Violence, Regime Survival and Control

CLIONADH RALEIGH, PRESIDENT & CEO

Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (www.acleddata.com)

Addressing 3 Questions

What are the current violent conflict trends in Africa, and what are key challenges to peace and security that Africa will face in the future?

What are the drivers and causes of violent conflict in Africa and how have they evolved?

What are the key strategic security implications of these conflict trends, and what should security sector leaders do now in terms of leadership, policies, and institutions to address these drivers of conflict?

ACLED-Index Countries: Extreme to Limited Severity

Extreme Severity (4 out of 4)	High Severity (3 out of 4)	Moderate Severity (2 out of 4)	Limited Severity (1 out of 4)
Colombia	Afghanistan	Bangladesh	Armenia
Haiti	Brazil	Burundi	Azerbaijan
Mali	Burkina Faso	Cameroon	Belize
Mexico	Dem. Rep. of Congo	Ethiopia	Central Af. Republic
Myanmar	India	Honduras	Egypt
Syria	Iraq	Jamaica	El Salvador
Yemen	Nigeria	Libya	eSwatini
	Pakistan	Mozambique	Guatemala
	Philippines	Niger	Indonesia
	Somalia	Palestine	Israel
	South Sudan	Sudan	Kenya
	Ukraine		Nepal

Population Exposure Rate to Armed, Organized Political Violence within 5km of Event Location (2022)


Greenland

6.0%
Sweden

4.4%
Norway

Iceland

Estonia

10.2%
Russia

2.0%
Canada

Saint Pierre and Miquelon

Lithuania

Isle of Man
United Kingdom

4.0%
Belarus

10.3%
Kazakhstan

Mongolia

5.4%
United States

Portugal

5.0%
Bosnia and Herzegovina

0.0%
Turkmenistan

4.4%
China

3.4%
South Korea

Bermuda

8.0%
Tunisia

85.0%
Lebanon

57.1%
Mexico

Turks and Caicos Islands

27.7%
Libya

6.1%
United Arab Emirates

37.9%
Bangladesh

31.6%
Hong Kong

21.7%
Belize

11.0%
Saint Martin (French part)

24.4%
Western Sahara

4.8%
Chad

Northern Mariana Islands

inor Outlying Islands

20.7%
Guinea-Bissau

38.4%
Nigeria

12.9%
Ethiopia

7.9%
Sri Lanka

10.5%
Cambodia

Palau

51.4%
Colombia

0.4%
French Guiana

25.6%
Democratic Republic of the Congo

Marshall United Stat

Nauru

37.9%
Peru

42.6%
Brazil

8.7%
Mozambique

73.6%
Mauritius

5.4%
Indonesia

9.5%
Papua New Guinea

Tuvalu

Tok

0.7% Wallis and
Vanuatu

Tong

ok Islands

na

Pitcairn Islands

36.4%
Paraguay

24.9%
Namibia

0.1%
Australia

Norfolk Island

21.8%
Argentina

37.6%
South Africa

Saint Helena

Exposure to Armed, Organized Violence

0.0%   98.9%

New Zealand

How Many Unique Groups?

Distinct Groups vs. Quarter of Event Date

Legend:
- External Forces
- Insurgent Forces
- Militia Forces
- State Forces

Actions by Groups

Events vs. Quarter of Event Date

Unique Group Numbers

Where is the conflict coming from?

1. Conflict appears to be adapting to institutional change, rather than dissipating as a result of these political shifts

2. There are often several types of co-occurring conflict across states, making discussions about power distribution and conflict poorly applicable

3. Conflict is not a breakdown of state functions, but a strategic tool employed by different parties who are given operational space within different governance forms

In short, domestic politics causes conflict.

How do domestic politics matter?

1. Countries have a geography of power and hierarchy of power- and many elites and appointments

2. Regimes are highly inclusive of different ethno-political groups and regions- the issue is not over access to power from outside.

3. Conflict is a competition for power amongst the powerful. It is rarely, if ever, about a shift in ideology. It is about interests.

