



**AFRICA CENTER
FOR STRATEGIC STUDIES**

**Force Commanders' Roundtable:
Comparative Advantage, Coordination and
Convergence in African Peace Operations**

SYLLABUS

January 9-11, 2024



AFRICA CENTER FOR STRATEGIC STUDIES

FORCE COMMANDERS' ROUNDTABLE: COMPARATIVE ADVANTAGE, COORDINATION AND CONVERGENCE IN AFRICAN PEACE OPERATIONS

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SYLLABUS

About the Africa Center.....	3
Program Overview	4
Session 1: Peace Operations in Africa: Taking Stock and Looking Ahead.....	7
Session 2: Lessons Learned from Multidimensional Peace Operations.....	9
Session 3: AU-UN Partnered Peace Operations and the Future of the AU-UN Relationship..	11
Session 4: The Challenges and Opportunities of REC-Led Interventions.....	13
Session 5: Ad-Hoc Security Initiatives and Coordination to Counter Cross-Border Insurgency	15
Session 6: U.S. Support for Peace Operations in Africa	17
Session 7: Coordination of Peace Operations Components and Capabilities.....	19
Session 8: Integrating African Peace Operations with Civilian-Led Conflict Management....	21

ABOUT THE AFRICA CENTER

Since its inception in 1999, the Africa Center has served as a forum for research, academic programs, and the exchange of ideas with the aim of enhancing citizen security by strengthening the effectiveness and accountability of African institutions, in support of U.S.-Africa policy.

VISION

Security for all Africans championed by effective institutions accountable to their citizens.

Realizing the vision of an Africa free from organized armed violence guaranteed by African institutions that are committed to protecting African citizens is the driving motivation of the Africa Center. This aim underscores the Center's commitment to contributing to tangible impacts by working with our African partners – military and civilian, governmental and civil society, as well as national and regional. All have valuable roles to play in mitigating the complex drivers of conflict on the continent today. Accountability to citizens is an important element of our vision as it reinforces the point that in order to be effective, security institutions must not just be “strong,” but also be responsive to and protective of the rights of citizens.

MISSION

To advance African security by expanding understanding, providing a trusted platform for dialogue, building enduring partnerships, and catalyzing strategic solutions.

The Africa Center's mission revolves around the generation and dissemination of knowledge through our research, academic programs, strategic communications, and community chapters. Drawing on the practical experiences and lessons learned from security efforts on the continent, we aim to generate relevant insight and analysis that can inform practitioners and policymakers on the pressing security challenges that they face. Recognizing that addressing serious challenges can only come about through candid and thoughtful exchanges, the Center provides face-to-face and virtual platforms where partners can exchange views on priorities and sound practices. These exchanges foster relationships that, in turn, are maintained over time through the Center's community chapters, communities of interest, follow-on programs, and ongoing dialogue between participants and staff. This dialogue – infused with real world experiences and fresh analysis – provides an opportunity for continued learning and catalyzes concrete actions.

MANDATE

The Africa Center is a U.S. Department of Defense institution established and funded by Congress for the study of security issues relating to Africa and serving as a forum for bilateral and multilateral research, communication, exchange of ideas, and training involving military and civilian participants. (10 U.S.C 342)

Program Overview

Introduction

Peace operations in Africa stand at a critical juncture. The demand for decisive action to address rising conflict and instability on the continent by the United Nations (UN), the African Union (AU), and other regional actors has never been greater. Nevertheless, regional actors and institutions are struggling to meet this demand. Due to a divided UN Security Council and concerns about their effectiveness, UN-sponsored peacekeeping missions are on the decline. African-led peace operations have become increasingly central to managing Africa's conflicts, but often lack capabilities, resources, and international support of UN missions. The passage on December 21 of UN Security Council Resolution 2719, which will allow for UN-assessed contributions support peace operations undertaken by the African Union, provides a critical opportunity to advance the global peace operations enterprise.

This program addresses the challenges of advancing Africa's peace and security architecture to meet rising threats, and fostering effective, locally owned, and sustainable peace operations capacity. It includes briefings with moderated reaction and response periods, group discussions, and a session hosted by the Department of State to offer Force Commanders, peace operations leaders, and U.S. government officials currently involved in shaping U.S. policy on peace operations an opportunity to have an open exchange of views. Sessions will focus on generating lessons learned, commonalities, and differences across experiences in leading peacekeeping missions in Africa to support coordinated, innovative approaches to the peacekeeping challenges facing the continent today.

The content of the program, entitled "Comparative Advantage, Coordination and Convergence in African Peace Operations," is divided into four 'components': (1) AU / UN Roles and Responsibilities, (2) REC and Regional Actor Roles and Responsibilities, III. (3) Roundtable on U.S. Support for Peace Operations in Africa, and (4) Coordination within African Peace Operations. During each session, speakers will offer remarks, drawing on their experiences as leaders within relevant missions. Then, the conversation will be opened to discuss challenges, share lessons learned, generate recommendations and spark conversation and creative debate among participants.

1. The first component, *AU / UN Roles and Responsibilities*, takes stock of the key challenges and lessons learned from peace operations mandated by the UN and AU. It will begin with a broad overview of key trends and contemporary challenges in peace operations across Africa. It will continue with a session aimed at drawing out lessons learned from multidimensional peace operations, focusing on the experiences of the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) and African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM). It will conclude with a discussion of lessons learned from AU-UN partnered peace operations and a discussion of the future of the AU-UN relationship, focusing on the United Nations-African Union Mission in Darfur.
2. The second component, *REC and Regional Actor Roles and Responsibilities*, takes stock of key challenges and lessons learned in peace operations led by regional actors and institutions, a growing trend in peace operations across Africa. The first session compares the experiences of the ECOWAS Mission in the Gambia (ECOMIG) and the SADC Mission in Mozambique, brainstorming insights and recommendations to inform future REC-led

peace enforcement missions. The second session focuses on Africa's Ad-Hoc Security Initiatives (ASIs), comparing and contrasting the Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF) and G5 Sahel Joint Force responses to cross-border insurgencies.

