



AFRICA CENTER
FOR STRATEGIC STUDIES

Emerging Security Sector Leaders Seminar

SYLLABUS

Online, via Zoom for Government

June 4-6, 2024

&

In-Person

June 17-28, 2024



AFRICA CENTER FOR STRATEGIC STUDIES

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ABOUT THE AFRICA CENTER

Since its inception in 1999, the Africa Center has served as a forum for research, academic programs, and the exchange of ideas with the aim of enhancing citizen security by strengthening the effectiveness and accountability of African institutions, in support of U.S. - Africa policy.

VISION

Security for all Africans championed by effective institutions accountable to their citizens.

Realizing the vision of an Africa free from organized armed violence guaranteed by African institutions that are committed to protecting African citizens is the driving motivation of the Africa Center. This aim underscores the Center's commitment to contributing to tangible impacts by working with our African partners – military and civilian, government and civil society, as well as national and regional. All have valuable roles to play in mitigating the complex drivers of conflict on the continent today. Accountability to citizens is an important element of our vision as it reinforces the point that in order to be effective, security institutions must not just be “strong,” but also be responsive to and protective of the rights of citizens.

MISSION

To advance African security by expanding understanding, providing a trusted platform for dialogue, building enduring partnerships, and catalyzing strategic solutions.

The Africa Center's mission revolves around the generation and dissemination of knowledge through our research, academic programs, strategic communications, and community chapters. Drawing on the practical experiences and lessons learned from security efforts on the continent, we aim to generate relevant insight and analysis that can inform practitioners and policymakers on the pressing security challenges that they face. Recognizing that addressing serious challenges can only come about through candid and thoughtful exchanges, the Center provides face-to-face and virtual platforms where partners can exchange views on priorities and sound practices. These exchanges foster relationships that, in turn, are maintained over time through the Center's community chapters, communities of interest, follow-on programs, and ongoing dialogue between participants and staff. This dialogue—infused with real world experiences and fresh analysis—provides an opportunity for continued learning and catalyzes concrete actions.

MANDATE

The Africa Center is a U.S. Department of Defense institution established and funded by Congress for the study of security issues relating to Africa and serving as a forum for bilateral and multilateral research, communication, exchange of ideas, and training involving military and civilian participants. (10 U.S.C 342)

Course Overview

Introduction

The complex and turbulent security environment in Africa makes the need for leadership development in the security sector a matter of urgency and strategic importance. Beyond this rapidly changing security environment, the rise of military coups in Africa calls for a re-examination of the state of security governance and the role of political leadership in addressing security threats through strategies, policies, and practices that are people-centered. The demand for continuous coaching and training of security leaders in Africa has been echoed by Brigadier General (ret.) Daniel K. Frimpong, former Commander of the Ghana Military Academy, who once said “[g]ood leaders develop through a never-ending process of self-study, education, training, and experience.”¹ In the 2021 African Union (AU) Africa Governance Report, the role of political leadership that is adaptive, inclusive, accountable, and ethical has been recognized as one of the key drivers for Africa to realize the AU’s Agenda 2063.² This seminar provides a collaborative and trusted problem-solving platform for emerging African security sector leaders. It seeks to support the next generation of principled and professional public servants in the security sector in their efforts to adequately adapt, and proactively respond, to the unprecedented security challenges the African continent faces. The seminar accordingly provides them an opportunity to learn from their peers and other African security experts to advance their acquisition of attributes and skills for effective leadership. This will help them lead with empathy to address citizens’ basic security and safety needs and proactively prepare to confront complex and changing security threats.

Why Conduct This Program?

Cumulative evidence shows a well-designed executive training program enhances effective leadership. There is also a consensus among African leaders, scholars, and practitioners that effective, strategic, and ethical leadership is central to the continent’s success. You have already received a considerable amount of training on professionalism, ethics, and leadership/decision-making through formal military education and non-academic experiences. Furthermore, your nomination by your government or institution to attend this program indicates that your past performance and your leadership potential in these areas are held in high regard. We will honor these accomplishments and seek to build upon them in a meaningful and useful way.

This three-week (one week virtual, two weeks in-person) seminar is designed to facilitate participants’ engagement in interdisciplinary peer learning about strategic and adaptive leadership and its implications for the effective management of African security challenges. This entails accurately analyzing the security environment to design and

¹ Brigadier General Daniel K. Frimpong, “Appendix Two,” *Leadership and the Challenges of Command*, AFRAM Publications, (Accra: 2003), p. 156.

² African Union, “Africa’s Governance Futures for the Africa We Want.” The Africa Governance Report 2021. <https://au.int/en/documents/20220328/africa-governance-report-2021-africas-governance-futures-africa-we-want>

implement inclusive security strategies that can forge new civil-military relations and enhance professionalism in the security sector; judiciously managing security resources to ensure accountability and transparency; and leveraging partnership with regional, continental, and international stakeholders to collectively confront transnational security threats. Participants will consider these topics in relation to their own context as well as in comparative regional perspectives. This will enable participants to reflect on lessons that can be learned at home, in neighboring countries, and in other parts of Africa and the world.

The overarching goal of the program is to provide practical and effective tools and skills that participants can use to contribute to their nation's security, development, and governance. To this end, there are three program objectives:

- Enhance awareness of the changing security landscape in Africa and strengthen critical thinking, problem-solving, and decision-making skills for adaptive and effective leadership.
- Expand understanding of strategic approaches at the national level to address current, emerging, and future security threats in Africa in ways that advance human security and forge new civil-military relations and enhance professionalism.
- Assess regional and international support and responses to African security challenges, and explore how African security leaders can leverage strategic security partnerships that are enduring, collective and collaborative, and based on sovereign equality, inter-dependence, and mutual interests.

Program Overview

Strategic leadership, critical thinking, ethical and evidence-based decision-making, and standards of behavior at the strategic level will guide and inform the program's central topics. Effective leadership training is crucial to the creation and sustainment of democratic governance and professionalism in the security sector in Africa. The program will be delivered over three weeks. The first week is virtual and will provide an overview of the course materials, simulation exercise, and assignment requirements, as well as highlight the importance of strategic leadership and critical thinking as themes that are core to the program. The second and third week are in-person and are divided into three modules: (1) Analyzing Africa's Security Threats; (2) National Response to Security Challenges; and (3) Regional and International Response to Security Challenges. The modules are inter-related and mutually reinforcing. Across the three modules, speakers will highlight security threats and opportunities, as well as the implications for leadership to deliver better citizen security and safety.

Topics are introduced in plenary sessions by a guest speaker or panel of experts, followed by discussion group sessions. The group discussions will be moderated by facilitators who are highly-qualified and experienced experts. The role of a facilitator is not to lecture or to insist on any "correct" solutions, but to create a conducive environment for candid

dialogue and sharing of experiences. Take advantage of the facilitators' wealth of expertise and experiences, though do not hesitate to challenge them.

Academic Approach

Given the variation in the level of experience and understanding among participants about security threats and level of response to these security threats, this seminar will seek to capture important lessons and sound practices through:

- Academic content in this syllabus to focus on evidence-based analysis supported by practical examples with less focus on theory.
- Plenary sessions that will be led by seasoned experts on the subject matter, focusing on collaborative, two-way learning as opposed to one-way, traditional classroom-based learning.
- Small group discussions that provide a trusted platform for participants to share their experiences and lessons learned and to prioritize peer-to-peer learning and teamwork with participants serving as experts on the context of their countries and regions.

The seminar will be conducted in English, French, and Portuguese. A strict policy of non-attribution will apply during discussion group sessions as well as during the question-and-answer portion of plenary sessions. Plenary sessions will be recorded and posted to the Africa Center website after the close of the program.

Academic Material

The Africa Center utilizes academic tools to promote frank and open dialogue on critical issues and to lay the foundation for the development of effective peer networking. To facilitate our discussions, we have provided this academic syllabus and recommended readings. We encourage you to consider critically the analyses and content in all the materials provided. In this regard, the readings are intended to foster a healthy dialogue on the security challenges under discussion, which, in turn, will enable you to forge realistic and effective strategies to address these challenges.

As with all Africa Center academic programs, this seminar will be conducted under a strict policy of non-attribution, which is binding during and after the seminar. We encourage you to share the insights you gain from this seminar with your colleagues, but not to quote the specific comments of your fellow participants. We hope that this will allow you to address freely the sensitive issues under discussion. The views expressed in the readings, case studies, and presentations do not represent the official policy or position of the National Defense University, the Department of Defense, or the U.S. Government. All program documentation will be posted on the Africa Center website.

The Syllabus

This syllabus is an educational document intended to expose participants to various perspectives and help them take full advantage of the program. This syllabus provides an overview of academic material and key policy questions about strategic leadership in Africa's security sector. The document is organized sequentially to guide participants through the program's three modules. For each plenary session, the syllabus gives a brief introduction and frames questions for discussion to be answered by participants in the discussion group meeting. We provide selected readings that are intended to prepare participants for the plenary sessions and discussion groups and should be read prior to the sessions for which they are listed. We recognize that the syllabus covers more issues and materials than can be sufficiently discussed in the available time. We hope that you use these materials as resources even after the program concludes.

We encourage you to share questions and suggestions about the materials and the seminar, as it will enhance the quality of our programs. Much expertise and knowledge about these topics comes from you, the participants. We encourage you to read the assigned materials and actively participate in your discussion groups and to freely share your experiences and knowledge. The syllabus content does not reflect the views or official position of the Department of Defense or U.S. Government.

The benefits of this program should continue after you have returned home. The discussions and written materials as well as the friendships formed over the next two weeks should help you respond to the often-unpredictable challenges you will face in your profession.

Preparation for the Seminar

Before the first week of the seminar, we ask that you:

1. Skim this syllabus.
2. Review the Week 1 portion of the syllabus and read the recommended readings.
3. Spend some time thinking about the Week 1 discussion questions and considering what experiences from your work you might share in discussion groups.
4. Be ready to participate in discussion groups and learn from other participants.

Before each subsequent week of the seminar, we ask that you repeat this process.

Virtual Session 1: Course Introduction: ESSL & ACSS at 25 Years

Format: Plenary presentation

Objectives:

- Introduce Emerging Security Sector Leaders (ESSL) program and its evolution within the Africa Center over the past 25 years.
- Discuss why ESSL is flagship program of the Center, and its impact over the years.

Background:

Over the past 25 years, ESSL and its predecessor program, Next Generation of African Security Sector Leaders (Next Gen), have been the longest running programs offered by the Africa Center. Both seminars have targeted mid-level African security sector professionals, to provide the next generation of African security sector leaders with practical and effective tools upon which they can draw to contribute to their nations' security and development. The seminars have addressed the roles and responsibilities of professional security sector officials in democratic societies—enhancing leadership skills to respond to current and emerging security challenges more effectively. Next Gen and ESSL have focused on strategic leadership and national security strategy, Africa's contemporary security threats, and the coordination of external security assistance.

As we celebrate the 25-year anniversary of the Africa Center, this opening virtual session will reflect on the ESSL program as a flagship seminar for the Center, as well as the impact it has had over the years.

Recommended Readings:

Emerging Security Sector Leaders Seminar. *Africa Center for Strategic Studies*.

<https://africacenter.org/programs/emerging-security-sector-leaders-seminar/>

Virtual Session 2: The Importance of Strategic Leadership & Critical Thinking for ESSL

Format: Plenary presentation

Objectives:

- Highlight the importance of strategic leadership and critical thinking for emerging security leaders faced with evolving challenges.

Background:

In the complex and often fraught environment African security professionals operate in, effective strategic leadership and critical thinking are key to successfully addressing security challenges. African security threats are predominantly irregular and have their roots in a diverse and complex set of social, economic, and political issues that defy straight-forward solutions.³ In this context, the traditional tools and systems of the security sector can be unreliable, or even part of the problem in cases where the security sector may have become corrupted or politicized.⁴ This places a high burden on the decision-maker to identify problems, tools and solutions when many orthodox security approaches may be ineffective or counter-productive.

Strategic leadership is generally defined as “the unique abilities of anticipating, envisioning, maintaining flexibility, thinking strategically, and empowering employees to create new inventions that lead to organizational transformations or changes.”⁵ Beyond developing these abilities, strategic leadership is also about having the adaptive capacity to appropriately respond to the dynamism and complexity of the context.⁵⁷ Critical thinking, on the other hand, “is a learned skill.”⁶ It involves the “use of those cognitive skills or strategies that increase the probability of a desirable outcome. It is used to describe thinking that is purposeful, reasoned, and goal directed—the kind of thinking involved in solving problems, formulating inferences, calculating likelihoods, and making decisions, when the thinker is using skills that are thoughtful and effective for the particular context and type of thinking task.”⁷ Given the complex and dynamic security environment on the African continent, strategic leaders must develop critical thinking skills so as to achieve their objectives. In fact, as Gen. Martin E. Dempsey explained, “strategic leaders must be inquisitive and open-minded. They must be able to think critically and be capable of

³ Paul Williams, *War and Conflict in Africa* (2nd Ed.) (Polity Press, 2016), p.38-40.

⁴ Emile Ouedraogo, *Advancing Military Professionalism in Africa* (2016)

<https://africacenter.org/wpcontent/>

[uploads/2016/06/ARP06EN-Advancing-Military-Professionalism-in-Africa.pdf](https://africacenter.org/wpcontent/uploads/2016/06/ARP06EN-Advancing-Military-Professionalism-in-Africa.pdf)

⁵ Alex Jaleha and Vincent Machuki, “Strategic Leadership and Organizational Performance: Critical Review of Literature.” *European Scientific Review*. Vol 4(35): 127, 2018.

<https://eujournal.org/index.php/esj/article/view/11558>

⁶ Helen Bouyges, “3 Simple Habits to Improve Your Critical Thinking,” *Harvard Business Review*, May 2019

⁷ Diane F. Halpern, *Thought and knowledge: An introduction to critical thinking (5th ed.)* (New York, NY, US: Psychology Press, 2014)

developing creative solutions to complex problems..."⁸ Accordingly, critical thinking is essential for defining how strategic security sector leaders can address complex problems.

