




East Africa Security Governance Forum

Oversight of CT/CVE - Roles & Responsibilities of the Security Services & Legislators

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Current Threat: International Terrorism



International terrorism refers to terrorism that goes beyond national boundaries in terms of the methods used, the people that are targeted or the places from which the terrorists operate

Source: GTI 2024

GTI 2024 Overall Results

MEASURING THE IMPACT
OF TERRORISM

THE IMPACT OF TERRORISM



RANK	COUNTRY	SCORE	RANK CHANGE
1	Burkina Faso	8.571	↑ 1
2	Israel	8.143	↑ 24
3	Mali	7.998	↑ 1
4	Pakistan	7.916	↑ 3
5	Syria	7.890	↔
6	Afghanistan	7.825	↓ 5
7	Somalia	7.814	↓ 4
8	Nigeria	7.575	↔
9	Myanmar	7.536	↔
10	Niger	7.274	↔
11	Iraq	7.078	↓ 5
12	Cameroon	6.98	↓ 1
13	Democratic Republic of the Congo	6.514	↑ 1
14	India	6.324	↓ 1
15	Mozambique	6.267	↓ 3
16	Colombia	6.188	↓ 1
17	Chile	5.679	↓ 1
18	Kenya	5.616	↑ 1
19	Philippines	5.383	↓ 1
20	Egypt	5.221	↓ 3
21	Chad	4.987	↓ 1
22	Palestine	4.966	↑ 6
23	Yemen	4.951	↓ 1
24	Benin	4.898	↑ 3
25	Togo	4.67	↑ 5
26	Iran	4.464	↓ 1
27	Uganda	4.377	↑ 22

RANK	COUNTRY	SCORE	RANK CHANGE
28	Thailand	4.219	↓ 5
29	Türkiye	4.168	↓ 8
30	United States of America	4.141	↓ 1
31	Indonesia	3.993	↓ 7
32	Bangladesh	3.317	↑ 14
33	Sri Lanka	3.072	↓ 2
34	Greece	3.028	↓ 1
35	Russia	3.016	↑ 8
36	Tunisia	2.914	↑ 4
37	Germany	2.782	↓ 2
38	France	2.647	↓ 4
39	Libya	2.469	↓ 7
40	Burundi	2.434	↓ 4
41	United Kingdom	2.373	↑ 3
42	Tanzania	2.267	↓ 3
43	Angola	2.254	↑ 48
44	Algeria	2.197	↓ 6
45	Nepal	2.163	↓ 8
46	Côte d'Ivoire	2.06	↓ 5
47	Peru	2.045	↓ 6
48	Djibouti	2.035	↓ 3
49	Brazil	1.988	↓ 2
50	New Zealand	1.947	↓ 2
51	Belgium	1.904	↑ 11
52	Canada	1.753	↑ 4
53	Norway	1.747	↓ 3
54	Ukraine	1.686	↑ 20

RANK	COUNTRY	SCORE	RANK CHANGE
55	Spain	1.669	↑ 5
56	Lebanon	1.562	↓ 5
57	Australia	1.475	↓ 2
58	Italy	1.447	↓ 4
59	Central African Republic	1.445	↓ 2
60	Saudi Arabia	1.366	↑ 5
61	Argentina	1.274	↓ 3
62	Ethiopia	1.272	↓ 3
63	Kosovo	1.218	↑ 28
64	Japan	1.189	↔
65	Venezuela	1.174	↓ 13
66	Slovakia	1.092	↓ 5
67	Mexico	1.04	↑ 1
68	Austria	0.953	↓ 5
69	Tajikistan	0.871	↓ 16
70	Sweden	0.735	↓ 4
71	Switzerland	0.627	↓ 4
72	Cyprus	0.616	↑ 3
73	China	0.582	↑ 21
74	Netherlands	0.577	↓ 4
75	Jordan	0.455	↓ 4
-76	Armenia	0.423	↑ 18
-76	Uzbekistan	0.423	↓ 4
78	Paraguay	0.241	↓ 5
-79	United Arab Emirates	0.233	↓ 2
-79	Iceland	0.233	↓ 2
81	Malaysia	0.192	↓ 5

22%↑

Deaths from terrorism rose to 8,352 in 2023, a 22 per cent increase from the prior year.