3. The third component consists of a high-level roundtable entitled *U.S. Support for Peace Operations in Africa* co-hosted by the U.S. Department of State. Roundtable participants will hear from senior U.S. government officials about their priorities, programs, strategies, concerns, and interests, and should come prepared to offer their recommendations to the U.S. government with respect to how it can best support peace operations in Africa.
4. The final component highlights key issues of *Coordination within African Peace Operations*. It begins with a discussion of lessons learned by AMISOM and the UN Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO) in coordinating the deployment of police, military, and special force components and capabilities. It concludes with a discussion of how African-led peace operations can integrate civilian and locally led efforts to manage and mitigate conflict into their doctrine, drawing from the experience of the Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic (MINUSCA).

Program Objectives

The objectives of the roundtable are to:

1. Convene former force commanders and other senior peace operations leaders to exchange experiences, views, lessons learned, and good practices in peace operations in Africa.
2. Generate ideas to advance and revitalize the doctrine, partnerships, cooperation mechanisms, and financing underlying Africa's peace and security architecture.
3. Provide an opportunity for senior U.S. policymakers to engage in dialogue with strategic African leaders on how the U.S. can help advance Africa's peace operations architecture.

Academic Approach

Drawing on the many decades of expertise present, this roundtable will seek to capture important lessons and sound practices through:

- *Academic content* in this syllabus focused on evidence-based analysis supported by practical examples.
- *Roundtable discussions* that provide a trusted platform for participants to network and share their perspectives on the program content.
- *Strategic dialogue* with representatives and participants from the United States, to help inform U.S. policy in support of peace operations in Africa.

The roundtable will succeed only with honest analysis and productive dialogue. To this end, the Africa Center seeks to provide empirical evidence to facilitate frank and open exchange on critical issues, as well as to lay the foundation for effective peer networking. To facilitate learning, we provide an academic syllabus and recommended readings. We encourage participants to actively engage with the analyses and content in all the material provided. They are intended to foster a healthy dialogue on a wide range of African security challenges, which in turn will help forge realistic and effective strategies to address insecurity in Africa. *This roundtable in its entirety will be*

conducted under a strict policy of non-attribution, which is binding during and after the seminar. This will allow for candid discussion of the sensitive issues presented.

The Syllabus

This syllabus is an educational document intended to expose participants to various perspectives and help them take full advantage of the program. *It does not reflect the views or official position of the Department of Defense or U.S. Government.* It provides an overview of key ideas, policy questions, and debates in contemporary peace operations in Africa.

The document is organized sequentially to guide participants through the program's four components. For each session, the syllabus gives a brief introduction that frames the topic, provides potential questions for further discussion, and recommended readings that are intended to stimulate the thinking of roundtable participants in preparation for each session. We recommend they be read prior to the sessions for which they are listed. We hope that participants use these materials as resources even after the program concludes. We encourage all participants to share questions and suggestions about the materials and the roundtable, as it will enhance the quality of our programs.

The lion's share of expertise and knowledge about these topics comes from the participants themselves. Therefore, we heartily encourage all participants to share experiences and knowledge with each other, to challenge and debate ideas that are raised at the forum, and to use the forum as they wish to build additional professional networks.

Preparation for the Roundtable

Before the roundtable, we ask that participants:

1. Read this syllabus.
2. Review and read each portion of the syllabus and recommended readings the day prior to each session.
3. Spend some time thinking about the discussion questions and consider what questions, comments, or experiences to share during each session.

Session 1: Peace Operations in Africa: Taking Stock and Looking Ahead

Objectives:

- Provide an overview of key trends in African peace operations.
- Discuss successes, challenges, and lessons learned in African peace operations.
- Provide an overview of key ongoing initiatives and debates on how to improve Africa's regional security architecture.

Background:

There have been more than 50 peace operations in Africa during the twenty-first century.¹ Though empirical data consistently demonstrates that peace operations reduce civilian casualties, shorten conflicts, and increase commitment to peace agreements, peace operations are often the subject of controversy and criticism.² As the continent's security landscape continues to evolve, there is a critical need to extract lessons learned both from mission failures and successes in an effort to innovate and adapt to current threats. With the recent coups across the Sahel, civil wars in Ethiopia and Sudan, and significant increases in militant Islamist violence, the need for effective modalities of conflict prevention and resolution could not be greater.³

While the UN remains the most significant source of financial resources and arguably the most prominent actor in peace operations in Africa, over the past decade there has been a marked shift towards more partnered operations with mandates that extend beyond traditional peacekeeping. AU and Regional Economic Communities (REC) authorized operations are becoming more prominent.⁴ In fact, the year 2022 which marked the 20th anniversary of the AU, witnessed the authorization of four new African-led peace operations, bringing the total to 10 operations with over 70,000 personnel across 17 African countries.⁵ This evolution is a response to division in the UN Security Council and perceived limitations of UN-sponsored missions, such as limited rapid response capabilities and doctrinal inflexibility in addressing unconventional threats.⁶

However, while African-led peace operations have been crucial for managing conflicts, they have their own limitations. These include limited operational and expeditionary capabilities, poor integration with civilian-led conflict management efforts, concerns about their ability to abide by international humanitarian, heavy dependence on external donors, and a formal regional

¹ Paul D. Williams. "Learning Lessons from Peace Operations in Africa." In Terence McNamee, and Monde Muyangwa, eds., *The State of Peacebuilding in Africa* (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2021). https://www.researchgate.net/publication/346605287_Learning_Lessons_from_Peace_Operations_in_Africa

² UN News. "Does UN Peacekeeping work? Here's What the Data Says." December 2022. <https://news.un.org/en/story/2022/12/1131552>

³ Africa Center. "Spike in Militant Islamist Violence in Africa Underscores Shifting Security Landscape." *Infographic*. Washington: Africa Center for Strategic Studies. January 2021. <https://africacenter.org/spotlight/spike-militant-islamist-violence-africa-shifting-security-landscape/>

⁴ See Paul D. Williams. "Learning Lessons from Peace Operations in Africa."