Recommended Readings:

Ben Ramalingam et al, "Five Principles to Guide Adaptive Leadership." *Harvard Business Review*, 2020. <https://hbr.org/2020/09/5-principles-to-guide-adaptive-leadership>

Regina Eckert and Simon Rweyongoze, "Leadership Development in Africa: A Focus on Strengths." *Center for Creative Leadership*, 2015. <https://www.ccl.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/04/leadershipDevelopmentAfrica.pdf>

Kwesi Aning and Joseph Siegle, "Deep Commitment, High Expectations: The Values of the Next Generation of African Security Sector Leaders." *Africa Defense Forum*, 2018:

- EN: <http://adf-magazine.com/deep-commitment-high-expectations/>
- FR: <http://adf-magazine.com/engagement-profond-attentes-elevees/?lang=fr>

Sam Adeyemi, "Africa does not Need Charity, it Needs Good Leadership," *World Economic Forum on Africa*, 2017. <https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2017/05/africa-doesn-t-need-charity-it-needs-good-leadership>

Matt Andrews, Lant Pritchett, Michael Woolcock, "Escaping Capability Traps through Problem Driven Iteration Adaption (PDIA)," CID Working Paper No. 240, June 2012. <https://www.cgdev.org/publication/escaping-capability-traps-through-problem-driven-iterative-adaptation-pdia-working-paper>

⁸ Gen. Martin E. Dempsey referenced in "Critical Thinking and SOF Decision Making," *Special Warfare* (June, 2017)

Virtual Session 3: Writing Assignment Overview

Format: Discussion groups

Objectives:

- Provide detailed overview of writing assignment and grading rubric.

Background:

This session will break participants into discussion groups where ACSS facilitators will provide a detailed overview of the writing assignment and grading rubric, as well as the the deadlines for submission of the first (Final Draft 1 Deadline Due 23:59 EST June 14th) and second versions of the assignment (Final Draft 2 Deadline Due 08:00 EST June 26th).

Recommended Readings:

Review ESSL Assignment Overview and Rubric.

Virtual Session 4: Mega Trends and Country Risk, Vulnerability and Resilience Assessments

Format: Plenary session

Objectives:

- Provide an overview of the assessment frameworks used to assess a country's risks, vulnerabilities and sources of resilience.
- Discuss how to incorporate national, regional, and continental megatrends and their possible implications on security into threat, vulnerability, and resilience assessments.

Background:

There are several factors that will shape Africa's peace and security and the trajectory of change in the near and long term. These factors include a web of complex, multifaceted, and ever-changing security threats including but not limited to transnational organized crime, violent conflicts, violent extremism and terrorism, cyber threats, maritime threats, state fragility, and pandemics. These security threats will be exacerbated by megatrends⁹ such as demographic change¹⁰, urbanization¹¹, the rising middle class, climate change¹², and emerging technologies¹³. Moreover, these security threats and megatrends are accompanied by an underlying current of a rising governance deficit in Africa, in which states themselves have become a source of insecurity.¹⁴ The intersections of these megatrends will undoubtedly shape the ways that African governments and institutions will address human security in the decades to come. These megatrends will create shocks that both exacerbate security challenges and create new opportunities for addressing human security in the continent.

Country risk and vulnerability assessments (CRVA) can assist policymakers in making informed decisions that address the dynamic security challenges affecting the continent.

⁹ Raymond Gilpin, "Unpacking the implications of future trends for security in Africa." *Brookings*, 2020. <https://www.brookings.edu/blog/africa-in-focus/2020/02/03/unpacking-the-implications-of-future-trends-for-security-in-africa/>

¹⁰ Basedau, M., Heyl, C. and Woertz, E. 2021. "Population Growth and Security in Africa: Myth or Underestimated Risk?" *German Institute for Global and Area Studies*, Hamburg. January 14. https://assets.ctfassets.net/jlhgjubhhjuo/4NjHjVvw3biOA3lQ5SvHIz/2c19465df7f608cf3b2e2cc8ef033046/GIGA_Population_Growth_Security_in_Africa_PDF.pdf

¹¹ Eyita-Okon, E. 2022. "Urbanization and human security in post-colonial Africa". *Front. Sustain. Cities* 4:917764. doi: 10.3389/frsc.2022.917764

¹² Africa Center. 2021. "How Global Warming Threatens Human Security in Africa". *Infographic*. Washington: Africa Center for Strategic Studies. <https://africacenter.org/spotlight/how-global-warming-threatens-human-security-in-africa/>

¹³ Razakamaharavo, V.. 2021. "Implications of Emerging Technologies on Peace and Security in Africa". *Conflict and Resilience Monitor* 2021/2. Accord. <https://www.accord.org.za/conflict-trends/implications-of-emerging-technologies-on-peace-and-security-in-africa/>

¹⁴ Peter Mwai, "Are Military Takeovers on the Rise in Africa?" *BBC*, 2022. <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-46783600>

Specifically, CRVAs identify structural vulnerabilities, event driven risks, and existing resilience factors to broader security threats occurring within a particular country or region and that are affected by megatrends. Such assessments leverage both qualitative and quantitative data to provide baseline assessments of the patterns and trends of security dynamics across human security pillars based on robust, holistic methodologies and reliable empirical evidence. Examples of the different data source typically used to for CRVA include: geospatial data from the ECOWAS Warning and Response Network (ECOWARN); the Intergovernmental Authority on Development's (IGAD) Conflict Early Warning and Response Mechanism (CEWARN); the Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED); the Afrobarometer; the Mo Ibrahim Index of African Governance (IIAG); ENACT's Organized Crime Index; in addition to field research and qualitative desktop research, among other sources.

Accordingly, information from well-researched CRVA can inform early warning and response efforts and generate actionable recommendations. Moreover, CRVAs are crucial for strategic security sector leaders tasked with addressing complex security problems. The analysis and recommendations generated from a CRVA help inform security leaders as they develop creative solutions to complex problems.

Recommended Readings:

Raymond Gilpin. "Unpacking the implications of future trends for security in Africa." *Brookings*, 2020. <https://www.brookings.edu/blog/africa-in-focus/2020/02/03/unpacking-the-implications-of-future-trends-for-security-in-africa/>

Country Risk and Vulnerability Assessment Handbook, *ECOWAS and USAID*, December 2018, https://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/PA00WNNZ.pdf

Virtual Session 5: Simulation Overview

Format: Discussion groups

Objectives:

- Provide participants with a detailed overview of the simulation exercise.
- Sort participants into their respective simulation and discussion groups.
- Identify the Chairperson and Rapporteur for each group.

Background:

This session will break participants into discussion groups where ACSS facilitators will provide a detailed overview of the simulation exercise, sort participants into their respective simulation working groups, and answer questions regarding the exercise.

Recommended Readings:

Review ESSL Simulation Package

In-Person Sessions

Plenary Session: Fireside Chat

Format: Plenary session

Objectives:

- Explore the experiences of notable ACSS alumni in responding to dynamic and changing security threats during their careers.
- Reflect on the experiences the alumni have had with the Africa Center at different stages of their careers.

Background:

The Africa Center has more than 8,000 civilian and military alums spread across the continent. These alums have benefited from a variety of ACSS programs on topical security issues for Africa and, through the knowledge and expertise acquired over their careers, many have gone on to be strategic security sectors leaders in their countries and the continent. Indeed, bureaucracies in Africa are full of former Africa Center alums occupying senior administrative positions in defense, security, territorial administration, justice, foreign affairs, and intelligence services ministries to name a few.

This session will offer reflections on the experiences of notable Africa Center alums, including their professional experience on the African continent and journey to becoming a strategic leader, key lessons they have learned throughout their professional career, and their advice to emerging security sector leaders.

Recommended Readings:

See materials from the Africa Center's Community Chapter Leaders Forum:

- EN - <https://africacenter.org/programs/2023-01-cclf/>
- FR - <https://africacenter.org/fr/programs/2023-01-cclf/>
- PO - <https://africacenter.org/pt-pt/2023-01-cclf/>

Plenary Session 1: Conflict Trends Security & Mega Trends

Format: Plenary session
Discussion group

Objectives:

- Understand the dynamics of major megatrends in Africa such as urbanization, demographic and social change, the rising middle class, climate change, enabling technology, and pandemics.
- Understand the security implications of these megatrends for the leadership in the security sector in Africa.
- Explore drivers of violent conflicts in Africa, how they relate to the major megatrends in Africa, and their strategic implications on diplomatic, defense, and development responses.

Background:

The term “megatrends” was widely popularized by John Naisbitt, a political scientist who published a bestseller in 1982 on the trends transforming our lives. Many variations on the definition exists but put simply megatrends are “long-term driving forces that are observable now and will most likely have a global impact”.¹⁵ Often used in forecasting, they can inform policy decisions to realize a desired future.

Some of the major megatrends seen in Africa include:

1. Population growth: While all other continents will see a decline in population by 2100, Africa’s population will triple in the same period.¹⁶ As the population was estimated at 1.4 billion people as of 2022, that is over 4 billion people.¹⁷ This is in part due to the current “youth bulge” as 77% of the population is under the age of 35.¹⁸
2. Urbanization: By 2050, more than 60% of the population of Africa will be living in cities.¹⁹
3. Climate change: An increase in temperature, less precipitation, and more tropical

¹⁵ European Commission, “The Megatrends Hub,” 28 November 2022, https://knowledge4policy.ec.europa.eu/foresight/tool/megatrends-hub_en

¹⁶ Yomi Kazeem, “Africa’s Population Will Triple by the End of the Century Even as the Rest of the World Shrinks,” *World Economic Forum*, 23 July 2020, <https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2020/07/africa-population-triple/#:~:text=Every%20global%20region%20could%20see%20their%20populations%20decline,or%20faster%20than%20birth%20rates%20in%20several%20countries.>

¹⁷ Statista, “Total Population of Africa from 2000 to 2030,” 2024, <https://www.statista.com/statistics/1224168/total-population-of-africa/>

¹⁸ Bandar Hajjar, “The Children’s Continent: Keeping Up With Africa’s Growth,” *World Economic Forum*, 13 January 2020, <https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2020/01/the-children-s-continent/>

¹⁹ Aimée-Noël Mbiyozo, “Climate Change will Strain Africa’s Already Congested Cities,” *Institute for Security Studies*, 20 October 2021, <https://issafrica.org/iss-today/climate-change-will-strain-africas-already-congested-cities>

storms can already be seen across the continent.²⁰

4. Enabling technology: Increased digitization and technological infrastructure is transforming labor and production, while also serving to connect people to each other and the international community.²¹
5. Emerging middle class: If economic growth continues, there will be a rise of a young, entrepreneurial, technologically savvy middle class.²²
6. Pandemics: As the world becomes increasingly interconnected and without adequate advances in prevention, infectious disease can spread quickly from country to country.

These trends are inevitable, but their outcomes will depend on African leaders' strategies and policy responses. African governments have no choice but to proactively plan for and respond to these megatrends so as to mitigate anticipated challenges and harness potential opportunities.²³ Megatrends will have profound impacts on the security outcomes and the way security is planned, managed, and delivered to citizens. These trends create new opportunities for African governments to review their existing security policies, capacities, and institutions to better respond to these complex threats and to build trust with citizens based on their inclusion in security governance and strategy development.²⁴ Effective response to these trends requires coordinating and collaborating across multiple government agencies and nation states; developing policy responses and mechanisms that are flexible, agile, iterative and adaptive; leveraging external partnership; and developing foresight capabilities. As these trends are mutually reinforcing and cannot be addressed in isolation, African countries (and their external partners) must think strategically about how to address them through national, regional, and continental policies and strategies that are feasible, proactive, creative, coordinated, and comprehensive.

Megatrends are also related to the violent conflict trends we observe on the continent. Since 2010, the number of armed conflicts that involve African states have increased, including those related to violent extremist organizations and insurgent groups in areas such as the Sahel, Coastal Western Africa, Northern Mozambique, Somalia and Kenya, as well as civil wars in Libya, Central African Republic, and Sudan.²⁵ In part, the recent surge of violence

²⁰ United Nations, "Climate Change is an Increasing Threat to Africa," 27 October 2020,

<https://unfccc.int/news/climate-change-is-an-increasing-threat-to-africa>

²¹ Njuguna Ndung'u and Landry Signé, "The Fourth Industrial Revolution and Digitization will Transform Africa into a Global Powerhouse," *Brookings*, 8 January 2020, <https://www.brookings.edu/articles/the-fourth-industrial-revolution-and-digitization-will-transform-africa-into-a-global-powerhouse/>

²² Nafisa Akabor, "The Rise Of African Tech Hubs: How They Are Becoming The Silicon Valleys Of The Continent," *CNBCAfrica*, 2 November 2023, <https://www.cnbc africa.com/2023/the-rise-of-african-tech-hubs-how-they-are-becoming-the-silicon-valleys-of-the-continent/>

²³ Olli Ruohomäki, "Africa Megatrends: Looking over the horizon into the future." *FIIA Briefing Paper 305*. Finnish Institute of International Affairs, 2021. https://www.fiaa.fi/wp-content/uploads/2021/03/bp305_african-megatrends.pdf

²⁴ Luka Kuol and Joel Amegboh, "Rethinking National Security Strategies in Africa." *Journal of International Relations and Diplomacy*. Vol. 9 (1): 1-17, 2021.

<http://www.davidpublisher.com/Public/uploads/Contribute/60a72058556ba.pdf>

²⁵ Paul Williams, "Continuity and Change in War and Conflict in Africa." *Prism* 6:4, 2017; Africa Center, "Sudan Conflict Straining Fragility of Its Neighbors," *Africa Center for Strategic Studies*, April 25, 2024,

is due to the changing nature of conflict itself. In recent years, the most prevalent forms of conflict in Africa have included riots and protests, violence against civilians and battles between state and non-state actors.²⁶ Non-state armed conflicts and incidents of one-sided violence against civilians have also increased. The number of parties to various conflicts has risen over time because rebel organizations and violent extremist organizations frequently splinter and multiply.

