



AFRICA CENTER FOR STRATEGIC STUDIES

EMERGING SECURITY SECTOR LEADERS SEMINAR

Washington, D.C.
06 - 17 June 2022

SYLLABUS

Table of Contents

About the Africa Center for Strategic Studies

Course Overview

Module I: Africa's Evolving Security Landscape

Plenary Session 1: Megatrends and African Security Implications

Plenary Session 2: Violent Conflict Trends

Plenary Session 3: Violent Extremism Dynamics

Plenary Session 4: Transnational Organized Crime Dynamics

Plenary Session 5: Cyber Threats

Plenary Session 6: Maritime Security Threats

Plenary Session 7: Youth, Peace, and Security

Plenary Session 8: Women, Peace, and Security

Plenary Session 9: Democratization Trends

Plenary Session 10: Rule of Law and Security Governance

Module II: National Response to Security Challenges

Plenary Session 11: Strategic Leadership in Africa's Security Sector

Plenary Session 12: Forging New Civil-Military Relations and Security Sector Reform

Plenary Session 13: Enhancing Professionalism in Africa's Security Sector

Plenary Session 14: National Security Strategy Development and Implementation

Plenary Session 15: Managing Security Resources in Africa

Module III: Regional and International Response to Security Challenges

Plenary Session 16: Regional Responses to Security Threats: Early Warning and Early Response

Plenary Session 17: African Union Responses to Security Challenges

Plenary Session 18: United Nations Responses to Security Challenges in Africa

Plenary Session 19: United States Government: Security Assistance and Partnership in Africa

ABOUT THE AFRICA CENTER

Since its inception in 1999, the Africa Center has served as a forum for research, academic programs, and the exchange of ideas with the aim of enhancing citizen security by strengthening the effectiveness and accountability of African institutions, in support of U.S. - Africa policy.

VISION

Security for all Africans championed by effective institutions accountable to their citizens.

Realizing the vision of an Africa free from fear and want guaranteed by African institutions that are committed to protecting African citizens is the driving motivation of the Africa Center. This aim underscores the Center's commitment to contributing to tangible impacts by working with our African partners – military and civilian, governmental and civil society, as well as national and regional. All have valuable roles to play in mitigating and addressing the complex drivers of insecurity on the continent today. Accountability to citizens is an important element of our vision as it reinforces the point that in order to be effective, security institutions must not just be “strong,” but also be responsive to and protective of the rights and needs of citizens.

MISSION

To advance African security by expanding understanding, providing a trusted platform for dialogue, building enduring partnerships, and catalyzing strategic solutions.

The Africa Center's mission revolves around the generation and dissemination of knowledge through our research, academic programs, strategic communications, and community chapters. Drawing on the practical experiences and lessons learned from security efforts on the continent, we aim to generate relevant insight and analysis that can inform practitioners and policymakers on the pressing security challenges that they face. Recognizing that addressing serious challenges can only come about through candid and thoughtful exchanges, the Center provides face-to-face and virtual platforms where partners can exchange views on priorities and sound practices. These exchanges foster relationships that, in turn, are maintained over time through the Center's community chapters, communities of interest, follow-on programs, and ongoing dialogue between participants and staff. This dialogue—infused with real world experiences and fresh analysis—provides an opportunity for continued learning and catalyzes concrete actions.

MANDATE

The Africa Center is a U.S. Department of Defense institution established and funded by Congress for the study of security issues relating to Africa and serving as a forum for bilateral and multilateral research, communication, exchange of ideas, and training involving military and civilian participants. (10 U.S.C 342)

Course Overview

Introduction

The complex, volatile, and turbulent security environment makes the need for leadership development in the security sector a matter of urgency and strategic importance. Beyond this rapidly changing security environment, the rise of military coups in Africa calls for a re-examination of the state of security governance and the role of political leadership in addressing security threats through strategies, policies, and practices that are people-centered and citizen focused. The demand for continuous coaching and training of security leaders in Africa has been echoed by Brigadier General (ret.) Daniel K. Frimpong, former Commander of the Ghana Military Academy, who once said “[g]ood leaders develop through a never-ending process of self-study, education, training, and experience.”¹ In the 2021 African Union (AU) Africa Governance Report, the role of political leadership that is adaptive, inclusive, accountable, and ethical has been recognized as one of the key drivers for Africa to realize the AU’s Agenda 2063.² This seminar provides a collaborative and trusted problem-solving platform for emerging security sector leaders from Africa. It seeks to support the next generation of principled and professional public servants in the security sector in their efforts to adequately adapt, and proactively respond, to the unprecedented security challenges the African continent faces. The seminar accordingly provides them an opportunity to learn from their peers and other African security experts to advance their acquisition of attributes and skills for effective leadership. This will help them lead with empathy to citizens’ basic needs and proactively prepare to confront complex and changing security threats.

Why Conduct This Program?

Cumulative evidence shows a well-designed executive training program enhances effective leadership. There is also a consensus among African leaders, scholars, and practitioners that effective, strategic, and ethical leadership is central to the continent’s success. You have already received a considerable amount of training on professionalism, ethics, and leadership/decision-making through formal military education and non-academic experiences. Furthermore, your nomination by your government to attend this program indicates that your past performance and your leadership potential in these areas are held in high regard. We will honor these accomplishments and seek to build upon them in a meaningful and useful way.

This two-week, in-person seminar is designed to facilitate participants’ engagement in interdisciplinary peer learning about strategic leadership and its implications for the effective management of African security challenges. This entails accurately analyzing the security environment so as to design and implement inclusive security strategies that can forge new civil-military relations and enhance professionalism in the security sector; judiciously managing security resources to ensure accountability and transparency; and leveraging partnership with regional, continental, and international stakeholders to collectively confront transnational security threats. Participants will consider these topics in relation to their own context as well as in comparative regional perspective. This will enable participants to reflect about lessons that can be learned at home, in neighboring countries, and in other parts of Africa and world.

¹ Brigadier General Daniel K. Frimpong, “Appendix Two,” *Leadership and the Challenges of Command*, AFRAM Publications, (Accra: 2003), p. 156.

² African Union, “Africa’s Governance Futures for the Africa We Want.” The Africa Governance report 2021. <https://au.int/en/documents/20220328/africa-governance-report-2021-africas-governance-futures-africa-we-want>

The overarching goal of the program is to provide practical and effective tools and skills that participants can use to contribute to their nation's security, development, and governance. To this end, there are three program objectives:

- Enhance awareness of the changing security landscape in Africa and strengthen problem-solving and decision-making skills for adaptive and effective leadership.
- Expand understanding of strategic approaches at the national level to address current, emerging, and future security threats in Africa in ways that forge new civil-military relations and enhance professionalism.
- Assess regional and international support and responses to African security challenges, and explore how African security leaders can leverage strategic security partnerships that are collective and collaborative.

Program Overview

Strategic leadership, critical thinking, ethical and evidence-based decision-making, and standards of behavior at the strategic level will guide and inform the program's central topics. Effective leadership training is crucial to the creation and sustainment of democratic governance and professionalism in the security sector in Africa. The program is divided into three modules: I. Africa's Evolving Security Landscape, II. National Response to Security Challenges, and III. Regional and International Response to Security Challenges. The modules are inter-related and mutually reinforcing. Across the three modules, speakers will highlight security threats and opportunities, as well as the implications for leadership to deliver better citizen security and safety.

1. *Africa's Evolving Security Landscape*: The primary aim of this module is to provide a snapshot of the context within which African leaders are working to develop and implement effective strategies. This module will expand understanding of the general security context and landscape in Africa by providing an evidence-based problem statement about African security. This problem statement will map the most important characteristics of the African security environment – both challenges and opportunities – as well as the implications for the future of citizen security and safety if no proactive actions are taken. The diagnosis of this dynamic African security landscape will be informed by analysis of the continent-wide megatrends that shape African security futures, current prominent security threats, dynamics of governance and rule of law that affect security challenges, and the roles of youth and women in peace and security.
2. *National Response to Security Challenges*: This module will focus on the proactive actions to be taken at the national level to ameliorate the negative impacts of security challenges and harness security opportunities so as to deliver better citizen security and safety. There is an additional need for *Strategic Leadership* and the ability to anticipate security challenges and the safety and security needs of citizens; address those needs through the development of proactive and people-centered strategies to confront these challenges; forge new civil-military relations to build consensus and popular support to implement these strategies; and build citizen and community trust in security institutions by enhancing professionalism and judiciously managing security resources to ensure accountability and transparency.

3. *Regional and International Response to Security Challenges*: This module will allow African security professionals to assess key partners in the security sector and options for forging and leveraging strategic partnerships with them. As the security challenges facing Africa are transnational and transboundary, this module will focus on assessing policies, strategies, and commitments that advance collective and collaborative responses at regional, continental, and international levels.

Topics are introduced in plenary sessions by a guest speaker or panel of experts, followed by discussion group sessions. The group discussions will be moderated by facilitators who are highly-qualified and experienced experts. Roughly, half of facilitators are female and Africans. The role of a facilitator is not to lecture or to insist on any “correct” solutions, but to create a conducive environment for candid dialogue and sharing of experiences. Take advantage of the facilitators’ wealth of expertise and experiences, though do not hesitate to challenge them.

Academic Approach

Given the variation in the level of experience and understanding among participants about security threats and level of response to these security threats, this seminar will seek to capture important lessons and sound practices through:

- *Academic content* in this syllabus to focus on evidence-based analysis supported by practical examples with less focus on theory.
- *Plenary sessions* that will be led by seasoned experts on the subject matter, focusing on collaborative, two-way learning as opposed to one-way, traditional classroom-based learning.
- *Small group discussions* that provide a trusted platform for participants to share their experiences and lessons learned and to prioritize peer-to-peer learning and teamwork with participants serving as experts on the context of their countries and regions.

The seminar will be conducted in English, French, and Portuguese. A strict policy of non-attribution will apply during discussion group sessions as well as during the question-and-answer portion of plenary sessions. Plenary sessions will be recorded and posted to the Africa Center website after the close of the program.

The Syllabus

This syllabus is an educational document intended to expose participants to various perspectives and help them take full advantage of the program. This syllabus provides an overview of academic material and key policy questions about strategic leadership in Africa’s security sector. The document is organized sequentially to guide participants through the program’s three modules. For each plenary session, the syllabus gives a brief introduction and frames questions for discussion to be answered by participants in the discussion group meeting. We provide selected readings that are intended to prepare participants for the plenary sessions and discussion groups and should be read prior to the sessions for which they are listed. We recognize that the syllabus covers more issues and materials than can be sufficiently discussed in the available time. We hope that you use these materials as resources even after the program concludes.

We encourage you to share questions and suggestions about the materials and the seminar, as it will enhance the quality of our programs. We are quite willing to discuss specific topics with you. Much expertise and knowledge about these topics comes from you, the participants. We

encourage you to read the assigned materials and actively participate in your discussion groups and to freely share your experiences and knowledge. The syllabus content does not reflect the views or official position of the Department of Defense or U.S. Government.

The benefits of this program should continue after you have returned home. The discussions and written materials as well as the friendships formed over the next two weeks should help you cope with the often-unpredictable challenges you will face in your profession.

Preparation for the Seminar

Before the first week of the seminar, we ask that you:

1. Skim this syllabus.
2. Review the Week 1 portion of the syllabus and read the recommended readings.
3. Spend some time thinking about the Week 1 discussion questions and considering what experiences from your work you might share in discussion groups.
4. Be ready to participate in discussion groups and learn from other participants.