⁵ Nate D. F. Allen. "African-Led Peace Operations: A Crucial Tool for Peace and Security, *Spotlight*." Washington: Africa Center for Strategic Studies. August 2023. <https://africacenter.org/spotlight/african-led-peace-operations-a-crucial-tool-for-peace-and-security/>

⁶ *Ibid.*

architecture that increasingly does not reflect the realities of African peace operations as they are currently practiced.

To address these concerns, the UN, the AU and RECs could institutionalize achievements, adopt a standardized playbook for cross-border security challenges, and better integrate military aspects of peace with civilian-led approaches to conflict management. Another priority could be increasing resources and sustainable financing mechanisms for African-led peace operations, both through the Peace Fund and intermediary support through the UN Peacekeeping funds. The recent passage of UNSCR 2719 by the UN Security Council allowing for UN-assessed contributions in support of African-led peace operations could provide a much-needed kick-start to the re-invigoration of the global peace operations enterprise.

Discussion Questions:

- How have African peace operations evolved over the past several decades, and what are the key trends shaping the current landscape?
- What successes, challenges, and lessons learned can we extract from African peace operations during the twenty-first century?
- What steps can be taken to improve Africa's regional security architecture?

Recommended Readings:

Nate D. F. Allen, "African-Led Peace Operations: A Crucial Tool for Peace and Security," Africa Center for Strategic Studies, August 2023. <https://africacenter.org/spotlight/african-led-peace-operations-a-crucial-tool-for-peace-and-security/>

Allard Duursma et al., UN Peacekeeping at 75: Achievements, Challenges, and Prospects, *International Peacekeeping* 30:4, 415-476, 2023. <https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/13533312.2023.2263178?scroll=top&needAccess=true>

Bitania Tadesse, "The Role of African Multilateralism in the New Agenda for Peace," International Peace Institute Global Observatory, September 2023. <https://theglobalobservatory.org/2023/09/the-role-of-african-multilateralism-in-the-new-agenda-for-peace/>

Paul D. Williams, "Learning Lessons from Peace Operations in Africa," in Terence McNamee, and Monde Muyangwa, eds., *The State of Peacebuilding in Africa* (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2021). https://www.researchgate.net/publication/346605287_Learning_Lessons_from_Peace_Operations_in_Africa

Session 2: Lessons Learned from Multidimensional Peace Operations

Objectives:

- Take stock of strategic and operational successes, challenges, and lessons learned from multidimensional operations in Africa.
- Analyze the challenges faced by both MINUSMA and AMISOM/African Union Transition Mission in Somalia (ATMIS) in aligning mandates with capabilities, and the drawdown and exit of each mission.
- Consider how these challenges can be overcome in future peace operations, and what a future, more regionalized framework for partnered multidimensional peace operations might look like.

Background:

A key trend in the past two decades has been the rise and decline of multidimensional peace operations. Multidimensional peace operations are among the largest, longest-lasting operations ever undertaken and have accounted for most of the UN's peacekeeping budget. They have involved the expeditionary deployment and sustainment of tens of thousands of troops with complex, "multidimensional" mandates that push the boundaries of peacekeeping. Mandated tasks go beyond the traditional tasks of supporting ceasefires and peace agreements to include the protection of civilians; the stabilization or the restoration of state authority; the reduction of the threat posed by armed non-state actors; the disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration of combatants; the facilitation of elections or electoral processes; and security sector reform.

Major multidimensional peace operations in Africa have included the United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL; 2003-2018), the African Union - United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID; 2007-2020); the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM, 2007-2022); the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO; 2010-); United Nations Mission in the Republic of South Sudan (UNMISS, 2011-); United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA, 2013-2023); and the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic (MINUSCA, 2014-).

The legacy of these multidimensional peace operations is mixed. Critics frequently point to the expense, length, and continuation of political instability and conflict in the countries where most multidimensional missions have deployed as evidence of their failure. Fueled by these perceived failures, under siege from disinformation campaigns, and viewed as a tool of Western influence in an increasingly divided, multipolar international order, support for multidimensional peacekeeping has waned. Most multidimensional missions have ended or are in the process of winding down, having either completed their missions (UNMIL), lost international support amid funding shortfalls (UNAMID, AMISOM), or been asked to leave by the host country (MINUSMA, MONUSCO). Nevertheless, both rigorous quantitative⁷ and qualitative⁸ evaluations of these and other peacekeeping missions suggest that, despite the major challenges, peacekeeping operations save countless lives, reduce conflict, and prevent conflict recurrence and spillover.

⁷ Barbara Walter, Lise Howard, and V. Page Fortna. "The Extraordinary Relationship between Peacekeeping and Peace." *British Journal of Political Science* 51, no. 4 (2021): 1705-1722, <https://doi.org/10.1017/S000712342000023X>

⁸ See <https://effectivepeaceops.net/reports/> for an excellent repository of qualitative evaluations of most of major peace operations undertaken over the past decade, many of which are included as readings.

Still, no new major multidimensional peace operation has been authorized in close to a decade. It is important to consider how to wind down existing major multidimensional missions in a manner that limits the potential for increases in conflict and political instability, and how to apply lessons learned from these missions to new, more localized, less resource-intensive missions.

Discussion Questions:

- What are the key lessons learned from major multidimensional peace operations, and how can they be applied to future efforts by regional actors to prevent conflict in Africa?
- To what extent have the challenges faced by multidimensional missions been due to challenges in aligning mandates with resources?
- How can the potential for the spread of conflict and instability because of the drawdown of major multidimensional peace operations be mitigated?
- Is it realistic to expect the African Union or other regional actors to undertake or manage multidimensional peace operations in the near to medium term? If not, what kinds of mandates or missions can serve as alternatives?

