations thereby exacerbating and prolonging conflict. Poor resource management can strain traditional mechanisms for resolving tensions and conflict accelerates resource depletion, creating a cycle of environmental degradation and insecurity. Cooperative governance mechanisms to manage resources, such as the Nile Basin Initiative, can not only prevent insecurity but utilize Africa's resource abundance as a means of sustainable development.
Download the Article: [PDF]Chronicle of a Death Foretold: The Collapse of the Chad-Cameroon Pipeline Project
Chronicle of a Death Foretold: The Collapse of the Chad-Cameroon Pipeline Project. By Scott Pegg. African Affairs, 2009.
The Chad-Cameroon pipeline was a novel World Bank-sponsored consortium intended to generate a revenue windfall and ensure it was spent responsibly. In September 2008 the World Bank ended its role after Chad diverted oil revenues. Rather than breaking the “resource curse,” the pipeline is now cited as another cautionary example of how improper resource management subverts development and stability.
Read the article onlineGovernance Strategies to Remedy the Natural Resource Curse
By Joseph Siegle. International Social Science Journal. UNESCO, 2009.The seemingly paradoxical outcome of resource-rich countries being development-poor is, in fact, quite predictable given that autocratic governments often rule resource-rich states. Addressing the resource curse requires changing the incentives facing political leaders so that they are rewarded for transparency and confront robust international legal penalties when they do not. [HTML]
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Peacekeeping
The Civilian Dimension of the African Standby Force
Edited by Cedric de Coning and Yvonne Kasumba. African Union Commission and ACCORD, 2010.The development of the Africa Standby Force (ASF) has focused predominantly on its military components. As a result, civilian staff has comprised less than one percent of mission strength in recent African peace missions, undermining the management of political processes, restoration of core government services, and other key objectives. Greater clarity and commitment to the civilian components of the ASF policy framework are needed to achieve comprehensive African peacekeeping capabilities.
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UN Panels of Experts and UN Peace Operations: Exploiting Synergies for Peacebuilding
By Alix Boucher. The Stimson Center, 2010.
The small investigative teams appointed to monitor sanctions, analyze conflict trends, and identify governance gaps and institutional weaknesses in many conflict-affected countries present powerful complements to peacekeeping operations. Clarifying and coordinating roles, responsibilities, and strategies between these panels of experts and peacekeeping operations will produce mutual benefits and strengthen overall peace and post-conflict reconstruction processes. [PDF]
Enhancing Civilian Protection in Peace Operations: Insights from Africa
Systematic rapes, mass displacement, and other tragedies in Africa frequently damage the credibility of peacekeeping missions and jeopardize conflict resolution efforts. Yet several successful operations to protect non-combatants demonstrate that civilian protection is indeed feasible though challenging. To fulfill their mandates and protect the legitimacy of peace processes, peace operations require clearer civilian protection concepts and must address the nuanced dynamics and resource demands of different contexts. Download the Article: [PDF]
By Paul Williams. Africa Center for Strategic Studies, 2010.Lessons Learned from Peace Operations in Africa
By Paul Williams. Africa Center for Strategic Studies, 2010. Peace operations have been a principal tool used to curb conflict in Africa over the past decade, with over 40 operations deployed since 2000. This article takes stock of lessons learned from these experiences and the implications they hold for improving the effectiveness of future peace operations in Africa.
Download the Brief in: [ENGLISH][FRANÇAIS][PORTUGUESE]The African Standby Force: An Update on Progress
By Jakkie Cilliers. Institute for Security Studies, 2009.
A detailed update on the growth of the continental (AU) and regional (RECs) institutions designed to execute strategy and operations for the five African peace brigades. Includes information on the logistical plans, command and control, equipment, and mandates of the ASF. [PDF]
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Piracy
Global Challenge, Regional Responses: Forging a Common Approach to Maritime Piracy
By Dubai School of Government, April 2011.
