2024 Emerging Security Sector Leaders Forum

Simulation Exercise: Analyzing Competing Security Priorities

Scenario Brief

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Disclaimer

This document contains educational material designed to promote discussion by participants in the Emerging Security Sector Leaders seminar. The scenario is not an official prediction of the future; nor is it meant to depict an actual country. Any similarities to actual countries are not intentional. The scenario, briefing points, and other exercise materials do not reflect the views of the Africa Center for Strategic Studies, the National Defense University, the Department of Defense, or any other component of the United States Government.
Exercise Overview

This simulation exercise is designed to help participants consider competing security risks in a fictional African country, Webonia. It requires participants to analyze risks and vulnerabilities, identify potential sources of resilience, decide short- and long-term responses, react to unforeseen shocks, and recommend solutions to the national security leadership. The background information provided is not intended to be exhaustive. Participants should focus on the broad themes covered in the exercise and use their experience to fill in any gaps they identify. Teamwork, innovative solutions, and time-management are key to success.

Core and Supplementary Exercise Materials
To successfully complete this exercise, participants must read pages 3-7, as well as the information in the Annexes.

Background
In this exercise, participants will represent military and civilian security, justice, and civil society officials from the fictional country of Webonia, drawn together in a committee to advise the President and cabinet on security sector reforms. After experiencing variable waves of military and democratic rule, as well as internal conflict, Webonia is now in a period of stabilization. As part of its post-conflict stabilization, Webonia is currently undertaking transitional justice and security sector reform. Nonetheless, Webonia still faces multiple security threats, points of weakness, and/or areas for improvement including:

- An overemphasis on the military throughout the security sector reform (SSR) process, leaving policing institutions relatively less reformed and less trusted.
- A significant youth bulge, leading to frequent urban youth protests, clashes with the police, and police violence.
- A volatile region, with several of Webonia’s neighbors facing acute security crises.
- Violent extremism (VE)/terrorism and transnational organized crime (TOC) along Webonia’s northern border with Deron and Tshukano.

Given the length of the ongoing transition period, enduring security challenges, and instability in the region, Webonia’s leaders are concerned that their country could face a deteriorating security situation and backslide in its nascent security sector reform. These concerns have been heightened by frequent urban youth protests and critical media coverage of police violence. With this in mind, the president is seeking advice from the National Security Council on how to catalyze the reform and transition process. The administration is seeking input on analyzing the risks facing Webonia and its sources of resilience and determining the country’s short- and long-term priorities for advancing citizen security.

Detailed Information
The economic, political, and social dynamics affecting Webonia and its neighbors continue to shape the evolution of security threats. This document includes a map of Webonia and the region (Annex A); background on the politics, economics, and social structures of Webonia (Annex B); more details on Webonia’s political transition (Annex C); more information on the security challenges facing Webonia (Annex D); and an overview of the current structure and composition of Webonia’s security sector (Annex E).
Exercise Objectives

- Participants consider the linkages between national, regional, and international security challenges and explore how to mitigate Webonia’s vulnerabilities and amplify its sources of resilience.
- Participants examine the different ways that civilian and military elements of security sector reform and strategic leadership could be created to mitigate or reduce risk of insecurity in a complex national security context.
- Participants use their knowledge from the first several days and their experience to grapple with the competing demands of a changing security landscape (responsive vs. preventive approaches, hard vs. soft security approaches to threats and vulnerabilities).
Participant Instructions

Your discussion group will represent one of four groups of the NSC convened at the request of the Office of the President of Webonia. The President has asked the task force to prepare a plan to address the security risks in Webonia. This preparation will be broken into three sessions:

Session 1: Groups conduct a risk and resilience analysis of Webonia based on the materials given. Participants are tasked with enumerating Webonia's vulnerabilities and identifying its potential sources of resilience to security challenges.