Recommended Readings:

United Nations, “Does UN Peacekeeping Work? Here’s the Data.”

<https://www.un.org/en/video/does-un-peacekeeping-work-here%E2%80%99s-data>

Cedric de Coning. “How Not to Do UN Peacekeeping”, IPI Global Observatory, 23 May 2023.

<https://theglobalobservatory.org/2023/05/how-not-to-do-un-peacekeeping/>

Natasja Rupesinghe et al. *Assessing the Effectiveness of the United Nations Mission in Mali (MINUSMA)*, Effective Peace Operations Network (EPONS), 2019.

EN: <https://effectivepeaceops.net/wp-content/uploads/2019/11/EPON-MINUSMA-Report.pdf>

FR: <https://effectivepeaceops.net/wp-content/uploads/2019/09/EPON-MINUSMA-Exec-Summary-FRENCH.pdf>

Paul D. Williams et al. *Assessing the Effectiveness of the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM)*, Effective Peace Operations Network (EPONS), 2018.

<https://effectivepeaceops.net/publication/amisom/>

Session 3: AU-UN Partnered Peace Operations and the Future of the AU-UN Relationship

Objectives:

- Take stock of strategic and operational successes, challenges, and lessons learned from the AU-UN Hybrid Mission in Darfur (UNAMID).
- Analyze areas of comparative advantage and convergence between the AU and UN as sponsors of peace operations with the aim of generating insights to inform future AU-UN partnered operations.
- Brief participants on the current status of negotiations between the AU and UN on the topic of providing UN-assessed contributions to AU-led peace operations.

Background:

Since its establishment, the UN has played a leading role in maintaining international peace and security in Africa. Yet over the past two decades, the role and accompanying influence of African institutions have grown as well. Since the turn of the millennium, 38 African-led peace operations have been authorized, deploying to 25 countries.⁹ The AU has been the most active supporter of these operations, authorizing 22 total missions. In many if not most cases, the UN and the AU have sought to coordinate with one another to ensure that peace operations of all kinds have a basis in international law, and at times, have undertaken joint missions. There is mutual recognition that the future of peace operations in Africa depends on the relationship between the UN and the AU.

The UN and AU have the strong potential to complement each other. The AU brings political proximity, legitimacy, and rapid deployment efficiencies, while the UN offers global credibility, legal authority, operational experience, and access to humanitarian and development resources. However, there have been challenges in implementing this vision. One recent example of AU-UN partnership in peace operations is the African Union–United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID). Initially hailed as a groundbreaking model for peacekeeping cooperation, the mission faced considerable challenges including disputes over its mandate, failure to meet goals, and challenges from stakeholders in Sudan.¹⁰ Most observers point to operational problems, a lack of joint strategic vision, and insufficient resources, but it is also clear that UNAMID's shortcomings reflect legitimation issues driven by differing interpretations of peacekeeping effectiveness and impartiality.¹¹

Another overarching issue in UN-AU relations is financing. Since 2007, the AU has sought UN-assessed contributions to provide sustainable and predictable funding for African-led PSOs due to inadequate resources. The African members of the UN Security Council (A3) have pushed for this financing through resolutions and statements, but faced opposition. Following the AU's endorsement of a common position in February 2023, the UN Security Council adopted a presidential statement requesting a report from the Secretary-General on progress and recommendations for securing predictable, sustainable, and flexible resources.¹² On 21 December 2023, the Security Council unanimously adopted Resolution 2719 allowing for UN-assessed

⁹ See Nate D. F. Allen. "African-Led Peace Operations: A Crucial Tool for Peace and Security."

¹⁰ *Ibid.*

¹¹ *Ibid.*

¹² Security Council Report. *The Financing of AU Peace Support Operations: Prospects for Progress in the Security Council*. Research Report. April 2023. <https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/research-reports/the-financing-of-au-peace-support-operations-prospects-for-progress-in-the-security-council.php>

contributions to African-led PSOs.¹³ Changes in U.S. policy, which had previously been the biggest holdout due to concerns about self-financing and human rights compliance, proved crucial to ensuring Resolution 2719's passage.

Discussion Questions:

- How do the AU and UN complement each other as sponsors of peace operations? What are some points of friction?
- What were the successes and failures of the UNAMID hybrid model, and to what extent do you think it could inform future peace operations in Africa?
- Should the UN provide the African Union with resources from the UN assessed-contributions peacekeeping budget, and on what terms?

Required Readings:

Cedric De Coning, "The African Union – United Nations Strategic Partnership in an Era of Networked Multilateralism," ACCORD, November 2023.

<https://www.accord.org.za/analysis/the-african-union-united-nations-strategic-partnership-in-an-era-of-networked-multilateralism/>

Security Council Report, *The Financing of AU Peace Support Operations: Prospects for Progress in the Security Council*, Research Report, April 2023. <https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/research-reports/the-financing-of-au-peace-support-operations-prospects-for-progress-in-the-security-council.php>

Eugene Chen, *Not a Silver Bullet: The Push for Assessed Contributions for African-led Peace Support Operations*, Center of International Cooperation, November 2023.

<https://cic.nyu.edu/resources/not-a-silver-bullet-the-push-for-assessed-contributions-for-african-led-peace-support-operations/>

United Nations, "Cooperation between the United Nations and regional and subregional organizations in maintaining international peace and security." Security Council Resolution 2719, December 21, 2023. <http://unscr.com/en/resolutions/2719>

Ralph Mamiya, Wibke Hansen, et al. *Assessing the Effectiveness of the United Nations-African Union Hybrid Operation in Darfur*. Effective Peace Operations Network (EPONS), 2020.