Before each subsequent week of the seminar, we ask that you repeat this process.

Module I: Africa's Evolving Security Landscape

Plenary Session 1: Megatrends and African Security Implications

Format: Plenary session
Discussion group

Objectives:

- Understand the dynamics of major megatrends such as urbanization, demographic and social change, the rising middle class, climate change, enabling technology, and pandemics that are confronting African countries.
- Discuss the web of multifaceted and ever-changing security threats facing Africa.
- Understand the security implications of these megatrends and security threats for the leadership in the security sector.

Background:

There are several factors that will shape Africa's peace and security and the trajectory of change in the near and long term. These factors include a web of complex, multifaceted, and ever-changing security threats including but not limited to transnational organized crime, violent conflicts, violent extremism and terrorism, cyber threats, maritime threats, state fragility, and pandemics. These security threats will be exacerbated by megatrends such as demographic and social change, urbanization and the rising middle class, climate change, and the advancement of digital and information- technology. Moreover, these security threats and megatrends, are accompanied by an underlying current of a rising governance deficit in Africa, in which states themselves have become a source of insecurity.³ The intersections of these megatrends will undoubtedly shape the ways that African governments and institutions address human security in the decades to come. These megatrends will create shocks that both exacerbate challenges and create new opportunities for the continent. One such shock was the outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic. On the one hand, it exposed severe weaknesses in the capacities of states, systems of government, and public policies. On the other hand, it underscored the critical role of institutions and strategic leadership in confronting these shocks.⁴

By 2035, Africa is projected to double its population to nearly 2 billion people; such rapid growth will mean that 50 percent of the population will be under 21.⁵ This rapidly growing youth population will provide a huge working-age labor force necessary for economic growth, but could also exacerbate security challenges if unemployment remains high.⁶ Increasing urbanization will provide opportunities for development but could also increase urban poverty and crime.⁷ The movement of people within and across national boundaries will also continue to pose a host of political, economic, and societal challenges that influence the provision of human

³ Peter Mwai, "Are Military Takeovers on the Rise in Africa?" BBC, 2022. <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-46783600>

⁴ Luka Kuol, "COVID-19: A call for people-centered national security strategy in Africa." PRIO, 2020.

<https://blogs.prio.org/2020/11/covid-19-a-call-for-people-centered-national-security-strategy-in-africa/>

⁵ Camilla Roca and Ines Schultes, "Africa's Youth: Action Needed Now to Support the Continent's Greatest Asset." Mo Ibrahim Foundation, 2020. <https://mo.ibrahim.foundation/sites/default/files/2020-08/international-youth-day-research-brief.pdf>

⁶ Gilfred Boateng Asiamah, Ousmane Djiby Sambou, and Sadhiska Bhoosedur, "Africans say governments aren't doing enough to help youth." Afrobarometer, 2021. <https://afrobarometer.org/publications/ad486-africans-say-governments-arent-doing-enough-help-youth>

⁷ Julia Bello-Schunemann et al, *African Futures: Key trends to 2035*. Institute for Security Studies, 2017.

<https://issafrica.s3.amazonaws.com/site/uploads/policybrief105.pdf>

security.⁸ Rapid increases in access to technology and its use of technology will likely improve delivery of security to citizens, enhance access to public information, and increase demand for transparency and accountability. Yet it could also foster cyber-enabled criminality, exacerbating the broader threat posed by transnational organized crime on and offline.⁹ As families continue to rise into the middle class, expectations and demands for more accountable and transparent governance will increase, but it could also exacerbate income inequality and precipitate social unrest.¹⁰ Meanwhile, the climate crisis has the potential to affect each of the above tendencies; increasing temperatures and greenhouse gas emissions will increasingly cause natural disasters, damage neighborhoods, limit already scarce resources, and reduce economic opportunities – all of which have the potential to induce conflict.¹¹

These trends are inevitable, but their outcomes will depend on African leaders' strategies and policy responses. African governments have no choice but to proactively plan for and respond to these megatrends so as to mitigate anticipated challenges and harness potential opportunities.¹² Megatrends will have profound impacts on the security outcomes and the way security is planned, managed, and delivered to citizens. These trends create new opportunities for African governments to review their existing security policies, capacities, and institutions to better respond to these complex threats and to build trust with citizens based on their inclusion in security governance and strategy development.¹³ Effective response to these trends requires coordinating and collaborating across multiple government agencies and nation states; developing response mechanisms that are flexible, iterative and adaptive; leveraging external partnership; and developing foresight capabilities. As these trends are mutually reinforcing and cannot be addressed in isolation, African countries (and their external partners) must think strategically about how to address them national, regional, and continental policies and strategies that are feasible, proactive, creative, coordinated, and comprehensive.¹⁴

Discussion Questions:

- Which megatrends are most important in your country or sub-region? How do these megatrends interact to influence security outcomes in your country?
- What steps does your country or sub-region need to take to respond to these megatrends? What role should strategic leadership and other security sector leaders play?
- How does the security sector in your country need to adapt to address these long-term challenges? What role should the international community and the regional security architecture play?

Required Readings:

⁸ Wendy Williams, "Shifting Borders: Africa's Displacement Crisis and its Security Implications." Africa Center for Strategic Studies, 2019. <https://africacenter.org/publication/shifting-borders-africas-displacement-crisis-and-its-security-implications/>

⁹ Nathaniel Allen, "Africa's Evolving Cyber Threats." Africa Center for Strategic Studies, 2021. <https://africacenter.org/spotlight/africa-evolving-cyber-threats/>

¹⁰ Anton du Plessis and Anya Kaspersen, "Seven trends shaping the future of peace and security in Africa." World Economic Forum, 2016. <https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2016/06/7-trends-shaping-the-african-security-landscape/>

¹¹ Raymond Gilpin, "Unpacking the implications of future trends for security in Africa." Brookings, 2020.

<https://www.brookings.edu/blog/africa-in-focus/2020/02/03/unpacking-the-implications-of-future-trends-for-security-in-africa/>

¹² Olli Ruohomäki, "Africa Megatrends: Looking over the horizon into the future." *FIIA Briefing Paper 305*. Finnish Institute of International Affairs, 2021. https://www.fia.fi/wp-content/uploads/2021/03/bp305_african-megatrends.pdf

¹³ Luka Kuol and Joel Amegboh, "Rethinking National Security Strategies in Africa." *Journal of International Relations and Diplomacy*. Vol. 9 (1): 1-17, 2021. <http://www.davidpublisher.com/Public/uploads/Contribute/60a72058556ba.pdf>

¹⁴ Gilpin, *op cit*.

Raymond Gilpin, "Unpacking the implications of future trends for security in Africa." Brookings, 2020. <https://www.brookings.edu/blog/africa-in-focus/2020/02/03/unpacking-the-implications-of-future-trends-for-security-in-africa/>

Luka Kuol, "COVID-19: A call for people-centered national security strategy in Africa." Peace Research Institute Oslo (PRIO), 2020. <https://blogs.prio.org/2020/11/covid-19-a-call-for-people-centered-national-security-strategy-in-africa/>

Julia Bello-Schünemann et al. *African Futures: Key Trends to 2035*. Institute for Security Studies, 2017. <https://issafrica.s3.amazonaws.com/site/uploads/policybrief105.pdf>

Laura Kokko, « L'Afrique de l'avenir : les tendances clés d'ici à 2025, » dans *L'Afrique : un continent sur la voie de l'intégration*. Centre Universitaire Francophone, p. 173-193, 2018. http://acta.bibl.u-szeged.hu/63619/1/010_francophone.pdf#page=173

Plenary Session 2: Violent Conflict Trends

Format: Plenary session
Discussion group

Objectives:

- Explore the typology and drivers of violent conflicts in Africa.
- Analyze the strategic implications of conflict trends in Africa, including the types of defense, diplomacy, strategic leadership, and developmental responses that might be relevant to addressing these drivers.

Background:

Many analysts believed that Africa's democratic reforms in the aftermath of the Cold War would make African governments more accountable and legitimate, leading to a reduction of political violence and civil war. In the first several decades after the Cold War, these optimistic analyses were largely correct. According to the Uppsala Conflict Dataset Program, the number of conflicts in Africa dropped significantly, from a high of 17 conflicts in 1998 to just seven ongoing conflicts in 2005. However, particularly since 2010, the number of armed conflicts that involve African states have increased, including those related to Boko Haram in Nigeria, jihadist and Tuareg insurgent activities in Mali, al-Shabaab in Somalia and Kenya, and civil wars in Libya, Central African Republic, and South Sudan.¹⁵

In part, the recent surge of violence is due to the changing nature of conflict itself. In recent years, the most prevalent forms of conflict in Africa have been riots and protests, followed by violence against civilians and battles between state and non-state actors.¹⁶ Non-state armed conflicts and incidents of one-sided violence against civilians have also increased. The number of parties to various conflicts has risen over time because rebel organizations and violent extremist organizations frequently splinter and multiply. Violent extremist organizations, including Boko Haram, al-Shabaab, and affiliates of Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb and the Islamic State in West Africa Province, influence conflicts in multiple countries. More optimistically, the number of related fatalities is declining,¹⁷ and, in contrast to decades past, just a handful of African states bear the brunt of armed conflict.¹⁸

There are multiple causes of political violence and conflict.¹⁹ Some important triggers or drivers of violence are poor governance, social exclusion, and weak rule of law. For instance, state-perpetrated human rights abuses and citizens' perceptions of unjust treatment by the state is increasingly recognized as a core cause of violent extremism.²⁰ Similarly, the World Bank's 2018 Pathways for Peace report shows that "exclusion from access to power, opportunity, services, and security creates fertile ground for mobilizing group grievances into violence," particularly in fragile states or states that are known for human rights abuses.²¹ Government corruption and

¹⁵ Paul Williams, "Continuity and Change in War and Conflict in Africa." Prism 6:4, 2017.

¹⁶ Armed Conflict Location Event Dataset, <http://acleddata.org>

¹⁷ Jakkie Cilliers, "Violence in Africa: Trends, Drivers and Prospects to 2023," Africa Report 12, August 2018, p. 3; Ingrid Vik Bakken & Siri Aas Rustad, "Conflict Trends in Africa, 1946-2017," Peace Research Institute Oslo, June 2018.

¹⁸ Bakken & Rustad, "Conflict Trends in Africa, 1946-2017."

¹⁹ Raymond Gilpin, "Understanding the Nature and Origins of Violent Conflict in Africa," in *Minding the Gap: African Conflict Management in a Time of Change* by P. Aall and C. Crocker, 2016.

²⁰ Luca Raineri, "If Victims Become Perpetrators: Factors contributing to vulnerability and resilience to violent extremism in the central Sahel," International Alert, June 2018; "Journey to Extremism in Africa: Drivers, Incentives, and the Tipping Point for Recruitment," United Nations Development Program (September 2017), <http://journey-to-extremism.undp.org/en/report>

²¹ "United Nations; World Bank. 2018. Pathways for Peace : Inclusive Approaches to Preventing Violent Conflict. Washington, DC: World Bank, <https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/handle/10986/28337>

popular demand for accountability have also triggered recent protests in many African countries such as Zimbabwe, South Africa, Malawi²², Sudan, Burkina Faso, and Algeria. Africa's future could continue to show increased conflict if changes do not occur in governance, rule of law, the public management of resources, and the inclusion of youth, women, and marginalized groups in governance and politics.²³

Discussion Questions:

- What type of conflict affects your country/subregion the most?
- What are the impacts of conflict on your country/subregion/continent?
- What relations, are there between conflict and socio-economic and political problems?
- What should be the role of strategic leadership and other security sector leaders?

