



**AFRICA CENTER
FOR STRATEGIC STUDIES**

**MARITIME SAFETY AND
SECURITY: SHARED CHALLENGES
AND RESPONSES IN THE INDIAN
OCEAN**

SYLLABUS

January 22-25, 2024



AFRICA CENTER FOR STRATEGIC STUDIES

**Maritime Safety and Security: Shared Challenges and Responses in the
Indian Ocean Seminar
Dar es Salaam, Tanzania
January 22-25, 2023**

SYLLABUS

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ABOUT THE AFRICA CENTER

Since its inception in 1999, the Africa Center has served as a forum for research, academic programs, and the exchange of ideas with the aim of enhancing citizen security by strengthening the effectiveness and accountability of African institutions, in support of U.S.-Africa policy.

VISION

Security for all Africans championed by effective institutions accountable to their citizens.

Realizing the vision of an Africa free from organized armed violence guaranteed by African institutions that are committed to protecting African citizens is the driving motivation of the Africa Center. This aim underscores the Center's commitment to contributing to tangible impacts by working with our African partners – military and civilian, governmental and civil society, as well as national and regional. All have valuable roles to play in mitigating the complex drivers of conflict on the continent today. Accountability to citizens is an important element of our vision as it reinforces the point that in order to be effective, security institutions must not just be “strong,” but also be responsive to and protective of the rights of citizens.

MISSION

To advance African security by expanding understanding, providing a trusted platform for dialogue, building enduring partnerships, and catalyzing strategic solutions.

The Africa Center's mission revolves around the generation and dissemination of knowledge through our research, academic programs, strategic communications, and community chapters. Drawing on the practical experiences and lessons learned from security efforts on the continent, we aim to generate relevant insight and analysis that can inform practitioners and policymakers on the pressing security challenges that they face. Recognizing that addressing serious challenges can only come about through candid and thoughtful exchanges, the Center provides face-to-face and virtual platforms where partners can exchange views on priorities and sound practices. These exchanges foster relationships that, in turn, are maintained over time through the Center's community chapters, communities of interest, follow-on programs, and ongoing dialogue between participants and staff. This dialogue – infused with real world experiences and fresh analysis – provides an opportunity for continued learning and catalyzes concrete actions.

MANDATE

The Africa Center is a U.S. Department of Defense institution established and funded by Congress for the study of security issues relating to Africa and serving as a forum for bilateral and multilateral research, communication, exchange of ideas, and training involving military and civilian participants. (10 U.S.C 342)

Overview

The Indian Ocean has a long history of security challenges including piracy; armed robbery at sea; transnational organized crime in the form of trafficking of drugs, weapons, and humans; environmental dumping and pollution; over exploitation of fisheries; and illegal, unreported and unregulated (IUU) fishing. While this traditional list of well-known maritime threats remains of serious concern to future prosperity and stability in the region, in recent years the threat of climate change and violent extremism have also grown. Together, these threats undermine the pursuit of the “strategic end state” articulated in the 2050 Africa’s Integrated Maritime (AIM) Strategy: to “foster increased wealth creation from Africa’s oceans and seas by developing a sustainable thriving blue economy in a secure and environmentally sustainable manner.”

Thus far, responses to these challenges have included efforts at generating maritime security cooperation between governments. For instance, the Djibouti Code of Conduct (DCoC), launched in 2009, brought together several African states (from Egypt to South Africa), along with several states from the Arabian Peninsula, to coordinate against piracy. The Code was amended in 2017 (i.e., the Jeddah Amendments) to extend the cooperative regime to include the full spectrum of maritime crimes. Moreover, the states of the Indian Ocean Commission set up a Regional Center for Operational Coordination and a Regional Information Fusion Center in Madagascar. While these efforts are encouraging, the architecture in the region is not as clearly defined, nor as robust, as in the Gulf of Guinea.

There remains a need for improved dialogue and coordinated initiatives among Indian Ocean coastal states to enhance security of this shared ocean. Given the scope and scale of the maritime threats and challenges in the Western Indian Ocean, initiatives that can strengthen existing collaborative mechanism, promote greater dialogue, cooperation and complementarity across coastal states are needed.