# Most Governments are inclusive

Representation Measures

Country	Cabinet Size (Median)	Representation (Average)	Representation (Minimum)	Malapportionment (Average)	Malapportionment (Maximum)
Algeria	32.00	0.97	0.67	21.37	36.72
Botswana	18.00	0.56	0.36	7.71	16.64
Burundi	25.00	0.67	0.67	16.21	33.26
Cameroon	40.00	0.83	0.73	24.15	38.69
Central African Republic	25.00	0.73	0.50	15.40	37.10
Democratic Republic of Co..	40.00	0.64	0.50	25.38	69.13
Ethiopia	31.00	0.66	0.60	12.77	22.50
Guinea	32.00	0.96	0.83	12.72	24.50
Ivory Coast	34.00	0.88	0.78	22.41	42.75
Kenya	30.00	0.54	0.40	11.73	21.16
Liberia	23.00	0.71	0.47	18.12	44.44
Malawi	23.00	0.84	0.71	15.19	32.74
Mali	29.00	0.88	0.44	14.52	34.20
Morocco	24.00	0.70	0.40	9.96	23.42
Nigeria	31.00	0.48	0.37	11.98	23.95
Rwanda	22.00	0.69	0.67	17.51	33.76
Sierra Leone	28.00	0.83	0.67	11.84	18.80
South Africa	31.00	0.88	0.70	14.68	20.92
South Sudan	31.00	0.58	0.08	11.03	17.51
Tanzania	31.00	0.66	0.57	23.05	31.48
Tunisia	30.00	1.00	1.00	0.00	0.00
Uganda	27.00	0.54	0.38	14.36	23.71
Zimbabwe	38.00	0.80	0.63	15.06	23.52

Figure 2. Conflict in Political Environments

High

Ratio of State Violence

High

Rate of Political Violence

MONOPOLY
Repression violence
High levels of state initiated violence, low levels of state-challenging violence

OLIGOPOLY
Survival violence
High number of distinct groups fighting each other and the regime.

BIFURCATED
Destroy violence
Central challenge to state power by equally powerful network. Goal to replace government

CARTEL
Signal violence
Multiple subnational elites vie for power through the use of intermittent, targeted violence

Low

Low

Few **Number of Non-State Armed Actors** *Many*

Country	State Forces	Insurgent/Rebel	Militias	Riot/Protesters
Nigeria	22.22%	12.37%	43.89%	21.52%
Democratic Republic of Congo	28.90%	15.12%	41.37%	14.61%
Somalia	44.34%	40.40%	13.03%	2.23%
South Sudan	23.36%	18.89%	53.13%	4.61%
Sudan	23.48%	2.94%	25.60%	47.99%
Ethiopia	41.00%	15.19%	29.91%	13.90%
Mali	24.30%	40.69%	26.97%	8.04%
Burundi	23.40%	2.05%	62.39%	12.16%
Central African Republic	30.49%	3.43%	58.38%	7.70%
Mozambique	26.73%		64.59%	8.68%
Libya	62.03%	2.18%	24.75%	11.04%
Kenya	22.26%	6.00%	19.65%	52.10%
Burkina Faso	23.55%	57.42%	11.08%	7.96%
Madagascar	27.24%		47.71%	25.04%
Niger	19.36%	49.48%	25.59%	5.57%
Uganda	33.85%	1.08%	18.56%	46.51%
Cameroon	34.92%	49.59%	6.98%	8.52%
South Africa	11.92%		4.49%	83.59%
Chad	31.35%	12.67%	30.57%	25.41%
Benin	22.89%	6.27%	34.83%	36.02%

Putting This Together

1. ***Regimes have more control than we think, and they will often choose alignment over control (appointments rather than capacity)***

   ◦ *That allows for a greater share of competitive violence that the state will not engage in but will allow to occur*

   ◦ *We should expect a much stronger pushback to 'regime challenging' violence, even in the costly short term*

   2. *A state's topography of power can change and does change- and with it, conflict geography will change*

   3. *Militias will proliferate and threats will continue to multiply,*

   rebel groups will continue decrease as a main threat

   governments will engage in more indirectly coercive governance

   local authorities will exert more violence to sustain positions

Thank You

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