East and West Africa have emerged as global piracy hot spots where rising numbers of attacks have resulted in hundreds of kidnappings and billions of dollars in aggregate economic costs. Effective responses in both regions will require better management and control of maritime domains as well as legal reforms to address maritime criminality, subregional cooperation, and onshore political and development adjustments to mitigate the incentives that motivate many pirates.
Download the Article: [PDF]The Economic Costs of Maritime Piracy
By Anna Bowden et al. One Earth Future, December 2010.
Piracy significantly elevates the costs of international shipping and expenditures on security and patrolling, but its economic and human impact in Africa is equally considerable. In Kenya, a piracy premium forces up the cost of imports and exports by tens of millions of dollars each month. Basic food prices in Somalia have become more volatile, with spikes of 10 percent or more. And in Nigeria, piracy threatens some 50,000 jobs.
Download the Article: [PDF]
Somalia: Pirates or Protectors?
By Andrew Mwangura. Pambazuka News, May 2010.
Each year hundreds of illegal vessels operate along Somalia’s coast and compete with many local fishermen, putting some out of business and overfishing many stocks. Somali pirates have garnered some popular support on the grounds that they deter such activity. Tandem efforts to counter both piracy and illegal fishing are needed to undermine the credibility piracy enjoys in Somalia. [LINK]
Diplomatic Efforts Against the Gulf of Aden Pirates: A Model from the Gulf of Guinea
By James Kraska and Brian Wilson. Harvard International Review, 2009.
The maritime domain is predominantly international and therefore efforts to address piracy require multi-national collaboration. Exemplary initiatives such as the sub-regional coast guard network arranged by the Maritime Organization of West and Central Africa and the Maritime Security Trust Fund of the International Maritime Organization deserve greater support and attention. [LINK]Piracy off the Horn of Africa
By Lauren Ploch. Congressional Research Service, 2009. An in-depth analysis of the increase in pirate attacks off the coast of Somalia that began in 2008. Written for congressional lawmakers, the paper looks at U.S. and international (chiefly NATO and European Union) policy responses as of April 2009. [PDF]Pirates and How to Deal With Them
By Roger Middleton. Chatham House, 2009. This paper reports on the proceedings of a roundtable of experts brought together in February 2009 to clarify some of the legal concerns around combating piracy off the Somali coast, focusing on the international legal framework on piracy and legal issues surrounding the arrest and prosecution of pirates. [PDF]
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Post-Conflict Reconstruction
Youth, Armed Violence, and Job Creation Programmes
By Oliver Walton. The Governance and Social Development Resource Centre and the Norwegian Peacebuilding Centre, September 2010.
Africa’s large youth populations have been a frequently tapped recruitment pool by insurgent groups and state forces in many recent conflicts around the continent. Some post-conflict reconstruction initiatives have managed to successfully disarm and reintegrate armed youths, but most still need to broaden their focus beyond creating employment opportunities and simultaneously address other social and political grievances that motivate many youths to take up arms in the first place.
Download the Article: [PDF]Reconstructing Public Administration after Conflict: Challenges, Practices and Lessons Learned
By The UN Department of Economic and Social Affairs, 2011.
Progress toward peace and development is unlikely and unsustainable in post-conflict areas unless basic governance and public administration institutions are established and functioning. In addition to a focus on designing and managing state institutions, equal attention should be paid to rebuilding public trust in the government and a shared vision of governance.
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Planning and Budgeting in Southern Sudan: Lessons for Post-Conflict Settings
By Fiona Davies and Gregory Smith. Overseas Development Institute, October 2010.
Lack of experience and capacity in designing and managing national budgets is a common feature in post conflict contexts. Through innovative inter-ministerial budget sector working groups, coding systems to enhance monitoring, and adopting technical systems at a slow but deliberative pace, the Government of South Sudan offers some lessons for setting budget priorities, spending ceilings, and administrative schema.
