Role of Collaborative Policing in Countering Violent Extremism

READ AHEAD

Nouakchott, Mauritania

January 29 – February 1, 2023

ROLE OF COLLABORATIVE POLCING IN COUNTERING VIOLENT EXTREMISM

January 29 – February 1, 2023

READ AHEAD

TABLE OF CONTENTS

BACKGROUND

In several African countries affected by the threat of violent extremism and terrorism, collaborative security approaches to countering violent extremism (CVE) and counterterrorism have emerged as an important complement to traditional military and law enforcement responses. Traditionally, counterterrorism practices have involved little engagement with local communities and have seldom taken into account their diverse needs, concerns, and perceptions. The limitations of these methods have highlighted the necessity of drawing on the support of local communities to successfully counter violent extremism and terrorism. At its core, the ethos of a collaborative, partnership-based approach to security resides in inclusivity, dialogue, and trust between security actors, local authorities, and local communities, particularly those most exposed to vulnerability and violence. This is particularly critical in contexts of preventing and countering violent extremism where communities and security actors must have a clear understanding of the nature and source of the threat they are facing as well as the causes and dynamics of violent extremism.

Implementing a collaborative, partnership-based approach to preventing and countering terrorism and violent extremism is a complicated and multifaceted process that demands the effective engagement of communities in the problem-solving process as well as sound changes in the structures and management styles within defense, security, and relevant government agencies. This necessitates political will, sufficient resources, and careful coordination between multiple stakeholders and agencies. In other words, transitioning from a purely security-driven response to a multi-stakeholder, partnership-led approach entails a mindset change from all key stakeholders in the government, relevant ministries and defense and security agencies. For the latter, such a shift is a major undertaking as it requires a redefinition of identities, roles, mandates, and principles under which they operate.

This roundtable will consider a set of formidable challenges surrounding the adoption and implementation of proactive, community-based approaches to policing and other security functions in contexts of countering violent extremism. Operational-level participants will provide context-based insights into the hurdles, opportunities, and strategies of adopting and operationalizing a partnership-based approach to CVE within their organizations and at the frontline in local communities. Subnational actors, NGOs, and other law enforcement partners will offer their perspectives on the barriers and opportunities for working in partnership.

Roundtable Objectives:

1. Assess the role and contributions of defense and security forces in building trust and fostering cooperation with local communities.

2. Examine the challenges, opportunities, and strategies of adopting a proactive, community-based approach to policing and other security functions in contexts of hybrid insecurity.
3. Explore the operational requirements needed to make security services–public partnerships in CVE successful.
4. Produce a document that synthesizes the conclusions that the subject matter experts draw on the range of questions raised at the roundtable, and that shares the practical recommendations that the group agrees upon through its exchanges.

Academic Approach

Days 1 and 2 will include 5 sessions with experts providing brief opening remarks to foster discussion of key issues, and two breakout sessions in which participants will be divided into discussion groups, where facilitators with relevant expertise and background will lead the interaction toward concrete deliverables.

On Day 3, three subject matter experts will share the insights that they have synthesized from listening and contributing to the sessions. Participants will provide a briefback that identifies courses of action to be taken to enhance cooperation and coordination between security actors, relevant sector-based ministries, local authorities, and border communities in the implementation of collaborative, partnership-based strategies to preventing/countering violent extremism (P/CVE). A draft of the roundtable conclusions will be finalized within two weeks after the closure of the roundtable and all participants in the roundtable will be free to share them with whom they wish.

All subject matter experts will be asked to reflect on their unique national, sectoral, and personal insights on this issue by focusing on several guiding questions that are listed in this document for each session of the roundtable. Providing thoughtful and concise distillations of your knowledge and expertise on each session's themes will facilitate the generation of conclusions and practical take-aways from the roundtable discussions.

The forum will be conducted in English and French. A strict policy of non-attribution applies to the entirety of the roundtable proceedings, other than what the subject matter experts agree to include in the document reflecting the roundtable's conclusions and practical take-aways. These rules are binding during and after the roundtable. This read-ahead is an educational document that seeks to provide an overview of key ideas, debates, and policy issues related to the issues at hand. It does not reflect the views or official position of the Department of Defense or U.S. Government.