2.5

Terrorism attacks became more deadly in 2023 with 2.5 deaths per attack compared to 1.6 in 2022.

23%↓

The number of terrorist attacks decreased to 3,350 in 2023, a reduction of 23 per cent from the 4,321 attacks in 2022.

26%

Within sub-Saharan Africa, the Sahel is the most affected region, accounting for almost half of all deaths from terrorism and 26 per cent of attacks in 2023.



Burkina Faso became the country with the highest impact from terrorism for the first time, with deaths from terrorism increasing by 68 per cent to 1,907. A quarter of all terrorism deaths occurring globally were in Burkina Faso.



519

Terrorism deaths fell by 519 in Afghanistan in 2023, an 81 per cent improvement. This is the first year since 2019 that Afghanistan has not been the country most impacted by terrorism.

54%



Of the 3,350 terrorist attacks recorded in 2023, 54 per cent were attributed to a group.

The countries with the highest number of attacks not attributed to a group were Myanmar, Burkina Faso, Mali, and Pakistan.

90%

Conflict remains the primary driver of terrorist activity. Over 90 per cent of terror attacks in 2023 occurred in conflict zones.

Key Assumptions

1. The recent high-level glitch of Senior Government Leaders in the USA's National Security Team + the Vice President exchanging war plans and related intelligence data on real-time Signal App creates an explicit outlook that characterizes the relationship between Core Security Actors and Politicians
2. Context, Tradition and Doctrine significantly matter on issues of National Security

Part I

Ethical-Strategic Nexus in National Security

How Kenya's Security Sector Navigates Parliamentary Oversight in CT/CVE

How do military, police and intelligence service ethics shape how security sector officials liaise with their national parliaments on defence and security issues, specifically on CT/CVE? Please use examples from Kenya as well other countries you know from your service

Ethics & The Kenyan National Security Outlook

I. The Structural Core: Kenya's Security Doctrine and Its Parliamentary Implications

Kenya's security sector ethics are not abstract values but **codified operational doctrines** shaped by:

- 1. Colonial Security Legacies** → The architecture of Kenya's security institutions, particularly the police and intelligence, was built on secrecy, coercion, and Executive primacy. The **British colonial-era "Emergency Security Protocol"** (used during the Mau Mau rebellion) still influences how intelligence is siloed from parliamentary oversight
- 2. Geopolitical Pressures** → Kenya is a frontline state in the U.S. and Western-backed **Horn of Africa counterterrorism framework**, which restricts domestic legislative control- intelligence-sharing agreements
- 3. Security Networks** → Kenya's security institutions operate under a **state-security pact (need to know, need to share)**, where disclosure is managed internally to shield external alignments and operational strategy from civilian interference

Take Away: Engagement with Parliament is **not just about ethics**—it is about **institutional self-preservation within a controlled security-political ecosystem**

Ethics & The Kenyan National Security Outlook.../2

II. Military Ethics: Operational Insulation from Parliamentary Oversight

Kenya's **military doctrine** is influenced by the "**Doctrine of Strategic Autonomy**," which asserts that operational decision-making, particularly in CT operations is insulated- The **Key Assumption** dilemma

KDF engagements in Somalia remain shielded from full parliamentary scrutiny, under the rationale that disclosure risks intelligence leaks

❖ **Civil-Military relations** are designed to minimize direct parliamentary interference. The 2010 constitutional reforms gave Parliament greater oversight, but the KDF's internal **Advisory** process actively manages the narrative given to civilian authorities

Take Away: Military ethics dictate that Parliament is a **budget approver, not an operational stakeholder** in CT/CVE decision-making

Ethics & The Kenyan National Security Outlook.../3

III. Intelligence Ethics: The Architecture of Secrecy and Selective Disclosure

The **National Intelligence Service (NIS)** follows an "**Executive-Centric Intelligence Doctrine**," which means:

1. Intelligence reports are submitted to the **President and National Security Council (NSC)**, not Parliament
2. Parliamentary oversight is limited to budgetary allocation, not intelligence-gathering or analysis
3. NIS controls the **classification of terrorist threats**, determining what information Parliament receives

This ethical stance ensures that intelligence agencies are:

- 1. Politically insulated from legislative influence**
- 2. Protected from operational execution accountability**
- 3. Able to justify OPSEC in counterterrorism operations**

Take Away: The intelligence sector's ethical stance on secrecy **trumps parliamentary authority**. (Refer to the Key Assumption)

Ethics & The Kenyan National Security Outlook.../4

IV. Police Ethics: Coercion, Compliance, and the Double-Edged Oversight Challenge

The police operate under a **dual ethical framework**

1. **Accountability to Civil Authority (Legal Mandate)** → The National Police Service (NPS) is obligated to provide parliamentary reports on CT/CVE
2. **Operational Non-Disclosure (Counterterrorism Doctrine)** → The Anti-Terror Police Unit (ATPU) follows a **"Necessity of Force" doctrine**, which justifies its actions as **pre-emptive counterterrorism measures**

This ethical paradox results in

1. **Minimal disclosure to Parliament** → Security briefs on CT operations often omit ATPU's activities
2. **Legal-ethical shields** → Parliament struggles to demand accountability because of **counterterrorism immunity clauses** in Kenya's **Security Laws (Amendment) Act, 2014**

Take Away: Minimal disclosure undermines **legislative accountability** in CT/CVE strategies/operations

The Kenyan National Security Outlook.../5

V. The Political-Ethical Nexus: How the Executive Shapes Security-Parliament Relations

Beyond institutional ethics, Kenya's **Executive branch dictates the terms of security discourse in Parliament** through:

1. **Strategic Non-Disclosure Policies** → Security classification of reports; Top Sec and Sec are highly likely to be shared disclosed
2. **Selective Parliamentary Briefings** → Need to know principle

Take Away: Security discourse are between Executive and Parliament are shaped by control measures that ensures CT/CVE operations remain within the **Strategic Domain**

Part II

Strategic Outlook of Kenya's Intelligence-Legislature Relationship /Oversight: A System Design & Impact on CT & CVE

Are there areas where information sharing practices have succeeded and/or could be improved between the primary security services and the legislature for the purpose of enhancing the fight against terrorism and violent extremism?

Introduction

- Kenya's counterterrorism and intelligence-sharing framework suffers from structural weaknesses
- Kenya's counterterrorism challenges are **not accidental**—they are a direct result of **intelligence-sharing silos** that is built around **WHO's intelligence?**
- The expertise of the legislators on **security agenda** remains a concern- How do we partner with this reality?

Core Issues in Kenya's Intelligence-Legislature Relationship

A. Structural Concerns and Challenges/Opportunities

1. **Who's intelligence?** NIS and DMI reports to who?
2. **Intelligence Ecosystem:** The National Intelligence Service (NIS), Kenya Defence Forces (KDF) Military Intelligence, and police counterterrorism has established a **fusion centre on matters CT**
3. **Legislative Oversight:** Parliament's security committees receive CT/CVE reports. However, to what extent are the reports disclosed?

Core Issues in Kenya's Intelligence-Legislature Relationship.../2

B. Foreign Influence and Geopolitical Dependency

Overreliance on Western Intelligence

Kenya's counterterrorism strategy is significantly influenced by partnership- U.S., UK, Israeli **Mutual interests?**

AFRICOM & CIA Operations in Kenya

Covert security actions and outcomes on CT. **Must we disclose the nature of this ops?**

Regional Intelligence Integration

Collaboration with Ethiopia, Tanzania, Uganda, DRC, Rwanda, Burundi and Somalia- Is it working? How do we account for this collaboration?

Breaking the Cycle - What Reforms Will Matter?



Asanteni Sana

Q & A

Open Discussion