Sessions 2-3: Based on the risk and resilience analysis in Session 1, groups create a set of short-term and long-term response measures with justifications. In creating these responses, groups will be tasked with identifying the ends, ways, and means linked to their recommendations. During this time, Council members can, if they wish, also consider external partnerships - how much will Webonia rely on internal vs. external resources? Who will be the desired external partners? (e.g., the United States, the European Union, China, the African Union, the African Regional Economic Community (ARECO). Facilitators will provide more guidance for these two sessions.

Participant Roles
Each participant will represent a senior official from their actual service or branch of government, allowing them to leverage their experience and expertise to consider holistically how to realistically address the threats facing Webonia. However, participants should bear in mind that the goal of the simulation is to develop a unified action plan for the entire country, rather than specific individual plans for each sector or service.

Participants should begin by electing a chairperson who will help manage time, as well as a rapporteur who will also present the group’s plan during the brief back session after the simulation.

Time Management
The simulation will take place Friday, June 21st in two 90-minute sections (with a 30-minute coffee break), and Friday June 28th in three 90-minute sections, two before lunch break, with a coffee break in between, and one after lunch.

The chairpersons should plan to allow adequate time to complete the assignment and assist their group with prioritization to ensure that all important aspects of the problem are considered in the limited time allotted.

The simulation brief-backs will take place on Friday, June 21st (1100-1230) and Friday, June 28th (1330-1500) in 90-minute sections.

Output Goals
The rapporteur for each group will have 15 minutes to present their group’s assessments of the risks and vulnerabilities, as well as potential sources of resilience in Webonia on June 21st during the brief back session (1100-1230). On June 28th, each group’s rapporteur will have another 15 minutes to present their groups’ assessments of risk, vulnerability and resilience, as well as recommendations to the Office of the President during the brief-back session (1330-1500). Each group will also have 5 minutes to field questions from the audience. On June 28th, each group should answer the following questions during their presentations:

1. THE ENDS: Which aspects of Webonia’s security challenges did your group choose to
prioritize? Why?

2. THE MEANS: How did your group choose to allocate resources based on those priorities? Why?

3. THE WAYS: How did the country’s resilience factors influence your strategy and resource allocation decisions? How did Webonia’s vulnerability and resilience profile influence your decisions about the military and civilian tools, and the responsive and preventive methods, you sought to use to ensure security?

4. ADAPTATION AND LEARNING: What circumstances in Webonia would need to shift in order for your recommendations to change? Please elaborate.

**Required Deliverables**

In responding to the NSC’s mandate from the Office of the President, each group, based on their analysis, should develop:

i. An assessment of Webonia’s main sources of vulnerability as well as its sources of resilience to security challenges; and

ii. A prioritized list of recommendations for the Government of Webonia. This list should identify specific actions that the government can and should take to improve the security situation in Webonia in the short term (1 year) and medium- to long-term (5-10 years). For each action that is recommended, the NSC should briefly specify the end (desired end state) that the action is designed to contribute to, the ways (how) the action can be pursued, and the means (with what/resources) it requires.

**June 21:**

- **For Sessions 1-2:** Based on your reading of the situation in Webonia, what are the country’s primary security challenges and sources of vulnerability? What are the country’s main sources of resilience and/or stability?

- The rapporteur for each group will have **15 minutes maximum** to present their group’s assessment of the country’s security risks, challenges and sources of resilience to the Office of the President during the brief-back sessions.

**June 28:**

- **For Session 1-3:** Given your work on June 21, identify at least three short-term and three long-term, prioritized recommendations. You can break into sub-bullets based on the ends, ways, and means (mentioned earlier).

- The rapporteur for each group will have **15 minutes maximum** to present their group’s recommendations to the Office of the President during the brief-back sessions.
Annex A: Map of Webonia and the Region
Annex B: Politics and Economy of Webonia

VITAL STATISTICS

Independence: 1962 (from Great Britain)
Population: 30 million
Ethnic groups: Bamato 40%; Arika 22%; Kumalu 18%; Tsowe 15%; smaller ethnic groups comprise remaining 5%
Languages: English (official); African languages including Bamato and Arika are spoken widely.
Religions: Christian (70%), Muslim (30%)
Cities: Olatunji (capital); Port Boukhars (major port city)
Economy: GDP is $1225 per capita
  Export revenue: agricultural products (40%); mineral resources (35%); energy resources (15%); light manufactured goods (10%)