Required Readings:

Jakkie Cilliers, "Violence in Africa: trends, drivers and prospects to 2023." Institute for Security Studies, 2018. <https://issafrica.s3.amazonaws.com/site/uploads/ar-12-v1.pdf>

Ingrid Vik Bakken and Siri Aas Rustad, "Conflict Trends in Africa, 1989-2017." PRIO Conflict Trends 06, 2018. <https://www.prio.org/publications/12112>

"Africa and the Rule of Law: Statement of the International Development Legal Organization." 2016.

<https://www.idlo.int/sites/default/files/pdfs/policies/IDLO%20Statement%20Africa%20Rule%20of%20Law.pdf>

Leif Brottem, "The Growing Complexity of Farmer-Herder Conflict in West and Central Africa." Africa Center for Strategic Studies, 2021:

- EN: <https://africacenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/07/ASB39EN-The-Growing-Complexity-of-Farmer-Herder-Conflict-in-West-and-Central-Africa-update-7-27-21.pdf>
- FR : <https://africacenter.org/fr/publication/la-complexite-croissante-des-conflits-entre-agriculteurs-et-eleveurs-en-afrique-de-louest-et-centrale/>
- PO : <https://africacenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/11/ASB39PT-A-complexidade-crescente-do-conflito-agricultores-pastores-na-Africa-central-e-ocid.pdf>

²² See Moletsane Molake and Dan Hough, "What's Behind the Wave of Protests in Africa" Washington Post Monkey Cage Blog, 31 January 2019, [https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2019/01/31/do-bribery-experiencesdrive-people-to-protest-yes-mostly/](https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2019/01/31/do-bribery-experiences-drive-people-to-protest-yes-mostly/)

²³ Julia Bello-Schünemann et al. 2017. "African Futures: Key Trends to 2035. Institute for Security Studies Policy Brief 105

Plenary Session 3: Violent Extremism Dynamics

Format: Plenary session
Discussion group

Objectives:

- Examine the nature and scope of terrorism and violent extremism in Africa.
- Unpack the most determining factors that account for the endurance and proliferation of violent extremist organizations (VEOs).
- Assess national and regional approaches to countering violent extremism.
- Examine the role of strategic leadership and other security sector leaders to countering violent extremism.

Background:

Violent extremism continues to be one of the most significant challenges to peace and security in Africa. What makes this state of affairs particularly frustrating is that despite the extraordinary sacrifice and enormous number of lives and resources that Africans and their international partners have devoted to countering and preventing it, many violent extremist groups (VEOs) have still been able to flourish and expand their reach. Even in theaters where they were described as vanquished or in their final throes, VEOs remain a threat.

The resilience and proliferation of these organizations are puzzling because their objectives and methods are far more radical than the people they claim to represent. Surveys and available evidence show that the vast majority of Africans oppose violent extremism and terrorism. Yet, al-Qaeda-linked groups, Islamic State affiliates, and other violent extremist groups continue to attract recruits and financing, shrewdly exploiting opportunities created by state fragility, exclusionary governance, and local conflicts. In areas where they have managed to control territory, groups such as the Islamic State in West Africa Province have focused on delivering basic forms of governance and social services to the rural population of the Lake Chad area. In other theaters where they have not successfully supplanted the state, VEOs exploit and stoke political instability, inter-communal tensions, and socio-economic grievances. The growth and expansion of violent extremist organizations in the Sahel, Lake Chad Basin, and East Africa illustrate that their resilience and power stem not just from their violent activity, but also from their ability to supplant local governments as service providers and arbiters of social order.

To generate new results in the struggle against violent extremism, policy makers, security officials and practitioners must rethink existing assumptions and methods. This necessity of reexamining and replacing failed methods and paradigms is immediately evident in the emerging consensus among multiple African stakeholders that preventing and countering violent extremism requires population-centric strategies that include communities and build partnerships among a wide range of actors. To defeat extremists, security forces must therefore adapt their methods to carefully cooperate with local authorities, including service providers, traditional leaders, community defense groups, and civil society organizations. This is a testament to the growing recognition of the peril of treating community-oriented approaches to preventing, mitigating, and countering violent extremism as a distraction – instead of a necessary, strategic complement – to traditional security approaches.

Discussion Questions:

- What VEOs are operating in your country and region? How have these organizations affected the security environment in which you work?
- How should CVE efforts be combined with traditional counterterrorism efforts to have the greatest effect in your country or region?
- What concrete and practical measures can African nations take, working at the national, regional, and international levels, to better counter VEOs on the continent?
- What should be the role of strategic leadership and security sector leaders to countering violent extremism?

Required Readings:

Anouar Boukhars, "Trajectories of Violence Against Civilians by Africa's Militant Islamist Groups." Africa Center for Strategic Studies *Spotlight*, 2022.

- EN: <https://africacenter.org/spotlight/trajectories-of-violence-against-civilians-by-africas-militant-islamist-groups/>
- FR : <https://africacenter.org/fr/spotlight/trajec-toires-de-la-violence-contre-les-civils-par-les-groupes-islamistes-militants-dafrique/>
- PO : <https://africacenter.org/pt-pt/spotlight/trajetorias-de-violencia-contr-a-civis-pelos-grupos-militantes-islamicos-de-africa/>

Gregory Pirio, Robert Pittelli, and Yussuf Adam, "The Many Drivers Enabling Violent Extremism in Northern Mozambique." Africa Center for Strategic Studies *Spotlight*, 2019.

- EN:<https://africacenter.org/spotlight/the-many-drivers-enabling-violent-extremism-in-northern-mozambique/>
- FR: <https://africacenter.org/fr/spotlight/nombreux-facteurs-qui-favorisent-extremisme-violent-nord-mozambique/>
- PO: <https://africacenter.org/pt-pt/spotlight/os-diversos-fatores-que-desencadearam-a-violencia-extremista-na-regiao-norte-de-mocambique/>

« Burkina Faso: sortir de la spirale des violences. » International Crisis Group, 2020 :

- FR :<https://d2071andvip0wj.cloudfront.net/287-burkina-faso-sortir-de-la-spirale-des-violences.pdf>
- EN : <https://d2071andvip0wj.cloudfront.net/287-burkina-faso-spiral-of-violence.pdf>

Additional Africa Center Resources:

Developing Local Strategies to Counter Violent Extremism (CVE) in Africa program, January 25 – February 16, 2022:

- EN: <https://africacenter.org/programs/2022-01-cvelocal-developing-local-strategies-counter-violent-extremism-africa/>
- FR : <https://africacenter.org/fr/programs/2022-01-cvelocal-fr/>
- PO : <https://africacenter.org/pt-pt/2022-01-cvelocal-pt/>

"Why Al-Shabaab Persists in Somalia" webinar, December 9, 2021:

- EN: <https://africacenter.org/programs/202112cve-why-al-shabaab-persists-somalia-webinar/>
- FR : <https://africacenter.org/fr/programs/202112cve-pourquoi-al-shabaab-persiste-somalie/>
- PO : <https://africacenter.org/pt-pt/202112cve-por-que-al-shabaab-ersiste-somalia/>

Pauline Le Roux, « Répondre à l'essor de l'extrémisme violent au Sahel. » Africa Center for Strategic Studies, 2019.

- FR: <https://africacenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/01/ASB36FR-Repondre-a-1%E2%80%99essor-de-1%E2%80%99extremisme-violent.pdf>
- EN: <https://africacenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/12/ASB36EN-Responding-to-the-Rise-in-Violent-Extremism-in-the-Sahel-Africa-Center-for-Strategic-Studies.pdf>

Plenary Session 4: Transnational Organized Crime Dynamics

Format: Plenary session
Discussion group

Objectives:

- Describe the trends and levels of various forms of transnational organized crime and the relevant criminal networks operating in Africa.
- Understand the drivers of transnational organized crime in Africa, as well as its consequences for governance, stability, and economic development.
- Assess the merits of potential elements of state response to transnational organized crime, particularly the roles of security sector leaders in fostering citizen/community centric approaches, interagency cooperation, and regional collaboration.

Background:

Transnational organized crime (TOC) is a growing security challenge in Africa. There are many forms of TOC in Africa perpetrated by state and non-state actors with varying degrees of linkage. Human trafficking, arms trafficking, and non-renewable resource crimes are the three most widespread criminal markets, and overall, the COVID-19 pandemic increased the ability of those state-embedded actors who facilitate TOC to do so with less restrictive measures for accountable governance in place.²⁴ Furthermore, TOC and political instability continue to be mutually reinforcing phenomena, and the commercial, criminal, and corrupt elements of TOC foster a parallel political economy that undermines economic development and state legitimacy.²⁵

There is no single definition of organized crime, but the UN's Palermo Convention – which most African countries have ratified – defines “**organized criminal groups**” as three or more people, existing for a period of time, that act together with the aim of committing at least one crime punishable by four years’ incarceration. TOC is committed in order to obtain a direct or indirect financial/material benefit.²⁶ Organized crime is transnational when activities and their effects cross national borders. Devising responses can be challenging, as some states are ill-equipped to counter and prevent criminal network activities or have certain high-level officials who are politically unwilling to combat crimes from which they benefit. The coordination of security, justice, and other institutions on the inter-agency, cross-border, and subnational levels is warranted, but inherently complex.

Security sector actors in African states are well aware of the challenges of countering TOC, but also face the difficult task of devising responses that fit local contexts. Political economy frameworks can help emerging leaders understand where to start. Political economy is “the study of rational decisions in the context of political and economic institutions,” which shape various actors’ incentives to behave in certain ways.²⁷ Taking a political economy approach involves understanding who the different actors are, identifying the strategies they may adopt based on African states’ criminal markets and vulnerabilities, and assessing how resilience factors can

²⁴ Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime, “Africa Organized Crime Index 2021: Evolution of Crime in a Covid World,” <https://globalinitiative.net/wp-content/uploads/2021/11/ENACT-Organised-Crime-Index-2021.pdf>

²⁵ United Nations Economic Commission for Africa. 2015. *Illicit Financial Flows: Report of the High Level Panel on Illicit Financial Flows from Africa*. Addis Ababa, United Nations Economic Commission for Africa. <http://hdl.handle.net/10855/22695>

²⁶ UN Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime and the Protocols Thereto, <https://www.unodc.org/documents/treaties/UNTOC/Publications/TOC%20Convention/TOCbook-e.pdf>

²⁷ Allan Drazen, *Political Economy in Macroeconomics* (Princeton University Press, 2000), p. 4, citing James Alt & Kenneth Shepsle, eds. *Perspectives on Political Economy* (Cambridge University Press, 1990).

change organized criminal actors' incentives to pursue TOC in particular places. There are many factors that shape people's incentives to participate in illicit economies. Some key ones are the availability of alternative livelihoods, how legitimate the state and its laws are, and how the transparency and accountability of the security and justice sectors affect such legitimacy.

One example of a political economy framework is the ENACT Consortium's Organized Crime Index (released in 2019 and updated for 2021).²⁸ The Index shows a considerable increase in the TOC, with Africa having the second highest levels of criminality globally. It examines **four primary criminal actors**: state-embedded actors, criminal networks, foreign actors, and mafia-style actors. Beyond tracking the presence and intensity of ten different **criminal markets** in all African countries, the Index analyzes twelve factors affecting **resilience** to TOC: political leadership and governance, government transparency and accountability, international cooperation, national policies and laws, judicial capacity, law enforcement capacity, anti-money laundering, economic regulatory capacity, victim and witness support, prevention, non-state actor involvement in response, and territorial integrity.²⁹ Ultimately, the most successful efforts to counter TOC are likely to involve security responses that feed into broader efforts to address the development- and governance-related drivers of organized crime.