Other triggers or drivers of violence include poor governance, social exclusion, and weak rule of law. For instance, state-perpetrated human rights abuses and citizens' perceptions of unjust treatment by the state is increasingly recognized as a core cause of violent extremism.²⁷ In the Sahel region, where there is a large population of unemployed young men (At 14.8 years old, Niger has the lowest average age globally), transnational organized crime and illicit economic finance violent extremism.²⁸ Furthermore, layering climate change on this dynamic adds violent competition over resources – land, food, and water – and transition to other means of survival, as can be seen among Fulani nomadic herdsman who join armed groups or resort to banditry in the Sahel.²⁹ Similarly, the World Bank's 2018 Pathways for Peace report shows that "exclusion from access to power, opportunity, services, and security creates fertile ground for mobilizing group grievances into violence," particularly in fragile states or states that are known for human rights abuses.³⁰ Resilience to violent conflict and crime is correlated with levels of governance.³¹ Without the right policies and infrastructure in place, attuned to the megatrends shaping the continent, there will be continued security degradation.

Discussion Questions:

- Which megatrends are most important in your country or sub-region? How do

<https://africacenter.org/spotlight/sudan-conflict-straining-fragility-of-its-neighbors-displacement-refugees/>; Africa Center, "Deaths Linked to Militant Islamist Violence in Africa Continue to Spiral," *Africa Center for Strategic Studies*, January 29, 2024, <https://africacenter.org/spotlight/mig2024-deaths-militant-islamist-violence-africa-rise/>

²⁶ Armed Conflict Location Event Dataset, <http://acleddata.org>

²⁷ Luca Raineri, "If Victims Become Perpetrators: Factors contributing to vulnerability and resilience to violent extremism in the central Sahel," *International Alert*, June 2018; "Journey to Extremism in Africa: Drivers, Incentives, and the Tipping Point for Recruitment," *United Nations Development Program* (September 2017), <http://journey-to-extremism.undp.org/en/report>; "Journey to Extremism in Africa: Pathways to Recruitment and Disengagement" *United Nations Development Program* (February 2023). <https://journey-to-extremism.undp.org/content/v2/downloads/UNDP-JourneyToExtremism-report-2023-english.pdf>

²⁸ Will Marshall, "Africa's Crime-Terror Nexus: Transnational Organized Crime, Illicit Economic Networks and Violent Extremism in the Sahel," 16 February 2022, <https://globalriskinsights.com/2022/02/africas-crime-terror-nexus-transnational-organised-crime-illicit-economic-networks-and-violent-extremism-in-the-sahel/>

²⁹ Anouar Boukhars and Carl Pilgram, "In Disorder, They Thrive: How Rural Distress Fuels Militancy and Banditry in the Central Sahel," 20 March 2023, <https://www.mei.edu/publications/disorder-they-thrive-how-rural-distress-fuels-militancy-and-banditry-central-sahel>

³⁰ "United Nations; World Bank. 2018. Pathways for Peace : Inclusive Approaches to Preventing Violent Conflict. Washington, DC: World Bank, <https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/handle/10986/28337>

³¹ *Africa Organized Crime Index 2023: Increasing Criminality, Growing Vulnerabilities*, ENACT, 2023, <https://globalinitiative.net/analysis/organised-crime-index-africa-2023/>

- these megatrends interact to influence security outcomes in your country?
- What type of conflict affects your country/subregion the most? What are the impacts of conflict on your country/subregion/continent?
 - What relations are there between conflict and megatrends in your subregion/region?
 - Do you think leadership can make a difference in responding to these megatrends and how? How about ordinary people? Please give examples if possible.
 - What role should the regional security architecture play in responding to these megatrends and conflict trends?
 - How do international actors shape megatrends and their affect on the continent?

Recommended Readings:

Raymond Gilpin. "Unpacking the Implications of Future Trends for Security in Africa." *Brookings*, 2020. <https://www.brookings.edu/blog/africa-in-focus/2020/02/03/unpacking-the-implications-of-future-trends-for-security-in-africa/>

Matthias Basedau, Charlotte Heyl, and Eckart Woertz. 2021. "Population Growth and Security in Africa: Myth or Underestimated Risk?" *German Institute for Global and Area Studies*, Hamburg. January 14. https://assets.ctfassets.net/jlhgiubhhjuo/4NjHjVvw3biOA3lQ5SvHIz/2c19465df7f608cf3b2e2cc8ef033046/GIGA_Population_Growth_Security_in_Africa_PDF.pdf

Kristian Hoelscher, Nick Dorward, Sean Fox, Taibat Lawanson Jeffrey Paller and Melanie Phillips. 2023. "Urbanization and Political Change in Africa." *African Affairs*, 122 (488): 353–376. <https://academic.oup.com/afraf/article/122/488/353/7233788>

Africa Center. 2021. "How Global Warming Threatens Human Security in Africa". *Infographic*. Washington: Africa Center for Strategic Studies. <https://africacenter.org/spotlight/how-global-warming-threatens-human-security-in-africa/>

Velomahanina Razakamaharavo. 2021. "Implications of Emerging Technologies on Peace and Security in Africa". *Conflict and Resilience Monitor* 2021/2. Accord. <https://www.accord.org.za/conflict-trends/implications-of-emerging-technologies-on-peace-and-security-in-africa/>

Guy Lamb. 2023. "Revisiting human security in Africa in the post-Covid-19 era". Policy Paper No. 86. *Afrobarometer* February 2023.

Laura Kokko, « L’Afrique de l’avenir : les tendances clés d’ici à 2025, » dans L’Afrique : un continent sur la voie de l’intégration. *Centre Universitaire Francophone*, p. 173-193, 2018. http://acta.bibl.u-szeged.hu/63619/1/010_francophone.pdf#page=173

Plenary Session 2: Violent Extremism Dynamics

Format: Plenary session
Discussion group

Objectives:

- Unpack drivers/causes that account for the proliferation and endurance of violent extremist organizations (VEOs).
- Assess national and regional approaches to countering violent extremism and lessons learned (hard and soft approaches).
- Examine the role of strategic leadership to countering violent extremism (what role do national and local security actors play in national strategic plans to counter VEOs).

Background:

Violent extremism continues to be one of the most significant challenges to peace and security in Africa. What makes this state of affairs particularly frustrating is that despite the extraordinary sacrifice and enormous number of lives and resources that Africans and their international partners have devoted to countering and preventing terrorism, many violent extremist groups (VEOs) have still been able to flourish and expand their reach. Even in theaters where they were described as vanquished or in their final throes, VEOs remain a threat.

The resilience and proliferation of these organizations are puzzling because their objectives and methods are far more radical than the people they claim to represent. Surveys and available evidence show that the vast majority of Africans oppose violent extremism and terrorism. Yet, al-Qaeda-linked groups, Islamic State affiliates, and other violent extremist groups continue to attract recruits and financing, shrewdly exploiting opportunities created by state fragility, exclusionary governance, and local conflicts. In areas where they have managed to control territory, groups such as the Islamic State in West Africa Province have focused on delivering basic forms of governance and social services to the rural population of the Lake Chad area. In other theaters where they have not successfully supplanted the state, VEOs exploit and stoke political instability, inter-communal tensions, and socio-economic grievances. The growth and expansion of violent extremist organizations in the Sahel, Lake Chad Basin, and East Africa illustrate that their resilience and power stem not just from their violent activity, but also from their ability to supplant local governments as service providers and arbiters of social order.

To generate new results in the struggle against violent extremism, policy makers, security officials and practitioners must rethink existing assumptions and methods. This necessity of reexamining and replacing failed methods and paradigms is immediately evident in the emerging consensus among multiple African stakeholders that preventing and countering violent extremism requires population-centric strategies that include communities and

build partnerships among a wide range of actors. To defeat extremists, security forces must therefore adapt their methods to carefully cooperate with local authorities, including service providers, traditional leaders, community defense groups, and civil society organizations. This is a testament to the growing recognition of the peril of treating community-oriented approaches to preventing, mitigating, and countering violent extremism as a distraction – instead of a necessary, strategic complement – to traditional security approaches.

Discussion Questions:

- What VEOs are operating in your country and region? How have these organizations affected the security environment in which you work?
- What concrete and practical measures can African nations take, working at the national, regional, and international levels, to better counter VEOs on the continent?
- What should be the role of strategic leadership and security sector leaders to countering violent extremism?

Recommended Readings:

The Africa Center for Strategic Studies. “Deaths Linked to Militant Islamist Violence in Africa Continue to Spiral.” *The Africa Center for Strategic Studies*. January 29, 2024.

<https://africacenter.org/spotlight/mig2024-deaths-militant-islamist-violence-africa-rise/>

Journey to Extremism in Africa: Drivers, Incentives and The Tipping Point for Recruitment. UNDP. 2017.

<https://journey-to-extremism.undp.org/content/v1/downloads/UNDP-JourneyToExtremism-report-2017-english.pdf>

Journey to Extremism in Africa: Pathways to Recruitment and Disengagement. UNDP. February 2023.

<https://journey-to-extremism.undp.org/content/v2/downloads/UNDP-JourneyToExtremism-report-2023-english.pdf>

James Khalil, MaryAnne Iwara, & Martine Zeuthen, “Journeys through Extremism: The Experiences of Forced Recruits in Boko Haram,” *Resolve Network*, September 29, 2022,

<https://resolvenet.org/research/journeys-through-extremism-experiences-forced-recruits-boko-haram>

James Khalil and Martine Zauthen. “The ‘Off-Ramp’ From al-Shabaab: Disengagement During the Ongoing Offensive in Somalia.” *International Center for Counter-Terrorism*. March 7, 2023.

<https://www.icct.nl/publication/ramp-al-shabaab-disengagement-during-ongoing-offensive-somalia>

James Khalil, Yahye Abdi, Sif Heide-Ottosen, Abdullahi Ahmed Nor, and Martine Zeuthen, “The ‘Off-Ramp’ from al-Shabaab: Disengagement During the Offensive in Somalia,” *Resolve Network*, December 14, 2023, <https://resolvenet.org/research/off-ramp-al-shabaab-disengagement-somalia>

Anouar Boukhars, “Trajectories of Violence Against Civilians by Africa’s Militant Islamist Groups.” Africa Center for Strategic Studies *Spotlight*, 2022.

- EN: <https://africacenter.org/spotlight/trajectories-of-violence-against-civilians-by-africas-militant-islamist-groups/>

- FR : <https://africacenter.org/fr/spotlight/trajec-toires-de-la-violence-contre-les-civils-par-les-groupes-islamistes-militants-dafrique/>
- PO : <https://africacenter.org/pt-pt/spotlight/trajetorias-de-violencia-contra-civis-pelos-grupos-militantes-islamicos-de-africa/>

Gregory Pirio, Robert Pittelli, and Yussuf Adam, “The Many Drivers Enabling Violent Extremism in Northern Mozambique.” Africa Center for Strategic Studies *Spotlight*, 2019.

- EN: <https://africacenter.org/spotlight/the-many-drivers-enabling-violent-extremism-in-northern-mozambique/>
- FR: <https://africacenter.org/fr/spotlight/nombreux-facteurs-qui-favorisent-extremisme-violent-nord-mozambique/>
- PO: <https://africacenter.org/pt-pt/spotlight/os-diversos-fatores-que-desencadearam-a-violencia-extremista-na-regiao-norte-de-mocambique/>

Daisy Muibu, “Somalia’s Offensive Against al-Shabaab: Taking Stock of Obstacles.” *Combating Terrorism Center Sentinel*, February 2024, <https://ctc.westpoint.edu/somalias-stalled-offensive-against-al-shabaab-taking-stock-of-obstacles/>

Additional Africa Center Resources:

Developing Local Strategies to Counter Violent Extremism (CVE) in Africa program, January 25 – February 16, 2022:

- EN: <https://africacenter.org/programs/2022-01-cvelocal-developing-local-strategies-counter-violent-extremism-africa/>
- FR : <https://africacenter.org/fr/programs/2022-01-cvelocal-fr/>
- PO : <https://africacenter.org/pt-pt/2022-01-cvelocal-pt/>

“Why Al-Shabaab Persists in Somalia” webinar, December 9, 2021:

- EN: <https://africacenter.org/programs/202112cve-why-al-shabaab-persists-somalia-webinar/>
- FR : <https://africacenter.org/fr/programs/202112cve-pourquoi-al-shabaab-persiste-somalie/>
- PO : <https://africacenter.org/pt-pt/202112cve-por-que-al-shabaab-ersiste-somalia/>

Pauline Le Roux, « Répondre à l’essor de l’extrémisme violent au Sahel. » Africa Center for Strategic Studies, 2019.

- FR: <https://africacenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/01/ASB36FR-Repondre-a-l%E2%80%99essor-de-l%E2%80%99extremisme-violent.pdf>
- EN: <https://africacenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/12/ASB36EN-Responding-to-the-Rise-in-Violent-Extremism-in-the-Sahel-Africa-Center-for-Strategic-Studies.pdf>

Plenary Session 3: Transnational Organized Crime Dynamics

Format: Plenary session
Discussion group

Objectives:

- Describe the trends and levels of various forms of transnational organized crime and the relevant criminal networks operating in Africa.
- Understand the drivers of transnational organized crime in Africa, as well as its consequences for governance, stability, and economic development.
- Assess the merits of potential elements of state response to transnational organized crime, particularly the roles of security sector leaders in fostering citizen/community centric approaches, interagency cooperation, and regional collaboration.