CURRENT POLITICAL SITUATION

- **A new administration.** Webonia’s current government was elected in 2021. The election, deemed free and fair by international observers, was viewed in part as a reaction to the disastrous Camp Foxtrot Siege and the previous government’s failures to address the deteriorating security situation in the north. Victor Toze, from the Arika ethnicity, is the first President not drawn from the leadership of 1990s-era political opposition. He was a student and involved in protest in this era but was too young to be a leader. As a result, he is more open to a new relationship with the military than some of his predecessors.

- **The legacy of military rule.** While the majority of Webonians are too young to remember military rule themselves, the shadow of nearly 30 years of intermittent military rule looms large over Webonian politics. Webonian civil society organizations, especially the journalistic and legal communities, human rights activists and several faith-based groups participated in country’s democratization and carry this legacy with pride. President Toze is the first president since the 2001 transition to multiparty rule to embrace the armed services.

- **Corruption.** Corruption in government is an ongoing challenge in Webonia and political patronage networks are critical to political survival, policymaking, and electioneering. These practices have made Webonia vulnerable to transnational organized crime, and in turn, transnational organized crime proceeds have been known to fuel certain political parties and candidates.
FOREIGN RELATIONS OF WEBONIA

- ARECO. Since transitioning to democracy, the Webonian government has worked through the liberal African Regional Economic Community (ARECO) to pursue its interests. ARECO’s membership includes Webonia and its neighbors. ARECO has limited ability to intervene in the domestic affairs of its member states, but Tshukano and Los Pachecos were able to leverage ARECO’s limited powers to help support Webonia’s burgeoning democracy during its transition phase.

ECONOMY

Webonia is a rapidly growing economy and passed the middle-income threshold in 2014. After a period of stagnation in the 1980s and 1990s, when Webonia was under military rule, the country has grown consistently. Exports are 27% of GDP. Growth has been led by increasing agricultural exports and post processed agricultural goods, most notably locally canned coffee and increasingly high-quality leather goods, forming the foundation of a light manufacturing sector. This has allowed for a greater range of opportunities when compared with Webonia’s historical near total dependence on mining and gas extraction, which still make up a combined 45% of exports.

Since 1997, Webonia has built up its mining and agricultural sectors and has seen an increase in foreign investment. The United States signed a foreign investment treaty with Webonia in 2005 and various U.S.-based companies have recently begun setting up production facilities and other business infrastructure in the country. Additionally, China has opened various mining operations in Webonia. Although the economy has been growing steadily, investors remain wary of the potential negative effects on the business community of violence in the tri-border area.

Like many African countries, Webonia is experiencing the combination of rabid urbanization and a large youth bulge. The majority of Webonians are under the age of 30 and these young people increasingly live in the urban center of the capital, Olatunji. Webonian youth face serious challenges in employment with nearly 40% of Webonians under the age of 25 unemployed.

Energy Production:
- Significant natural gas fields (9th largest in Africa) at 52 trillion cm (tcm), but limited extraction and refinement capability.
- Webonia’s natural gas fields are largely in and around the Biong Delta, in the Kumalu homelands. This area was subject to conflict for much of the 1970s and 1980s and resource extraction and usage are still contentious.
- Energy accounts for 15% of export revenue.

Mining:
- Large copper deposits account for approximately 20% of Webonia’s export revenue. They are situated principally in the northern areas where insecurity can be a challenge. Working conditions at Webonian copper mines are a notorious grievance among workers, going back to the colonial era.
- Other mining operations extract iron, bauxite, and some battery precursor materials, making up an additional 15% of exports combined.
Agriculture:
- Subsistence agriculture persists throughout Webonia.
- Northern Webonia is largely pastoralist, focused on cattle and goats.
- Export agriculture is primarily concentrated in central and southern Webonia. Primary export crops are cotton, cocoa, coffee, and bananas.
Annex C: Webonia in Transition—Background