<https://effectivepeaceops.net/publication/unamid/>

¹³ United Nations. "Security Council Opens Door to UN Funding for African-led Peace Missions, Unanimously Adopting Resolution 2719." Meetings Coverage, 9518th Meeting, SC/15544, 21 December 2023. <https://press.un.org/en/2023/sc15544.doc.htm>

Session 4: The Challenges and Opportunities of REC-Led Interventions

Objectives:

- Take stock of strategic-level successes, challenges, and lessons learned from the ECOWAS Mission in the Gambia (ECOMIG) and the Southern African Development Community (SADC) Mission in Mozambique.
- Brainstorm insights and recommendations based on the lessons learned from these operations to inform efforts by the AU and RECs to deploy peace operations to prevent or respond to political unrest and unconstitutional changes in government.
- Analyze the broader comparative advantages and disadvantages of REC-led peace operations in comparison to UN or AU-led missions.

Background:

Africa's RECs have long played an important, if at times underrecognized role, in peace operations across Africa. The five RECs serve as pillars of the African Standby Force (ASF), a peacekeeping force under the direction of the AU composed of stand-by regional brigades each about 5,000 strong.¹⁴ Their contribution to the ASF brigades, as well as other measures requiring the RECs to coordinate with the AU on matters of peace and security, ensure that the RECs are deeply integrated into Africa's broader regional peace and security architecture. The RECs have also authorized and undertaken their own peace operations. Since the turn of the millennium, the RECs have managed 12 peace operations: 6 by the Economic Commission of West African States (ECOWAS),¹⁵ 2 each by the SADC and the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS), and 1 each by the Community of Sahel-Saharan States (CEN-SAD) and the East African Community (EAC).

Though some have ostensibly been authorized in support of ceasefires or peace agreements (MICOPAX, ECOMIL), REC-led missions have tended to deploy in circumstances for which there is no clear UN doctrine, such as to stabilize governments under threat from rebel groups (ECOMIL, MICOPAX, ECOMOG), to respond to crises caused by assassinations or attempts to unconstitutionally seize power (SAPMIL, SSMGB, ECOMIG), and, more recently, to conduct or support counterterrorism operations (EACRF, SAMIM). Among the first and most high-profile REC-led interventions was the ECOWAS Monitoring Group (ECOMOG), a coalition of West African states led by Nigeria established in 1990 that intervened repeatedly during civil wars in Sierra Leone and Liberia.

Due to their credibility with and proximity to regional states, role in organizing regional brigades of the African Standby Force, and the decline in UN-led peacekeeping, the demand for REC-led peace operations may increase. Despite this, comparatively little has been written taking stock of REC-led peace operations. To their critics, their tendency to deploy in unconventional circumstances may make them appear as little more than thinly disguised efforts by some regional actors to intervene in each other's affairs without a sound basis in peacekeeping

¹⁴ Aleksandra Dier and Daniel Trachsler. *The African Standby Force Put to the Test*. Center for Security Studies, ETH Zurich. 84, November 2010. <https://www.research-collection.ethz.ch/handle/20.500.11850/26199?show=full>

¹⁵ See Nate D. F. Allen. "African-Led Peace Operations: A Crucial Tool for Peace and Security."

principles. Yet, at least in some cases, intervention by the RECs has enabled regional actors to mitigate conflict in circumstances where other actors could or would not.

Discussion Questions:

- What are the key lessons learned from REC-led interventions, and how can they be applied to future efforts by regional actors to prevent conflict in Africa?
- What comparative advantages in authorizing, mandating, and deploying PSOs do RECs have vis a vis the United Nations or African Union?
- How can the RECs improve their working relationships with the AU, the UN, and bilateral actors such as the United States?
- Are any reforms to Africa's peace and security architecture needed to better account for peace operations undertaken by the RECs?

Recommended Readings:

Paul Nantulya, "Lessons from Gambia on Effective Regional Security Cooperation," Africa Center for Strategic Studies, 27 March 2017.

EN: <https://africacenter.org/spotlight/gambia-regional-security-cooperation/>

FR: <https://africacenter.org/fr/spotlight/les-lecons-de-la-gambie-sur-lefficacite-de-la-cooperation-en-matiere-de-securite-regionale/>

Andrew Cheatham, Amanda Long, and Thomas P. Sheehy, "Regional Security Support: A Vital First Step for Peace in Mozambique", United States Institute of Peace, 23 June 2022.

<https://www.usip.org/publications/2022/06/regional-security-support-vital-first-step-peace-mozambique>

Liesl Louw-Vaudran, "SADC and Rwanda Shouldn't go it Alone in Mozambique," Institute for Security Studies, 11 April 2022. <https://issafrica.org/iss-today/sadc-and-rwanda-shouldnt-go-it-alone-in-mozambique>

Sanae Suzuki, "Exploring the roles of the AU and ECOWAS in West African Conflicts." *South African Journal of International Affairs* 27:2, 173-191, 2020.

<https://doi.org/10.1080/10220461.2020.1767193>

Session 5: Ad-Hoc Security Initiatives and Coordination to Counter Cross-Border Insurgency

Objectives:

- Take stock of strategic-level successes, challenges, and lessons learned from Africa’s Ad-Hoc Security Initiatives (ASIs), specifically the Lake Chad Basin’s Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF) and the G-5 Sahel Joint Force.
- Analyze the roles played by the UN, the AU, the U.S., and other external actors in supporting the ASIs to counter cross-border insurgencies.
- Analyze challenges and opportunities in incorporating the ASIs into the continent’s formal peace operations architecture.
- Brainstorm insights and recommendations to inform the future of peace operations in Africa based on the experience of the ASIs.

Background:

Over the past decade, ASIs have emerged as a new form of collective security arrangement.¹⁶ While most ASIs have been authorized as peace operations under the auspices of the AU, they are separate from the African Standby Forces and fill a gap not initially envisioned in AU or UN peacekeeping doctrine: the need for neighboring countries to cooperate on the threat posed by cross-border armed groups. The four ASIs that have been created to date include: the AU Regional Coordination Initiative to Counter the Lord’s Resistance Army (2011-2018), the Lake Chad Basin’s Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF) (2015-), the G5 Sahel Joint Force (2017-2023), and the Accra Initiative (2017-).