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Rebuilding War-Torn States: The Challenge of Post-Conflict Economic Reconstruction
By Graciana del Castillo. Oxford University Press. 2008Achieving stabilization in a post-conflict context requires policymakers to manage a host of competing economic challenges. This review of the conceptual and practical issues faced in contemporary post-conflict economic reconstruction contexts provides valuable guidance for navigating this course. Among other priorities is recognizing that economic policies cannot pursue a “business-as-usual” development approach but must integrate considerations of social inclusion and political reconciliation that may be less economically efficient but more durable and stabilizing. [HTML]
The Emergence of a Somali State: Building Peace from Civil War in Somaliland
The Emergence of a Somali State: Building Peace from Civil War in Somaliland. By Michael Walls. African Affairs, 2009. Despite little outside intervention, the 1991-1993 peace process in the peaceful northern enclave of Somaliland successfully enabled a sustainable governance framework under a civilian administration. Persistent efforts identified pre-existing social norms that facilitate dialogue and successfully leveraged them to build consensus through conference and negotiation toward a legitimate political framework. [PDF]
Liberate Liberia
Liberate Liberia. By Joseph Siegle. Wall Street Journal, July 13, 2003. [HTML]
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Preventing and Reversing Military Coups
China and the Coups: Coping with Political Instability in Africa
By Jonathan Holslag. African Affairs, May 2011.
China typically does not see coups in Africa as major threats to its interests but rather follows a strict policy of conservative restraint, unilateralism, and mercantilism. At times China has even seemingly ignored criticism of or sanctions imposed on military regimes by African regional organizations. China's approach, however, may have to evolve as its interests and reputation on the continent will benefit from the stability provided by transparent and legitimate governance.
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Unconstitutional Changes of Government - New AU Policies in Defense of Democracy
By Ulf Engel. University of Liepzig, 2010.
The African Union has a well-defined set of norms and approaches to address unconstitutional changes of government among member states. However, existing policy scripts that include suspension, stakeholder coordination, and sanctions have been applied unevenly following recent military coups. The AU should more consistently execute its pre-defined response schemes, collaborate with Regional Economic Communities to enhance joint leverage, and continue to strengthen democratic norms in order to promote constitutional compliance.
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Democracy and the Chain of Command: A New Governance of Africa’s Security Sector
By Dominique Djindjéré. Africa Center for Strategic Studies, 2010.As many African countries continue down the path of democratic reform, Africa's defense and security forces must make fundamental changes to adapt to a democratic model of governance. In this paper, General Djindjere puts forward five priority reforms Africa's defense and security forces should pursue to facilitate this transition. In addition to building professionalism, the legitimacy and trust security forces will gain in the eyes of their compatriots from this process will lead to greater effectiveness and popular support for national security efforts.
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Madagascar: Regional Path to Peace
By Peter Kagwanja and Thomas Kimaru. Africa Policy Institute, 2009.
Political polarization and an inability to sufficiently engage opposition views continue to plague mediation efforts following a 2009 military-backed coup d’état. To create a sustainable resolution, the African Union, neighboring states, and international actors should prioritize broad national reconciliation and security sector professionalism initiatives.
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The Theory of Collective Response
The Theory of Collective Response. By Charles Sampford and Margaret Palmer. Lexington Books, 2005.
This opening chapter in a longer work chronicles the deficiencies in international law and international response to coups d’état in developing democracies. By recognizing the principle of "effective control" as opposed to "consent of the governed" as indicators of regime sovereignty and legitimacy, the international community and international law fail to discourage unconstitutional changes in government and anti-democratic behavior in developing countries. The authors propose practical options to influence and intervene when democracy is threatened in developing countries.
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Regional and International Security Cooperation
The Role of ECOWAS in Managing Political Crisis and Conflict: The Cases of Guinea and Guinea-Bissau
By Gilles Olakounlé Yabi. Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, September 2010.
ECOWAS's preparations to deploy forces in Guinea-Bissau and Mali echo earlier interventions in Guinea and Guinea Bissau where the West African organization similarly demonstrated that it is willing and able to apply its resources and influence to shape political transitions and reduce tensions. However, the subregional body's interventions often lack the persistence, coordination, and wherewithal critical to realizing more complex institutional reforms at the national and subnational levels to prevent crises from recurring.