In partnership with United States Naval Forces Europe-Africa (NAVEUR-NAVAF), The Near East South Asia (NESA) and the Daniel K. Inouye Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies (APCSS), this seminar will provide an opportunity for officers and officials from African, South Asian and Pacific Indian Ocean states to discuss the maritime security threats affecting the Indian Ocean region, generate a shared understanding of common challenges and their underlying drivers, and consider shared responses. The seminar will also provide a platform to discuss the maritime security architecture in the region and catalyze next steps towards practical maritime security cooperation among the participating countries. The following are the seminar objectives: 1. Convene African, South Asian and Pacific Indian Ocean states to generate a shared understanding of the need to operationalize a multilayered approach to their common maritime security challenges; 2. Informed by the examples of successful maritime security collaboration in other regions (especially the Gulf of Guinea), consider effective shared responses to

maritime challenges in the Indian Ocean. 3. Catalyze next steps towards greater and more effective maritime security cooperation at the regional level that builds on, integrates, and coordinates efforts taking place both at the national and international levels.

Anticipated Outcomes


- Generate a shared commitment to fully operationalize an effective and multilayered maritime security architecture for the Western Indian Ocean.
- Establish the groundwork for strengthening collaborative and sustainable strategic responses to counter maritime insecurity in the Western Indian Ocean.
- Identify opportunities for more effective maritime security cooperation among Western Indian Ocean countries.

Seminar Structure

This seminar, spanning four days, will be comprised of both plenary sessions that draw on strategic, policy, academic, and operational expertise, and discussion sessions where participants are encouraged to share freely on the topics that arise. The plenary session presentations will be followed by a moderated question-and-answer period during which participants will be encouraged to share experiences, question assumptions, and think through creative approaches. The small group discussions will focus on problem solving. Participants will be encouraged to share perspectives and learn from each other. A team of experienced facilitators will work with participants to this end.

All Africa Center programs are conducted under a strict non-attribution policy. This allows participants to contribute and exchange views without reservation, thereby creating an effective and productive learning environment. Simultaneous interpretation will be provided to allow the seminar to be conducted in English and French. All seminar materials will be provided in these languages.

Map of Africa



Map No. 4045 Rev. 7 UNITED NATIONS
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Session 1: Setting the Stage: Thematic Introductions and Definitions

Format: Plenary presentation

Objectives:

- Establish the blue economy as key to economic prosperity and security.
- Identify the Djibouti Code of Conduct and the Jeddah Amendment as the basis for collaborative action.
- Explain that collaboration and sovereignty in the maritime domain are not mutually exclusive.
- Highlight that maritime security in the Indian Ocean requires collaborative frameworks to pool resources for more effective state presence at sea.

Background:

It is widely understood that the blue economy is critical to economic development. The blue economy focuses on the sustainable exploitation of resources within coastal states' maritime domains, i.e., the Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ), to promote socio-economic development of the citizens through poverty reduction, economic growth and job creation, food security, and many other important ways. With appropriate planning, governance, and decision-making processes that involve a broad range of relevant stakeholders, the blue economy can make transformative contributions.

To fully achieve the potential of the blue economy in terms of improvements of the general welfare of societies, there are conditions to be met and challenges to be overcome. Above all, it is critical to have visionary political leadership focused on maritime issues to take full advantage of the opportunities and benefits emanating from the sea. Another important condition is the existence of adequate naval resources both to achieve maritime domain awareness and protection as well as to deter maritime threats. Importantly, such naval resources also ensure maritime safety and security for citizens and communities who depend on the sea for their livelihood. Ultimately, the blue economy should be managed sustainably (i.e., restore, protect, and maintain diverse, productive, and resilient ecosystems) to provide social and economic benefits for future generations.

The West Indian Ocean (WIO) has abundant resources and enormous development potential. The Somali current makes the region one of the world's most productive fishing grounds. Close to shore, warm waters and abundant nutrients provide ideal conditions for coral reef ecosystems that span from southern Somalia to Mozambique, where South Africa's kelp forest begins. However, for all the benefits these ecosystems provide, they are under intense threats from climate change and population growth. For example, the most recent assessment from the United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) indicates that roughly 30% of the Indian Ocean's stocks are not fished within

biologically sustainable levels.¹ IUU fishing directly affects the economies of states and the marine ecosystems of this region, undermining regulated and sustainable fisheries management efforts. In addition, these illicit activities put key stakeholders along the seafood value chain at risk, including vulnerable coastal communities that rely on the ocean for their livelihoods as well as large- and small-scale fishers that abide by the rules but lose out to endemic and rampant theft of fish. Also, the data shows that IUU fishing is linked to other maritime threats.