First Day: Integrating Collaborative Approaches to CVE

Session 1: Putting Collaborative Policing Approaches into Practice

Objectives:

- Examine the strategic and operational foundations for a collaborative, community-based approach to policing in contexts of hybrid insecurity.
- Highlight the role of non-state security actors in community-oriented policing.
- Consider the strategic changes, leadership practices, and monitoring and review processes necessary for building and implementing community-police partnerships.

Background:

At its core community-oriented policing (CoP) approaches to P/CVE are about winning over the support of the public. How these approaches are designed and implemented vary greatly across different countries, and even across different agencies within the same state. Nevertheless, as a philosophy of policing, community-oriented approaches often emphasize certain key foundational themes that underpin efforts to effectively address conventional and special threats such as violent extremism. The themes include community partnerships as essential to effective policing, proactive approaches that are focused towards prevention rather than response, fear reduction as a means towards building trustful relationships with the public, and increased responsibility given to local police officers.

Security sector reforms aimed at operationalizing these themes to counter violent extremists are rooted in an understanding that the actions and immediate consequences of violent extremist groups tend to be local and often fall under the domain of criminal justice. On the African continent, these groups tend to recruit locally, often through peer groups and families,[1] while their behaviors and actions (often violent) violate several state-local statutes, including their use of criminal means – like forging documents and illicit smuggling – to facilitate or finance their broader goals. Accordingly, community-based policing's focus on empowering local officers with more authority to engage local community members as partners in identifying and responding to social issues that give rise to violent extremism offers potential for broader efforts to counter these threats.

However, the transition towards community-police partnerships requires policing institutions to make several adjustments. Most notably, moving towards CoP involves

---

[1] UNDP, "Journey to Extremism in Africa Pathways to Recruitment and Disengagement," *United Nations Development Programme* (2023) 19, https://www.undp.org/sites/g/files/zskgke326/files/2023-03/JTE_Pathways%20to%20Recruitment%20and%20Disengagement_2023%20%283%29.pdf

shifting organizational culture towards a mindset that policing is a "service" rather than an instrument of "force."[2] Leadership must initiate this change, modeling organizational thinking and institutional strategy around the idea that police officers' powers are exercised in collaboration with communities, as opposed to being enforced over communities. Leaders much also devolve some of their authority to frontline officers, empowering them with greater discretionary authority to implement CoP. Furthermore, building trust with local communities, particularly those that have been historically marginalized, can take time and require policing organizations to operate ethically, transparently, and with accountability. What is more, mechanisms for monitoring and reviewing progress are required.

This session aims to identify and elaborate how CoP can be implemented as a part of broader P/CVE efforts. Participants will discuss the hurdles that policing organizations face when attempting to build strong relations with the public, best practices for successfully engaging the community as well as how to evaluate progress. Furthermore, contexts with hybrid security – where multiple sources of security and justice authority operate simultaneously and often overlap[3] – can present both challenges and opportunities for CoP efforts to prevent/counter violent extremism. Participants will discuss how they navigate operations in such contexts with a plurality of actors.

Discussion Questions:
- What are the hurdles that police organizations face in building police–community relationships in contexts of hybrid insecurity?
- What are the operational requirements needed to make collaborative policing successful on the frontlines of countering violent extremism?
- What are the best practices for evaluating the implementation of community-oriented policing at all levels?

Recommended Readings:
1. Good Practices in Building Police–Public Partnerships, OSCE, SPMU Publication Series Vol.4, 2nd edition, June 2022, https://www.osce.org/files/f/documents/8/4/32547_0.pdf
2. Fairlie Chappuis, "Hybrid Security: Challenges and Opportunities for Security Sector Reform Insights from Burkina Faso, Colombia & DRC," Geneva Center for Security Sector Governance (DCAF), July 10, 2023, https://www.dcaf.ch/sites/default/files/publications/documents/DCAF_Hybrid-Security-Study_EN.pdf

---

[2] Good Practices in Building Police–Public Partnerships, OSCE, SPMU Publication Series Vol.4, 2nd edition, June 2022, 38, https://www.osce.org/files/f/documents/8/4/32547_0.pdf

[3] Matthew Schwartz, "Policing and (in)security in fragile and conflict-affected settings: A review of perspectives on policing in sub-Saharan Africa," *Global Center of Cooperative Security*, May 08, 2015, https://www.globalcenter.org/wp-content/uploads/policing-and-in-security-in-fragile-and-conflict-affected-settings.pdf

3. Matthew Schwartz, "Policing and (in)security in fragile and conflict-affected settings: A review of perspectives on policing in sub-Saharan Africa," *Global Center of Cooperative Security*, May 08, 2015, https://www.globalcenter.org/wp-content/uploads/policing-and-in-security-in-fragile-and-conflict-affected-settings.pdf

Session 2: Enhancing Civilian-Military Interactions and Mutual Trust

Objectives:

- Examine the dynamics of civilian-military interactions in preventing and countering violent extremism.
- Discuss the challenges and opportunities for civilian-military coordination in preventing and countering violent extremism.
- Highlight existing cases of trust building and cooperation structures and mechanisms between military actors and communities.