ASIs share several core characteristics that facilitate cooperation among regional actors. These include the establishment of a joint headquarters, mechanisms to share intelligence, the organization of cross-border multinational operations, and “hot pursuit” rules that enable security forces to pursue militant groups into their neighbors’ territory. Troops party to an ASI typically remain under their country’s command, and only deploy into neighboring countries if they are part of a joint operation or following the rules of hot pursuit. Some ASIs, notably the AU-RCI Initiative and the MNJTF, have had marked success in diminishing the threat from cross-border insurgency. Others, including the G5 Sahel Joint Force and the Accra Initiative, have faced challenges coordinating national forces across multiple border regions in multiple theaters, integrating their operations with non-kinetic approaches to conflict management, generating expeditionary capacity, and fostering the necessary trust across responsible nations to truly operationalize.

Since ASIs play a distinctive role in responding to the growing threat of cross-border insurgency, they are likely to endure. However, key questions remain surrounding how best to incorporate ASIs into Africa’s broader peace and security architecture, what role the UN, the AU, the RECS, or other bilateral partners could play in supporting their operations, and how to address their challenges and shortcomings.

Discussion Questions:

- What lessons from the ASIs can be more systematically applied to efforts across the continent to address the threat of cross-border insurgency?

¹⁶ Cedric de Coning, Andrew E. Yaw Tchie, Natasja Rupesinghe and Anab Ovie Grand, Understanding Ad-Hoc Security Initiatives in Africa, Tfp Policy Brief, August 2021

https://trainingforpeace.org/wp-content/uploads/Tfp_ASI_Policy-Brief_v7-for-web.pdf

- How should Africa’s peace and security architecture be adapted to include ASIs?
- What are the key differences between the MNJTF and the G-5 Sahel Joint Force that enabled the former to endure and led the latter to draw-down?
- How might ASIs be leveraged to facilitate cooperation, trust, and confidence-building between security forces and citizens in at-risk border regions?

Recommended Readings:

Cedric de Coning, Andrew E. Yaw Tchie, Natasja Rupesinghe and Anab Ovie Grand, *Understanding Ad-Hoc Security Initiatives in Africa*, Tfp Policy Biref, August 2021
https://trainingforpeace.org/wp-content/uploads/Tfp_ASI_Policy-Brief_v7-for-web.pdf

Gustavo de Carvalho and Annete Leijenaar, “Ad Hoc Security Initiatives a Potential Force Multiplier for the AU,” Institute for Security Studies, 1 September 2017, <https://issafrica.org/iss-today/ad-hoc-security-initiatives-a-potential-force-multiplier-for-the-au>

Freedom Onuoha, Andrew E. Yaw Tchie, and Mariana Zabala, *Assessing the Effectiveness of the Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF)*, Effective Peace Operations Network (EPONS), 2023.
<https://effectivepeaceops.net/publication/mnjtf/>

Fiifi Edu-Afful, *Shifting from External Dependency: Remodeling the G5 Sahel Joint Force for the Future*, Effective Peace Operations Network (EPONS), 2022.

EN: <https://effectivepeaceops.net/wp-content/uploads/2022/06/EPON-SAHEL-Report.pdf>

FR : <https://effectivepeaceops.net/wp-content/uploads/2022/06/EPON-SAHEL-Report-FRENCH.pdf>

Session 6: Roundtable on U.S. Support for Peace Operations in Africa

Objectives:

- Take stock of current U.S. priorities, policies, strategies, and programs supporting peace operations in Africa.
- Provide opportunities for Force Commanders to exchange views with senior USG officials on how the United States can further empower African-led conflict management and mitigation efforts.
- Brainstorm recommendations and solutions to further enable the United States to support African-led peace operations in alignment with U.S. interests.
- Specific areas to tackle include: adequacy of pre-deployment training; resource accountability; civilian harm mitigation and related accountability mechanisms; political-military coordination within PSOs and with the host nation.

Background:

The United States is among the world's strongest supporters of international peacekeeping, believing "in the critical importance of UN peacekeeping as a tool to prevent conflict and protect civilians."¹⁷ The U.S. is the world's largest single contributor to global peacekeeping, providing 25% of the UN's peacekeeping budget, which in FY 2023 amounted to a Congressional appropriation of 1.48 billion dollars.¹⁸ Through the U.S. Global Peace Operations Initiative (GPOI), the United States is also the world's largest contributor to peace operations capacity building assistance, having invested more than \$1.5 billion since 2005.¹⁹ These investments in peace operations capacity have paid off, especially in Africa, where, in part because of GPOI's efforts, a majority of UN peacekeepers come from African states.

As evidenced by its commitments following the 2023 Peacekeeping Ministerial held in Ghana, current U.S. policy priorities with respect to international peacekeeping include:

- Expanding female participation in peace operations by operationalizing the UN's Women, Peace and Security Objectives.
- Providing aviation, ISR, and counter-IED training to enhance peacekeeper safety and enable the protection of civilians.
- Investing in cleaner and greener UN peacekeeping.
- Providing support to enable regional peace operations through partnerships with African troop contributing countries.
- Investing in police peacekeeping capabilities.