The gross annual marine product of the economic activities carried out in the WIO - according to the World Wildlife Fund, "...is estimated at more than \$20.8 billion."² It includes three categories: (i) Coastal and Marine Tourism generates US\$14.7 billion annually; (ii) Carbon sequestration provides 14 percent of the gross marine product or US\$2.9 billion annually; (iii) Fisheries and Aquaculture and totals US\$1.9 billion annually. The largest economic contribution (around 70%) comes from coastal and maritime tourism. According to FAO, fishing in the Indian Ocean provided around 15 percent of the world's fish catch in 2020. People in Mozambique, Seychelles, and Tanzania obtain 20 percent or more of their meat from fish. For Comoros, this number rises to over 50 percent.

Finally, deep-sea mining has been added as a priority to the Blue Economy. The Indian Ocean contains copper, cobalt, nickel, zinc, gold, and rare earth elements, estimated at a value of \$3 Trillion. In March 2022, the Indian Ocean Rim Association (IORA) and the U.N. International Seabed Authority (ISA) signed a memorandum of understanding to collaborate on the sustainable development of seabed mining in the region. This will generate new opportunities for the maritime economy. Still, the associated environmental concerns will need to be properly accounted for. Mining the deep sea can cause the extinction of species that live on the ocean floor, destroy deepwater ecosystems, disturb the water column, and generate sediment plumes and toxins that could impact marine life far beyond the mine site.

Discussion Questions:

- How is the blue economy factored into your country's strategic assessments? What is its overall contributions to development?
- How does your country manage marine resources?
- Please share your insights into specific steps your country is currently taking to promote a sustainable blue economy.

Further Readings:

¹ FAO, *The State of World Fisheries and Aquaculture 2020*, (Rome: Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, 2020) 53-54 <https://www.fao.org/3/ca9229en/ca9229en.pdf>

² David Obura, *Reviving the Western Indian Ocean Economy: Actions for a Sustainable Future* (Gland, Switzerland: World Wide Fund For Nature (Formerly World Wildlife Fund), 2017) 7 <https://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/content/documents/13692WWF2.pdf>

1. FAO, *The State of World Fisheries and Aquaculture 2020*, (Rome: Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, 2020)
<https://www.fao.org/3/ca9229en/ca9229en.pdf>
2. Global Maritime Trends 2050. *Impact Economist*.
<https://impact.economist.com/ocean/global-maritime-trends-2050/>.
3. Harmful Marine Extractives: Understanding the risks & impacts of financing non-renewable extractive industries (2022). *United Nations Environment Program Finance Initiative*). Geneva.
4. ACSS, "Trends in African Maritime Security," *Spotlight*, March 15, 2019,
<https://africacenter.org/spotlight/trends-in-african-maritime-security/>.
5. ACSS, "Ten Years of the Yaoundé Protocol: Reflections on Maritime Security in the Gulf of Guinea," *Africa Center for Strategic Studies*, June 14, 2023,
<https://africacenter.org/spotlight/ten-years-of-the-yaounde-protocol-reflections-on-maritime-security-in-the-gulf-of-guinea/>.
6. Kelly Moss and Maisie Pigeon, "The Western Indian Ocean," *Stables Seas*, (March 2022), https://safety4sea.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/03/Stable-Seas-Western-Indian-Ocean-Report-2022_03.pdf.
7. Sharon Lerner, "Africa's Exploding Plastic Nightmare," *The Intercept*, (2020)
<https://theintercept.com/2020/04/19/africa-plastic-waste-kenya-ethiopia/>.
8. Ifesinachi Okafor-Yarwood, et al., "The Blue Economy-Cultural Livelihood-Ecosystem Conservation Triangle: The African Experience." *Sec. Marine Conservation and Sustainability*, (2020),
<https://www.frontiersin.org/articles/10.3389/fmars.2020.00586/full#:~:text=all%2042%20Articles-,The%20Blue%20Economy%E2%80%93Cultural%20Livelihood%E2%80%93Ecosystem,Conservation%20Triangle%3A%20The%20African%20Experience&text=The%20concept%20of%20Blue%20Economy,economic%20benefits%20and%20ecological%20conservation.>

Session 2: Western Indian Ocean Security: Evidence-Based Perspectives, and Digital Tools

Format: Plenary presentation
Discussion groups

Objectives:

- Relying on data and data visualization, highlight the importance of the maritime domain to Western Indian Ocean states and the risks posed by security challenges.
- Generate shared understanding of the regional threat posed by piracy; armed robbery at sea; transnational organized crime in the form of trafficking of drugs, weapons, and humans; environmental dumping and pollution; over exploitation of fisheries; and IUU fishing.
- Begin the discussion of the importance of collective action in response to regional threats.