Background:

Building communities of trust between defense and security forces and the local populations they serve is critical to P/CVE. Yet, that overall relationship is often fraught with misunderstandings, misperceptions, and mistrust. That wariness goes both ways, as in some contexts the military perceives some local communities as undermining their efforts through alleged support for, or acquiescence to, the violent extremists, and communities blame the armed forces for prioritizing short-term military gains over curbing wartime violence against civilians and lifting stifling restrictions that damage livelihoods and worsen the suffering of vulnerable populations. Unsurprisingly, these mutual suspicions have led to estrangement between the military and some local communities, complicating governments' stated goal of connecting with local populations. Such failure to improve and sustain communication and meaningful collaboration between these key actors have hampered efforts to prevent and counter violent extremism. The challenge confronting the military and local communities is, therefore, how to build a clear understanding of the nature and source of the threat(s) they are facing as well as the barriers that impede the construction of mutually beneficial cooperative relationships.

The good news is that an increasing number of militaries fighting to curb violent extremist groups are becoming cognizant of the paramount importance of investing in building trust with civilian populations and creating cooperation mechanisms and platforms for inclusive dialogue to identify common solutions to better protect communities and meet their expectations and needs. Such people centered security approach (PCS) that prioritizes protection of civilians and makes local communities stakeholders in the articulation and provision of security is essential to preventing and countering violent extremism. Embracing and implementing a people centered security approach, however, necessitates a paradigm shift in how the military engages in P/CVE. This shift includes a political component (integrating PCS in defense and security policies, enshrining primacy of civilian protection in the missions and rules of engagement of the military) and an operational one (supporting civilian-military

initiatives, establishing mechanisms for information exchange and humanitarian civilian military coordination, among others).

This session aims to elaborate how the armed forces can best contribute to P/CVE efforts while ensuring respect for the principle of "Do No Harm." Military participants will sketch how their institutions perceive and approach P/CVE principles and priorities. They will discuss the key challenges they face in working in the P/CVE space and how they can be overcome. They will also consider the extent to which their efforts are able to tackle the integrated nature of the threat and leverage and reinforce the unique contributions of non-security actors to P/CVE.

Discussion Questions:
- What are some of the key ingredients to building and sustaining trust and cooperation in relation to P/CVE?
- What are some of the barriers to building trust between military actors and communities in relation to P/CVE?
- What are some examples of existing mechanisms, measures and arrangements through which military actors are able to liaise with civilian populations in relation to P/CVE?

Recommended readings:

1. Jeannine Abatan, "Civilian-state security cooperation in Benin and Togo: a double-edged sword," Institute for Security Studies, June 12, 2013, https://issafrica.org/iss-today/civilian-state-security-cooperation-in-benin-and-togo-a-double-edged-sword
2. "Dilemmes de la Collaboration Civilo-Militaire et Humanitaire dans le Bassin du Lac Tchad," eds, Akinola Olojo & Chika Charles Aniekwe, UNDP, 2021, https://www.undp.org/fr/africa/publications/dilemmes-de-la-collaboration-civilo-militaire-et-humanitaire-dans-le-bassin-du-lac-tchad-note-de-politique-du-pnud-sur-la
3. "le rôle des forces de défense et de sécurité (FDS) dans la prévention de l'extrémisme violent (PEV) en Afrique : les cadres d'engagement," CHEDS, 22-25 mai, 2022, Dakar, Sénégal, https://cheds.gouv.sn/senegal/2023/05/SR-PEV-4.-Rapport-Version-finale1.pdf
4. « Investir dans la Paix et la Prévention de la Violence en Afrique de l'Ouest et dans le Sahel : Conversations régionales sur le Plan d'action du Secrétaire général de l'ONU pour la prévention de l'extrémisme violent », organisées par l'International Peace Institute (IPI), le Bureau régional des Nations Unies pour l'Afrique de l'Ouest et le Sahel (UNOWAS) et le Département fédéral des affaires étrangères de Suisse (DFAE),
   -Dakar, juin 2016: https://www.ipinst.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/09/1609_Investing-in-Peace-FRENCH.pdf