Download the Article: [ENGLISH][FRANÇAIS]The African Union’s Conflict Management Capabilities
By Paul D. Williams. Council on Foreign Relations, October 2011.
The African Union’s founding documents envisage an organization empowered to play a major role in resolving Africa’s armed conflicts. However, its practical abilities in the field of conflict management suffer from a persistent capabilities-expectations gap, falling well short of its ambitious vision. The organization can more effectively realize its goals by pursuing technical reforms in its key strategic planning offices and streamlining its partnership with the UN and Africa’s regional economic communities.
Download the Article: [PDF]The Role of SADC in Managing Political Crisis and Conflict: The Cases of Madagascar and Zimbabwe
By Gavin Cawthra. Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, 2010.Whereas the Southern African Development Community (SADC) for years refrained from intervening in various political crises in Zimbabwe, the regional economic community more quickly and effectively responded to recent instability in Madgascar. SADC’s overall influence and ability to resolve these and other regional challenges will require institutionalized crisis response mechanisms as current ad hoc efforts diminish its credibility, unity, and range of options.
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The Panel of the Wise: A Comprehensive Introduction to a Critical Pillar of the African Peace and Security Architecture
By Jamila El Abdellaoui. Institute for Security Studies, August 2009.
A Panel of the Wise comprised of five elder African statesmen was created by the African Union to independently facilitate conflict resolution, conduct shuttle diplomacy, and develop proposals to enhance general security and stability. Adjustments to the panel’s communications strategy and engagement with civil society may further elevate its impact on conflict prevention and stabilization. [PDF]
Peace, Security and the African Peer Review Mechanism: Are the Tools Up to the Task?
by, Steven Gruzd. African Security Review, 2007.
The African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM) offers a powerful tool to improve security sector governance and security capacity in Africa. Assessments of Ghana, Kenya, and Rwanda have identified conflict vulnerabilities and opportunities to improve security institutions. Improvements to APRM guidelines, panels of experts, and country submissions could further enhance the potential security and stability benefits from the process. [PDF]
The China-Africa Toolkit: A Resource for African Policymakers
South African Institute for International Affairs, 2009.
In addition to $100 billion in annual two-way trade, China provides $13 billion in assistance and supports several peace operations in Africa. To better shape this relationship in a form that enhances and sustains development Africa's policymakers should familiarize themselves with the fundamental drivers of Chinese interests on the continent. [PDF]
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Security and Development
Conflict, Security, and Development: World Development Report - 2011
By the World Bank, 2011.
One-and-a-half billion people live in areas affected by fragility, conflict, or large-scale, organized criminal violence, and no low-income fragile or conflict-affected country has yet to achieve a single United Nations Millennium Development Goal. Strengthening legitimate institutions with an aim to provide citizen security, justice, and jobs is crucial to break such cycles of violence, fragility, and weak development.
Download the Article: [ENGLISH] [FRENCH]Fragile States, Conflict and Chronic Poverty
By Chronic Poverty Relief Centre, December 2010.Conflict intensifies and perpetuates chronic poverty, as people lose assets, income, and access to markets and social service spending falls. Chronic poverty can also lead to conflict, particularly through social discontent and where violence offers a means of livelihood. Basic service provision aimed at the poorest and hard to reach and social protection can help increase livelihood security and lessen the potential for violence and instability.
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Mozambique: Balancing Development, Politics and Security
By Jeremy Astill-Brown and Markus Weimer. Chatham House, August 2010.