Pre-Colonial Period

- **Multiple militaries, with diverse origins.** Before the colonial era, Webonia was not one united polity and had three distinct political systems and attendant military models. The centralized Tsowe kingdom was defended by levies of pastoralists bound to the king through kinship ties. The Bulutha kingdom was also centralized and had a small professional royal guard drawn from the aristocracy. The Bamato and Arika peoples were politically decentralized and had militias drawn from age cohort groupings at the village level. The Tsowe forces and Bamato and Arika militias rarely involved themselves in politics because of their kinship ties and origin among the people. The Bulutha royal guard, being drawn from the court, had a greater involvement in picking rulers in times of crisis or intrigue, but were never themselves the rulers.

Colonial Era

- **Protecting power and extraction.** During the colonial era, the British established a unit of King’s African Rifles (KAR) in Webonia, drawn principally from the Bamato and Arika. This unit was used principally to deter threats of rebellion and defend the ports, urban centers, and extractive industries that were the focus of British rule. This KAR unit transitioned directly into the new Webonian Army at independence, keeping most of its officers and enlisted personnel as well as its force structure and traditions.

From Independence in 1962 to Military Rule in 1974

- **A brief democratic opening.** After Webonia’s independence from Great Britain in 1962, the legitimately elected president in 1962 gradually implemented a one-party state. By the 1972 election, political opposition had been banned.

- **A robust and dangerous insurgency.** During the 1970s, southwestern Webonia experienced increasing conflict, driven by the Kumalu Nation Resistance Movement (KNRM) in the Biong River Delta. A combination of political and economic marginalization, the government’s failure to share revenue from the gas extraction primarily situated in and around Kumalu communities, and cross-border support from Bulutha linked to Cold War rivalries contributed to the insurgency.

- **Webonian Army dissatisfaction.** The Webonian Army did not fare well against the KNRM, and they blamed government corruption and failure to give the Army the support needed to win in the Biong Delta for their losses. After several years of embarrassing setbacks and serious casualties, a group of dissatisfied officers toppled the government in a 1974 coup. They set up a council of senior officers chaired by an Army General.
Military Rule: The 1974 Coup to the 1992 Liberty Garden Massacre

- **The junta restores control of the Biong Delta.** Once in power, the military junta activated conscription and massively expanded the defense budget. A large scale and bloody campaign in the Biong Delta largely restored government control of the region by the 1980s, including the gas fields.

- **Political instability and violent repression.** The military government performed poorly at many basic tasks of governing during the 1980s and increasingly failed to deliver basic services. Critics, journalists, and civil society activists were imprisoned or in some cases assassinated. While most military units were implicated, Military Intelligence took the lead in the identification and detention of political dissidents. There were two additional coups during this period.

- **The military agrees to elections.** In 1992, facing deep and widespread discontent and international pressure to liberalize, the junta agreed to elections. It threw its support behind a retired moderate officer, expecting that fear and mild concessions would result in his election by the population.

- **Patrick Ngugi returns from exile to run for the presidency.** Patrick Ngugi, a popular author and activist who had been living in exile after spending a decade in prison for criticizing the 1974 coup, returned to the country in 1992 to stand for office. He promised sweeping reforms, justice for detainees and torture victims, enormous cuts to the security services, and arrest and a trial for the junta. His return generated enormous support, and as the election approached, a near permanent crowd of supporters camped in Liberty Garden Park across from the Houses of Congress in the capitol, Olatunji, protesting and campaigning on his behalf.

- **The election is canceled, and a protest movement starts.** With polls one month before the election indicating a landslide victory by Ngugi, the junta panicked and canceled the election, citing security concerns. Ngugi supporters in Liberty Garden called for the immediate reinstatement of the election, and there was a mix of protest and rioting. Supporters of Ngugi barricaded the square with overturned vehicles.

- **The Liberty Garden Massacre.** After Ngugi’s supporters successfully beat back the police from Liberty Garden for two days, the military was sent in. It used live rounds and armored vehicles to disperse the crowd. The number of deaths and injuries is still not known, but estimates range as high as 40 dead and 200 wounded. Patrick Ngugi was among those killed. The Webonian government became increasingly isolated internationally.