U.S. support to peace operations in Africa and elsewhere is not unqualified, nor without concerns about accountability, sustainability, cost, and effectiveness. Since 2017, the United States has accumulated over 1 billion dollars in peacekeeping arrears due to differences between assessed

¹⁷ U.S. Department of State. "U.S. Commitments and the 2023 Accra Peacekeeping Ministerial." 7 December 2023. <https://www.state.gov/u-s-commitments-at-the-2023-accra-peacekeeping-ministerial/>

¹⁸ Congressional Research Service. "United Nations Issues: U.S. Funding for United Nations Peacekeeping." April 2023. <https://sgp.fas.org/crs/row/IF10597.pdf>

¹⁹ U.S. Department of State. "Partnerships Make Peacekeeping Possible: The United States Works Worldwide to Build Global Peacekeeping Capacity." 5 January 2022. <https://www.state.gov/partnerships-make-peacekeeping-possible-the-united-states-works-worldwide-to-build-global-peacekeeping-capacity/>

contributions by the UN (27%) and caps implemented by Congress at 25% over concern that the U.S. contribution is too high.²⁰ While the United States is broadly supportive of allowing UN assessed contributions to peace operations undertaken by the African Union, the deal remained elusive and was only recently reached on 21 December 2023. The deal was negotiated amid concerns, on the part of United States and other Security Council members, about burden-sharing between the UN and AU, human rights compliance, and the respect for the laws of armed conflict under the auspices of AU-led operations.

Discussion Questions:

- Are you familiar with any U.S. initiatives to support peacekeeping in Africa, and how would you assess their impact?
- Under what terms and conditions should the U.S. support UN-assessed contributions to future AU-led peace operations?
- How might the U.S. enhance its support for AU or regionally led African peace operations outside of the UN?
- How might the U.S. encourage accountability and civilian harm mitigation in the context of African-led peace operations?
- How can the U.S. encourage adequate politico-military coordination and civilian oversight of African-led peace operations?
- How can the U.S. expand and improve its efforts to provide pre-deployment training for African peacekeepers?

Recommended Readings:

U.S. Department of State, “U.S. Commitments and the 2023 Accra Peacekeeping Ministerial,” 7 December 2023. <https://www.state.gov/u-s-commitments-at-the-2023-accra-peacekeeping-ministerial/>

U.S. Department of State, “Partnerships Make Peacekeeping Possible: The United States Works Worldwide to Build Global Peacekeeping Capacity,” 5 January 2022. <https://www.state.gov/partnerships-make-peacekeeping-possible-the-united-states-works-worldwide-to-build-global-peacekeeping-capacity/>

Congressional Research Service, “United Nations Issues: U.S. Funding for United Nations Peacekeeping,” April 2023, <https://sgp.fas.org/crs/row/IF10597.pdf>

Amanda Long and Thomas Colin-Jensen, “How the Biden Administration Can Revive UN Peacekeeping,” U.S. Institute of Peace, 18 February 2021. <https://www.usip.org/publications/2021/02/how-biden-administration-can-revive-un-peacekeeping>

Paul Williams, “Enhancing U.S. Support for Peace Operations in Africa,” Council on Foreign Relations, May 2015. <https://www.cfr.org/report/enhancing-us-support-peace-operations-africa>

²⁰ Congressional Research Service, Op. cit.

Day 3: Coordination within African Peace Operations

Session 7: Coordination of Peace Operations Components and Capabilities

Objectives:

- Take stock of strategic-level successes, challenges, and lessons learned in coordinating the components and capabilities of peace operations in Africa.
- Analyze the challenges and lessons learned in coordinating the roles and responsibilities of police, military, and special forces such as the Force Intervention Brigade (FIB) within the context of efforts by peacekeepers to address threats from armed non-state actors.
- Brainstorm how police, military (including special forces), or other capabilities may be integrated into and sustained in future peace operations in Africa.

Background:

The success of any peace operation depends on cultivating capabilities that align with the operation's mandate and enable the fulfillment of its mission. While most peacekeepers are uniformed military, they come from various backgrounds and nationalities and serve a variety of functions, from infantry to intelligence to air support. United Nations peacekeeping, with its doctrine emphasizing principles of impartiality, non-use of force, and the protection of civilians, has historically invested more in defensive capabilities, including robust police components. Police have served in UN missions since 1960, and nearly every major UN mission possesses a police component. Police are recognized by the UN as critical to deterring crime, protecting property, maintaining public order, protecting civilians from harm, addressing gender-based violence, and reinforcing host-nation policing capacity.²¹ By contrast, only in rare instances, such as the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo (MONUSCO)'s Force Intervention Brigade, has the UN cultivated more offensive, special-forces like capabilities.

African-led missions, by contrast, have historically been more focused on peace enforcement. They are better suited than UN missions to rapidly deploy to intervene in emergent crises and are notable for conducting offensive operations against terrorist groups, insurgents, and other kinds of spoilers. With notable exceptions such as the African-Led Support Mission in the Central African Republic (MISCA) and the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM), few African-led peace operations possess police components. The lack of a robust police architecture or specialized non-military components have at times been a source of criticism against African-led missions,²² though the AU recently released a comprehensive police policy,²³ and through the African Mechanism for Police Cooperation (AFRIPOL) has made considerable effort to harmonize law enforcement capacities across member states.

Cultivating the right capabilities and coordinating their use across components reflecting multiple different nationalities is a perennial challenge faced by peace operations. Today, both African- and UN- led operations face questions over the extent to which the capabilities they possess are suited for the contemporary operating environment; over how to balance the demand

²¹ Report of the Secretary General on United Nations Police (S/2016/952). 10 November 2016.

https://police.un.org/sites/default/files/sg_report_on-un-policing_2016.pdf

²² Yvonne Akpasom. "What Roles for the Civilian and Police Dimensions in African Peace Operations." In De Coning, Gelot and Karlsund, eds. *Future of African Peace Operations* (Zed Books) 108-109, 2016.

²³ African Union. AU Police Policy: Policy for International Policing in AU PSOD and SO. April 2022.

<https://trainingforpeace.org/publications/au-police-policy/>.

by many host governments for offensive operations and units with the desire to respect historic peacekeeping principles; how to properly train, resource, and sustain the capabilities they possess; and how, under the auspices of the continent's broader peace operations architecture, they might think about cultivating the force structure needed to fight conflicts in the future.