Mozambique’s two decade arc of stabilization and poverty reduction are giving way to rising social discontent. Development strategies should be modified to confront newly emerging security and governance challenges. A top priority will be building legitimate state institutions that can resist a rapid rise in organized crime, reverse an increasingly constrictive political environment, and adjust economic growth plans that will likely provide few opportunities for Mozambique’s poor. [PDF]
Economic Drivers of Conflict and Cooperation in the Horn of Africa
By Roy Love. Chatham House, 2009.The four cross-border regions of the Horn of Africa exemplify a complex development-security nexus in which politics, inter-elite struggles, resource endowments, poverty and other seemingly distinct phenomena all interact. They also illuminate how local initiatives and international aid programs can enhance development and reduce conflict. [PDF]
Democracy and Development: Overcoming Autocratic Legacies
Poor countries are more vulnerable to crisis, be it economic, humanitarian, or open conflict. Cross-national analysis, however, shows that the development performance of low-income democracies significantly outpaces that of autocracies – and do so with less volatility. Sustaining democratization, therefore, is a priority for attaining both development and security objectives. PDF
For additional reading go to: Security and DevelopmentInvesting in Peace: How Development Aid Can Prevent or Promote Conflict
By Robert J. Muscat. M.E. Sharpe, 2002.The author examines nine cases in which the work of development agencies exacerbated or ameliorated the root causes of conflict. This permits some generalizations about the efficacy or deleterious effects of development programs on conflict -- and of their futility when the conflict-prevention dimension of international assistance efforts is ignored.
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Security Sector Reform
Ask the Expert: New ACSS Scholar Talks Security Sector Reform
U.S. Army Colonel (ret.) Thomas Dempsey recently arrived at the Africa Center for Strategic Studies (ACSS) as the new Assistant Professor for Security Studies. He leads ACSS’ Security Sector Reform (SSR) Program, the center’s newest endeavor to help African partners develop innovative solutions to complex security-sector problems.According to a working paper jointly authored by the U.S. Agency for International Development and the departments of State and Defense, SSR involves reform efforts in foreign countries that are directed at the institutions, processes, and forces that provide security and promote the rule of law. It is an effort being undertaken by the United States and major donor countries, along with the UN and other international organizations, to assist partner governments to provide effective, legitimate, and accountable security for their citizens.
A leading expert on the complexities of SSR in Africa, Dempsey answers questions about reform and ACSS’ contributions to solving the continent’s most pressing security sector challenges.
"...there are things that we can learn from our African partners—there is a lot of expertise there on collaboration between military and police forces, especially in austere and challenging operational environments."
Q: How do you define SSR?
A: SSR is about how a state provides a variety of security services to its citizens. During the Cold War, when the defense community talked about national security, it was about defense and military affairs. Either you were with the Western democracies or you were with the Soviet Union and its client states. Democratic regimes were very much in the minority outside of the West. Then the Soviet Union collapsed, and the Cold War ended. These events allowed the transition to functional democracies around the world—in Eastern Europe and Latin America, for example. You’ve also seen progress in Asia and Africa, although to a lesser extent. With that transition, there has also been a change in the definition of national security, broadening its focus from the defense and military sectors to include how the state provides policing services and justice, whether people can get jobs, whether they have access to education and adequate health care. This creates a much broader definition of security under a term generally called “human security.” From this evolving definition, SSR emerges at the end of the 1990s. It’s a new way of how major donors provide security assistance to partner states, especially those emerging from conflict. It is a shift away from “train-and-equip” approaches, focused on how well the soldier or policeman can shoot, towards why are they shooting in the first place, and to whom that guy with a gun is accountable.
Q: What is the purpose of SSR?
A: SSR is designed to improve the way a government provides safety, security, and justice to its citizens. The objective is to provide these services in a way that promotes an effective and legitimate public service. SSR has a strong normative component—a country’s security apparatus must respect human rights and the rule of law, it must be transparent, accountable to civilian authority, and responsive to the needs of the public. This is how we define what any security sector in the world—including ours—ought to look like and how it should function.
Q: Who are the main proponents of SSR?
A: Every state has a vested interest in improving how it provides security to its citizens. External partners like the United States share that interest, and have become important stakeholders in designing and implementing SSR programs. This is especially true in Africa, where SSR has become a major component of development assistance efforts.
Q: What are the largest obstacles to implementing SSR?