Background:

Transnational organized crime (TOC) is a growing security challenge in Africa. There are many forms of TOC in Africa perpetrated by state and non-state actors with varying degrees of linkage. Human trafficking, arms trafficking, and non-renewable resource crimes are the three most widespread criminal markets, and overall, the COVID-19 pandemic increased the ability of those state-embedded actors who facilitate TOC to do so with less restrictive measures for accountable governance in place.³² Furthermore, TOC and political instability continue to be mutually reinforcing phenomena, and the commercial, criminal, and corrupt elements of TOC foster a parallel political economy that undermines economic development and state legitimacy.³³

There is no single definition of organized crime, but the UN's Palermo Convention – which most African countries have ratified – defines “**organized criminal groups**” as three or more people, existing for a period of time, that act together with the aim of committing at least one crime punishable by four years' incarceration. TOC is committed to obtain a direct or indirect financial/material benefit.³⁴ Organized crime is transnational when activities and their effects cross national borders. Devising responses can be challenging, as some states are ill-equipped to counter and prevent criminal network activities or have certain high-level officials who are politically unwilling to combat crimes from which they benefit. The coordination of security, justice, and other institutions on the inter-agency, cross-border,

³² Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime, “Africa Organized Crime Index 2021: Evolution of Crime in a Covid World,” <https://globalinitiative.net/wp-content/uploads/2021/11/ENACT-Organised-Crime-Index-2021.pdf>

³³ United Nations Economic Commission for Africa. 2015. *Illicit Financial Flows: Report of the High Level Panel on Illicit Financial Flows from Africa*. Addis Ababa, United Nations Economic Commission for Africa. <http://hdl.handle.net/10855/22695>

³⁴ UN Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime and the Protocols Thereto, <https://www.unodc.org/documents/treaties/UNTOC/Publications/TOC%20Convention/TOCebook-e.pdf>

and subnational levels is warranted, but inherently complex.

Security sector actors in African states are well aware of the challenges of countering TOC, but also face the difficult task of devising responses that fit local contexts. Political economy frameworks can help emerging leaders understand where to start. Political economy is “the study of rational decisions in the context of political and economic institutions,” which shape various actors’ incentives to behave in certain ways.³⁵ Taking a political economy approach involves understanding who the different actors are, identifying the strategies they may adopt based on African states’ criminal markets and vulnerabilities, and assessing how resilience factors can change organized criminal actors’ incentives to pursue TOC in particular places. There are many factors that shape people’s incentives to participate in illicit economies. Some key ones are the availability of alternative livelihoods, how legitimate the state and its laws are, and how the transparency and accountability of the security and justice sectors affect such legitimacy.

One example of a political economy framework is the ENACT Consortium’s Organized Crime Index (released in 2019, again in 2021, and updated for 2023).³⁶ It examines the roles of **five primary criminal actors**: state-embedded actors, criminal networks, foreign actors, mafia-style actors, and private sector actors, and tracks the presence and intensity of **fifteen different criminal markets** in all African countries. The Index shows a considerable increase in TOC over this timeframe, with state-embedded actors playing key roles in facilitating such activities. To influence state responses to TOC, the Index analyzes **twelve factors affecting resilience** to TOC: political leadership and governance, government transparency and accountability, international cooperation, national policies and laws, judicial capacity, law enforcement capacity, anti-money laundering, economic regulatory capacity, victim and witness support, prevention, non-state actor involvement in response, and territorial integrity.³⁷

Ultimately, the ENACT research concludes that the most successful efforts to counter TOC are likely to involve security responses that feed into broader efforts to address the development- and governance - related drivers of organized crime. In particular, the 2023 Index provides empirical evidence over the last five years of “the crucial role of effective rule of law, accountability mechanisms and a transparent civil society in combating organised crime.”³⁸

³⁵ Allan Drazen, *Political Economy in Macroeconomics* (Princeton University Press, 2000), p. 4, citing James Alt & Kenneth Shepsle, eds. *Perspectives on Political Economy* (Cambridge University Press, 1990).

³⁶ Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime, *ENACT Global Organized Crime Index 2021*, <https://globalinitiative.net/wp-content/uploads/2021/09/GITOC-Global-Organized-Crime-Index-2021.pdf>; *ENACT Organized Crime Index Africa 2019*, <https://enact-africa.s3.amazonaws.com/site/uploads/2019-09-24-oc-index-2019.pdf>

³⁷ *Organised Crime Index Africa 2019*, op.cit.

³⁸ Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime, *ENACT Global Organized Crime Index 2023*, <https://globalinitiative.net/wp-content/uploads/2021/09/GITOC-Global-Organized-Crime-Index-2023.pdf>, p.8.

Discussion Questions:

- How much is transnational organized crime a security concern in your country/region, and what kinds of criminal actors and criminal markets are involved?
- What factors allow transnational organized crime to flourish in your country/region? To what extent are issues of development, governance, and rule of law linked to transnational organized crime?
- What kinds of efforts to counter and prevent transnational organized crime are underway in your country/region? To what extent are they addressing any of the twelve resilience factors mentioned in the ENACT Organized Crime Index?
- What roles can security sector actors play in responding to transnational organized crime on the cross-border, national inter-agency, and subnational levels? How important are the AU, RECs, international institutions, and local civil society and why?

Recommended Readings:

“Introduction,” [*Africa Organized Crime Index 2023 – Increasing Criminality, Growing Vulnerabilities*](#), ENACT, pp. 4-14.

- EN: https://africa.ocindex.net/assets/downloads/english/enact_report_2023.pdf
 - To find the report on your country, visit: Data Analysis Portal for Organised Crime Index Africa 2023, <https://africa.ocindex.net/>
- FR: <https://enact-africa.s3.amazonaws.com/uploads/pages/1708078791220-2023-ocindex-africa-report-fr.pdf>
 - Pour trouver le rapport sur votre pays, visitez : Portail d’analyse des données de l’Indice du crime organisé en Afrique 2023, <https://africa.ocindex.net/>
- PO: [*Índice de crime organizado de Àfrica 2023 : Criminalidade em aumento, vulnerabilidades crescente*](#)
 - Para encontrar o relatório relativo ao seu país, visite : Portal de análise de dados de l’Indice du crime organizado de Àfrica 2023, <https://africa.ocindex.net/>

Catherine Lena Kelly, “[*An Introduction to Coordination of Security and Justice Responses to Countering Transnational Organized Crime*](#),” Africa Center for Strategic Studies

- EN: <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=gORTFAb1lLw&t=1s>
- FR: <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=nGeziZFrwgl>
- PO: <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=kdzZLRDL-Yc>

Lusaka Agreement Task Force, “[*Cross-Border Cooperation and Coordination to Combat Illegal Wildlife Trade: A Case Study of the Lusaka Agreement Task Force \(LATF\)*](#),” 2022.

“[*Déclaration de Kinshasa sur le renforcement de la coopération judiciaire dans la région des Grands Lacs*](#),” Réunion des Ministres de la Justice des Etats Membres de la Conférence Internationale sur la Région des Grands Lacs, 16 juin 2022.

Additional Africa Center Resources: Enhancing Security-Justice Coordination to Counter TOC, Western and Southern Africa program videos, February 9 - March 3, 2021:

- EN: <https://africacenter.org/programs/security-justice-transnational-organized-crime/>

- FR: <https://africacenter.org/fr/programmes/renforcer-coordination-securite-justice-criminalite-transnationale-organisee/>
- PO: <https://africacenter.org/pt-pt/reforco-coordenacao-seguranca-justica-criminalidade-organizada-transnacional/>

Enhancing Security-Justice Coordination to Counter TOC, Central, Eastern, and Northern Africa program videos, October 19 – November 10, 2021:

- EN: <https://africacenter.org/programmes/2021-ctoc-sj-2/>
- FR: <https://africacenter.org/fr/programmes/2021-ctoc-sj-2/>

Professional Development for Countering Transnational Organized Crime webinar series videos, 2021-2022:

- EN: <https://africacenter.org/programmes/2020-ctoc-webinar-series/>
- FR: <https://africacenter.org/fr/programmes/2020-ctoc-webinar-series/>
- PO: <https://africacenter.org/pt-pt/2020-ctoc-webinar-series/>

Plenary Session 4: Maritime Security Threats

Format: Plenary session
Discussion group

Objectives:

- Explore trends in maritime safety and security in Africa.
- Evaluate existing collaborative arrangements to safeguard Africa's maritime interests.
- Examine the role of strategic leadership and security sector actors to sustain maritime safety and security.

Background:

Africa's blue economy – including fisheries, minerals, hydrocarbons, tourism, and trade from thirty-eight coastal countries and six islands -- is estimated to be worth US \$1 trillion per year.³⁹ Besides such economic potential, over 90% of African exports and imports are transported by water.⁴⁰ While there is much potential, there is a tendency towards “sea blindness”, or to ignore the maritime domain and its centrality to African economic growth as well as its security and defense. The maritime space has been a theater of criminal activities and is host to a web of interconnected security threats. Some of the most pressing threats include Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated (IUU) fishing and other natural resource theft, as well as piracy and armed robbery at sea.⁴¹ The COVID-19 pandemic has also exacerbated the security threats in the maritime domain in Africa, particularly by disrupting supply chains and increasing the risk of ports becoming targets for attack.

The protection of Africa's maritime space and its resources is a strategic security concern of coastal countries and landlocked countries and requires the provision of effective maritime security. The maritime domain has become one of the main focuses of the AU Agenda 2063 and 2050 Africa's Integrated Maritime Strategy (2050 AIM Strategy).⁴² Both recognize the maritime domain's pivotal role as a catalyst for Africa's economic resurgence and socio-economic change.⁴³ The Lomé Charter was adopted in 2016 by the AU as a binding maritime security and safety charter with focus on security provisions of the 2050 AIM Strategy.⁴⁴

³⁹ Ifesinachi Okafor-Yarwood. “Review of nine African “blue economy” projects shows what works and what does’ not work”. The Conversation, August 11, 2020.

⁴⁰ Henrietta Nagy and Siphesihle Nene, “Blue Gold: Advancing Blue Economy Governance in Africa.” Sustainability 13, 7153: 1-11. 2021. <https://www.mdpi.com/2071-1050/13/13/7153>

⁴¹ Ifesinachi Okafor-Yarwood. “Review of nine African “blue economy” projects shows what works and what does’ not work”. The Conversation, August 11, 2020.

⁴² Nagy and Nene, op cit.

⁴³ Richard Wetaya, “Blue economy seen as a catalyst for Africa's economic resurgence.” Alliance for Science. 2022. <https://allianceforscience.cornell.edu/blog/2022/02/blue-economy-seen-as-catalyst-for-africas-economic-resurgence/>

⁴⁴ Pieter Brits and Michelle Nel, “African maritime security and the Lomé Charter: Reality or dream?” African Security Review 27 (3-4): 226 – 244, 2018.

These AU commitments are aligned and linked to the United Nations Sustainable Development Goal 14, which promotes the sustainable use of oceans, seas, and marine resources, including for development.

This collaborative international approach finds its concrete expression at the regional level where nations sharing a maritime region have worked with each other, often through the Regional Economic Community structure, to build practical agreements and frameworks for cooperation at the operational level. For example, the Yaoundé Code of Conduct established cooperation between Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS) member states on a variety of maritime security issues and created a jointly staffed Inter-regional Coordination Center to organize cooperation. These frameworks have helped facilitate the harmonization of maritime laws on issues such as hot pursuit, evidence sharing, and extradition as well as providing for tracking and even operational coordination between navies. Although joint capacities are still in development, there have been several notable successes. One is the recapture of the Hailufeng 11 in May 2020, after its capture by pirates off the coast of Côte d'Ivoire. Through information sharing across the region and operational cooperation between Benin and Nigeria, the vessel was successfully recaptured, and the pirates were tried in Nigeria under a new anti-piracy law.

African states' ability to collectively govern their maritime domains and to sustainably manage its resources determines their capacity to deliver an array of benefits to their citizens and improve their provision of security and development. Improving governance and security in the littoral communities most affected by IUU fishing and other forms of natural resource theft can also help diminish threats by enhancing their interest in cooperating with law enforcement and limiting community member engagement in maritime crime.⁴⁵ There is also more work to continue to ensure that national laws and practices are in place to facilitate the prosecution of maritime criminals, especially when cross-border and regional cooperation is required. Many littoral African nations are still developing chain of custody procedures for the handling of maritime criminals and criminal evidence; prosecution can also be challenging due to the complexities of the law of the sea, or low levels of maritime legal expertise or law enforcement authorities within navies.⁴⁶ Updating national law and procedure and harmonizing it regionally are both essential.

Discussion Questions:

- What is the economic potential of the maritime space of your country/region, and do you think this potential is being fully realized? Why or why not?

https://www.researchgate.net/publication/329326511_African_maritime_security_and_the_Lome_Charter_Reality_or_dream

⁴⁵ Ifesenachi Okafor-Yarwood, "The cyclical nature of maritime security threats: illegal, unreported, and unregulated fishing as a threat to human and national security in the Gulf of Guinea." *African Security*; Vol. 13 (2): 116-146, 2020.

⁴⁶ Ian Ralby, "Learning from success: Advancing maritime security cooperation in Atlantic Africa." CIMSEC, 2019. https://cimsec.org/learning-from-success-advancing-maritime-security-cooperation-in-atlantic-africa/?fbclid=IwAR0qlr2I3Vn_wQhTc_Gu-JsuDjiTrZl8DYr5cQT3fsr4I1DqDa0jYQR5Xzg

- Can you share some of the key maritime security threats in your country/region, and whether they have been adequately addressed?
- Given the transboundary nature of threats facing maritime space, what is the level of cooperative, coordinated, and collective responses of countries in your region to maritime insecurity? Can you share some examples of such collective responses and what can be done better?
- What roles can security sector leaders play in fostering maritime safety and security?

Recommended Readings:

Ian Ralby, "Trends in African Maritime Security." *Africa Center for Strategic Studies Spotlight*, 2019:

- EN: <https://africacenter.org/spotlight/trends-in-african-maritime-security/>
- FR: <https://africacenter.org/fr/spotlight/tendances-en-matiere-de-securite-maritime-en-afrique/>

United Nations, "Africa's Blue Economy: A Policy Handbook." 2016.

- EN: <https://wedocs.unep.org/bitstream/handle/20.500.11822/30130/AfricasBlueEconomy.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y>
- FR: <https://repository.uneca.org/handle/10855/23073>

Ifesenachi Okafor-Yarwood, "Illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing and the complexities of the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) for countries in the Gulf of Guinea." *Marine Policy*, vol. 99 (January), p. 414-422, 2019.