Discussion Questions:

- How much is transnational organized crime a security concern in your country/region, and what kinds of criminal actors and criminal markets are involved?
- What factors allow transnational organized crime to flourish in your country/region? To what extent are issues of development, governance, and rule of law linked to transnational organized crime?
- What kinds of efforts to counter and prevent transnational organized crime are underway in your country/region? To what extent are they addressing any of the twelve resilience factors mentioned in the ENACT Organized Crime Index?
- What roles can security sector actors play in responding to transnational organized crime on the cross-border, national inter-agency, and subnational levels? How important are the AU, RECs, international institutions, and local civil society and why?

Required Readings:

Mark Shaw, "Africa's Changing Place in the Global Criminal Economy." ENACT Continental Report 1, 2017:

- EN: <https://enact-africa.s3.amazonaws.com/site/uploads/2017-09-26-enact-continental-report1.pdf>
- FR: <https://enactafrica.org/research/continental-reports/levolution-de-la-place-de-lafrique-dans-leconomie-criminelle-mondiale>

African Union, "Communique of the 845th Peace and Security Council meeting on Organized Transnational Crime, Peace, and Security in Africa." 2019:

- EN: <http://www.peaceau.org/en/article/communique-of-the-845th-psc-meeting-on-organized-transnational-crime-peace-and-security-in-africa>

²⁸ Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime, *ENACT Global Organized Crime Index 2021*, <https://globalinitiative.net/wp-content/uploads/2021/09/GITOC-Global-Organized-Crime-Index-2021.pdf>; ENACT *Organized Crime Index Africa 2019*, <https://enact-africa.s3.amazonaws.com/site/uploads/2019-09-24-oc-index-2019.pdf>

²⁹ *Organised Crime Index Africa 2019*, op.cit.

- FR: <http://www.peaceau.org/uploads/cps-.com.criminality-.trans.org.ps.-afrique.25-4-2019.pdf>

Africa Center for Strategic Studies, “Executive Summary: Enhancing Security-Justice Coordination to Counter Transnational Organized Crime.” 2021:

- EN: <https://africacenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/06/CTOC-SJ-Executive-Summary-EN.pdf>
- FR: <https://africacenter.org/fr/programmes/renforcer-coordination-securite-justice-criminalite-transnationale-organisee/>
- PO: <https://africacenter.org/pt-pt/reforco-coordenacao-seguranca-justica-criminalidade-organizada-transnacional/>

Additional Africa Center Resources:

Enhancing Security-Justice Coordination to Counter TOC, Western and Southern Africa program, February 9 - March 3, 2021:

- EN: <https://africacenter.org/programmes/security-justice-transnational-organized-crime/>
- FR: <https://africacenter.org/fr/programmes/renforcer-coordination-securite-justice-criminalite-transnationale-organisee/>
- PO: <https://africacenter.org/pt-pt/reforco-coordenacao-seguranca-justica-criminalidade-organizada-transnacional/>

Enhancing Security-Justice Coordination to Counter TOC, Central, Eastern, and Northern Africa program, October 19 - November 10, 2021:

- EN: <https://africacenter.org/programmes/2021-ctoc-sj-2/>
- FR: <https://africacenter.org/fr/programmes/2021-ctoc-sj-2/>

Professional Development for Countering Transnational Organized Crime webinar series, 2021-2022:

- EN: <https://africacenter.org/programmes/2020-ctoc-webinar-series/>
- FR: <https://africacenter.org/fr/programmes/2020-ctoc-webinar-series/>
- PO: <https://africacenter.org/pt-pt/2020-ctoc-webinar-series/>

Plenary Session 5: Cyber Threats

Format: Plenary session
Discussion group

Objectives:

- Explore how the spread of information and communications technology in Africa is affecting threats from espionage, critical infrastructure sabotage, organized crime, and armed conflict.
- Assess national, regional, and international approaches to managing cyber threats.
- Discuss the challenges faced by African security actors in responding to cyber threats and challenges.

Background:

With the rapid spread of digital technology across the African continent, cyberspace is becoming an increasingly important security domain. A growing number of African citizens are falling victim to online fraud, theft, and extortion perpetrated by organized, and increasingly globalized, cyber-enabled criminal networks. Africa's critical infrastructure, essential to the continent's future prosperity, is becoming vulnerable to cyber sabotage, evidenced by recent ransomware attacks against Transnet, the South African port operator.³⁰ Expanding telecommunications infrastructure and the proliferation of cheap malware has enabled foreign powers and African states alike transformed the intelligence industry, exposing African states to novel forms of cyber-enabled espionage. Social media, open-source intelligence, and unmanned systems are increasingly being deployed by armed state and non-state actors in Africa's armed conflicts, changing the character of warfare.

The policy response in most African countries has not kept pace with this rapidly diversifying array of cyber threats. Deficits in human and organizational capacity mean that most cyber incidents go unreported and unaddressed. Though the number of states with cyber security policies and strategies are rising, even Africa's most cyber mature countries face often fail to establish key interagency coordination mechanisms or anticipate and respond to the latest threats. The commitment of African nations to inclusive, transparent, multi-stakeholder models of internet governance and international cooperation on cybersecurity ranks significantly behind the rest of the world, according to International Telecommunications Union.³¹ Only eight African countries have ratified the 2014 African Union Convention on Cyber Security and Personal Data Protection.³² Crucial issues such as the protection of critical infrastructure or regulating the norms of interstate behavior in cyberspace lack coherent policy frameworks at the national, regional, and international level.

The African security sector has a crucial role to play as part of a broader multi-stakeholder approach to cyber space security in Africa – coordinating the protection of critical infrastructure, responding to the most strategically significant threats from organized, armed actors, and in thinking through how best to adapt technological advances into security and military strategies and operations. Yet because information technology is an enabling technology with a broad array of applications, key sources of expertise lie in the private sector, and civil society has a critical

³⁰ Reuters, 2021. "South Africa's Transnet Restores Operations at Ports After Cyberattack." <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-transnet-cyber/south-africas-transnet-restores-operations-at-ports-after-cyber-attack-idUSKBN2EZ0RQ>

³¹ International Telecommunications Union. 2019. *Global Cybersecurity Index 2018* (Geneva, International Telecommunications Union). https://www.itu.int/dms_pub/itu-d/opb/str/D-STR-GCI.01-2018-PDF-E.pdf

³² See <https://au.int/en/treaties/african-union-convention-cyber-security-and-personal-data-protection>

role to play in ensuring that digital technology is used transparently and accountably. For the digital revolution to realize its full potential, African governments must adopt a human-centric approach to cybersecurity.

Discussion Questions:

- What are the cyber-related security challenges in your country or region? How is digital changing the security landscape?
- What practical steps can security sector actors take, working across government, the private sector, and civil society, to address these cyber threats?
- How can African countries advance their cooperation with one another and with external actors to manage the cyber threats they face?

Required Readings:

Nathaniel Allen, “Africa’s Evolving Cyber Threats.” Africa Center for Strategic Studies *Spotlight*, 2021:

- EN: <https://africacenter.org/spotlight/africa-evolving-cyber-threats/>
- FR : <https://africacenter.org/fr/spotlight/lafrique-a-lepreuve-des-nouvelles-formes-de-cybercriminalite/>

Mourad El Manir, “L’Afrique face aux défis protéiformes du cyberspace.” Policy Center for the New South, 2019. https://www.policycenter.ma/sites/default/files/PP_19-20_Al-Manir.pdf

Abdul-Hakeem Ajijola and Nate D.F. Allen, “African Lessons in Cyber Strategy.” Africa Center for Strategic Studies *Spotlight*, 2022:

- EN: <https://africacenter.org/spotlight/african-lessons-in-cyber-strategy/>
- FR : <https://africacenter.org/fr/spotlight/lecons-dafrique-en-matiere-de-cyber-strategie/>

ENACT and INTERPOL, “Online Organized Crime from the Surface to the Darkweb.” INTERPOL Analytical Report, 2020. <https://enact-africa.s3.amazonaws.com/site/uploads/2020-08-20-interpol-darkweb-report.PDF>

Additional Africa Center Resources:

“The African Security Sector’s Response to Cyber-Enabled Organized Crime” webinar, February 17, 2022:

- EN: <https://africacenter.org/programs/the-african-security-sectors-response-to-cyber-enabled-organized-crime/>
- FR : <https://africacenter.org/fr/programs/la-reponse-du-secteur-securitaire-africain-a-la-cybercriminalite-organisee/>
- PO : <https://africacenter.org/pt-pt/a-resposta-do-setor-de-seguranca-africano-ao-cibercrime-organizado/>

“State Responses to the Use of Information Technology by Africa’s Violent Extremist Groups” webinar, December 2, 2021:

- EN: <https://africacenter.org/programs/202111cy-state-responses-information-technology-africa-violent-extremist-groups/>
- FR : <https://africacenter.org/fr/programs/202111cy-reponses-etatiques-utilisation-technologie-emergeante-groupes-extremistes-africains/>
- PO : <https://africacenter.org/pt-pt/202111cy-respostas-estado-uso-tecnologia-emergente-grupos-extremistas-africanos/>

Cyberspace Security Priorities for Africa's National Security Actors program, August 3-25, 2021:

- EN: <https://africacenter.org/programs/cyberspace-priorities-national-security/>
- FR : <https://africacenter.org/fr/programs/priorites-cyberespace-securite-nationale-afrique/>
- PO : <https://africacenter.org/pt-pt/prioridades-ciberespaco-seguranca-nacional-africa/>

Plenary Session 6: Maritime Security Threats

Format: Plenary session
Discussion group

Objectives:

- Explore trends in maritime safety and security in Africa.
- Evaluate existing collaborative arrangements to safeguard Africa's maritime interests.
- Examine the role of strategic leadership and security sector actors to sustain maritime safety and security.

Background:

The African maritime industry or "blue economy," in terms of fisheries, minerals, hydrocarbons, tourism, and trade from thirty-eight coastal countries and six islands, is estimated to be worth US\$ 1 trillion per year.³³ Besides such economic potential, over 90% of African exports and imports are transported by water.³⁴ While there is much potential, there is a tendency towards "sea blindness" and to ignore the maritime domain and its centrality to African economic growth as well as its security and defense. The maritime space has been a theatre of criminal activities and is host to a web of interconnected security threats. Some of the most pressing threats include Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated Fishing (IUU) and other natural resource theft, as well as piracy and armed robbery at sea.³⁵ The COVID-19 pandemic has also exacerbated the security threats in the maritime domain in Africa, particularly by disrupting supply chains and increasing the risk of ports becoming targets for attack.

The protection of the Africa's maritime space and its resources is a strategic security concern of coastal countries and landlocked countries and requires the provision of effective maritime security. The maritime domain has become one of the main focuses of the AU Agenda 2063 and 2050 Africa's Integrated Maritime Strategy (2050 AIM Strategy).³⁶ Both recognize the maritime domain's pivotal role as a catalyst for Africa's economic resurgence and socio-economic change.³⁷ The Lomé Charter was adopted in 2016 by the AU as a binding maritime security and safety charter with focus on security provisions of the 2050 AIM Strategy.³⁸ These AU commitments of are aligned and linked to the United Nations Sustainable Development Goal 14, which promotes the sustainable use of oceans, seas, and marine resources, including for development.