Background:

Linking together an increasingly economically vibrant set of regional states, the Indian Ocean is a key geostrategic area. Providing the primary trade routes between the Pacific and Europe, the Indian Ocean Region (IOR) is mineral rich, economically diverse, and politically dynamic. The importance of the Indian Ocean is apparent when looking at the intensity by which major non-regional powers invest, engage, and seek to influence the region. The IOR is part of the Indo-Pacific, a concept that currently shapes geopolitics, alludes to a period of major power competition, and recognizes the growing power of both Asia and Africa.

The Western Indian Ocean (WIO) encompasses East Africa, the Indian Ocean African island states, and portions of the Arabian Peninsula. Dynamic in the same way as the larger IOR, the WIO is a complex region where maritime security challenges, both global and local, converge. The waters of the WIO face numerous challenges. Illicit networks operate throughout the WIO and challenge the capacity of regional states. IUU fishing, trafficking, human smuggling, piracy, and interregional maritime disputes are but some of the threats that exist in these waters. Yet, it is not merely maritime security challenges that define these waters. Maritime coordination and cooperation, while too often overlooked, also define the WIO. Investments in information sharing, joint training and exercises, maritime domain awareness, and public-private partnerships are emerging amongst the regional state and non-state actors.

Discussion Questions:

- What are the key threats to maritime security in the Western Indian Ocean region?
- What are the prospects for collective action in response to these regional threats?
- What role can evidence-based approaches supported by improved data and data visualization tools play in identifying and addressing maritime threats?

Further Readings:

1. Darshana M. Baruah, Nitya Labh, and Jessica Greely, "Mapping the Indian Ocean Region," *Carnegie Endowment for International Peace*, June 15, 2023, <https://carnegieendowment.org/2023/06/15/mapping-indian-ocean-region-pub-89971>
2. CEIP, "The Indian Ocean Strategic Map," *Carnegie Endowment for International Peace*, <https://carnegieendowment.org/publications/interactive/indian-ocean-map/>
3. Christian Bueger and Timothy Walker, "Beyond piracy: making waves in the Western Indian Ocean," *ISS Africa*, February 14, 2022, <https://issafrica.org/iss-today/beyond-piracy-making-waves-in-the-western-indian-ocean>
4. Kelly Moss, Maisie Pigeon, et al., "Stable Seas: Western Indian Ocean," *Stable Seas*, March 17, 2022, <https://www.stableseas.org/post/stable-seas-western-indian-ocean>
5. Nilanthi Samaranayake, "Why the U.S. Wants to Step Up Engagement in the Indian Ocean," *United States Institute of Peace*, May 24, 2023, <https://www.usip.org/publications/2023/05/why-us-wants-step-engagement-indian-ocean>

Session 3: Western Indian Ocean Security: National-level Strategic Assessments (Eastern and Southern Africa)

Format: Plenary presentation
Discussion groups

Objectives:

- Provide national-level strategic assessments from Eastern and Southern African states on maritime security highlighting key national interests in the maritime domain.
- Assess actions taken by stakeholders in Eastern and Southern Africa to promote maritime security in the Indian Ocean.
- Explore shared steps that could be taken to close the gap between maritime threats and capabilities.

Background:

Littoral countries of Eastern and Southern Africa are affected by various maritime crimes ranging from piracy, armed robbery at sea, human trafficking and illicit smuggling, to environmental dumping/pollution, over exploitation of fisheries and illegal fishing. Moreover, across Eastern and Southern Africa, insecurity at sea is often caused or exacerbated by broader security issues taking place on land, such as terrorism, insurgency, organized crime among others, much of which spillover across state borders. Geopolitical events from further afield, such as the Israel-Hamas conflict and the Houthi rebel attacks on commercial vessels in the Red Sea, also have important implications for maritime security in the Western Indian Ocean region.

These complex threats tend to vary from country to country in terms of severity and each state's maritime interests. Accordingly, while states agree that a wide array of crimes/threats need to be tackled in the Western Indian Ocean region, as indicated by the DCoC and the Jeddah amendment, individual states might choose to prioritize only one of two of these threats based on their national interests.