<https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S0308597X17303445>

Pieter Brits and Michelle Nel, "African maritime security and the Lomé Charter: Reality or dream?" *African Security Review* 27 (3-4): p. 226-244, 2018.

https://www.researchgate.net/publication/329326511_African_maritime_security_and_the_Lome_Charter_Reality_or_dream

Thierry Vircoulon & Violette Tournier, « Sécurité dans le golfe de Guinée : un combat régional, »

Politique Etrangère 3, 2015. <https://www.cairn.info/revue-politique-etrangere2015-3-page-161.htm>

Additional Africa Center Resources:

"Enhancing Maritime Safety and Security in Africa: Whole of Africa Maritime Dialogue," round table, 27-28 July, 2021:

- EN/FR/PO : <https://africacenter.org/programs/mss-dialogue-2021/>

André Standing, "Criminality in Africa's Fishing Industry: A Threat to Human Security." Africa Center for Strategic Studies *Africa Security Brief* No. 33, 2017:

- EN: <https://africacenter.org/publication/criminality-africa-fishing-industry-threat-human-security/>
- FR: <https://africacenter.org/fr/publication/criminalite-peche-commerciale-afrique-menace-securite-humaine/>
- PO: <https://africacenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/11/ASB33PT-Criminalidade-na-industria-pesqueira-de-Africa-Uma-ameaca-a-seguranca-humana.pdf>

“Maritime Security in the Western Indian Ocean: A Conversation with Assis Malaquias,” 7 July 2017:

- EN: <https://africacenter.org/spotlight/maritime-security-western-indian-ocean-a-discussion-with-assis-malaquias/>
- FR: <https://africacenter.org/fr/spotlight/la-securite-maritime-dans-la-partie-occidentale-de-locean-indien-une-discussion-avec-assis-malaquias/>

Plenary Session 5: Cyber Threats

Format: Plenary session
Discussion group

Objectives:

- Explore the nature of cyber security in Africa: what is it and why is it relevant, and what are its implications?
- Explore how the spread of information and communications technology in Africa is affecting threats from espionage, critical infrastructure sabotage, organized crime, and armed conflict.
- Assess national, regional, and international approaches to managing cyber threats.
- Discuss the challenges faced by African security actors in responding to cyber threats and challenges.

Background:

With the rapid spread of digital technology across the African continent, cyberspace is becoming an increasingly important security domain. A growing number of African citizens are falling victim to online fraud, theft, and extortion perpetrated by organized, and increasingly globalized, cyber-enabled criminal networks. Africa's critical infrastructure, essential to the continent's future prosperity, is becoming vulnerable to cyber sabotage. Disinformation, much of it sponsored by external actors, is drilling into Africa's information ecosystems, undermining democracy and political stability. Social media, open-source intelligence, and unmanned systems are increasingly being deployed by nation state and non-state actors in Africa's armed conflicts, changing the character of warfare.

The policy response in many African countries is struggling to keep pace with this rapidly diversifying array of cyber threats. Deficits in human and organizational capacity mean that many cyber incidents go unreported and unaddressed. Though the number of states with cyber security policies and strategies are rising, even Africa's most cyber mature countries often fail to establish key interagency coordination mechanisms or anticipate and respond to the latest threats. Crucial issues such as the protection of critical infrastructure or regulating the norms of interstate behavior in cyberspace lack coherent policy frameworks at the national, regional, and international levels.

The African security sector has a crucial role to play as part of a broader multi-stakeholder approach to cyber space security in Africa – coordinating the protection of critical infrastructure, responding to the most strategically significant threats from organized, armed actors, and in thinking through how best to adapt technological advances into security and military strategies and operations. Yet because information technology is an enabling technology with a broad array of applications, key sources of expertise lie in the private sector, and civil society has a critical role to play in ensuring that digital technology

is used transparently and accountably. For the digital revolution to realize its full potential, African governments must adopt a human-centric approach to cybersecurity.

Discussion Questions:

- What are the cyber-related security challenges in your country or region? How is digital technology changing the security landscape?
- What practical steps can security sector actors take, working across government, the private sector, and civil society, to address these cyber threats?
- How can African countries advance their cooperation with one another and with external actors to manage the cyber threats they face?

Recommended Readings:

Nate D.F. Allen, "Africa's Evolving Cyber Threats." *Spotlight*. Washington: Africa Center for Strategic Studies, 2021:

- EN: <https://africacenter.org/spotlight/africa-evolving-cyber-threats/>
- FR : <https://africacenter.org/fr/spotlight/lafrique-a-lepreuve-des-nouvelles-formes-de-cybercriminalite/>

Africa Center for Strategic Studies, "Mapping Disinformation in Africa." *Spotlight*. Washington: Africa Center for Strategic Studies, 2022:

- EN: <https://africacenter.org/spotlight/mapping-disinformation-in-africa/>
- FR : <https://africacenter.org/fr/spotlight/cartographie-de-la-desinformation-en-afrique/>
- PO : <https://africacenter.org/pt-pt/spotlight/mapeamento-da-desinformacao-em-africa/>

Abdul-Hakeem Ajijola and Nate D.F. Allen, "African Lessons in Cyber Strategy." *Spotlight*. Washington: Africa Center for Strategic Studies, 2022:

- EN: <https://africacenter.org/spotlight/african-lessons-in-cyber-strategy/>
- FR : <https://africacenter.org/fr/spotlight/lecons-dafrique-en-matiere-de-cyber-strategie/>

INTERPOL, "African Cyber Threat Assessment Report 2021." INTERPOL 2021:

- EN:https://www.interpol.int/en/content/download/16759/file/AfricanCyberthreatAssessment_ENGLISH.pdf?inLanguage=eng-GB
- FR:https://www.interpol.int/en/content/download/16759/file/AfricanCyberthreatAssessment_FRENCH.pdf?inLanguage=fr-FR

Plenary Session 6: Strategic Leadership in Africa's Security Sector

Format: Plenary session
Discussion group

Objectives:

- Understand the critical role of leadership in confronting the changing and complex African security landscape.
- Analyze the tenets of effective strategic leadership in an African context.
- Highlight the importance of adaptability for effective leadership in the ever-changing and complex security environment.

Background:

There is optimism that Africa can claim the latter part of the 21st century if its leaders are prepared to harness emerging global opportunities and address the continent's evolving security challenges. Depending on whether African leaders respond proactively or reactively to the challenges and opportunities they face, the interconnected megatrends discussed in Session 1 may lead to virtuous, mutually reinforcing cycles of stability, growth, and development or vicious cycles of instability, conflict, and poverty. The dynamic security landscape demands that security sector leaders move away from the old approach of "business-as-usual" and provide much-needed strategic and proactive leadership to create resilient institutions over the long term, and make decisive, evidence-based decisions in the face of crisis and uncertainty.

Although there are different approaches to the understanding of leadership, the focus here is on effective strategic leadership that is generally defined as "the unique abilities of anticipating, envisioning, maintaining flexibility, thinking strategically, and empowering employees to create new inventions that lead to organizational transformations or changes."⁴⁷ Beyond developing these abilities, strategic leadership is also about having the adaptive capacity to appropriately respond to the dynamism and complexity of the context.⁴⁸ With the rapidly changing and uncertain external environment, adaptive leadership gains ground and prominence.

Adaptive leadership is defined as "the ability to anticipate future needs, articulate those needs to build collective support and understanding, adapt your responses based on continuous learning, and demonstrate accountability through transparency in your

⁴⁷ Alex Jaleha and Vincent Machuki, "Strategic Leadership and Organizational Performance: Critical Review of Literature." *European Scientific Review*. Vol 4(35): 127, 2018.

<https://eujournal.org/index.php/esj/article/view/11558>

⁴⁸ Paul Schoemaker, Steve Krupp and Samantha Howland, "Strategic Leadership: The Essential Skills." *Harvard Business Review*. 91(1-2): 131-134, 2018. <https://hbr.org/2013/01/strategic-leadership-the-essential-skills>

decision-making process.”⁴⁹ There are five key principles that are central to the application of adaptive leadership, namely: evidence-based learning and adaptation; stress-testing underlying assumptions and beliefs; streamlining deliberative decision-making processes; appreciating the significance of accountability, transparency, and inclusion; and mobilizing collective action.⁵⁰

The concept of leadership is well embedded in African values and cultures. For example, the concept of *ubuntu* is a South African leadership ethic which means “a person is a person through others” and it provides understanding of ourselves in relation to the world.⁵¹ A similar ethic, found in West Africa, is the *Kurukan Fuga*⁵² or the Manden Charter, which established the Federation of Mandinka clans under one government and outlined laws by which the Malinké people should abide by social peace, co-exist in diversity, and live with dignity. Some of the indispensable characteristics that most strategic leaders have in common include being a visionary, having high moral and ethical values, being a strategic thinker, investing in the development of social and human capital as well as future leadership, being a quick learner, being a change initiator, and exhibiting both sense giving and sense making.⁵³

Discussion Questions:

- Who are some leaders (national, regional, continental, and international) you consider to be role models for leadership and why?
- Do you see yourself as a leader and what can you do to make yourself an effective strategic leader?
- Can you share cultural values and norms in your country or region that promote effective leadership?
- Based on the experience of COVID-19 in your country/region, can you share your assessment of the quality of leadership provided to address the pandemic and what could have been done differently?
- Do you know of any leaders in your community/country/region who have facilitated positive change? What factors have led to their success as a leader?

Recommended Readings:

Ben Ramalingam et al, “Five Principles to Guide Adaptive Leadership.” *Harvard Business Review*, 2020. <https://hbr.org/2020/09/5-principles-to-guide-adaptive-leadership>

Regina Eckert and Simon Rweyongozze, “Leadership Development in Africa: A Focus on Strengths.” *Center for Creative Leadership*, 2015. <https://www.ccl.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/04/leadershipDevelopmentAfrica.pdf>

⁴⁹ Ben Ramalingam et al, “5 Principles to Guide Adaptive Leadership,” *Harvard Business Review*, September 11, 2020. <https://hbr.org/2020/09/5-principles-to-guide-adaptive-leadership>

⁵⁰ Ramalingam et al, *op cit*.

⁵¹ See <https://historyplex.com/ubuntu-african-philosophy>

⁵² See <https://en.unesco.org/mediabank/23135/>

⁵³ Page 211, Asif, *op cit*.

Kwesi Aning and Joseph Siegle, "Deep Commitment, High Expectations: The Values of the Next Generation of African Security Sector Leaders." *Africa Defense Forum*, 2018:

- EN: <http://adf-magazine.com/deep-commitment-high-expectations/>
- FR: <http://adf-magazine.com/engagement-profond-attentes-elevees/?lang=fr>

Sam Adeyemi, "Africa does not Need Charity, it Needs Good Leadership," *World Economic Forum on Africa*, 2017. <https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2017/05/africa-doesn-t-need-charity-it-needs-good-leadership>

Plenary Session 7: Rule of Law and Security Governance: Importance to Civil-Military Relations

Format: Plenary session
Discussion group

Objectives:

- Discuss what rule of law is as a principle, its place in democratic and civilian security sector governance, and the ways it shapes drivers of security challenges affecting Africa.
- Discuss the key elements of Civil-Military Relations (CMR) and their link to the democratic governance of the security sector under the rule of law.
- Discuss how reforming the security sector and promoting sound institutions of security sector governance can contribute to forging healthy CMR, and vice versa.

Background:

Addressing challenges related to delivering legitimate and accountable security services to the populace – especially in relation to a government’s strategy to address issues like terrorism, organized crime, armed conflict, maritime or cyber insecurity, or otherwise – demands a holistic, coordinated effort across the security sector and entities across the different branches of government authorized to oversee security. Rule of law and healthy civil-military relations are critical components of ensuring the security sector’s effectiveness in these endeavors.

Rule of law and justice are vital for peace and stability, which it is the security sector’s job to provide. In its simplest form, the rule of law means that nobody is above the law, including those who are in the security services; all people are treated equally under the law, regardless of who they are. Laws are clear, well-known, and applied transparently and evenly by an independent judiciary. Maximally, rule of law includes accountability, just laws, open government, and accessible justice for all.⁵⁴ The African Union’s Agenda 2063 further advances such a vision by calling for an Africa where people “enjoy affordable and timely access to independent courts and judiciary that deliver justice without fear or favor.” Thus, rule of law is not just about security officials enforcing the law; fostering the rule of law helps governments build a “social contract” with citizens.

Rule of law is also a core element of sound security sector governance, which facilitates the provision of security to citizens on the basis of democratic and civilian control of the security sector. Rule of law is particularly relevant to security governance in light of empirical evidence that some security threats, like violent extremist recruitment, tend to be exacerbated by state-perpetrated abuses of civilians and people’s perceptions of unfair treatment by state officials. The professionalism of the security services, as well as citizens’

⁵⁴ World Justice Project, “What is the Rule of Law?” <https://worldjusticeproject.org/about-us/overview/what-rule-law>

perceptions of it, hinge upon having a system of checks and balances that ensures everyone respects civil liberties and human rights. When there is accountable and people-centered security sector governance, these institutions and actors work in complementarity, within a robust system of checks and balances, to ensure that the defense and security forces who “hold and deploy the means of coercion on behalf of, and for the protection of the entire society,...do not end up functioning as a threat to the same elements they were supposed to protect in the first place.”⁵⁵

There are, accordingly, range of formal and informal institutions that must be engaged consistently and adaptively. Formal, national-level oversight institutions (like parliaments, inspectorates, military ombuds institutions, independent anti-corruption and human rights commissions) play key roles in monitoring security force activities and behaviors toward citizens; civilian leaders should also be subject to oversight by the same or similar institutions. The everyday practices that security officials exercise with citizens also matter, since every rights-bearing citizen is a key stakeholder in the rule of law. Local oversight in security sector governance and security governance as a whole also depends upon the work of civil society organizations, media, customary or religious authorities, women and youth groups, and non-state security providers.