A: We need to develop more effective and affordable ways and means to implement SSR across the security sector. Most needed, in my view, are better approaches for reforming policing and justice functions, and strengthening the rule of law; these sectors are among the least developed in the current SSR toolkit. We have a much better grasp of how to rebuild a military than of how to rebuild a police force or a justice system. Expenditures on security have tended to be weighted heavily to defense and military, with police and justice systems being correspondingly underfunded. We don’t have a very good grasp of some of SSR's technical aspects. How should we sequence SSR activities? Do you have to address the need for security from military threats before you address basic issues of governance, or restore police services? Which takes priority? How do you replace or transform existing security forces in post-conflict or transitioning states? What should the relationship be between SSR and disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration of former fighters? How do you balance existing traditional or customary justice practices with formal, codified legal systems?
Q: What countries in Africa are most in need of SSR?
A: I think every country in Africa has a need to continually assess its own security sector to identify where it can do a better job serving the needs of its people. That is a debate that we have in the United States on a recurring basis, sometimes leading to major reforms of our own security system. What priority SSR should receive, when funds are limited and there are other competing demands on the state’s resources, is a key issue that needs to be addressed by the executive and legislative branches of every nation. It is one of the reasons that governments craft national security strategies and policies.
Q: Where is it happening now?
A: I think SSR programs are underway, to a greater or lesser extent, across the continent. Priorities differ, and the level of resourcing varies significantly from country to country. I do believe, based on my discussions with our ACSS African alumni, that SSR is increasingly viewed as an essential component of development in the African context.
Q: What does it look like when it is being implemented?
A: It will look different in every situation depending on what’s needed. Most of the people who would be able to answer what it looks like would be inside the host nation, all the way down to local communities. It’s not just the national government that is involved, it’s also external actors who are stakeholders and who are providing resources and expertise, local officials and police who are actually responsible for delivering services, and the local communities who are the recipients of those services—the security sector “customers.” Building consensus across that diverse collection of stakeholders is a challenge.
Q: What can the U.S. and other major donors provide to countries in need of SSR?
A: The United States is only one player. Our ability to affect change is very limited. SSR is very labor- and capital-intensive. It needs lots of players and lots of donors. One thing we can all do, including our African partners, is equip our military forces and police officers, our diplomatic corps, and our technical development advisors with a better toolkit to generate desired SSR outcomes more quickly and at more affordable costs. We can help our partners in Africa develop better mousetraps.
Q: How is SSR connected to U.S. national security strategy?
A: SSR is an integral component of U.S. approaches to engagement with our foreign partners. The Statement on Security Sector Reform, issued jointly by our Department of Defense, Department of State, and U.S. Agency for International Development in 2009, clearly articulates the role of SSR in pursuing key elements of our National Security Strategy. With our partners, we confront increasingly complex threats that require us to address the linkages between security, governance, development, and conflict. SSR is designed to do just that.
Q: During presentations, you describe the rule of law as the rules of the road while SSR is the driver education course. Does the nature of the relationship between the two ever go in the reverse, where SSR requires changes to the way a country implements the rule of law? Have you ever seen SSR reveal fundamental shortcomings in the way a government operates?
A: Absolutely. In too many cases, rule of law doesn’t drive the train; but without it, the security sector loses its direction and legitimacy. Accountability, transparency, and legitimacy derive in fundamental ways from rule of law. Where SSR assessments reveal fundamental rule-of-law deficits, technical improvements in military and police capabilities frequently do not contribute to better outcomes, and in some cases can lead to negative consequences for citizens and the state itself. But people are starting to get that now. They are realizing that the solution to a lot of problems is the police, not the army. And we’re slowly starting to realize that it isn’t just the police, but the justice system, and the rule of law. Don’t get me wrong, they still have a paucity of resources in terms of building police and justice system capabilities, but we are moving in the right direction. In Colombia, for instance, the way the Colombian government got it right was by realizing that their justice system didn’t work. With our help, they went and tore it down and then rebuilt it. Strengthening rule of law as a precursor to comprehensive SSR proved to be a winning combination for them. On the other hand, when you’ve got people shooting each other in the street, the rule of law isn’t on anybody’s mind. High levels of organized violence need to be addressed with military force, not police force. But once the military has dealt with that threat, how do you pull police and the justice system back into it? You need to get police and the military at the same table to talk. That’s something that ACSS is good at.