1999-2011 Transition to Civilian Rule

- **A second protest movement starts.** In a climate of deep economic trouble and increased international pressure on the military junta, a new generation of youth launched a second protest movement in 1999. Sam Okwiri, one of the survivors of the 1992 movement, became the movement’s head. He was known for being more moderate than Patrick Ngugi.
• **A gradual shift to civilian rule.** Confronted with a new generation of soldiers and security officials that refused to put down the second protest movement, hardliners in the military made a deal with Sam Okwiri in 1999. National and local elections would be permitted in 2001, in exchange for a promise that no judicial action would be taken against the military. Okwiri was elected president. He served two terms and succeeded in gradually withdrawing the military from politics.

• **The Liberty Garden Trials.** Okwiri’s successor, elected to the presidency in 2011, felt emboldened after a decade of civilian rule. He restructured and significantly downsized the armed services and dismissed all senior officers that remained from the period of military rule. His administration tried several senior officers in court in 2011 for their role in the 1992 Liberty Garden Massacre, in a series of trials known as the ‘Liberty Garden Trials.’ The trials and diminishment of the military were cathartic and a long-awaited moment for many Webonians. However, the trials’ narrow focus on prosecuting senior officers meant that many implicated junior officers and those that operated behind the scenes avoided prosecution or dismissal.

2011-present Violence in the North at Sea, Street Protests, and Calls for Increasing Reforms

• **Spreading violence, and military underperformance.** In the mid-2010s, violence began to spread in the tri-border region, originating in Deron but threatening to destabilize Webonia as well. Extremist groups operating out of Deron are growing and are intimately linked to transnational organized crime operations to fund their initiatives. Enabled by their international connections, the New Army of the Prophet (NAP) in Deron is particularly notorious for exploiting this nexus. Many other recruiters, informal service providers, and fixers are involved in human smuggling, which in the Tri-Border regional context puts smuggled people at greater risk of human trafficking. Although most of the humans trafficked move beyond the part of the Tri-Border Region where the NAP operates, NAP also engages in trafficking through the recruitment and enslavement of ‘wives’ for soldiers. Many armed groups in the region collect significant revenues taxing or receiving bribes from people involved in human smuggling and human trafficking networks. Webonia’s military is deployed to the region and has seen only mixed success in combatting the insurgents when violence spills over the border (see Annex C).

• **Police Violence and Youth Protests.** Webonia’s security reforms have focused primarily on professionalizing the military, leaving a large, unreformed police force that is unpopular compared to the military and particularly amongst the urban youth. As Webonia experiences calls for increased reforms from a growing and active youth population, clashes between activists and the police have become a recurring scene on the streets of Webonia. Since 2021, there have been at least 3 major protest waves around the country, all of which started due to police violence and ended in the same manner.
Annex D: Key Security Challenges in Webonia

Webonia’s security challenges are geographically concentrated around the Tri-Border Region shared by Webonia, Deron, and Tshukano, as well as internal threats related to the transition process.

- **Transnational organized crime.** There is weak state control in the border region, and several types of transnational organized crime thrive, most notably human trafficking, smuggling, and arms trafficking. Perhaps the most dangerous smuggling trade in Webonia is in small arms and light weapons, which some members of the Webonian and Buluthan security services are in the habit of selling to others. These weapons are in high demand due to the endemic violence in the Tri-Border Region. They are moved relatively easily on traditional Tsowe and Milong pastoralist trading and migration routes. Livestock theft within the Tri-Border Region and along its outskirts has become increasingly common as the involved communities have become more and more heavily armed and organized for violence. The black-market trade in commodities is less directly linked to politically violent actors in the region, but several armed groups, particularly the New Army of the Prophet (NAP) – a violent insurgent group, garner significant revenues taxing this trade.