The health of a country’s Civil-Military Relations (CMR) also influence the state’s ability to deliver human security to citizens effectively. CMR is concerned with the manner in which the military and the society it is meant to protect interact, usually through some sort of negotiated bargain between citizens, civilian government authorities, and the military.⁵⁶ Arguably, the biggest challenge is to address the dilemma of “who guards the guardians”⁵⁷ and to craft pathways to reconcile the security sector’s desire to act on the wants of civilians with the ability to do only what civilians authorize.⁵⁸ A key challenge in most African countries is how to nurture healthy CMRs that will create a secure environment conducive to citizen security, job creation, justice, and rule of law. There is an alarming regression in democracy and a surge of coup d’états in Africa, combined with increased and unconstrained military spending, all without significant improvements in citizen security and safety.⁵⁹ The Ibrahim Index of African Governance shows a shrinking trust of citizens in security forces.⁶⁰ These indicators demonstrate increasingly problematic CMRs, with

⁵⁵ Adedeji Ebo, “Parliamentary Oversight of the Security Sector in West Africa: Addressing Democratic Governance Deficits,” in Adedeji Ebo and Boubacar N’Diaye, eds. *Parliamentary Oversight of the Security Sector in West Africa: Opportunities and Challenges*, Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces, 2008 :7.

⁵⁶ Mackubin Thomas Owens, *US Civil-Military Relations After 9/11: Renegotiating the Civil Military Bargain* (New York: The Continuum International Publishing Group, 2011), 13.

⁵⁷ Thomas Bruneau and Florina Christina Matei, “Towards a New Conceptualization of Democratization and Civil-Military Relations.” *Democratization*. Vol 15(5) pp. 909 – 929, 2008. https://fsi-live.s3.us-west-1.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/Bruneau_final_file.pdf

⁵⁸ See Feaver, Peter D. 1996. “The Civil-Military Problématique: Huntington, Janowitz, and the Question of Civilian Control,” *Armed Forces and Society*, vol. 23, no. 2, pp. 149-178

⁵⁹ Nan Tian, “A cautionary tale of military expenditure transparency during the great lockdown.” SIPRI, 2020. <https://www.sipri.org/commentary/blog/2020/cautionary-tale-military-expenditure-transparency-during-great-lockdown>

⁶⁰ See <https://mo.ibrahim.foundation/iiag/2020-key-findings#kf1>

increased military intrusion in politics and control of civilians. This regressive trend has been exacerbated by weak civilian oversight of the security sector and gaps in knowledge, experience, and attitudes.

Reversing such a grim trend in Africa is urgent and will require rethinking, re-negotiation, reform, or transformation of the CMR framework. Frameworks for not only security sector reform, but also for sound security sector governance, provide an opportunity for countries in developing or consolidated democracies, as well as those emerging from military dictatorship, to forge new CMRs that will consolidate democratic civilian control of the security sector and rule of law. It has been shown that democratic civilian control of the security sector is not sufficient by itself to nurture healthy CMRs, as effectiveness and efficiency of the military in fulfilling their assigned roles and missions are also important.⁶¹ Overall, what is needed are clearly defined roles and missions for the security forces, legal and practical mandates and resources for effective oversight institutions and practices, and a commitment to professional norms and ethics within the security services.

Discussion Questions:

- What practical measures can African countries take to promote the rule of law in the security sector? What institutions or practices does your country use to ensure that defense and security forces build relationships with citizens that facilitate both fair/equitable enforcement of the law and respect for human rights?
- Do African security sector leaders have an interest in building democratic and civilian oversight institutions that facilitate rule of law? Why or why not?
- What are some of the limitations that civilians face in exercising facing the democratic control over the military/security forces in your country/region and how can you help to address such limitations?
- Who are the relevant stakeholders in improving the state of civil-military relations in your country/region and why?

Recommended Readings:

“Letting Citizens, Constitution Lead the Way: Civilian Control of the Armed Forces Remains a Durable Model Despite Coups, Setbacks,” *Africa Defense Forum*, 1 January 2024.

- EN : <https://adf-magazine.com/2023/12/letting-citizens-constitution-lead-the-way/>
- FR: <https://adf-magazine.com/fr/2023/12/laisser-les-citoyens-et-la-constitution-montrer-la-voie/>
- PO : <https://adf-magazine.com/pt-pt/2023/12/os-cidadaos-e-a-constituicao-devem-assumir-a-lidenranca/>

Christopher Day, Moses Khisa, and William Reno, “Rethinking the Civil-Military Conundrum in Africa.” *Civil Wars* Vol 22(2-3) pp. 156-173, 2020.

⁶¹ Bruneau and Matei, *op cit*

<https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/13698249.2020.1736808>

Catherine Lena Kelly, "Justice and Rule of Law Key to African Security." *Africa Center for Strategic Studies Spotlight*, 2021:

- EN: <https://africacenter.org/spotlight/justice-and-rule-of-law-key-to-african-security/>
- FR: <https://africacenter.org/fr/spotlight/la-justice-et-letat-de-droit-pierres-angulaires-de-la-securite-en-afrique/>

"Security Sector Governance: Applying Principles of Good Governance to the Security Sector." *Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces*, 2015:

- EN: https://www.dcaf.ch/sites/default/files/publications/documents/DCAF_BG_1_Security%20Sector%20Governance_0.pdf
- FR: https://www.dcaf.ch/sites/default/files/publications/documents/DCAF_BG_1_La%20gouvernance%20du%20secteur%20de%20la%20securite.pdf

Additional Africa Center resources:

"Why Does Rule of Law Matter for Security Sector Effectiveness in Africa?" *Africa Center for Strategic Studies webinar*, December 16, 2021:

- EN: <https://africacenter.org/programs/jrol2021-rule-of-law-for-security-sector-effectiveness-in-africa/>
- FR: <https://africacenter.org/fr/programs/jrol2021-etat-de-droit-efficacite-secteur-securite-afrique/>
- PO: <https://africacenter.org/pt-pt/jrol2021-estado-direito-importante-eficacia-setor-seguranca-africa/>

"How Do National Oversight Institutions Influence Security Sector Governance?" webinar, April 26, 2022:

- EN: <https://africacenter.org/programs/2204rol-oversight-security-governance/>
- FR: <https://africacenter.org/fr/programs/2204rol-institutions-controle-gouvernance-securite/>
- PO: <https://africacenter.org/pt-pt/2204rol-instituicoes-supervisao-governacao-seguranca/>

"Roles of Parliament in Democratic and Civilian Security Sector Governance" panel, African Parliamentarians Forum 2022, March 1, 2022:

- EN: <https://africacenter.org/programs/african-parliamentarians-forum-2022/>
- FR: <https://africacenter.org/fr/programs/forum-parlementaires-africains-2022/>

Plenary Session 8: Critical Thinking to Enhance Professionalism in Africa's Security Sector

Format: Plenary session
Discussion group

Objectives:

- Assess the status of professionalism in Africa's security sector, challenges to professionalism, and the costs of weak professionalism in African security services.
- Discuss importance of critical thinking for enhancing military professionalism and innovation.
- Share knowledge, experiences, and lessons learned to enhance and advance professionalism in Africa's security sector among uniformed and civilian professionals.

Background:

It is well established that enhancing professionalism in Africa's security sector is critical to improving citizen security and safety, promoting political stability, improving rule of law and governance in the security sector, and cultivating citizens' trust in security officials. Though it is a frequently used term, it is necessary to establish a common understanding of "professionalism" for its application in the security sector. In the armed forces, professionalism is commonly defined in terms of the principles guiding the professional, such as the subordination of the military to democratic civilian authority, allegiance to the state, and a commitment to political neutrality and an ethical institutional culture. The inherent values of professionalism include discipline, integrity, honor, sacrifices, commitment to the greater good of society, dedication to duty, individual responsibility, and accountability for moral agency and service in spite of self-interest.⁶²

Despite the call by the African Union for member states to invest in comprehensive capacity-building and professionalism in the security sector,⁶³ military professionalism in Africa has been weakened by a recent surge of coups, waning popular trust in militaries, political instability, corruption, and failure to confront the insecurity and violence caused by non-state security actors. Although there are many reasons that explain weak military professionalism in Africa, some factors of primary concern are a lack of systematic checks and balances, politicization of militaries and militarization of politics, and ambiguity over the missions of the militaries that serve to protect governments from rather than for citizens.⁶⁴ Ultimately, the professionalism of the security services, as well as citizens' perceptions of it, hinge upon having a system of checks and balances that ensures everyone respects civil liberties, human rights, and the rule of law. Formal, national-level oversight

⁶² Emile Ouedraogo, "Advancing Military Professionalism in Africa." *Research Paper No. 6*. Africa Center for Strategic Studies, Page 1-3, 2014. <https://africacenter.org/publication/advancing-military-professionalism-in-africa/>

⁶³ African Union Policy Framework on Security Sector Reform, 2014, https://issat.dcaf.ch/download/60132/986021/AU_SSR_policy_framework_en.pdf

⁶⁴ Ouedraogo, *op cit*.

institutions – like parliaments, inspectorates, military ombuds institutions, independent anti-corruption and human rights commissions – play a key role in monitoring security force activities and behaviors toward citizens. The everyday practices that security officials exercise with citizens also matter, along with the local oversight of security that may involve civil society organizations, media, customary authorities, and non-state security providers.

The bleak status of military professionalism in Africa notwithstanding, some militaries have exhibited notable levels of professionalism during political transitions, elections, and popular uprisings against autocratic regimes by upholding the rule of law and respecting the constitution and will of the people. Most African security sector professionals are not only satisfied with their profession, but also have a strong sense of pride in embracing the values of professionalism such as duty, responsibility, respect, and honesty.⁶⁵ In some African countries, the armed forces enjoy the respect of citizens and become a source of their national pride. This shows military professionalism is a product of policies, strategies, and political leadership, as well as each individual's commitment to the principles of rule of law in the security sector.

Governments and security sector leaders have a vital interest in enhancing the professionalism and accountability of defense and security institutions. The development and implementation of national security strategies will not only provide mechanisms for democratic civilian control and oversight of the security sector to ensure respect for civil liberties, human rights, and rule of law, but will also provide guidance and clarity for the roles, mission, mandate, professional norms and values, and doctrine of security forces.

Discussion Questions:

- How would you describe the level of professionalism in the security sector, particularly of the armed forces, police, and intelligence services in your country/region and the reasons?
- Which security institutions have exhibited quality professionalism and why?
- What do you think is the main challenge to military/security professionalism in your country/region and why?
- What do you think the future of military/security professionalism in your country/region and why?
- Based on your experiences, are there any lessons on how to build and advance a professional armed forces and security services in your country/region?

Recommended Readings:

Emile Ouedraogo, "Advancing Military Professionalism in Africa." *Research Paper No. 6*, Africa Center for Strategic Studies, p. 1-3, 2014:

- EN : <https://africacenter.org/publication/advancing-military-professionalism-in-africa/>

⁶⁵ Kwesi Aning and Joseph Siegle, "Assessing Attitudes of the Next Generation of African Security Sector Professionals." *Research Paper No. 7*. Africa Center for Strategic Studies, Page 1-2, 2019. <https://africacenter.org/publication/assessing-attitudes-next-generation-african-security-sector-professionals/>

- FR : <https://africacenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/ARP06FR-Pour-la-professionnalisation-des-forces-arm%C3%A9es-en-Afrique.pdf>
- PO : <https://africacenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/ARP06PT-Promo%C3%A7%C3%A3o-do-Profissionalismo-Militar-em-%C3%81frica.pdf>

Kwesi Aning and Joseph Siegle, "Assessing Attitudes of the Next Generation of African Security Sector Professionals." *Research Paper No. 7*, Africa Center for Strategic Studies, p. 1-2, 2019:

- EN: <https://africacenter.org/publication/assessing-attitudes-next-generation-african-security-sector-professionals/>
- FR: <https://africacenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/08/ARP07FR%20-%20Evaluation%20des%20attitudes%20de%20la%20prochaine%20generation%20de%20professionnels%20du%20secteur%20de%20la%20securite%20en%20Afrique.pdf>
- PO: <https://africacenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/11/ARP07PT-Avaliacao-das-attitudes-da-proxima-geracao-de-profissionais-do-setor-da-seguranca-em-Africa.pdf>

David Novy, "Professionalism in the Armed Forces." *Research Report*, Air War College, p. iv, 2017. <https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/pdfs/AD1038055.pdf>

African Union, "African Union Policy Framework on Security Sector Reform." P. 16, 2014:

- EN: https://issat.dcaf.ch/download/60132/986021/AU_SSR_policy_framework_en.pdf
- FR: https://issat.dcaf.ch/fre/download/60132/996775/SSR_policy_framework_fr.pdf
- PO: <https://www.peaceau.org/uploads/policy-framework-po.pdf>

Plenary Session 9: National Security Strategy Development and Implementation

Format: Plenary session

Discussion group

Objectives:

- Examine the rationale, key concepts, and prerequisites for National Security Strategy Development (NSSD) and key elements of the National Security Strategy document.
- Discuss the typical phases of NSSD in Africa.
- Examine the role of strategic leadership and security sector leaders in the development and implementation of national security strategies in Africa.

Background:

One of the core functions of any nation-state is to provide its own security as well as the security and safety of its citizens. Despite the inordinate resources allocated to the security sector, many states in Africa are becoming increasingly incapable of ensuring the security of all their citizens, and, in some instances, states themselves have become sources of insecurity. Despite an increase in military and security spending in Africa, the Ibrahim Index of African Governance shows a decline in the levels of national security and citizen security and safety, as well as a shrinking trust of citizens in security institutions.⁶⁶ This growing insecurity, the emergence of new security threats, and a shift towards understanding security as security for all as opposed to regime or state security, demonstrate a need for African governments to re-evaluate how to deliver security and safety to their citizens.

Most African countries do not have an overarching National Security Strategy. Instead, some countries have classified strategies with uncoordinated sectoral security strategies that are formulated with limited or no involvement of citizens, and largely financed by external partners without effective national ownership. This lack of grand strategy as a reference point for decision-makers in the security sector may inhibit effective coordination, alignment of resources and leveraging of partnership, prioritization of security threats, and shared understanding of national security vision. In recognition of this gap, the African Union has requested its member states to produce national security strategies. The “Solemn Declaration on a Common African Defense and Security Policy” (2004)⁶⁷ and the “Policy Framework on Security Sector Reform” (2014)⁶⁸ provided member states with guidelines for developing such strategies in a fully consultative and participatory process. The United Nations also provides support to its member states in crafting their national security policies and strategies. Despite this call and guidelines provided by the AU and support facility at

⁶⁶ See <https://iiag.online/data.html?meas=PubPercSaf&loc=g1&view=table>

⁶⁷ See <https://www.peaceau.org/uploads/declaration-cadsp-en.pdf>

⁶⁸ <http://www.peaceau.org/uploads/au-policy-framework-on-security-sector-reform-ae-ssr.pdf>

the UN, many African countries are unable to develop such strategies, largely due to limited political will, low levels of awareness, and a deficit of the necessary practical tools and experience in developing such strategies.