-N'Djamena, juin 2017: https://www.ipinst.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/08/IPI-E-RPT-Chad-Meeting-NoteFrench.pdf
-Alger, juin 2018, https://www.ipinst.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/09/1809_Algiers-Meeting-Note-French.pdf

Discussion Groups

- To what extent do defense and security forces in your country liaise with local communities in relation to P/CVE?
- What are the most effective policing strategies to build relationships of trust with communities?
- How does the police engage and manage hybrid security actors?
- What would a transition to a collaborative, partnership-based approach to policing look like for your organization?
- How does collaborative policing look like on the ground in your country?
- What processes or methods should be put in place for police-community engagement?
- How integrated is police organization's efforts with relevant government agencies?

Second Day: Implementing Collaborative Approaches to CVE

Session 3: Implementing Evidence Based Policing in CVE

Objectives:

- Discuss the features and applications of evidence-based policing in countering violent extremism.
- Examine how community policing and intelligence-led policing relate to one another in countering violent extremism.
- Identify best practices for carrying out evidence-based policing activities in police organizations.

Background:
Evidence-based policing (EBP) involves the use of objective research, evaluation, analysis, and scientific examination in the process of law enforcement decision making. Put differently, EBP is about basing police practices on evidence about what works best. Accordingly, rather than being a policing strategy that competes with policing approaches such as community-oriented policing (CoP) and intelligence-led policing (ILP), EBP is a method that assists law enforcement agencies to objectively determine which strategies and approaches are the best for its situation, how to implement these strategies, and how effective the strategies are.

On the matter of preventing/countering violent extremism, significant empirical evidence points to the importance of building community trust and cultivating actionable human intelligence. Furthermore, police partnerships with the community based on mutual trust have been identified as the most effective way to generate the information needed to identify and prevent violent extremist threats. CoP and ILP approaches have been touted for their ability to improve public perceptions of police and generate actionable intelligence respectively. However, empirical evidence also suggests that these two approaches can be at odds with one another due to concerns that ILP's covert surveillance and intelligence gathering approaches can undermine the transparent trust-building efforts of community policing. How security forces reconcile these two functions – trust building and covert intelligence gathering – is what evidence-based policing practices can help to determine. Research and evaluation can point to what specific policing practices may or may not be working, allowing for adjustments to be made by law enforcement organizations.

Pockets of policing organizations across the African continent have started to use evidence-based practices to guide their decisions. However, capacity constraints, shifting operational demands, and leadership responsiveness to evidence remain a challenge. This session provides practitioners the opportunity to discuss the ways in which they use objective evidence to guide their strategies to counter violent extremism,

how intelligence informs their operations, and the role of community-oriented policing in building the public trust needed for willing public cooperation with information sharing. Participants will also have the chance to examine the capacity constraints and other challenges that inhibit their functions.

Discussion Questions:
- How does evidence-based policing inform resource allocation and community-oriented policing initiatives and interventions?
- How does the intelligence system inform police priorities and operation in countering violent extremism?
- Do police organization in your country have the capacity to turn data gathered from local populations into actionable intelligence?

Recommended Readings:

1. Gary Cordner, "Evidence-Based Policing in 45 Small Bytes," *National Institute of Justice* (May 2020): 8-9, https://www.ojp.gov/pdffiles1/nij/254326.pdf#page=14
2. Anine Kriegler, "What does evidence-based policing offer South Africa," *Institute for Security Studies*, September 28, 2023, https://issafrica.org/iss-today/what-does-evidence-based-policing-offer-south-africa
3. Gareth Newham and Brian Rappert, Policing for Impact: Is South Africa ready for Evidence-Based Policing, *South Africa Crime Quarterly* (June 2018) https://www.scielo.org.za/pdf/sacq/n64/02.pdf
4. Cynthia Lum and Christopher S. Koper, "Evidence-Based Policing ," *The Oxford Handbook of Evidence-Based Crime and Justice Policy* (2023), https://olli.gmu.edu/docstore/600docs/1501-655-Lum%20and%20Koper%20EBP%20reprint%20in%20Critical%20Issues.pdf

Session 4: Operationalizing Partnerships between Security Actors, Local Authorities, and Civilian Populations in West Africa

Objectives:
- Assess the extent to which defense and security frameworks, mechanisms, operations, and training programs promote and support cooperation between security forces and local communities.
- Share promising practices in operationalizing P/CVE policies and programs designed to facilitate information sharing and coordination between security actors and local communities.
- Share experiences of practical involvement of security actors in strengthening their link to local populations namely through community policing programs, civil-military action, and coordination with local authorities.