Recognizing the diverse aspirations of the littoral states along the Western Indian Ocean, it is vital to assess the key national interests of individual states as well as the steps they have taken to address these maritime concerns. Building such understanding can help to highlight areas of common/shared concern among Eastern and Southern African that require joint action. In fact, in an effort to minimize reliance on international naval forces, developing regional capability to address maritime threats remains high on the agenda for signatory states to the Jeddah amendment to the Djibouti Code of Conduct.³ Such

³ IMO, "Enhancing maritime security in the Western Indian Ocean and Gulf of Aden," *International Maritime Organization*, March 21, 2022, <https://www.imo.org/en/MediaCentre/Pages/WhatsNew-1694.aspx>

efforts have already resulted in the establishment of information sharing centres, including the Regional Maritime Rescue Coordination Centre (RMRCC) in Mombasa, the Maritime Rescue Coordination Centre (MRCC) in Dar es Salaam, and the Regional Maritime Information Sharing Centre (ReMISC) in Sana'a. Meanwhile, the Regional Maritime Information Fusion Centre (RMIFC) of the Eastern, Southern Africa and Indian Ocean Region located in Madagascar, and the Seychelles-based Regional Coordination of Operations Centre (RCOC) are important mechanisms for information sharing and maritime domain awareness in the Western Indian Ocean. Recently, signatories to the DCoC and Jeddah Amendment agreed to using the RMIFC and RCOC as their regional centers.⁴

Discussion Questions:

- What are the key shared threats to maritime security affecting Eastern and Southern African states?
- What actions are currently being undertaken by Eastern and Southern Africa states to promote maritime security in the Indian Ocean?
- What steps can be taken to improve cooperation and coordination in addressing maritime threats in the Western Indian Ocean region?

Further Readings:

1. Hamad Hamad, "Maritime Security Concerns of the East African Community (EAC)," *Western Indian Ocean Journal of Marine Science* 15 no. 2 (2016): pp. 75-9 https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2965871.
2. Timothy Walker, "Africa must get on board as world attention turns to maritime security", *ISS Africa*, October 27, 2021, <https://issafrica.org/iss-today/africa-must-get-on-board-as-world-attention-turns-to-maritime-security>.
3. Anum Khan, "Africa's Maritime Security: From Strategy to Solutions," *National Maritime Foundation*, June 30, 2023, <https://maritimeindia.org/africas-maritime-security-from-strategy-to-solutions/>.
4. João Paulo Borges Coelho, *African Approaches to Maritime Security: Southern Africa* (Maputo: Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, 2013) <https://library.fes.de/pdf-files/bueros/mosambik/10671.pdf>.
5. Christian Bueger and Timothy Walker, "From Djibouti to Jeddah, the Western Indian Ocean needs security," *ISS Africa*, May 23, 2018, <https://issafrica.org/iss-today/from-djibouti-to-jeddah-the-western-indian-ocean-needs-security>.

⁴ Brian Gicheru Kinyua, "Re-Imagining Africa's Agency in Global Maritime Security," *The Maritime Executive*, December 10, 2023, <https://maritime-executive.com/article/re-imagining-africa-s-agency-in-global-maritime-security>

Session 4: Western Indian Ocean Security: Regional/International-level Strategic Assessments

Format: Plenary presentation
Discussion groups

Objectives:

- Expand discussion on strategic assessments to include key voices outside of coastal Indian Ocean African states, including South Asia and Oceania (e.g., India, Indonesia, Australia), and the United States.
- Assess actions taken by stakeholders in South Asia and Oceania to promote maritime security.
- Explore shared steps that could be taken to close the gap between maritime threats and capabilities.

Background:

To understand and counter maritime security threats for any individual Indian Ocean state, theater level analysis of the Indian Ocean as a system is necessary. This session will complement Western Rim focused analysis in Session 3 by adding to the maritime security picture the perspective of key South Asia and Oceania states, thus allowing for assessments of the Indian Ocean theater as a whole. This analysis will focus on India, Australia and Indonesia, and the diverse array of maritime threats they face.

With the world's largest population and an already vast and rapidly expanding economy, India is the dominant local security provider in the Northern Indian Ocean Rim as well as the economic anchor for the Indian Ocean theater as a whole. The need to protect this growth and the increasing resources available to New Delhi have led to increased investment in maritime security provision. As India seeks to secure its blue economy and increasingly serve as a regional security provider, the principal maritime security challenges it faces are IUU fishing, environmental degradation, climate change and natural disasters as well as criminal activities at sea, particularly piracy, and terrorism. In response to these threats, New Delhi has invested in increasing maritime detection and response capacity by including integration of new equipment and technology for its Navy, bolstering its maritime domain awareness, and working to operationalize the recently approved National Maritime Domain Awareness (NMDA) project. The NMDA seeks to create an integrated intelligence grid capable of detecting and responding to sea-based threats in real time.