This collaborative international approach finds its concrete expression at the regional level where nations sharing a maritime region have worked with each other, often through the Regional Economic Community structure, to build practical agreements and frameworks for cooperation at the operational level. For example, the Yaoundé Code of Conduct established cooperation between Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS) member states on a variety of maritime security issues and

³³ Ifesinachi Okafor-Yarwood. "Review of nine African "blue economy" projects shows what works and what does' not work". The Converstaion, August 11, 2020.

³⁴ Henrietta Nagy and Siphesihle Nene, "Blue Gold: Advancing Blue Economy Governance in Africa." *Sustainability* 13, 7153: 1-11. 2021. <https://www.mdpi.com/2071-1050/13/13/7153>

³⁵ Ifesinachi Okafor-Yarwood, Timothy Walker, Denys Reva, "Gulf of Guinea Piracy: A Symptom, Not a Cause, of Insecurity," ISS Africa, 10 February 2021, <https://issafrica.org/iss-today/gulf-of-guinea-piracy-a-symptom-not-a-cause-of-insecurity>.

³⁶ Nagy and Nene, *op cit*.

³⁷ Richard Wetaya, "Blue economy seen as a catalyst for Africa's economic resurgence." *Alliance for Science*. 2022.

<https://allianceforscience.cornell.edu/blog/2022/02/blue-economy-seen-as-catalyst-for-africas-economic-resurgence/>

³⁸ Pieter Brits and Michelle Nel, "African maritime security and the Lomé Charter: Reality or dream?" *African Security Review* 27 (3-4): 226 - 244, 2018.

https://www.researchgate.net/publication/329326511_African_maritime_security_and_the_Lome_Charter_Reality_or_dream

created a jointly staffed Inter-regional Coordination Center to organize cooperation. These frameworks have helped facilitate the harmonization of maritime laws on issues such as hot pursuit, evidence sharing, and extradition as well as providing for tracking and even operational coordination between navies. Although joint capacities are still in development, there have been several notable successes. One is the recapture of the *Hailufeng 11* in May 2020, after its capture by pirates off the coast of Côte d'Ivoire. Through information sharing across the region and operational cooperation between Benin and Nigeria, the vessel was successfully recaptured, and the pirates were tried in Nigeria under a new anti-piracy law.³⁹

African states' ability to collectively govern their maritime domains and to sustainably manage its resources determines their ability to deliver an array of benefits to their citizens and improve their provision of security and development. Improving governance and security in the littoral communities most affected by IUU fishing and other forms of natural resource theft can also help diminish threats by enhancing their interest in cooperating with law enforcement and limiting community member engagement in maritime crime.⁴⁰ There is also more work to continue to ensure that national laws and practices are in place to facilitate the prosecution of maritime criminals, especially when cross-border and regional cooperation is required. Many littoral African nations are still developing chain of custody procedures for the handling of maritime criminals and criminal evidence; prosecution can also be challenging due to the complexities of the law of the sea, or low levels of maritime legal expertise or law enforcement authorities within navies.⁴¹ Updating national law and procedure and harmonizing it regionally are both essential.

Discussion Questions:

- What is the economic potential of the maritime space of your country/region, and do you think this potential is being fully realized? Why or why not?
- Can you share some of key maritime security threats in your country/region, and whether they have been adequately addressed?
- Given the transboundary nature of threats facing maritime space, what is the level of cooperative, coordinated, and collective responses of countries in your region to maritime insecurity? Can you share some examples of such collective responses and what can be done better?
- What roles can security sector leaders play in fostering maritime safety and security?

Required Readings:

Ian Ralby, "Trends in African Maritime Security." Africa Center for Strategic Studies *Spotlight*, 2019:

- EN: <https://africacenter.org/spotlight/trends-in-african-maritime-security/>
- FR: <https://africacenter.org/fr/spotlight/tendances-en-matiere-de-securite-maritime-en-afrique/>

United Nations, "Africa's Blue Economy: A Policy Handbook." 2016.

³⁹ Ian Ralby, "Nigerian Navy Thwarts Hijacking of Chinese Fishing Vessel," *The Maritime Executive*, 18 May 2020, <https://www.maritime-executive.com/article/nigerian-navy-successfully-interdicts-maritime-kidnapping-attempt>.

⁴⁰ Ifesenachi Okafor-Yarwood, "The cyclical nature of maritime security threats: illegal, unreported, and unregulated fishing as a threat to human and national security in the Gulf of Guinea." *African Security*; Vol. 13 (2): 116-146, 2020.

⁴¹ Ian Ralby, "Learning from success: Advancing maritime security cooperation in Atlantic Africa." CIMSEC, 2019. https://cimsec.org/learning-from-success-advancing-maritime-security-cooperation-in-atlantic-africa/?fbclid=IwAR0qlr2l3Vn_wQhTc_Gu-JsuDjiTrZl8DYr5cQT3fsr4l1DqDa0jYQr5Xzg

- EN: <https://wedocs.unep.org/bitstream/handle/20.500.11822/30130/AfricasBlueEconomy.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y>
- FR: <https://repository.uneca.org/handle/10855/23073>

Ifesenachi Okafor-Yarwood, "Illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing and the complexities of the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) for countries in the Gulf of Guinea." *Marine Policy*, vol. 99 (January), p. 414-422, 2019.

<https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S0308597X17303445>

Pieter Brits and Michelle Nel, "African maritime security and the Lomé Charter: Reality or dream?" *African Security Review* 27 (3-4): p. 226-244, 2018.

https://www.researchgate.net/publication/329326511_African_maritime_security_and_the_Lome_Charter_Reality_or_dream

Thierry Vircoulon & Violette Tournier, « Sécurité dans le golfe de Guinée : un combat régional, » *Politique Etrangère* 3, 2015. <https://www.cairn.info/revue-politique-etrangere2015-3-page-161.htm>

Additional Africa Center Resources:

"Enhancing Maritime Safety and Security in Africa: Whole of Africa Maritime Dialogue," round table, 27-28 July, 2021:

- EN/FR/PO : <https://africacenter.org/programs/mss-dialogue-2021/>

André Standing, "Criminality in Africa's Fishing Industry: A Threat to Human Security." Africa Center for Strategic Studies *Africa Security Brief* No. 33, 2017:

- EN: <https://africacenter.org/publication/criminality-africa-fishing-industry-threat-human-security/>
- FR: <https://africacenter.org/fr/publication/criminalite-peche-commerciale-afrique-menace-securite-humaine/>
- PO: <https://africacenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/11/ASB33PT-Criminalidade-na-industria-pesqueira-de-Africa-Uma-ameaca-a-seguranca-humana.pdf>

"Maritime Security in the Western Indian Ocean: A Conversation with Assis Malaquias," 7 July 2017:

- EN: <https://africacenter.org/spotlight/maritime-security-western-indian-ocean-a-discussion-with-assis-malaquias/>
- FR: <https://africacenter.org/fr/spotlight/la-securite-maritime-dans-la-partie-occidentale-de-locean-indien-une-discussion-avec-assis-malaquias/>

Plenary Session 7: Youth, Peace, and Security

Format: Plenary session
Discussion group

Objectives:

- Identify the main peace and security-related issues impacting youth in Africa.
- Discuss gaps, challenges and priorities of the Youth in Peace and Security agenda in Africa.
- Examine the key component of the continental framework for Youth, Peace, and Security.
- Examine the role of security sector leaders in promoting youth engagement in the security sector.

Background:

Africa remains the world's youngest continent with a median age of 19.7 years. By 2050, one in three young people will live in sub-Saharan Africa. Faced with staggering youth unemployment and widespread dissatisfaction with the performance of their governments, young Africans are growing restless. This restlessness is manifested in the increasing tensions between a reform-minded youth and political actors who wield power through the politics of exclusion.⁴² The United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR 2250) and the African Union's Continental Framework for Youth, Peace, and Security defines "Youth, Peace and Security" as "conscious actions and processes to protect young people from participation in, and the ill effects of, violent conflicts and insecurity, and to promote and support their contributions to peace efforts in conflict and post-conflict situations."

The African Union (AU), Regional Economic Communities, and members states have adopted various commitments, initiatives and mechanisms related to youth, peace and security, including the Continental Framework for Youth, Peace and Security, the African Youth Charter, and the appointment of an AU Youth Envoy and Youth Advisory Council⁴³. Despite these policy pronouncements and normative instruments, progress on the meaningful inclusion of young women and men in shaping peace and security remains slow in Africa. Core challenges include structural barriers limiting youth participation and youth capacity to influence decision-making; violations of their human rights; and insufficient investment in facilitating their inclusion and empowerment.

Without a path for reform, youth will despair, and conditions will further deteriorate, possibly leading to more instability and conflict. Yet, most African youth have not chosen the path of violence. Many have been leading the record numbers of peaceful protests seen across Africa in recent years. This raises the question of how youth can meaningfully and constructively engage in their countries, pushing for reforms and improved security. The Youth, Peace and Security agenda has gained momentum in recent years and marks a shift in the understanding of who young people are and what their role is in peace and security.

The empowerment and participation of youth is a key tenet of the United Nations Sustainable Development Agenda, as emphasized by the Sustainable Development Goal (SDG) 10, which

⁴² Peter Biar Ajak "African Youth Engaging in Peace and Security." *Spotlight*, Africa Center for Strategic Studies, 2021.

<https://africacenter.org/spotlight/african-youth-engaging-in-peace-and-security/>

⁴³ "Continental Framework for Youth, Peace and Security." Addis Ababa: African Union.

https://au.int/sites/default/files/documents/39150-doc-continental_framework_on_youth_peace_and_security_-_english.pdf

calls for the promotion of the social, economic, and political inclusion of the young generation, and SDG 16, which aims to ensure responsive, inclusive, participatory, and representative decision-making at all levels. Youths' role in development and security is shaped by the state's capacity to harness their potential and meet their needs on a range of issues.

The AU Agenda 2063, UNSCR 2250 on Youth, Peace, and Security, and emerging research emphasizes the need to switch the narrative to recognize youth as positive agents for peacebuilding and security, rather than stigmatizing them as risks. The creativity and diversity of initiatives young Africans have engaged in to promote peacebuilding and good governance demonstrate the capacity of youth for innovation and problem-solving. For example, UNSCR 2250 calls on Member States to include young people in their institutions and mechanisms to prevent violent conflict and to support the work already being performed by youth in peace and security. While many African governments recognize young people's essential role in peace and security and as positive drivers of change, more work is still to be done. It includes providing youth access to quality education and skill development for gainful employment to enhance their economic role in society and, in turn, their contributions to peace and security.

Discussion Questions:

- Why is the youth, peace, and security agenda important in your country/region?
- How are young women and young men politically and socially engaged and already contributing to peace and security in your country/region?
- What are the opportunities and challenges of the youth, peace, and security agenda in your country/region? How can the youth co-lead the AU's Silencing the Guns agenda?
- How can involving youth in formulating policies and strategies related to security, peace and development improve the provision of citizen security in your country?