Q: What are your hopes for the new SSR program at ACSS?
A: I have worked with the Africa Center on many occasions since its founding and I regard it as the premier African studies academic organization in the United States. Our African stakeholders are ahead of us on thinking about SSR. On the continent, you’ll see senior police at defense meetings. Meanwhile, ACSS is reaching out to start tapping into U.S. expertise and bringing these people to the table. The U.S. law enforcement community is the best in the world. We can bring that to the table. And there are things that we can learn from our African partners—there is a lot of expertise there on collaboration between military and police forces, especially in austere and challenging operational environments. ACSS promotes that type of substantive discussion with expert practitioners, crossing functional (police, justice, and military), sectoral (public and private) and national lines. It is one of the things that differentiates the Africa Center from other players in the field. ACSS has already become known as a visionary center of excellence in the SSR field. It is a great example of where the most farsighted stakeholders in SSR are going. ACSS has moved the debate from focusing on the narrower national security interests to the broader topic of human security. So most of the heavy lifting has already been done. We have moved the program from the military realm to the SSR realm. I’m actually quite lucky coming into a program where lots of the work has already begun. Being selected as a member of ACSS permanent faculty is a great honor, and I look forward to being part of the team. Our focus for the coming months is in West Africa, where we will solicit input from our African partners about how to make SSR happen. ACSS goes where our African partners give us space to go. We bring a set of agendas, but they decide what they are interested in. Based on what I’ve seen so far, African partners across the board are interested in SSR, and those aspects of it that they feel are most important to their respective countries. Civil justice, law enforcement, investigations, border protection—I’m seeing a growing interest in all of these subjects. Eventually you’re going to have to get past seminars and produce hard deliverables and put best practices into play in the field. But ACSS is just the facilitator. Africans have to make their own decisions, and solve their own problems. I am confident that they are doing exactly that.
Building Integrity and Reducing Corruption in Defence and Security: 20 Practical Reforms
By Mark Pyman and Anne-Christine Wegener. Transparency International, March 2011.Corruption and mismanagement in the security sector wastes scarce resources, undermines operational effectiveness, and can fuel insurgency and conflict. Security sector management and capabilities can be vastly improved through common institutional reforms including asset and income disclosures for key decision makers, collaboration with civil society to improve monitoring and oversight, and integrating anti-corruption briefings into pre-deployment training.
Download the Article: [PDF]Security Sector Reform Provisions in Peace Agreements
By Eboe Hutchful. African Security Sector Network, 2009.
A failure to adequately define and clarify security sector reform provisions in peace agreements has often allowed spoilers to undermine subsequent reforms and institutionalized dysfunctional and abusive security and justice systems. Along with a range of other adjustments to peace agreement approaches, Africa’s Regional Economic Communities should create security sector reform frameworks that can be integrated into their frequent conflict and crisis response efforts.
Download the Article: [PDF]The Future of Security Sector Reform
Edited by Mark Sedra. Centre for International Governance Innovation, 2010.
Concepts of security sector reform (SSR) have increasingly emphasized governance and oversight of the security services as much as conventional train-and-equip paradigms. SSR initiatives that have achieved sustained progress and innovations are those that have complemented and worked within the political dynamics, security needs, and citizen expectations of the contexts in which they are implemented.
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The State of the Region: Security Sector Governance in Southern Africa
By Lauren Hutton. Institute for Security Studies, 2010.
Positive security sector transformations realized in the 1990s and early 2000s in Southern Africa have recently been undermined by politicization of the security services, suspected coup plots, and other unconstitutional actions in several countries. Consolidating past improvements will require better knowledge of and access to the security services among civil society actors and resources for security sub-sectors such as policing, corrections, and post-conflict restructuring.
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Security Sector Governance in Africa: A Handbook
By Nicole Ball and Kayode Fayemi. CDD, 2004. A major work addressing key actors in the security sector in Africa; the role and impact of democratic governance on the security sector; policy development and implementation in the security sector; financial management; regional actors and their impact on security sector governance; and challenges and opportunities in transforming the security sector. [HTML]
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Stabilization of Fragile States
Stress-Testing South Africa: The Tenuous Foundations of One of Africa’s Stable States
By Assis Malaquias. Africa Center for Strategic Studies, July 2011.