A well-designed and inclusive process for formulating national security strategy can facilitate the creation of a sound strategy. Such a process also enables decision-makers to make effective plans to address national security threats and to make long-term improvements in delivering security to the state and its citizens.⁶⁹ Such a process also ensures national ownership, inclusivity, and consensus; it lays the groundwork for the internal and external partnerships that facilitate the implementation of national security strategy. Based on its experience in socializing the concept of NSSD in all sub-regions of Africa, the Africa Center developed a toolkit entitled *National Security Strategy Development in Africa: Toolkit for Drafting and Consultation*. The main objective of this toolkit is to describe the common phases of the NSSD process, and it serves as a resource to aid national and regional stakeholders in African countries to craft or review their national security strategies. Since the publication and socialization of this toolkit, some additional African countries have started the process of drafting national security strategies. While this toolkit provides guidance for the process, it is not a blueprint, as each country will have to adapt the process to its unique national context and develop homegrown approaches in crafting and implementing strategy.

Discussion Questions:

- Do you know whether your country/region has a security strategy? If yes, do you know how it was developed, if citizens were engaged, or if it was approved by parliament? Is the document public?
- If your country/region does not have a security strategy, do you see any rationale for your country/region to have such a strategy? What would be the role of leadership in such a process?
- Who initiates the NSSD process and why? Who should be involved and consulted in the NSSD process, why, and at what stage of the process? Should the media, women, youth, and civil society be involved in the process, and if so, how?
- Should a security strategy be approved by the parliament and why? Should it be kept secret and why or why not?

Recommended Readings:

Africa Center for Strategic Studies, "National Security Strategy Development in Africa: Toolkit for Drafting and Consultation."

- EN: <https://africacenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/01/National-Security-Strategy-Development-in-Africa-Toolkit-for-Drafting-and-Consultation-Africa-Center-for-Strategic-Studies-2022-01.pdf>

⁶⁹ Mark Cancian et al, "Formulating National Security Strategy: Past Experience and Future Choices." Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), 2017. <https://www.csis.org/analysis/formulating-national-security-strategy>

- FR: <https://africacenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/01/Developpement-dune-strategie-de-securite-nationale-en-Afrique-Centre-dEtude-Strategiques-de-lAfrique-2022-01.pdf>
- PO: <https://africacenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/02/Desenvolvimento-da-Estrategias-de-Seguranca-Nacional-em-Africa-Um-kit-de-ferramentas-para-consulta-e-preparacao.pdf>

Luka Kuol and Joel Amegboh, "Rethinking National Security Strategies in Africa." *Journal of International Relations and Diplomacy*, Vol. 9 (1): 1-17, 2021.

<http://www.davidpublisher.com/Public/uploads/Contribute/60a72058556ba.pdf>

African Union, "The Solemn Declaration on Common African Defense and Security Policy." 2004:

- EN : <http://www.peaceau.org/uploads/declaration-cadsp-en.pdf>
- FR : <https://www.peaceau.org/uploads/declaration-cadsp-fr.pdf>

Africa Union, "Policy Framework on Security Sector Reform." 2014:

- EN: <http://www.peaceau.org/uploads/au-policy-framework-on-security-sector-reform-ae-ssr.pdf>
- FR: <https://www.peaceau.org/uploads/policy-framework-fr.pdf>
- PO: <https://www.peaceau.org/uploads/policy-framework-po.pdf>

Additional Africa Center Resources:

National Security Strategy Development and Implementation program, April 20 – May 5, 2021:

- EN: <https://africacenter.org/programs/nssd-2021-04-05/>
- FR : <https://africacenter.org/fr/programs/fr-nssd-2021-04-05/>
- PO : <https://africacenter.org/pt-pt/pt-nssd-2021-04-05/>

National Security Strategy Development Process: Lessons Learned program, March 9-24, 2021:

- EN: <https://africacenter.org/programs/national-security-strategy-development-lessons-learned/>
- FR : <https://africacenter.org/fr/programs/fr-nssd-mar-2021/>
- PO : <https://africacenter.org/pt-pt/pt-nssd-mar-2021/>

Plenary Session 10: Managing Security Resources in Africa

Format: Plenary session
Discussion group

Objectives:

- Examine trends, patterns, and drivers of security/military expenditures in Africa.
- Discuss the link between budget cycle and national security strategy development and implementation.
- Examine the role of security sector leaders in the judicious and transparent management of security resources in Africa.

Background:

African countries face challenges in generating, allocating, and aligning security sector resources, particularly when they have not yet developed inclusive and locally owned national security strategies. Intensified security threats in Africa have caused many security leaders to call for more spending in the security sector. According to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), military spending in Africa exceeded \$43 billion in 2020, up from \$15 billion in the 1990s. Defense expenditures accounted for an average of 8.2% of government spending across Africa in 2020, compared to a global average of 6.5%. The countries that increased their military expenditures in 2020 tended to be autocracies and/or countries exposed to violent conflict. Despite the rise of military expenditures in Africa during the last decade, national security, citizen security and safety, and trust of citizens in the police and military have been deteriorating.⁷⁰

These statistics show that more military spending does not necessarily improve security and safety. It can instead create a conducive environment for the abuse of state power, leading to the state's use of violence against citizens, the misalignment and deficient allocation of public resources, and corruption in the use of security resources.⁷¹ Military expenditures need to be guided by citizen-centered public policies and subjected to budgetary principles and civilian oversight. Otherwise, they risk sustaining an insecure environment in which conflict can become a lucrative enterprise that allows the security sector to sustain and justify high levels of expenditure.⁷² The unconstrained rise in military expenditures without policy guidance is counterproductive and unlikely to win the trust of citizens, because higher military expenditures crowd out investment in much-needed public services - such

⁷⁰ Kuol and Amegboh, *op cit.*

⁷¹ Chimere Iheonu, Kingsley Odo and Davidmac Ekeocha, "Estimating the effect of democracy, governance and militarization on peace in Africa." Research Africa Network, WP/20/046, 2020. <http://publications.resanet.org/RePEc/abh/abh-wpaper/Estimating-the-effect-of-Democracy-Governance-and-Militarisation-on-Peace-in-Africa.pdf>

⁷² Maurice Ogonnaya, "Has counter-terrorism become a profitable business in Nigeria." Institute for Security Studies (ISS), 2020. <https://issafrica.org/iss-today/has-counter-terrorism-become-a-profitable-business-in-nigeria>

as health, education, and justice. In addition, there are growing concerns that the security sector in Africa is not adhering to core budgetary principles including contestability, accountability, and transparency, which has led to increased corruption and off-budget expenditures and revenues.⁷³ All of this suggests that more military spending alone cannot address security threats without an overarching national security strategy in which resources are prioritized and aligned.

The COVID-19 pandemic has further exposed the challenges of aligning available national resources with national strategic goals while meeting unanticipated needs in an uncertain environment. The budgets that were appropriated before the pandemic have become less adaptable, with far-reaching cuts in public expenditure to meet urgent needs and pressing priorities. This has caused some misalignment of the available national resources and constrained states' ability to make strategic trade-offs in their allocation of resources across different sectors affecting security, development, and governance.⁷⁴ Current conditions call for revisiting the link between National Security Strategy and the management of security resources within the public financial management principles. The fiscal challenges caused by the pandemic may provide opportunities for rethinking how to make security strategies and security budgets agile and adaptive.

Discussion Questions:

- Based on the security threats and development challenges in your country, do you think more resources need to be allocated to the security sector and why?
- Based on the most recent approved budget of your country, which security sector institution/agency is allocated the most resources, and is that allocation justifiable?
- Which security sector institution/agency in your country should be allocated more public resources and why?
- Do you think having a National Security Strategy that is developed through an inclusive and participatory process will help in the effective allocation and alignment of security resources and why?

Recommended Readings:

Bernard Harborne, William Dorotinsky and Paul Bisca (Eds.), "Securing Development: Public Finance and the Security Sector." The World Bank, p. 7-14, 25-47, 2017:

- EN: <http://www.sipotra.it/wp-content/uploads/2017/05/SECURING-DEVELOPMENT.-Public-Finance-and-the-Security-Sector.pdf>
- FR: <https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/bitstream/handle/10986/25138/210766ovFR.pdf?sequence=4&isAllowed=y>

Luka Kuol and Joel Amegboh, "Rethinking National Security Strategies in Africa". Journal of International Relations and Diplomacy, Vol 9(1): 1-17, 2021.

⁷³ Bernard Harborne, William Dorotinsky and Paul Bisca (Eds.), "Securing Development: Public Finance and the Security Sector." The World Bank. Pg. 7-14, 25-47, 2017. <http://www.sipotra.it/wp-content/uploads/2017/05/SECURING-DEVELOPMENT.-Public-Finance-and-the-Security-Sector.pdf>

⁷⁴ Tian, *op cit.*

<http://www.davidpublisher.com/Public/uploads/Contribute/60a72058556ba.pdf>

Chimere Iheonu, Kingsley Odo and Davidmac Ekeocha, "Estimating the effect of democracy, governance and militarization on peace in Africa." Research Africa Network, WP/20/046, 2020. <http://publications.resanet.org/RePEc/abh/abh-wpaper/Estimating-the-effect-of-Democracy-Governance-and-Militarisation-on-Peace-in-Africa.pdf>

Maurice Ogbonnaya, "Has counter-terrorism become a profitable business in Nigeria?" Institute for Security Studies (ISS), 2020.

- EN: <https://issafrica.org/iss-today/has-counter-terrorism-become-a-profitable-business-in-nigeria>
- FR: <https://issafrica.org/fr/iss-today/la-lutte-contre-le-terrorisme-est-elle-devenue-une-activite-rentable-au-nigeria>

Additional Africa Center Resources:

Aligning Resources with National Security Strategies in Africa program, November 30 – December 15, 2021:

- EN: <https://africacenter.org/programs/msra-nssd-2021-aligning-resources-national-security-strategies-in-africa/>
- FR: <https://africacenter.org/fr/programs/msra-nssd-2021-alignment-ressources-strategies-nationales-securite-afrique/>
- PO: <https://africacenter.org/pt-pt/msra-nssd-2021-alinhamento-recursos-estrategias-seguranca-nacional-afrika/>

Africa Center for Strategic Studies, 2021. "National Security Strategy Development in Africa: Toolkit for Drafting and Consultation". Pages 40-41 :

- EN : <https://africacenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/01/National-Security-Strategy-Development-in-Africa-Toolkit-for-Drafting-and-Consultation-Africa-Center-for-Strategic-Studies-2022-01.pdf>
- FR: <https://africacenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/01/Developpement-dune-strategie-de-securite-nationale-en-Afrique-Centre-dEtude-Strategiques-de-lAfrique-2022-01.pdf>
- PO: <https://africacenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/02/Desenvolvimento-da-Estrategias-de-Seguranca-Nacional-em-Africa-Um-kit-de-ferramentas-para-consulta-e-preparacao.pdf>

Plenary Session 11: Regional and International Responses to Security Challenges

Format: Plenary session
Discussion group

Objectives:

- Examine strategies and good practices for mitigating conflicts, including mediation, diplomatic engagement, and defense.
- Assess the strengths and weaknesses of regional security and defense policies, and regional mechanisms for peace support operations in addressing regional security challenges.

Background:

Coups in West Africa, continued civil wars in Ethiopia, DRC and Sudan, and a significant increase in militant Islamist group violence and crime have marked recent years in Africa. There is a critical need for decisive collective action by nations, civil society, private enterprise, the African Union (AU), Regional Economic Communities (REC), and United Nations (UN). These stakeholders can collaborate on a number of strategies and good practices for mitigating conflict as Africa's security landscape continues to evolve. These do not just include military operations, but peacekeeping, dialogue and mediation, rule of law and justice reform, and early warning systems among others.

As the current era of UN-mandated stabilization missions in Africa comes to an end, the AU and RECs have increased localized ownership over conflict management. In fact, the year 2022 witnessed the authorization of four new African-led peace operations, bringing the total to 10 operations with over 70,000 personnel across 17 African countries.⁷⁵ High impact ECOWAS interventions into Liberia and Sierra Leone, AU leadership in troop contribution and peace talks during the United Nations - African Union Hybrid Operation in Darfur, and brokered peace agreements such as the Peace and Reconciliation Agreement in Mali are just some examples of recent activity.

Other means beyond peace operations include regional initiatives, for example the East African Community (EAC)-led Nairobi Process launched in 2022 which seeks to use dialogue and negotiation with all relevant stakeholder to resolve the conflict in the Eastern Democratic Republic of Congo. Moreover, regional security and defense mechanisms, such as ECOWAS's Early Warning and Response Network (ECOWARN), launched in 2003, and from the Horn of Africa's experience IGAD's Conflict Early Warning and Early Response Mechanism (CEWARN), established in 2002 are designed to preempt conflict.

However, regional institutions and mechanisms vary greatly based on leadership dynamics, political and cultural cleavages, and the depth of integration. Insufficient

⁷⁵ Nate D. F. Allen, "African-Led Peace Operations: A Crucial Tool for Peace and Security," Africa Center for Strategic Studies, August 2023. <https://africacenter.org/spotlight/african-led-peace-operations-a-crucial-tool-for-peace-and-security/>

political incentives at the national level to mainstream regional commitments and agreements into state planning, or into action, limit their effectiveness. This has affected dedication to both UN and African-led operations resulting in operational and expeditionary capabilities, poor integration with civilian-led efforts, and heavy dependence on external donors. Innovating relationships will be critical for advancing security. For example, the passage of UNSCR 2719 on assessed contributions is a watershed moment and could be the start of a deeper series of changes between the UN and African partners when it comes to communication and division of responsibilities.⁷⁶

Discussion Questions:

- Which strategies and good practices have been especially critical to mitigating conflict in your country or region?
- How can the AU and REC working relationship improve, both between the organizations and with international partners like the United Nations?
- How effective is your REC at mobilizing member states to collectively address regional security challenges? Please share some examples of successes and challenges.
- Do overlapping country memberships in the RECs help or hurt the RECs ability to coordinate collective responses to security challenges?