Required Readings:

African Union, "Continental Framework for Youth, Peace and Security." 2020:

- EN: <https://au.int/sites/default/files/documents/39150-doc-continental-framework-on-youth-peace-and-security-english.pdf>
- FR: <https://au.int/sites/default/files/documents/39150-doc-cadre-continental-pour-les-jeunes-la-paix-et-la-securite-docx.pdf>

Peter Biar Ajak, "African Youth Engaging in Peace and Security." Africa Center for Strategic Studies *Spotlight*, 2021:

- EN: <https://africacenter.org/spotlight/african-youth-engaging-in-peace-and-security/>
- FR: <https://africacenter.org/fr/spotlight/la-jeunesse-africaine-engagee-pour-la-paix-et-la-securite/>

Daniel Agbiboa, "Youth as Tactical Agents of Peacebuilding and Development in the Sahel." *Journal of Peacebuilding & Development*, Vol. 10 (3), 2015.

https://www.researchgate.net/publication/288021839_Youth_As_Tactical_Agents_Of_Peacebuilding_And_Development_In_The_Sahel

Additional Africa Center resources:

"The Battle for the Soul of Uganda." Africa Center for Strategic Studies *Spotlight*, 2020:

- EN: <https://africacenter.org/spotlight/battle-soul-uganda/>
- FR: <https://africacenter.org/fr/spotlight/ouganda-bataille-avec-pour-enjeu-lame-de-la-nation/>

“EndSARS Demands Nigerian Police Reform.” Africa Center for Strategic Studies

Spotlight, 2020:

- EN: <https://africacenter.org/spotlight/endsars-demands-nigerian-police-reform/>
- FR: <https://africacenter.org/fr/spotlight/endsars-demande-une-reforme-de-la-police-nigeriane/>

Plenary Session 8: Women, Peace, and Security

Format: Plenary session
Discussion group

Objectives:

- Examine how gender impacts security in Africa for both men and women.
- Analyze the role of gender in non-state armed groups in Africa.
- Critically assess recent efforts to improve gender mainstreaming in the security sector in Africa.
- Examine the role of security sector leaders in improving gender mainstreaming in the security sector.

Background:

The work of several Africans who have won the Nobel Peace Prize illustrates how gender perspectives shape security. In 2011, the former Liberian president, Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf, and the civil society activist, Leymah Gbowee, won the prize for their efforts to foster peace after years of civil war. In 2018, Denis Mukwege of the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) won the prize for his medical and advocacy work to “end the use of sexual violence as a weapon of war and armed conflict.”⁴⁴ As these examples show, men and women alike have stakes in addressing security challenges with a gender perspective. Gender is often equated with women, but gender sensitivity actually means weighing the needs, contributions, and perspectives of men and boys as well as women and girls. Some notable ways that gender influences the security sector include:

Dynamics of violence and peace. Women and girls as well as men and boys play key roles in perpetrating and resolving violent conflict. In non-state armed groups, women are sometimes asked to work behind the front lines or play familial and domestic roles; in other cases, they are recruited into combat and deployed. Women are as prone to violence and driven by many of the same grievances as men, but they often experience conflict and violence differently and have different social positions and resources for addressing security challenges. Based on their many social, political, and economic roles, women also bring essential perspectives to peacebuilding and countering violent extremism (CVE).

Realization of citizen and human security. The notion of security has evolved away from regime security to include a greater focus on citizen and community well-being. Responding to gender differences in experiences in the context of citizen security remains essential to achieving peace, stability, development, and good governance. For instance, sexual and gender-based violence (whether it occurs in peacetime or as a result of conflict) must be addressed as part of the national security agenda if that agenda is to effectively ensure citizen and human security.

National security, security governance, and security sector reform. Women remain under-represented in security sector institutions and national security strategy processes in Africa, although some African parliaments are among the world’s best on women’s representation. This is the case despite increased attention to gender and security in Africa since the UN Security Council Resolution 1325 passed in 2000, including through the AU’s 2015-2020 Gender, Peace, and Security Program. The AU’s Agenda 2063 seeks to increase inclusion of women in leadership related to a whole host of issues, and the AU has also made gender equality and women’s empowerment core principles of security sector reform. Inclusion can happen in different ways.

⁴⁴ <https://www.nobelprize.org/prizes/peace/2018/mukwege/facts/>

Through gender mainstreaming, security actors can make sure that their institutions and personnel are consistently evaluating how their proposed policies and plans could affect men and women as well as boys and girls differently, and work to minimize negative consequences to everyone. Another important approach is to promote not only more balanced gender representation, but also the equal participation, of men and women in the institutions, strategy development sessions, oversight processes, and public consultations that relate to the security and defense sector.

Discussion Questions:

- How do security challenges affect women and men differently in your country/region?
- What are the challenges to including gender perspectives in security strategy and policymaking?
- How can strategic leadership and security sector leaders improve gender sensitivity and gender mainstreaming in security sector?
- How can the U.S. and other partners support your country/region to improve gender mainstreaming in security sector?

Required Readings:

Bineta Diop and Phumzile Mlambo-Ngcuka, “African Women Leaders Network: A Movement for the Transformation of Africa.” *Africa Renewal*, 2020:

- EN: <https://www.un.org/africarenewal/web-features/african-women-leaders-network>
- FR : <https://www.un.org/africarenewal/fr/a-la-une/reseau-des-femmes-africaines-dirigeantes-un-mouvement-pour-la-transformation-de-lafrique>

African Union, “African Union Strategy for Gender Equality and Women’s Empowerment 2018-2028.”:

- EN : https://au.int/sites/default/files/documents/36195-doc-au_strategy_for_gender_equality_womens_empowerment_2018-2028_report.pdf
- FR : https://au.int/sites/default/files/documents/36897-doc-52569-au-fr-final_web.pdf
- PO: https://au.int/sites/default/files/documents/36897-doc-52569-au-por_web.pdf

African Union Commission, “Continental Results Framework: Monitoring and Reporting on the Implementation of the Women, Peace, and Security Agenda in Africa (2018-2028)”:

- EN: https://au.int/sites/default/files/documents/35958-doc-continental_results_framework_wps.pdf
- FR: <https://issat.dcaf.ch/fre/download/145747/2997043/Cadre%20Continental%20de%20R%C3%A9sultats.pdf>

Aisha Fofana Ibrahim, Alex Sivalie Mbayo, and Rosaline McCarthy, “Understanding the Links Between Gender and Security,” in *Tool 8: Integrating Gender in Security Sector Reform and Governance*. Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces, pp. 3-15, 2015:

- EN: <https://www.dcaf.ch/sites/default/files/publications/documents/SSRG-West-Africa-Toolkit-Tool-8-EN.pdf>

- PO:<https://issat.dcaf.ch/download/112398/2038498/SSRG-West-Africa-Toolkit-Tool-8-PO.pdf>

Additional Africa Center Resources:

“Women in African Peace and Security: Where Do Policy and Practice Stand?” Webinar, November 19, 2020:

- EN:<https://africacenter.org/programs/women-african-peace-security-where-policy-practice-stand/>
- FR:<https://africacenter.org/fr/programs/femmes-paix-securite-afrique-politiques-pratiques/>
- PO:<https://africacenter.org/pt-pt/mulheres-paz-seguranca-africana-situacao-politica-pratica/>

“The Gender Dimensions of Countering Violent Extremism in Africa.” Webinar, September 22, 2021:

- EN:<https://africacenter.org/programs/gender-countering-violent-extremism-africa-2021/>
- FR:<https://africacenter.org/fr/programs/dimensions-genre-lutte-contre-extremisme-violent-afrique-2021/>
- PO:<https://africacenter.org/pt-pt/dimensoes-genero-combate-extremismo-violento-africa-2021/>

“The Gender Dimensions of African Peace Operations.” Webinar, January 19, 2022:

- EN:<https://africacenter.org/programs/2022-01-wps-pso-gender-dimensions-african-peace-operations/>
- FR:<https://africacenter.org/fr/programs/2022-01-wps-pso-dimensions-genre-operations-paix-afrique/>
- PO:<https://africacenter.org/pt-pt/2022-01-wps-pso-dimensoes-genero-operacoes-paz-africa/>

Plenary Session 9: Democratization Trends

Format: Plenary session
Discussion group

Objectives:

- Examine the progress, challenges, and opportunities African countries face in achieving representative, democratic governance, and the security implications of these.
- Discuss major challenges of constitutional political succession and military coups as they relate to governance performance and public perceptions of democratic dividends.
- Explore the relationship between the politics of democratization and security in Africa.

Background:

The state of democracy in Africa is arguably one of the most controversial and difficult questions facing the continent today. Afrobarometer’s public opinion surveys done in 34 countries on the continent show that, on the whole, democracy is in demand by most African citizens, even if it is also undersupplied by African leaders and political elites. Democracy is important for providing citizen security and safety. One of the main reasons is that democratic systems are based on a balance of powers between different branches of government, such that open political competition and the exercise of civil liberties are possible. Strong legislatures and independent judiciaries can make executive branch actions more legitimate, transparent, and accountable to citizens, including in the domains of defense and security. Citizens are also key holders of rights in the exercise of representative, democratic governance, and are entitled to use these rights in a range of peaceful and legal ways to resolve disputes and express preferences.

While many countries are making obvious progress to improve representative governance and enhance state-society relations, others appear to be regressing. The global rise in nationalism and authoritarianism reinforces certain negative trends. Whether democracy can be designed to better fit African realities is a key question that academics and practitioners continue to grapple with.⁴⁵ As much as there have been significant advances in democratization, there have equally been ‘democratic rollbacks’ and the entrenchment of autocracy, albeit under the guise of electoralism in multi-party contexts. While it is important to acknowledge achievements of the continent’s success stories, of which there have been many over the last several decades, it is also crucial to recognize the setbacks that are now taking place, including through the recent spate of military coups in Mali, Burkina Faso, Guinea, Chad, and Sudan.

On the one hand, African countries have made great strides in election quality, peaceful transfers of power, and respect for fundamental freedoms and civil liberties since most of them transitioned from military, single-party, or personalist regimes to multiparty competitive systems in the early 1990s. Today, Afrobarometer opinion surveys show that seven in ten Africans affirm that “democracy is preferable to any other kind of government,” three-quarters reject military rule, and two-thirds are in favor of parliamentary oversight of the president, a core pillar of sound democratic governance and civilian oversight of the security sector.⁴⁶ Grassroots organizations – including those that mobilize youth to advocate for transparency and accountability in politics –

⁴⁵ Nic Cheeseman, “How to Design More Stable Democracies that Better Fit African Realities,” *The Conversation*, July 24, 2015, <https://theconversation.com/how-to-design-more-stable-democracies-that-better-fit-african-realities-45057>

⁴⁶ Joseph Asunka & E. Gyimah-Boadi, “Do Africans want democracy – and do they think they’re getting it?” *Washington Post*, October 22, 2021, <https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2021/10/22/do-africans-want-democracy-do-they-think-theyre-getting-it/>

have been at the forefront of civic engagement to combat corruption, strengthen local governance, and contest attempts to expand presidential power.⁴⁷

On the other hand, key indicators of political rights and civil liberties in Africa have been in decline since 2006.⁴⁸ Not all transitions in power are free and fair, and some elections exacerbate corruption and ethnic tensions.⁴⁹ Judicial independence and checks and balances also affect these dynamics, with higher risks of electoral violence in countries with quasi-independent judiciaries, where citizens are frequently uncertain about whether courts will fairly resolve election disputes.⁵⁰ Although leadership change is not necessarily a sign of the quality of a country's democracy, the abolition of presidential term limits in some countries have raised concerns. These measures are among those that often hinder the kind of accountable and responsive governance that is needed to deliver the political and economic "dividends" that citizens expect from democracy. Overall, a picture of complexity and of contradictory trends is revealed.