Along with India, Australia is a leader in maritime security provision in the Indian Ocean with a longstanding, effective and professional blue-water Navy. Although it focuses most maritime security effort towards the north and east, the Indian Ocean is of increasing importance for Australia. This has led to efforts to deepen regional maritime security cooperation in the Indian Ocean, including increased engagement with regional

partners. This includes regional forums, such as the Indian Ocean Rim Association and the Indian Ocean Naval Symposium as well as bilateral and multilateral arrangements such as the Indian-France-Australia trilateral dialogues, the Australia-India-Indonesia trilateral meeting and the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue that in 2022 announced the Indo-Pacific Partnership for Maritime Domain Awareness (IPMDA). Importantly, the IPMDA seeks to integrate three critical regions – the Pacific Islands, Southeast Asia, and the Indian Ocean region – which further emphasizes its importance.

Indonesia, the largest archipelago in the world, is located at the strategically vital intersection of the Indian and Pacific oceans. As a result of its location and unique archipelagic geography, Indonesia has to contend with IUU fishing, piracy, smuggling, illegal migration, and maritime terrorism. For Indonesia, these threats have a heightened domestic impact as they affect commerce and internal lines of communication at the national level. In response, the government of Indonesia has invested in infrastructure development to address capacity constraints and has also improved interagency coordination between relevant services – i.e., the Indonesian Maritime Security Agency (BAKAMLA) and SATGAS 115 – to address maritime security challenges.

Discussion Questions:

- What shared steps could be taken to close the gap between maritime threats and capabilities among western Indian Ocean African states?
- Which, if any, actions taken by stakeholders in South Asia and Oceania to promote maritime security offer lessons for Western Indian Ocean African states?

Further Readings:

1. Lyle J. Morris and Giacomo Persi Paoli, “A Preliminary Assessment of Indonesia's Maritime Security Threats and Capabilities,” *RAND Corporation*, 2018, https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research_reports/RR2400/R2469/RAND_RR2469.pdf
2. Darshana M. Baruah, Nitya Labh, and Jessica Greely, “Mapping the Indian Ocean Region,” *Carnegie Endowment For International Peace*, June 15, 2023, <https://carnegieendowment.org/2023/06/15/mapping-indian-ocean-region-pub-89971>
3. Rebecca Strating, “Maritime Cooperation in the Indian Ocean,” *Australian Institute of International Affairs*, March 16, 2022, <https://www.internationalaffairs.org.au/australianoutlook/maritime-cooperation-indian-ocean/>

Session 5: Western Indian Ocean Security: Lessons from the Gulf of Guinea

Format: Plenary presentation
Discussion groups

Objectives:

- Identify how geographically diverse states with different interests and procedures in the Gulf of Guinea coordinate information sharing to address criminality at sea.
- Identify how states negotiate legal and chain of evidence requirements for prosecution in national courts.
- Understand the practical role of the Gulf of Guinea regional architecture in making effective cooperation possible.

Background:

The Gulf of Guinea (GoG) offer an example of how diverse states with different interests can cooperate to build a locally led regional architecture to improve their maritime security. While far from perfect, the GoG architecture is a remarkable achievement in international cooperation to face very challenging security challenges in a rapidly evolving strategic environment.

The GoG is a complex maritime environment with 17 states sharing 6000 km of coastline and their respective maritime zones. It has an average maritime traffic density of 1500 ships per day bearing a wide variety of goods including very vulnerable and valuable commodities such as oil, gold, and diamonds. This abundance of valuable resources, coupled with significant governance deficits, facilitated the development of organized maritime crime in the region, including hijacking, theft, and piracy in the first decade of this century.

In June 2013, the leaders of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS), and the Gulf of Guinea Commission (GGC) gathered in Yaoundé, Cameroon to lay the basis for a joint regional strategy to prevent and prosecute illicit activities in the waters of the Gulf of Guinea. The Yaoundé Summit created three mechanisms: the Yaoundé Code of Conduct, the Heads of States Declaration, and the Memorandum of Understanding between regional organizations. Yaoundé Code of Conduct acts as a governing body for all 26 states.

The main method of coordination is through coordination centers in five zones (A,D,E,F, and G), each helmed by an internationally staffed Multinational Maritime Coordination Centre (MMCC) taking the lead in a coordinating responses between member navies. They span a national coordination center, regional coordination centers, inter-regional, and international coordination centers.