Political violence in South Africa is worsening and indicates the country’s potential fragility. Since the end of apartheid, steadily rising inequality has deepened the divide between a wealthy minority and a poor majority. Frustration with an uneven pace of change often ignites into violent protest. Elite competition for financial and political resources available through the state also drives violence within and between competing political parties, usually at the local level where intimidation and assassination are sometimes used to ensure electoral success. Much competition exists in a grey area where the distinction between politics and crime is blurred.
South Africans still overwhelmingly support the democratic process and view the government as legitimate. From this foundation the state can move to head off emerging political violence and stem ebbing public trust. This will require breaking up the current intertwining of political authority and economic opportunity. Citizens must also see tangible evidence that government is interested in the socioeconomic priorities of ordinary people.
Download the paper in: [FRANÇAIS][ENGLISH][PORTUGUESE]
Supporting Statebuilding in Situations of Conflict and Fragility: Policy Guidance
By The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, 2011.
Functioning states are essential to conflict prevention, regional stability, and poverty reduction, yet state fragility remains widespread and currently impacts tens of millions of Africans. Key elements of stabilization strategies include security and justice, revenue and expenditure management, and job creation, but priority should be placed on inclusive state-society interaction and accountability at all times and levels.
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Users’ Guide to Measuring Fragility
By German Development Institute and UN Development Programme, 2009
The increasing centrality of the concept of state fragility to security and development policymaking has prompted the creation of numerous fragility indices in recent years. However, each index uses different combinations of variables to determine fragility and therefore has varying applicability to different policy and planning needs. Typically, a comparative analysis of indices can yield a more complete picture of stability dynamics within fragile states.
Download the Article: [PDF]
Cameroon: Fragile State?
International Crisis Group, 2010.
Cameroon rarely garners as much attention as Africa's more turbulent countries, but its political system may prove too rigid to manage a stagnating economy, inequalities embedded in ethnic differences, and extensive corruption. A more transparent and accountable electoral administration system and general respect of the rule of law may better stem various weaknesses from destabilizing the country. [PDF]U.S. Policy Toward Fragile States: An Integrated Approach to Security and Development
U.S. Policy Toward Fragile States: An Integrated Approach to Security and Development. By Stewart Patrick. Center for global Devleopment, 2008.
An updated version of an earlier work by Patrick for the Center for Global Development. Patrick argues that fragile states do not compromise a monolithic phenomenon, but can take on different forms and contribute to a variety of transnational threats in distinct ways. Thus, the U.S. and other international actors must tailor multi-pronged diplomatic, defense, and development (3D) engagement strategies to assist these threats to global security. Patrick reviews U.S. efforts to date, and finds a variety of well-intentioned but ultimately insufficient inter-agency and multi-lateral collaborative efforts. Five specific tasks to overcome this deficient response to transnational threats and state instability are offered for the Obama administration. [PDF]Concepts and Dilemmas of State Building in Fragile Situations: From Fragility to Resilience
By Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, 2008.
State fragility is complex but often begins with a divergence between citizen expectations and a government’s ability to deliver services. Whether caused by unforeseeable exogenous shocks or an erosion of legitimacy due to élite misbehavior, this divergence can be reduced through state-building efforts that prioritize good governance and democratic processes in capacity building efforts. [PDF]
‘State-Building for Peace’: Navigating an Arena of Contradictions
‘State-Building for Peace’: Navigating an Arena of Contradictions. By Alina Rocha Menocal. Overseas Development Institute, 2009. This brief work examines the differences and similarities between "state-building" and "peace-building." Many international actors often conflate the two, with repercussions on programs intended to assist fragile states. For example, efforts to forge peace often require the acceptance of political arrangements that later undermine state stability, such as working with elites at the expense of forming an inclusive government. The authors offer recommendations for donors, some of which may be useful for field practitioners in state-building efforts. [HTML]
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