Discussion Questions:

- What have been the successes and the challenges of establishing and maintaining democracy in your country/region? What factors explain the success stories and the challenges in your country or region?
- How have leaders in your country/region either enhanced or inhibited democratic governance generally and in security sector?
- What practical measures can your country/region take to entrench democratic governance in general and in security sector in particular?
- What role can and should the security sector play in shaping the cultures and practices of democracy in their country? Do young, emerging leaders have any particular ideas, perspectives, skills, or experiences that they can bring to the table?

Required Readings:

Emmanuel Gyimah-Boadi, "Aspirations and Realities in Africa: Democratic Delivery Falls Short." *Journal of Democracy* 30:3, 2019. <https://muse.jhu.edu/article/729171>

Emmanuel Gyimah-Boadi, "Le recul démocratique en Afrique de l'Ouest: Caractéristiques, causes, et solutions." Kofi Annan Foundation, 2021. https://www.kofiannanfoundation.org/app/uploads/2022/02/Le-recul-democratique-en-afrique-de-louest_caracteristiques-causes-et-solutions_Boadi_Decembre2021.pdf

Joseph Siegle and Candace Cook, "Infographic: Circumvention of Term Limits Weakens Governance in Africa." Africa Center for Strategic Studies *Spotlight*, 2020 (updated May 17, 2021):

⁴⁷ Catherine Lena Kelly, "The Many Faces of Rule of Law and Security in Africa," *South Central Review* 37:2-3, 96-118, https://www.researchgate.net/publication/346574876_The_Many_Faces_of_Rule_of_Law_and_Security_in_Africa_South_Central_Review_372-3_96-118

⁴⁸ Robert Mattes & Michael Bratton, "Do Africans still want democracy?" Afrobarometer Policy Paper No. 36, 2016, <http://www.afrobarometer.org/press/do-africans-still-want-democracy>; see also Robert Mattes, "La démocratie en Afrique: La demande, l'offre, et le 'démocrate insatisfait,'" Synthèse de Politique no. 54 d'Afrobaromètre, février 2019, <https://afrobarometer.org/fr/publications/pp54-la-democratie-en-afrique-la-demande-loffre-et-le-democrate-insatisfait>

⁴⁹ Landry Signé, "Accountability and Demand for Democracy Drive Leadership Changes in Africa," Brookings Institution, June 14, 2018, <https://www.brookings.edu/opinions/accountability-and-demand-for-democracy-drive-leadership-changes-in-africa/>

⁵⁰ Meshack Simati, "Why do some elections in Africa turn violent?" *The Washington Post* Monkey Cage blog, November 22, 2017.

- EN: <https://africacenter.org/spotlight/circumvention-of-term-limits-weakens-governance-in-africa/>
- FR: <https://africacenter.org/fr/spotlight/en-afrique-contournement-limites-mandats-fragilise-gouvernance/>

Peter Fabricius, “African Coups are Making a Comeback.” Institute for Security Studies-Africa, 2021:

- EN: <https://issafrica.org/iss-today/african-coups-are-making-a-comeback>
- FR: <https://issafrica.org/fr/iss-today/les-coups-detat-sont-de-retour-en-afrique>

Plenary Session 10: Rule of Law and Security Sector Governance

Format: Plenary session
Discussion group

Objectives:

- Discuss what rule of law is as a principle and a process and its place in democratic and civilian security sector governance.
- Consider the different ways that the rule of law shapes the drivers of security challenges and the megatrends affecting African security futures.
- Examine the strategic benefits and the practical challenges that security sector leaders face when seeking to establish and enhance the rule of law in security sector and build trusting relationships with the citizens the security sector is meant to serve.
- Analyze the role of security sector leaders in advancing the rule of law in security sector governance.

Background:

At the root of some of Africa's stalled democratization efforts lie weaknesses in security governance and rule of law. In its simplest form, the rule of law means that nobody is above the law, including those who govern; all people are treated equally under the law, regardless of who they are. Laws are clear, well-known, and applied transparently and evenly by an independent judiciary. Maximally, rule of law includes accountability, just laws, open government, and accessible justice for all.⁵¹ The African Union's Agenda 2063 further advances such a vision by calling for an Africa where people "enjoy affordable and timely access to independent courts and judiciary that deliver justice without fear or favor." Thus, rule of law is not just about security officials enforcing the law; it is "an ongoing process in which state officials forge relationships of trust with citizens, based on relevant local, national, and international standards about rules, rights, and redress."⁵² In other words, fostering the rule of law is a core part of governments building a "social contract" with citizens.

The rule of law in African countries has historically progressed in fits and starts. Over the last decade on the Ibrahim Index of African Governance, average scores of African countries on overall governance have increased, although there was a slight decline from 2018 to 2019. The overall score improvements over the last ten years have been driven largely by progress on human development and economic opportunity. African countries' performance on security and rule of law – as well as on factors related to participation, rights, and inclusion that play into the rule of law itself – have declined overall.⁵³ Anti-corruption efforts are one area of the rule of law in which there has been modest but sustained progress in the last several years, but much work has yet to be done in this area, too, to bolster rule of law and governance as a whole. On a more positive note, on the latest Afrobarometer surveys, 77% of citizens from 34 countries expressed the belief that the president of their country must obey laws and courts, an increase from comparable polls taken in 2011-13, 2014-15, and 2016-18.⁵⁴ Still, it is only in certain cases that the supply of this kind of rule of law meets popular demand.

⁵¹ World Justice Project, "What is the Rule of Law?" <https://worldjusticeproject.org/about-us/overview/what-rule-law>

⁵² Catherine Lena Kelly, "The Many Faces of Rule of Law and Security in Africa," *South Central Review* 37:2-3, 96-118, <https://muse.jhu.edu/article/774161>

⁵³ "2020 Ibrahim Index of African Governance: Index Report" Mo Ibrahim Foundation (2020). <https://mo.ibrahim.foundation/sites/default/files/2020-11/2020-index-report.pdf>

⁵⁴ Joseph Asunka & E. Gyimah-Boadi, "Do Africans want democracy – and do they think they're getting it?" *Washington Post*, October 22, 2021, <https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2021/10/22/do-africans-want-democracy-do-they-think-theyre-getting-it/>

Rule of law is a core element of sound security sector governance, which facilitates the provision of transparent, accountable, and legitimate security to citizens on the basis of democratic and civilian control of the security sector. Rule of law is particularly relevant to security governance in light of empirical evidence that some security threats, like violent extremist recruitment, tend to be exacerbated by state-perpetrated abuses of civilians and people's perceptions of unfair treatment by state officials. The professionalism of the security services, as well as citizens' perceptions of it, hinge upon having a system of checks and balances that ensures everyone respects civil liberties, human rights, and the rule of law. There are, accordingly, range of formal and informal institutions that must be engaged consistently and adaptively. Formal, national-level oversight institutions (like parliaments, inspectorates, military ombuds institutions, independent anti-corruption and human rights commissions) play a key role in monitoring security force activities and behaviors toward citizens; civilian leaders should also be subject to oversight by the same or similar institutions. The everyday practices that security officials exercise with citizens also matter, since every rights-bearing citizen is a key stakeholder in the rule of law. Local oversight in security sector governance and security governance as a whole also depends upon the work of civil society organizations, media, customary or religious authorities, women and youth groups, and non-state security providers.

When there is good security sector governance, these institutions and actors work in complementarity, within a robust system of checks and balances, to ensure that the defense and security forces who "hold and deploy the means of coercion on behalf of, and for the protection of the entire society,...do not end up functioning as a threat to the same elements they were supposed to protect in the first place."⁵⁵

Discussion Questions:

- How is rule of law related to citizen security in Africa? What do these concepts mean to people in the institutions and communities where you work?
- What is the status of rule of law in your country/region and particularly in the security sector? What have been the challenges and successes of enforcing rule of law and advancing sound security sector governance in your country/region?
- How are justice and rule of law related to the security challenges that your country/region faces (conflict, violent extremism, organized crime, etc.)? How are justice and rule of law related to megatrends (youth bulge, urbanization, migration, climate change, etc.)?
- What practical measures can African countries take to promote the rule of law in the security sector? What institutions or practices does your country use to ensure that defense and security forces build relationships with citizens that facilitate both fair/equitable enforcement of the law and respect for human rights?
- Do African security sector leaders have an interest in building democratic and civilian oversight institutions that facilitate rule of law? Why or why not?

Required Readings:

Charles Manga Fombad, "An Overview of the Crisis of the Rule of Law in Africa." *African Human Rights Law Journal* 18, 213-243, 2018.

⁵⁵ Adedeji Ebo, "Parliamentary Oversight of the Security Sector in West Africa: Addressing Democratic Governance Deficits," in Adedeji Ebo and Boubacar N'Diaye, eds. *Parliamentary Oversight of the Security Sector in West Africa: Opportunities and Challenges*, Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces, 2008 :7.

https://repository.up.ac.za/bitstream/handle/2263/71546/Fombad_Overview_2018.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y

Catherine Lena Kelly, “Justice and Rule of Law Key to African Security.” Africa Center for Strategic Studies *Spotlight*, 2021:

- EN: <https://africacenter.org/spotlight/justice-and-rule-of-law-key-to-african-security/>
- FR: <https://africacenter.org/fr/spotlight/la-justice-et-letat-de-droit-pierres-angulaires-de-la-securite-en-afrique/>

Godfrey Musila, “Why Justice Matters for Security.” Africa Center for Strategic Studies *Spotlight*, 2018:

- EN: <https://africacenter.org/spotlight/why-justice-matters-for-security-africa/>
- FR: <https://africacenter.org/fr/spotlight/pourquoi-la-justice-est-importante-pour-la-securite/>

“Security Sector Governance.” Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces, 2015:

- EN: https://www.dcaf.ch/sites/default/files/publications/documents/DCAF_BG_1_Security%20Sector%20Governance_0.pdf
- FR: https://www.dcaf.ch/sites/default/files/publications/documents/DCAF_BG_1_La%20gouvernance%20du%20secteur%20de%20la%20securite.pdf

Additional Africa Center resources:

“Why Does Rule of Law Matter for Security Sector Effectiveness in Africa?” webinar, December 16, 2021:

- EN: <https://africacenter.org/programs/jrol2021-rule-of-law-for-security-sector-effectiveness-in-africa/>
- FR: <https://africacenter.org/fr/programs/jrol2021-etat-de-droit-efficacite-secteur-securite-afrique/>
- PO: <https://africacenter.org/pt-pt/jrol2021-estado-direito-importante-eficacia-setor-seguranca-africa/>

“How Do National Oversight Institutions Influence Security Sector Governance?” webinar, April 26, 2022:

- EN: <https://africacenter.org/programs/2204rol-oversight-security-governance/>
- FR: <https://africacenter.org/fr/programs/2204rol-institutions-controle-gouvernance-securite/>
- PO: <https://africacenter.org/pt-pt/2204rol-instituicoes-supervisao-governacao-seguranca/>

“Roles of Parliament in Democratic and Civilian Security Sector Governance” panel, African Parliamentarians Forum 2022, March 1, 2022:

- EN: <https://africacenter.org/programs/african-parliamentarians-forum-2022/>
- FR: <https://africacenter.org/fr/programs/forum-parlementaires-africains-2022/>

Module II: National Response to Security Challenges

Plenary Session 11: Strategic Leadership in Africa's Security Sector

Format: Plenary session
Discussion group

Objectives:

- Understand the critical role of leadership in confronting the changing and complex African security landscape.
- Analyze the tenets of effective strategic leadership in an African context.
- Highlight the importance of adaptability for effective leadership in the ever-changing and complex security environment.
- Examine the role of strategic leadership and security sector leaders in the development and implementation of national security strategies.