Background:

West Africa suffered 1,800 terrorist attacks in the first six months of 2023. This represents just "a snippet of the horrendous impact of insecurity" that have left half a million people as refugees and over six million internally displaced.[4] Militant attacks in Benin and Togo and incursions into Côte d'Ivoire have increased anxiety about the expansion of violent extremist organizations (VEOs) into coastal West African states. Insecurity in the vulnerable northern regions of littoral states that share borders with Burkina Faso and Mali has already disrupted communities' economic livelihood activities and led to shutdowns of schools and health clinics. There have also been reports of kidnappings of local officials and civilians accused of resisting these destabilizing encroachments.

The depth of the security challenges has propelled the defense and security forces (DSF) to the forefront of securing long and porous borders. States have directed resources towards deploying more forces and investing in equipment and training for DSF personnel. To avoid the limitations of the military-heavy approach adopted in the Sahel, coastal states recognized early on the importance of integrating communities into the efforts to prevent and counter VEOs. Indeed, as early as 2012, Benin created the Agency for Integrated Border Management to make inroads with local communities in border areas. Since then, state authorities established the Republican Police in 2018, the High-Level Committee in charge of PVE and the fight against border insecurity in 2019, the Presidential Committee for External Inspection of the DSF, and the National Guard in 2020.[5] Benin has also launched a number of initiatives to improve information sharing

---

[4] Edith Lederer, "West Africa recorded over 1,800 terrorist attack in first six months of 2023, regional official says," July 25, 2023, https://apnews.com/article/west-africa-sahel-terrorists-insecurity-mali-932b612a72bc368f9429736b27caf2ce

[5] "Population and Prevention of Violent Extremism: Towards a New Dynamic for the DFS Mandate?" Roundtable, 7th International Forum on Peace and Security in Africa, December 7, 2021,

between citizens, security forces, and local authorities, including organizing awareness-raising sessions, implementing community policing programs, and establishing civil-military actions geared towards improving economic and health conditions of communities.

Togo, Côte d'Ivoire, and Ghana have also made efforts to foster civil-military dialogue and prop up collaboration between security forces and the population. In 2019, Togo established the Inter-Ministerial Committee for the Prevention and Fight against Violent Extremism (CIPLEV) as a model of unity of effort among and between different ministries (Decentralization, Social Affairs, and Grassroots Development, among others) and regional and local sub-committees that include representatives from the security forces, civil society, religious leaders, and local authorities.[6] Côte d'Ivoire, which suffered a terrorist attack on the seaside resort of Grand-Bassam in 2016, has also invested in enhancing state military and economic presence in its northern regions. Since 2020, when violent extremists killed fourteen soldiers in the border town of Kafolo, the authorities have stepped their endeavors to boost communications between local communities and the security forces, governors, and local authorities. The establishment of civilian-military committees have played an important role in mitigating disputes between local populations and DSF. In Ghana, state officials also stress the importance of enhancing social cohesion creating more spaces that enable better cooperation between communities, the DSF, political actors, and parliamentarians.

Broadly speaking, affected littoral states are on the right path. In this session, participants will share successes and challenges in operationalizing P/CVE policies and programs designed to enhance cooperation and coordination between security actors, relevant sector-based ministries, local authorities, and local communities in the implementation of P/CVE frameworks and policies.

Discussion Questions:
- What are the forums where security actors, local authorities and civilian populations meet to share views and experiences related to P/CVE in your country?
- How are security actors-community partnerships set up, resourced, and managed in your country/area of operation?
- How do security actors engage border communities and non-state armed actors in community-oriented policing as it relates to P/CVE?