Under the Yaoundé architecture, the GoG collaboration mechanism has successfully disseminated information among its member states. This aids in legal prosecution in

national courts as countries can collaborate and easily access information relevant to the prosecution. The ICC, while being African-led, also has buy-in from international partners, including support from the UN, the EU, the IMO, the US, Germany, France, and Spain who contribute on specific aspects such as Maritime Domain Awareness (MDA).

Understanding what worked and what still needs work in the GoG can provide perspective for Western Indian Ocean countries as they look at mechanisms for enhancing maritime cooperation.

Discussion Questions:

- What lessons can be drawn from the Gulf of Guinea that are applicable to the Western Indian Ocean region?
- How can geographically diverse states with different interests and procedures in the Western Indian Ocean improve information sharing to address maritime security threats?

Further Readings:

1. Africa Center for Strategic Studies, "Africa Center's Assis Malaquias Recognized for Work on Maritime Security," *Spotlight*, July 30, 2015. <https://africacenter.org/spotlight/malaquias-recognized-work-maritime-security/>; En Francais: <https://africacenter.org/fr/spotlight/dix-ans-du-protocole-de-yaounde-reflexions-sur-la-securite-maritime-dans-le-golfe-de-guinee/>
2. Africa Center for Strategic Studies, "Maritime Security in the Gulf of Guinea: A Primer," *Spotlight*, May 20, 2015. <https://africacenter.org/security-article/maritime-security-gulf-guinea-2>
3. Adeniyi Adejimi Osinowo, "Combating Piracy in the Gulf of Guinea," *Africa Security Brief No. 30*, Africa Center for Strategic Studies, February 2015. <https://africacenter.org/publication/combating-piracy-gulf-guinea-html/>; En Francais: <https://africacenter.org/fr/publication/lutte-contre-piraterie-golfe-guinee/>

Session 6: Western Indian Ocean Security: International Linkages - the Quad, IPMDA, and Information Sharing

Format: Plenary presentation
Discussion groups

Objectives:

- Discuss practical lessons from other regional bodies that can inform the continued development of maritime security collaboration and cooperation in the Indian Ocean.
- Highlight the lessons that Quad countries and partners learned that could be shared with Indian Ocean coastal states.
- Draw lessons from the IPMDA partnership, particularly in information sharing and transparency, that could be useful for Indian Ocean coastal states.

Background:

In 2022, leaders from the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (Quad), including the United States, Australia, India, and Japan, unveiled the Indo-Pacific Partnership for Maritime Domain Awareness (IPMDA) to enhance existing maritime domain awareness capabilities. Though maritime cooperation among these states increased after the Indian Ocean tsunami of 2004, the IPMDA signaled a renewed focus on the Indo-Pacific for the Biden Administration, which has sought to boost the profile of the Quad as a centerpiece of its Indo-Pacific strategy. Given the various maritime security challenges affecting the Indo-Pacific, the IPMDA seeks to integrate three critical regions - the Pacific Islands, Southeast Asia, and the Indian Ocean region - in the Indo-Pacific to protect fisheries, improve partner ability to respond to climate and humanitarian events, and detect and track “dark shipping” (i.e., vessels that switch off their Automatic Identification Systems to circumvent vessel tracking) among a vast array of other proposed benefits.

To achieve these benefits, the IPMDA focuses on leveraging existing technologies to harness available unclassified data to improve maritime domain awareness and bolster information sharing. These initiatives will improve partners’ ability to fully monitor their respective maritime domains and extend support for information-sharing across existing regional fusion centers, including the Information Fusion Center-Indian Ocean Region in India, the Information Fusion Center in Singapore, the Pacific Islands Forum Fisheries Agency, in the Solomon Islands, and the Pacific Fusion Center in Vanuatu. Importantly, IPMDA marks the first time the United States has included states in the Pacific Islands, Southeast Asia, and the Indian Ocean region in a single framework. Given the Quad’s success in building a framework to support such coordination, there are lessons that can be drawn from the IPMDA partnership, particularly in information sharing and transparency, that could be of service to the Indian Ocean coastal states.

Discussion Questions:

- How can the Quad countries and partners best support Indian Ocean states efforts to improve maritime security cooperation?
- What lessons can be drawn from the IPMDA partnership?
- What role can India, Australia and the United States play in Western Indian Ocean state's efforts to counterterrorism?