- **Terrorism threat and general instability from Deron.** The border region feels the effects of long-standing political instability in Deron (Webonia’s neighboring country), which includes transnational terrorism groups within its borders and a series of military coups throughout its history. The major extremist actor is the New Army of the Prophet (NAP), a violent insurgent group composed principally of the pastoralist and historically marginalized Tsowe people as well as some foreigners. Espousing a strict religious ideology, the NAP offers a violent vision of justice and independence to marginalized Tsowe. However, brutal punishments for dissenters, harsh taxation, and heavy involvement in human trafficking have alienated many others. Security forces in this region have often been the source of military coups and their own abuses have further destabilized successive governments and alienated the population.

- **Other violent actors.** There are also smaller, locally oriented armed groups with opportunistic objectives. Some communities rely on local vigilante groups for protection. Some of these vigilante groups have also come to engage in cattle rustling and banditry.

- **Ongoing security sector reform.** Webonia continues to implement reforms in its security sector, looking to institute greater civilian control over the military and accountability for security sector abuses of civilians, to improve popular trust in the security services. So far, this reform process has focused mostly on the various branches of the military and neglected the police, who are much less trusted by the average citizen and are perceived to be more deeply implicated in mismanagement of government resources and petty corruption in certain parts of the country (the capital city and border communities). While the Webonian military has reformed significantly since its days as a ruling junta and now enjoys widespread popularity, police forces in the country are under-trained, underpaid, and minimally coordinated with the justice sector. In the meantime, citizens exhibit a vast demand for redress and dispute resolution, on both criminal and civil disputes. While the ethnic majorities (Bamato and Arika) tend to be open to using state courts to resolve disputes, citizens from other ethnic groups tend to distrust the current justice system – seeing it as partial to Bamato and Arika litigants – and rely on their local traditional leaders and other community authorities to address their justice concerns. In some cases, local vigilante groups, particularly in the North, take justice into their own hands,
undermining the rule of law that Webonia’s leaders ultimately aspire to.

- **Youth protests.** The unpopularity of the police forces in Webonia are most pointed with the country’s urban youth. Decades of high population growth have created a “youth bulge” in Webonia, with politically active groups, particularly in the capital, pushing for more aggressive reforms and a greater focus on police reform. These frequent protests consistently lead to clashes, sometimes deadly, with between the police and youth protesters. This is a point of consistent concern for the Office of the President.

- **Illegal immigration.** Migration is a natural and complex phenomenon, containing both economic and demographic advantages and security risks. However, Webonian intelligence indicates the possibility that terrorist and criminal groups are using illegal migration channels to reinforce their positions within Webonia and further exacerbate terror and crime problems.

- **Climate change.** Climate change is associated with environmental degradation, desertification, and the depletion of natural resources. So much of Webonia’s economic activity and the population’s livelihoods are at risk of depletion or destabilization due to policies and political attitudes. Climate change has impacted desertification and ocean acidification, threatening food production and national food security. Climate change has impacted seasonal weather patterns, resulting in more unpredictable water resources and more extreme weather events.
Annex E: Security Sector of Webonia

Webonia’s security apparatus consists of the military (Army, Navy, Air Force, and Special Service Brigade) and the National Police Force. Other institutions that are involved in or focus on the security services are the Webonian military oversight institutions, the judiciary, and civil society groups.

The security sector is continuing reforms dating back two decades, with a host of issues facing the effort. Oversight institutions are underfunded and have limited independence from the actual military. The judiciary faces similar issues, with limited funding, and a lack of willingness to operate independently of the ruling majority and the military. Given the military’s history in the country, the civil society community is deeply mistrustful of the military and the ability for the judiciary or oversight institutions to check its power and abuses. The close relationship between the military, oversight institutions, and the judiciary drive much of that distrust and are a cause of significant tension.

All components of Webonia’s uniformed military share similar problems – (i) an officer corps dominated by the Bamato leading a more diverse enlisted body; (ii) contracting and payroll fraud, which cause mismatches between actual strength and paper-based calculations of it.; and (iii) general corruption in procurement processes and a lack of transparency.