---

https://cheds.gouv.sn/wp-content/uploads/2022/01/Synthe%CC%80se-TR-PEV-FDD-07.12.2021_V.-Eng.pdf

[6] "A Model and Catalyst for Fighting Violent Extremism in West Africa: The Expanding U.S.-Togo Partnership," U.S. Department of State, October 20, 2023, https://www.state.gov/a-model-and-catalyst-for-fighting-violent-extremism-in-west-africa-the-expanding-u-s-togo-partnership/

Recommended Readings:

1. Carol Mottet, Ariane Inkesha, Mieux comprendre le rôle des forces de défense et de sécurité (FDS) dans la prévention de l'extrémisme violent (PEV) en Afrique de l'Ouest - Etude comparative portant sur la revue et l'analyse des cadres politiques, législatifs et opérationnels ainsi que les pratiques (2020-2022) (Berne/Genève : DFAE/DCAF, 2022), https://www.dcaf.ch/sites/default/files/publications/documents/PVE_Report_FR.pdf
2. "Empêcher les jihadistes de pénétrer dans le nord de la Côte d'Ivoire," International Crisis Group, 11 août 2023,
French: https://icg-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/2023-09/b192-northern-cote-divoire-FRENCH.pdf
English: https://icg-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/2023-09/b192-northern-cote-divoire.pdf
3. Kars de Bruijne, "Despite military progress, it's not going well in Northern Benin," Clingendael, November 2023, https://www.clingendael.org/publication/despite-military-progress-its-not-going-well-northern-benin
4. Oluwole Ojewale, "Theorising and illustrating plural policing models in countering armed banditry as hybrid terrorism in northwest Nigeria," Cogent Social Sciences, 9:1, 2023, DOI: 10.1080/23311886.2023.2174486

Session 5: **Capturing Lessons Learned from Security Services' Engagement with Local Communities in East Africa**

Objectives:

- Provide context-based insights into the role that collaborative security approaches play in countering violent extremism in East Africa.
- Reflect on the challenges and strategies of implementing community-oriented policing in East Africa.
- Distill lessons from police–community collaboration and engagement in countering violent extremism in East Africa.

Background:

East Africa provides useful lessons for collaborative whole-of-society approaches to counter violent extremism. For instance, in 2016 Kenya announced its National Strategy for Countering Violent Extremism (NSCVE). Unlike its earlier Prevention of Terrorism Act (2012) and the Security Laws Amendment Act (2014), which were more centralized and security-oriented, the NSCVE is more devolved from central government and development-oriented. NSCVE was motivated by the need to build public trust and engagement to stem the drivers and enablers of violent extremism. But where the novelty of NSCVE lies is in an implementation structure that mandates the development of County Action Plans (CAPs) that are implemented by Country Engagement Forums (CEF). These forums provide opportunities for various civil society organizations, community representatives, private companies among others to partner with state authorities in "the customisation, coordination and monitoring of P/CVE Programming."[7]

Similarly, there are some notable strengths emerging from community policing approaches in Tanzania and Kenya.[8] Designed to improve community relations with the police, such approaches have expanded police presence in local communities, secured official endorsement of civilian security groups, and established regular channels for communication between police, local government, and the public. Both cases offer insightful instances where the government has attempted to harness or

---

[7] Michael Jones, "A Template for the Global South? Understanding the Promises and Pitfalls of Preventing/Countering Violent Extremism in Kenya," *RUSI Emerging Insights* (2020): 7, https://static.rusi.org/250_ei_pcve_kenya_web_version.pdf

[8] Kenya's community policing approach (Nyumba Kumi) was borrowed from Tanzania, and is mainly built around clusters of ten households (though in Kenya the number of households are not fixed).

integrate customary systems and norms into its national policy.[9] Furthermore, in an effort to degrade al-Shabaab's presence in the vast Boni forest region,[10] and stabilize Lamu and parts of Garissa, Tana River, and Kilifi counties that border the forest, Kenyan forces have for the last eight years adopted a multi-agency approach.[11] Led by Kenya Defence Forces, the operation involves police, the wildlife and forest services, intelligence, several government ministries, departments, and agencies, non-governmental organizations, and civil society groups. Recognizing the need to improve relations with the public, particularly historically marginalized groups, civil-military cooperation has featured prominently as part of the operation's mandate.

Several challenges still exist for implementing these national strategies, community-oriented policing approaches and multi-agency operations. Notably, mistrust of security agencies take time to repair, while fear of retaliation from violent extremist organizations and challenges like interagency tensions, and funding and capacity constraints can hamper progress.

This session will allow participants to discuss practical approaches that have yielded progress in engaging local communities as well as the challenges involved and how to possibly overcome them. In doing so, it will provide an opportunity for participants to share their own experiences and the lessons learned from implementing a collaborative security approach.