Discussion Questions:

- Do you think that the UN should seriously consider mandating, authorizing, or providing greater support to peace enforcement missions?
- How would you evaluate efforts by the African Union and other regional actors to cultivate police or other specialized units and integrate them into their operations?
- What kinds of capabilities do you think need to be expanded in African peace operations? How should peace operations in Africa cultivate these capabilities? To what extent is bilateral support to individual African militaries useful, versus support through a multilateral or regional organization?

Recommended Readings:

Report of the Secretary General on United Nations Police (S/2016/952), 10 November 2016.
https://police.un.org/sites/default/files/sg_report_on-un-policing_2016.pdf

African Union, "AU Police Policy: Policy for International Policing in AU PSOD and SO," April 2022. <https://trainingforpeace.org/publications/au-police-policy/>

Institute for Security Studies, 'Spotlight: Training Police for Peace Enhances AMISOM effectiveness,' 14 March 2019. <https://issafrica.org/impact/spotlight-training-police-for-peace-enhances-amisom-effectiveness>

Alexandra Novosseloff et al. *Assessing the Effectiveness of the United Nations Mission in the DRC / MONUC – MONUSCO*, Effective Peace Operations Network (EPONS), 2019.

EN: <https://effectivepeaceops.net/wp-content/uploads/2019/06/EPON-MONUSCO-LowRes.pdf>

FR : <https://effectivepeaceops.net/wp-content/uploads/2019/09/EPON-MONUSCO-Exec-Summary-FRENCH.pdf>

Session 8: Integrating African Peace Operations with Civilian-Led Conflict Management

Objectives:

- Take stock of the strategic-level successes, challenges, and lessons learned peace operations in Africa have faced in coordinating with civilian actors to manage and mitigate conflict.
- Brainstorm how good practices in interfacing with local communities adopted by the UN can be more broadly integrated into the operations led by the AU and RECs.

Background:

In many respects, peace operations are top-down endeavors, involving the expeditionary deployment of military components by states. Nevertheless, success in peacekeeping is contingent on how peace operations relate to their civilian counterparts and how they interact with local communities. Recognition that military and law enforcement solutions are not enough to fulfill complex and multidimensional peacekeeping mandates have led many, but not all, peace operations in Africa to rely on civilian expertise and develop doctrine and institutions to enable effective engagement with community-based actors.²⁴

As a result of their substantial resources and emphasis on principles of non-use of force and civilian protection, United Nations peacekeeping operations in Africa have typically been deployed with a robust civilian component, including civil affairs officers who serve as key interlocutors with local communities. For example, MINUSCA leveraged these interactions to facilitate local peacebuilding activities that have reduced violence and helped facilitate a 2019 Peace Accord.²⁵ UN Missions also have extensive doctrine, pre-deployment training, and accountability measures to ensure that peacekeepers respect human rights, international humanitarian law, and the laws of armed conflict, each essential components to gaining the trust and cooperation of local communities.

The AU also has an increasingly comprehensive doctrine enabling effective civilian engagement, though the civilian components of AU-led missions are typically not as robust as UN-led ones. Lessons learned from the African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS) and elsewhere guided the establishment of the ASF Civilian Policy Framework of 2006.²⁶ Later missions such as AMISOM and MISCA were authorized more civilian personnel to deliver on state building and civilian protection directives, but their integration continued to lag behind the military and police since policies and procedures were still nascent or did not meet UN standards.

Finally, there is little established procedure or guidance regarding engagement with civilians within the context of REC-led missions and/or the ad-hoc security initiatives (ASIs). Since many African-led peace operations have been mandated as peace enforcement or in direct response to a crisis, often capacities for civil affairs or engagement with local actors are limited or built-up

²⁴ United Nations Peacekeeping. "Mandates and the Legal Basis for Peacekeeping."

<https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/mandates-and-legal-basis-peacekeeping>

²⁵ Howard et al. Assessing the Effectiveness of the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic / MINUSCA. Effective Peace Operations Network (EPOS). 2020. <https://effectivepeaceops.net/wp-content/uploads/2020/10/EPON-MINUSCA-Report.pdf>

²⁶ Cedric de Coning, Irene Limo, James Machakaire and Jide Okeke. "The Role of the Civilian Component in African Union Peace Support Operations." In *The Africa Standby Force. Quo Vadis?* (African Sun Media, 2017).

ad-hoc and after-the-fact. Support to these initiatives, or more formal doctrine aimed at enhancing their civil affairs and community engagement capabilities, might enhance their efficacy.

Discussion Questions:

- What are some challenges the UN, AU, and RECs have faced integrating civilian components into their operations? How have they addressed challenges?
- How can good practices in interfacing with local communities adopted by the UN be integrated into African-led peace enforcement operations?
- How can peace operations in Africa better coordinate their activities and operations with peacebuilding initiatives undertaken by local communities and supported by the international community?
- How can peace operations across Africa navigate the tensions between local communities and government security forces in areas where they operate?

Recommended Readings:

Aishatu Morido Yanet, "Civilian Dimensions of Peace Support Operations in Africa," *Journal of International Peacekeeping* 25, 3, 261-282, 2022.

https://brill.com/view/journals/joup/25/3/article-p261_003.xml

Cedric de Coning, Irene Limo, James Machakaire and Jide Okeke, "The Role of the Civilian Component in African Union Peace Support Operations," in *The Africa Standby Force. Quo Vadis?* (African Sun Media, 2017).

<https://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=Qeu9DwAAQBAJ&oi=fnd&pg=PA63&dq=civilian-led+peacekeeping+efforts+in+Africa&ots=Wv-7-ajvpf&sig=GvJAFRRY2vfUYW3ZQxOx7-M1YMM#v=onepage&q=civilian-led%20peacekeeping%20efforts%20in%20Africa&f=false>

Howard et al., *Assessing the Effectiveness of the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic / MINUSCA*, Effective Peace Operations Network (EPONS), 2020.

EN: <https://effectivepeaceops.net/publication/minusca/>

FR : <https://effectivepeaceops.net/wp-content/uploads/2020/10/EPON-MINUSCA-Exec-Summary-FR.pdf>