**Webonian Military:** All components of Webonia’s uniformed military share similar problems – an Officer Corps dominated by the Bamato leading a more diverse enlisted body, and corruption impacting readiness due to the frequent occurrence of contracting and payroll fraud, which causes mismatches between actual strength and paper-based calculations of it. Accusations of ethnic favoritism and nepotism are also rampant, particularly in the National Police.

- **Army:** Webonia has a medium-sized volunteer army, greatly diminished in size and funding from the dictatorship era. Funding de-prioritization since the 2011 Liberty Gardens Trials and subsequent coup-proofing efforts have left most units under-trained and under-equipped. Corruption has also taken a toll. As a result, the government relies on a much smaller subsection of the military to address urgent security threats, most notably the 3,500-strong elite Special Service Brigade. It has performed well in combat encounters with armed groups. However, the largely Bamato unit has been accused of serving as a political tool of the incumbent government and of committing abuses against Webonian minority groups, particularly the Tsowe and Kumalu.

- **Navy:** Without a separate Coast Guard, Webonia’s small Navy is responsible for maritime law enforcement and rescue and operates mainly small, brown watercraft. While more trained than the Army or Air Force, the government has not prioritized the Navy and has only 2 offshore patrol boats capable of blue water operation. Historically, the Navy played a role in patrolling the Biong Delta, countering Kumalu separatists in the 1970-80s, and protecting natural gas extraction. It is capable of brown water operation, led by 3 large and 7 small patrol boats and shallow watercraft.

- **Air Force:** Webonia has a very limited Air Force with a small fleet of transport helicopters and a single squadron of fighter jets. These have suffered major mechanical neglect associated with post-2011 funding decreases, and there have been corruption scandals around maintenance and parts contracts.
• National Police Force: Webonia’s National Police consists of around 35,000 members, the majority of whom are Bamato, with a substantial Arika minority. This has led to significant problems throughout the country, as the police are met with distrust by local populations of other ethnic groups. Among the security forces, the National Police have been most accused of nepotism and ethnic favoritism, with a history of the government staffing the National Police largely based on ethnicity.

Oversight Institutions: The Webonian Parliament is controlled by a dominant party with a supermajority, and there are several smaller but engaged opposition parties represented. The Committee on Defense and Security is led by a former General and this grants its members credibility in overseeing defense expenditures on security sector reform but also leaves the proceedings of the Committee shrouded in partial secrecy even on issues for which there is no legal requirement for classified discussion. The SSR process has included the creation of a National Anti-Corruption Commission (NACC) that is nominally independent but limited in its resourcing.

Judiciary: Webonia has a civil law tradition: prosecutors are the ones who lead preliminary investigations to determine whether there is enough evidence for the state to pursue a criminal case on terrorism and transnational organized crime issues, and they have a special court for terrorism run out of the capital city. If the prosecutor and the investigators working with her determine that there is sufficient evidence to pursue a case, then an investigating judge leads a deeper investigation with the help of specialized judicial police officers who may make arrests and collect evidence. On the latest Afrobarometer public opinion survey, 45% of the population indicates it trusts the state courts “not at all” or “a little,” partially because citizens perceive state courts to be working in favor of Bamato court users. In rural Webonia, customary justice institutions are often the forum of first resort.

Civil Society: The Webonian Citizen Action Committee has assembled a loose alliance of NGOs and traditional leaders to institute greater reforms in the face of continuing internal security threats. The Citizen Action Committee is organized in the majority of districts across the country, with a notable retired founding father heading it up. In the Tri-Border Region, the Tsowe Women’s Peacebuilding Society has assembled a loose alliance of NGOs and traditional leaders opposed to the traffickers and armed groups whose activities pose challenges to mobility, livelihood, and dispute resolution in the area. While these groups are prepared to work with the Webonian government, they are also seeking respite from harsh treatment they report experiencing at the hands of the Special Service Brigade, an elite unit of the Webonian gendarmerie (dominated by Bamato officers) that has been deployed to the region on border security missions since the Liberty Garden Trials. While these groups are prepared to work with the Webonian government, they are skeptical of the government’s willingness to continue reforms, particularly at the expense of the military or police, and are haunted by the shadow of decades of abuse during military rule.