Discussion Questions:
- How does a collaborative security approach, focused on trust and cooperation between citizens and the security forces, look like on the ground?
- How are partnerships between security actors, local authorities and civilian populations set up, resourced, and managed?
- How is the impact of community-oriented policing measured?

Recommended Readings:
1. Michael Jones, "A Template for the Global South? Understanding the Promises and Pitfalls of Preventing/Countering Violent Extremism in Kenya," *RUSI Emerging Insights* (2020), https://static.rusi.org/250_ei_pcve_kenya_web_version.pdf
2. Ben Crisman et al., "Preventing Violent Extremism: Lessons from Kenya," Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs, Princeton

---

[9] Lauren Van Metre and Thomas Leo Scherer, "Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism: Assessing Missteps and Promising Community Approaches," *United States Institute for Peace* (March 2023) 43, https://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/Preventing-and-Countering-Violent-Extremism.pdf

[10] Boni forest is an expansive territory that stretches from Lamu, Garissa and Tana River counties in Kenya to Somalia.

[11] The Boni Forest operation has undergone various changes over the last 8 years, transitioning from Operation Linda Boni, to Boni Enclave Campaign, to Operation Fagia Msitu, to Operation Amani Boni.

University, (2020)
file:///C:/Users/daisy/Downloads/Preventing%20Violent%20Extremism.pdf
3. Martine Zeuthen, Timothy Kimaiyo, Abdikadir Dakane and Aden Awle, "Barriers to Reporting 'Suspicious Activities' Evidence from Lamu and Garissa Counties, Kenya," *RUSI Emerging Insights* (November 2022), https://static.rusi.org/barriers-to-reporting-suspicious-activities-in-lamu-and-garissa-kenya.pdf
4. Rahma Ramadhan, Lynda Ouma, Brian Kimari, Patrick Mutahi, "Assessing the role of County Engagement Forums in PCVE in Kenya: A Focus on Lamu, Kwale, and Isiolo Counties," *CHRIPS* (2023), https://chrips.or.ke/wp-content/uploads/2023/12/Assessing-County-Engagement-Forums.pdf

Discussion Groups

- In your country, do existing defense and security frameworks promote building trust between civilian populations and security forces?
- Are the skills and competencies needed to foster cooperation between security forces and local communities integrated into existing training police programs?
- How does your organization's vision, mission, and values align with the principles of collaborative policing?
- Are the staff in your organization/department clear about what needs to happen in order to implement collaborative policing?
- Do you have an implementation strategy that describes how CoP principles and practices will be integrated into all aspects of policing?
- Where is your police organization in terms of gathering information from civilian populations? Does your organization have the capacity to turn data gathered from local communities into actionable intelligence?
- Is a monitoring and review process integrated into community-oriented policing plan (s)?

Third Day: Learning & Institutionalizing Lessons

Panel 6: Mechanisms for Institutionalizing Lessons Learned

Objectives:

- Identify courses of action to be taken to enhance cooperation and coordination between security actors, relevant sector-based ministries, local authorities, and local communities in the implementation of more effective policing in P/CVE.
- Identify courses of action to enhance the will, skills, and capacities of defense and security actors operating on the front line to build trust and foster cooperation with local communities.
- Identify courses of action to train and involve local populations in security bodies and mechanisms responsible for implementing P/CVE policies.

Background:

During this session, the subject matter experts will share the insights that they have synthesized from listening and contributing to the sessions during Day 1 and 2. They will also identify courses of action that can be taken to enhance cooperation and coordination between security actors, relevant sector-based ministries, local authorities, and border communities in the implementation of collaborative, partnership-based strategies to P/CVE. Military and police participants will propose concrete actions to boost the will, skills, and capacities of DSF actors operating on the front line to build trust and foster cooperation with local communities. They will also identify good practices' guidelines and operational measures to implement collaborative policing and civilian-military engagement.

Discussion Groups: Brief back Preparations

- Participants identify the needs of their specific organizations in implementing community-oriented policing and other security functions on the ground.
- Participants identify the strategic changes and organizational transformations required from police organizations and leaders to implement a collaborative, partnership-based approach to P/CVE.
- Participants propose good practices' guidelines and operational measures for effectively implementing collaborative, partnership-based strategies to P/CVE in country-specific contexts.