Recommended Readings:

Nate D. F. Allen. "African-Led Peace Operations: A Crucial Tool for Peace and Security, *Spotlight*. Washington: Africa Center for Strategic Studies. August 2023.

<https://africacenter.org/spotlight/african-led-peace-operations-a-crucial-tool-for-peace-and-security/>

Nate D. F. Allen and Nicole Mazurova "African Union and United Nations Partnership Key to the Future of Peace Operations in Africa," *Spotlight*. Washington: Africa Center for Strategic Studies. April 30, 2024. <https://africacenter.org/spotlight/african-union-united-nations-peace-operations/>

Sanae Suzuki, "Exploring the roles of the AU and ECOWAS in West African Conflicts." *South African Journal of International Affairs* 27:2, 173-191, 2020.

<https://doi.org/10.1080/10220461.2020.1767193>

Bitania Tadesse, "The Role of African Multilateralism in the New Agenda for Peace," *International Peace Institute Global Observatory*, September 2023. <https://theglobalobservatory.org/2023/09/the-role-of-african-multilateralism-in-the-new-agenda-for-peace/>

Mark Whitlock and Robert Muggah, "Reflections on the evolution of conflict early warning." *International Journal of Security and Development*, 10 (1), 2022.

<https://www.stabilityjournal.org/articles/10.5334/sta.857/>

⁷⁶ Security Council Report, The Financing of AU Peace Support Operations: Prospects for Progress in the Security Council, Research Report, April 2023. <https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/research-reports/the-financing-of-au-peace-support-operations-prospects-for-progress-in-the-security-council.php>

L'Organisation pour l'alimentation et l'agriculture (FAO), « Les mécanismes communautaires de réduction des risques de catastrophes pour des moyens d'existence résilients au Sahel. » 2017.
<https://www.fao.org/emergencies/recursos/documentos/recursos-detalle/es/c/1035230/>

West African Network for Peacebuilding, "Annual Report 2021: Adapting Resilient Approaches and Synergies to Peacebuilding in the 'New Normal'." 2021:

- EN: <https://wanep.org/wanep/annual-report-2021-adapting-resilient-approaches-and-synergies-to-peacebuilding-in-the-new-normal/>
- FR: https://wanep.org/wanep/wp-content/uploads/2022/03/Wanep-2021_French.pdf

Plenary Session 12: Leveraging Donor Assistance

Format: Plenary session

Discussion group

Objectives:

- Identify the variation in external security assistance models.
- Explore the role of strategic leadership in using and leveraging external assistance to deliver better security to citizens in Africa.
- Investigate links between national security strategy development and effective security assistance coordination.

Background:

Many African states provide security to their citizens through a reliance not only on their own resources but also through external partnerships. A defining feature of Africa's contemporary security environment is the increasing great power competition, with renewed interest and increased presence of traditional security partners (the U.S., European Union, and China) and emerging partners (India, Russia, Brazil, Vietnam, South Korea, the Gulf States, and Turkey). To varying degrees, all of these African security partners have taken an increased interest in Africa as a destination for business and a place to procure vital natural resources. These countries are also cultivating ties with African countries to enhance their diplomatic standing and influence in multilateral institutions such as the United Nations, the African Union, and the Regional Economic Communities (RECs).

China merits a special focus because of the depth of Chinese ties in African countries, the magnitude of economic opportunity it can offer, and the multi-sectoral nature of the relationships that it is currently growing across the continent. China is increasingly coordinating its engagement with Africa under its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), a global infrastructure investment and foreign policy strategy. As of 2022, 52 of 54 sub-Saharan countries have signed on to the BRI Memorandum of Understanding with China.⁷⁷ This engagement directly links the continent's security with China's own prosperity - a serious departure from its famed foreign policy of non-interference in domestic affairs. China's increased focus on security stems from needing to protect investments from the disruptions and damage caused by conflict, and the desire to strengthen its global reputation. Working towards these ends, the Chinese Ministry of National Defense organized the first China-Africa Defense and Security Forum in summer 2018 and has increased its participation in

⁷⁷ Xuewu Gu et al., "China's Engagement in Africa: Activities, Effects and Trends," *Center for Global Studies*, June 2022, https://www.researchgate.net/publication/361589142_China's_Engagement_in_Africa_Activities_Effects_and_Trends/citations

UN peacekeeping.⁷⁸ Of China's approximately 2,500 troops in UN peacekeeping missions, almost 85% are in Africa.

Russia, on the other hand, has taken a different approach. The upsurge of violent extremism, terrorist activity, and coup d'états in Western and Central Africa has given opportunity for Russia to deepen its influence through the Wagner Group, a shadowy mercenary company, that has gradually assumed traditional and strategic military and security partnerships with countries in West Africa. The 2023 Russia-Africa summit further showcased intentions to lay the foundation for deeper cooperation, coming at a sensitive time considering Russian withdrawal from the Black Sea grain initiative the week prior.

While external security assistance can help African nations, such assistance risks undermining the very security the state is meant to strengthen if partnerships are not guided and informed by national security priorities and objectives. On the one hand, African leaders must clearly understand their security threats and identify capacity gaps and response needs in order to shape discussions with external partners about security assistance; external partners, on the other hand, need to understand that the effectiveness of their security assistance rests with clearly articulated national security priorities and agenda. Having a National Security Strategy will help better manage, align, coordinate, and utilize security assistance for improved delivery of security and safety on the continent. Without a national security agenda, security priorities and interests of external security partners may overshadow the strategic interests of recipient nations, failing to achieve the desired outcomes for either donor or recipient.

External security assistance should therefore be based upon genuine and enduring partnership (rather than patronage), mutual interests, the African Union's principles of sovereign equality and inter-dependence, the traditional African values of equal burden-sharing and mutual assistance, and the indivisibility of African security.⁷⁹ It is most effective when predicated on a national ownership and solid institutional framework and when tailored, aligned, and appropriate to national needs and interests. National Security Strategies is itself a tool for leveraging external security partnerships and domestic resource utilization for greater transparency, accountability, and sustainability in the Africa security sector.

Discussion Questions:

- How significant is external assistance, particularly external security assistance, in your country/region? Who are the new external security partners and how effective are they in comparison with the traditional partners?
- Do you think external security assistance has helped in reducing and combating the security threats facing your country/region? Please give examples.

⁷⁸ Niall Dungun, "The Expanding Role of Chinese Peacekeeping in Africa." *Oxford Research Group*, January 18, 2018, <https://www.oxfordresearchgroup.org.uk/Blog/the-expanding-role-of-chinese-peacekeeping-in-africa>

⁷⁹ AU, 2004, Solemn Declaration on A Common African Defense and Security Policy, Addis: African Union.

- How can African countries/institutions best coordinate multiple offers of partnership? Please give examples.
- How can your country/region address the increasing influence of great power competition? How can your country/region make better use of and leverage external security assistance to help achieve national/regional security priorities and objectives?

Recommended Readings:

Lina Benabdallah, "China-Africa military ties have deepened. Here are 4 things to know," *The Washington Post* Monkey Cage blog, July 6, 2018,

<https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2018/07/06/china-africa-military-ties-have-deepened-here-are-4-things-to-know/>

Nick Turse, "U.S. General Worry About Rising Russian and Chinese Influence in Africa, Documents Show," *The Intercept*, August 13, 2019, <https://theintercept.com/2019/08/13/russia-china-military-africa/>

<https://theintercept.com/2019/08/13/russia-china-military-africa/>

Moderan, O. (2015). Political Leadership and National Ownership of Security Sector Reform Processes. Toolkit for Security Sector Reform and Governance in West Africa, 3.

<https://www.dcaf.ch/sites/default/files/publications/documents/SSRG-West-Africa-Toolkit-Tool-1-EN.pdf>

Watts, Steve. "Identifying and Mitigating Risks in Security Sector Assistance for Africa's Fragile States". Rand Corporation 2015.

http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research_reports/RR800/RR808/RAND_RR808.pdf

Additional Readings:

Ismail, Olawale, and Elisabeth Skons, eds. Security Activities of External Actors in Africa. Oxford University Press, 2014.

<https://www.sipri.org/sites/default/files/files/books/SIPRI2014IsSk01.pdf>

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- EN : <https://africacenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/01/National-Security-Strategy-Development-in-Africa-Toolkit-for-Drafting-and-Consultation-Africa-Center-for-Strategic-Studies-2022-01.pdf>
- FR : <https://africacenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/01/Developpement-dune-strategie-de-securite-nationale-en-Afrique-Centre-dEtude-Strategiques-de-lAfrique-2022-01.pdf>
- PO : <https://africacenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/02/Desenvolvimento-da-Estrategias-de-Seguranca-Nacional-em-Africa-Um-kit-de-ferramentas-para-consulta-e-preparacao.pdf>

Plenary Session 13: United States Government: Security Assistance and Partnership in Africa

Format: Plenary session
Discussion group

Objectives:

- Examine the objectives and mechanisms of U.S. security assistance to Africa.
- Assess the impact and effectiveness of U.S. security assistance.
- Explore the role of strategic leadership in using and leveraging external assistance to deliver better security to citizens in Africa.

Background:

The State Department is the lead agency for U.S. foreign assistance, coordinating interagency efforts to support U.S. partners through the Office of Foreign Assistance. Through various bureaus and funding authorities, the State Department also directly administers assistance aimed at advancing African peace and security. This includes programming to build African security sector capacity, support peace operations, confront terrorism, manage conflict, combat organized crime, and strengthen democratic accountability and the rule of law. While a large proportion of the assistance is bilateral, the Department also takes a regional approach.

The United States Agency for International Development (USAID) operates under the authority of the Secretary of State and delivers the largest proportion of overall U.S. foreign assistance to Africa. USAID advances U.S. foreign policy objectives through support for economic growth, agriculture, trade, global health, democracy, conflict prevention, and humanitarian assistance, among other initiatives.

While the Department of State is the lead agency for foreign assistance and provides some funds for training of foreign military forces (e.g. ACOTA), the Department of Defense is the primary actor with foreign defense establishments. Programs funded by the Department of State are implemented through:

- International Military Education and Training (IMET)
- Foreign Military Financing-funded training (FMF)
- International Narcotics and Law Enforcement (INL)
- African Contingency Operations Training and Assistance (ACOTA)
- Enhanced International Peacekeeping Capabilities (EIPC)
- Foreign Assistance Act (FAA)

In April 2022, the United States released an interagency Strategy to Prevent Conflict and Promote Stability, following the 2019 passage of the Global Fragility Act. The strategy aims to provide integrated, long-term U.S. support to locally-driven efforts to prevent large-scale

violence. The coastal West African countries of Benin, Côte d'Ivoire, Ghana, Guinea, and Togo, as well as Libya and Mozambique, have been selected as partner countries for this effort, which will receive up to \$200 million annually.

The Role of U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM):

In 2007, the United States created a new command for Africa. Prior to then, responsibility for the African continent was divided between three U.S. commands: European Command (EUCOM), Central Command (CENTCOM), and Pacific Command (PACOM). The establishment of AFRICOM was driven by the growing strategic relevance of the continent to critical U.S. interests.

To promote U.S. strategic objectives, AFRICOM works with African states and regional organizations to help strengthen stability and security in the region. It does this through a variety of programs and initiatives targeted at improving national and regional security capabilities, military professionalism, and good governance.

Security Assistance Effectiveness:

Research evaluating the effectiveness of US security assistance finds that not all forms of this assistance are created equal. There exists a growing consensus that building defense and security institutions that are civilian-led, representative of society, meritocratic, and capable of independent strategic leadership – as opposed to focusing only on operational and tactical training and the supply of equipment – are key to building security forces capable of meeting Africa's contemporary security challenges. Key characteristics that make security partnerships more effective at reducing civil wars, insurgencies, terrorism, and government repression in African countries include “regular, intensive contact between international advisers and the partner nation's security personnel; a relatively long-term commitment; close oversight of the performance of security forces; and the integration of train-and-equip efforts into an overall political strategy.”⁸⁰ Historically, partnerships with these characteristics were more frequently built between US and African forces in countries where security assistance was provided in conjunction with a UN peace support operation.

Discussion questions:

- What are the elements of the U.S. security assistance and the U.S. Department of Defense's policies toward Africa that are most meaningful to you and your work?
- Are perceptions in your home country different from what you learned today?
- How does the information you learned today change how you will do your work?
- How can strategic leadership and security sector leaders harness and leverage US security assistance to promote national security priorities and interests in Africa?

Required Readings:

⁸⁰ See Stephen Watts et al, “Reforming Security Sector Assistance for Africa,” RAND Corporation Research Brief RB-10028-OSD/AFRICOM, 2018, https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_briefs/RB10028.html

General Thomas Waldhauser, "United States Africa Command 2022 Posture Statement." 2022. <https://www.armed-services.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/AFRICOM%20FY23%20Posture%20Statement%20%20ISO%20SASC%2015%20MAR%20Cleared.pdf>

U.S. Department of State Bureau of Conflict and Stabilization Operations, "United States Strategy to Prevent Conflict and Promote Stability." 2022. <https://www.state.gov/united-states-strategy-to-prevent-conflict-and-promote-stability/#goal-4>

Aline LeBoeuf, "La compétition stratégique en Afrique. Approches militaires américaine, chinoise, et russe." *Focus stratégique* 91, Institut Français des Relations Internationales, p. 17-18, 33-43 et l'annexe, 2019. https://www.ifri.org/sites/default/files/atoms/files/leboeuf_competition_strategique_afrique_2019_0.pdf