Further Readings:

1. White House, "FACT SHEET: Quad Leaders' Tokyo Summit 2022," *White House*, May 23, 2022, <https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2022/05/23/fact-sheet-quad-leaders-tokyo-summit-2022/>
2. Ahana, Roy, "A work in progress: The Indo-Pacific partnership for maritime domain awareness," *Pacific Forum*, June 23, 2023, [PacNet #48 - A work in progress: The Indo-Pacific partnership for maritime domain awareness - Pacific Forum \(pacforum.org\)](https://www.pacforum.org/2023/06/23/a-work-in-progress-the-indo-pacific-partnership-for-maritime-domain-awareness)

Session 7: Western Indian Ocean Security: Mapping Responses

Format: Plenary presentation
Discussion groups

Objectives:

- Discuss the results of a series of polls conducted throughout the three previous days of programming that identify common key threats and actionable next steps towards maritime security cooperation.
- Build consensus around the shared threats and opportunities to devise next steps for collaboration/cooperation.

Background:

Stretching from Africa's eastern coast to Australia's western coast, the Indian Ocean is host to a variety of maritime security challenges that vary in terms of their strategic importance to African, South Asian and Pacific Indian Ocean states. These challenges include issues around sovereignty, IUU fishing, piracy, armed robbery at sea, transnational organized crime, environmental dumping and pollution among other challenges. Though states may vary in how they prioritize these threats, there is a need to move beyond awareness-raising and consensus-building towards stronger collaboration and cooperation.

Discussion Questions:

1. What are some of the shared security concerns that you believe Western Indian Ocean states need to coordinate responses to?
2. What actionable steps can be taken to improve maritime security cooperation across the Indian Ocean?
3. What lessons can be drawn from the Gulf of Guinea, as well as the Indo-Pacific?

Further Readings:

1. Darshana M. Baruah, Nitya Labh, and Jessica Greely, "Mapping the Indian Ocean Region," *Carnegie Endowment For International Peace*, June 15, 2023, <https://carnegieendowment.org/2023/06/15/mapping-indian-ocean-region-pub-89971>

Session 8: Next steps for Western Indian Ocean Maritime Security Collaboration

Format: Plenary presentation
Discussion groups

Objectives:

- Catalyze actionable steps towards maritime security cooperation among participating states.
- Assess how Gulf of Guinea states and Indo-Pacific states organized themselves into the regional architectures.
- Discuss how lessons learned from other regions apply to the Western Indian Ocean context.

Background:

The Djibouti Code of Conduct and Jeddah Amendment were the first major attempts by Western Indian Ocean states to establish a cooperation/collaboration mechanism to counter piracy, armed robbery against ships and illicit maritime activity in the western Indian Ocean and Gulf of Aden. Though this Code and its amendment are important steps towards securing the Indian Ocean region, the architecture in the Western Indian Ocean is not as clearly defined as it should be. Certainly, cooperative mechanisms are beginning to take hold particularly in the states of the Indian Ocean Commission, which have set up a Regional Center for Operational Coordination and a Regional Information Fusion Center in Madagascar. However, coordinated and cooperative initiatives to collectively address the multifaceted nature of maritime threats in the region are lacking.

Given the array of maritime activities involved, their interconnectedness and level of complexity, countries must develop collaborative mechanisms both within their respective governments – to enhance effectiveness and minimize duplication of efforts – as well as with other countries to address common threats and challenges. Collaborative frameworks rest on interagency and intergovernmental coordination, cooperative mechanisms between state institutions to share information, integrate multiple agencies, and take coordinated actions. To fully realize the strategic advantages of the region requires greater coordination among the diverse Western Indian Ocean states.

Based on the results of the mapping exercise captured in Session 7, this session will discuss the practical next steps that the participants involved can take to improve greater coordination and collaboration in response to recognized shared maritime security threats.

Further Readings:

1. Darshana M. Baruah, Nitya Labh, and Jessica Greely, “Mapping the Indian Ocean Region,” *Carnegie Endowment For International Peace*, June 15, 2023,

<https://carnegieendowment.org/2023/06/15/mapping-indian-ocean-region-pub-89971>

2. Africa Center for Strategic Studies, "Maritime Security in the Western Indian Ocean: A Discussion with Assis Malaquias," *Africa Center for Strategic Studies*, May 26, 2017, <https://africacenter.org/spotlight/maritime-security-western-indian-ocean-a-discussion-with-assis-malaquias/>
3. Africa Center for Strategic Studies, "Trends in African Maritime Security," *Africa Center for Strategic Studies*, March 15, 2019, <https://africacenter.org/spotlight/trends-in-african-maritime-security/>