Background:

There is optimism that Africa can claim the latter part of the 21st century if its leaders are prepared to harness emerging global opportunities and address the continent's evolving security challenges. Depending on whether African leaders respond proactively or reactively to the challenges and opportunities they face, the interconnected megatrends discussed in Session 1 may lead to virtuous, mutually reinforcing cycles of stability, growth, and development or vicious cycles of instability, conflict, and poverty. The dynamic security landscape demands that security sector leaders move away from the old approach of "business-as-usual" and provide much-needed strategic and proactive leadership to create resilient institutions over the long term, and make decisive, evidence-based decisions in the face of crisis and uncertainty.

Although there are different approaches to the understanding of leadership, the focus here is on *effective strategic leadership* that is generally defined as "the unique abilities of anticipating, envisioning, maintaining flexibility, thinking strategically, and empowering employees to create new inventions that lead to organizational transformations or changes."⁵⁶ Beyond developing these abilities, strategic leadership is also about having the adaptive capacity to appropriately respond to the dynamism and complexity of the context.⁵⁷ With the rapidly changing and uncertain external environment, *adaptive leadership* gains ground and prominence.

Adaptive leadership is defined as "the ability to anticipate future needs, articulate those needs to build collective support and understanding, adapt your responses based on continuous learning, and demonstrate accountability through transparency in your decision-making process."⁵⁸ There are five key principles that are central to the application of adaptive leadership, namely: evidence-based learning and adaptation; stress-testing underlying assumptions and beliefs; streamlining deliberative decision-making processes; appreciating the significance of accountability, transparency, and inclusion; and mobilizing collective action.⁵⁹

⁵⁶ Alex Jaleha and Vincent Machuki, "Strategic Leadership and Organizational Performance: Critical Review of Literature." *European Scientific Review*. Vol 4(35): 127, 2018.

⁵⁷ Paul Schoemaker, Steve Krupp and Samantha Howland, "Strategic Leadership: The Essential Skills." *Harvard Business Review*. 91(1-2): 131-134, 2018. <https://hbr.org/2013/01/strategic-leadership-the-essential-skills>

⁵⁸ Ben Ramalingam et al, "5 Principles to Guide Adaptive Leadership," *Harvard Business Review*, September 11, 2020. <https://hbr.org/2020/09/5-principles-to-guide-adaptive-leadership>

⁵⁹ Ramalingam et al, *op cit*.

The concept of leadership is well embedded in the African values and cultures that sustained African communities during the trying times of slavery and colonization. For example, the concept of *ubuntu* is a South African leadership ethic which means “a person is a person through others” and it provides understanding of ourselves in relation to the world.⁶⁰ A similar ethic, found in West Africa, is the *Kurukan Fuga*⁶¹ or the Manden Charter, which established the Federation of Mandinka clans under one government and outlined laws by which the Malinké people should abide by social peace, co-exist in diversity and live with dignity. Some of the indispensable characteristics that most strategic leaders have in common include being a visionary, having a high moral and ethical values, being strategic thinker, investing in the development of social and human capital as well as future leadership, being a quick learner, being a change initiator, and exhibiting both sense giving and sense making.⁶²

Discussion Questions:

- Who are some leaders (national, regional, continental, and international) you consider to be role models for leadership and why?
- Do you see yourself as a leader and what can you do to make yourself an effective strategic leader?
- Can you share cultural values and norms in your country or region that promote effective leadership?
- Based on the experience of COVID-19 in your country/region, can you share your assessment of the quality of leadership provided to address the pandemic and what could have been done differently?
- Do you know of any leaders in your community/country/region who have facilitated positive change? What factors have led to their success as a leader?

Required Readings:

Ben Ramalingam et al, “Five Principles to Guide Adaptive Leadership.” Harvard Business Review, 2020. <https://hbr.org/2020/09/5-principles-to-guide-adaptive-leadership>

Regina Eckert and Simon Rweyongoze, “Leadership Development in Africa: A Focus on Strengths.” Center for Creative Leadership, 2015. <https://www.ccl.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/04/leadershipDevelopmentAfrica.pdf>

Kwesi Aning and Joseph Siegle, “Deep Commitment, High Expectations: The Values of the Next Generation of African Security Sector Leaders.” Africa Defense Forum, 2018:

- EN: <http://adf-magazine.com/deep-commitment-high-expectations/>
- FR: <http://adf-magazine.com/engagement-profond-attentes-elevees/?lang=fr>

Sam Adeyemi, “Africa does not Need Charity, it Needs Good Leadership,” World Economic Forum on Africa, 2017. <https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2017/05/africa-doesn-t-need-charity-it-needs-good-leadership>

⁶⁰ See <https://historyplex.com/ubuntu-african-philosophy>

⁶¹ See <https://en.unesco.org/mediabank/23135/>

⁶² Page 211, Asif, *op cit*.

Plenary Session 12: Forging New Civil-Military Relations and Security Sector Reform

Format: Plenary session
Discussion group

Objectives:

- Define the concept and key elements of Civil-Military Relations (CMR) and their link to the democratic governance of the security sector.
- Share some of the challenges in nurturing healthy CMR and how to overcome such challenges.
- Discuss how reforming the security sector and promoting sound institutions of security sector governance can contribute to forging healthy CMR, and vice versa.
- Discuss the role of strategic leadership in forging and nurturing healthy CMR.

Background:

Civil-Military Relations (CMR) describes the manner in which the military and the society it is meant to protect interact. It is generally defined as a negotiated bargain between three security stakeholders: citizens, civilian government authorities, and the military.⁶³ CMR focuses less on relationships and more on rules for effective democratic civilian control of security forces, and how to forge a social contract between civil society, elected civilian government, and security institutions. Arguably, the biggest challenge is to address the dilemma of “who guards the guardians”⁶⁴ and to craft pathways to reconcile the security sector’s desire to act on the wants of civilians with the ability to do only what civilians authorize.⁶⁵

However, the concept of CMR has shifted in light of the changing concept of security and the nature of security threats. The concept of security has evolved from state-centric to people-centric, with citizens rather than state becoming a referent object in the way security is perceived, planned, managed, delivered, and overseen. The nature of security threats has changed from more existential threats to the territorial integrity of the state to more complex security threats that cannot be addressed by traditional use of military force, but rather by a coordinated and collaborative response from all security institutions at national, regional, and international levels.

A key challenge in most African countries is how to nurture healthy CMRs that will create a secure environment conducive to citizen security, job creation, justice, and rule of law. There is an alarming regression in democracy and a surge of coup d’états in Africa, combined with increased and unconstrained military spending, all without significant improvements in citizen security and safety.⁶⁶ The Ibrahim Index of African Governance shows a shrinking trust of citizens in security forces, particularly in the police and military.⁶⁷ These indicators demonstrate increasingly problematic CMRs, with increased military intrusion in politics and control of

⁶³ Mackubin Thomas Owens, *US Civil-Military Relations After 9/11: Renegotiating the Civil Military Bargain* (New York: The Continuum International Publishing Group, 2011), 13.

⁶⁴ Thomas Bruneau and Florina Christina Matei, “Towards a New Conceptualization of Democratization and Civil-Military Relations.” *Democratization*. Vol 15(5) pp. 909 – 929, 2008. https://fsi-live.s3.us-west-1.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/Bruneau_final_file.pdf

⁶⁵ See Feaver, Peter D. 1996. “The Civil-Military Problématique: Huntington, Janowitz, and the Question of Civilian Control,” *Armed Forces and Society*, vol. 23, no. 2, pp. 149-178

⁶⁶ Nan Tian, “A cautionary tale of military expenditure transparency during the great lockdown.” SIPRI, 2020.

<https://www.sipri.org/commentary/blog/2020/cautionary-tale-military-expenditure-transparency-during-great-lockdown>

⁶⁷ See <https://mo.ibrahim.foundation/iiag/2020-key-findings#kf1>

civilians. This regressive trend has been exacerbated by weak civilian oversight of the security sector and gaps in knowledge, experience, and attitudes.

Reversing such a grim trend in Africa is urgent and will require rethinking, re-negotiation, reform, or transformation of the CMR framework. Frameworks for not only security sector reform, but also for sound security sector governance, provide an opportunity for countries in developing or consolidated democracies, as well as those emerging from military dictatorship, to forge new CMRs that will consolidate democratic civilian control of the security sector and rule of law. It has been shown that democratic civilian control of the security sector is not sufficient by itself to nurture healthy CMRs, as effectiveness and efficiency of the military in fulfilling their assigned roles and missions are also important.⁶⁸ Under systems of democratic and civilian control of the security sector that result from building the institutions of sound security sector governance, there are clearly defined roles and missions for the security forces, legal and practical mandates and resources for effective oversight institutions and practices, and a commitment to professional norms and ethics within the security services. In addition, developing and implementing citizen-centered and inclusively developed strategies - such as national security strategy and sectoral security strategies - is a potentially useful tool for improving CMRs, particularly if such strategies are also well-resourced and judiciously managed.

Discussion Questions:

- How would you describe the status of relations between civilians and military/security forces in your country/region, and which security forces are trusted more by citizens and why?
- In what areas do civil-military relations in your country/region need improvement? In which areas have they improved?
- What are some of the limitations that civilians face in exercising facing the democratic control over the military/security forces in your country/region and how can you help to address such limitations?
- Who are the relevant stakeholders in improving the state of civil-military relations in your country/region and why?

Required Readings:

Christopher Day, Moses Khisa, and William Reno, "Rethinking the Civil-Military Conundrum in Africa." *Civil Wars* Vol 22(2-3) pp. 156-173, 2020.

<https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/13698249.2020.1736808>

Nathaniel Allen and Luka Kuol, "Civil-Military Relations and Sudan's Treacherous Path to Democracy." *Texas National Security Review*, 2021. <https://tnsr.org/roundtable/policy-roundtable-the-military-and-mass-protests-in-africa/#essay3>

NOTE - please read:

Adedeji Ebo, "Towards a Code of Conduct for Armed and Security Forces in Africa: Opportunities and Challenges." Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces, 2005. <https://gsdrc.org/document-library/towards-a-code-of-conduct-for-armed-and-security-forces-in-africa-opportunities-and-challenges/>

68 Bruneau and Matei, *op cit*

And compare it to the following piece:

Mathurin Houngnikpo, "Africa's Militaries: A Missing Link in Democratic Transitions." Africa Center for Strategic Studies, 2012:

- EN: <https://africacenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/ASB17EN-Africa%E2%80%99s-Militaries-A-Missing-Link-in-Democratic-Transitions.pdf>
- FR : <https://africacenter.org/fr/publication/armees-africaines-chainon-manquant-transitions-democratiques/>
- PO : <https://africacenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/ASB17PT-Militares-em-%C3%81frica-Elemento-em-Falta-nas-Transi%C3%A7%C3%B5es-Democr%C3%A1ticas.pdf>

Augustin Loada and Ornella Moderan, "Tool 6: Civil Society Involvement in Security Sector Reform and Governance." Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces, Chapter 4, 2015:

- EN: <https://www.dcaf.ch/tool-6-civil-society-involvement-security-sector-reform-and-governance>
- FR : <https://www.dcaf.ch/sites/default/files/publications/documents/SSRG-West-Africa-Toolkit-Tool-6-FR.pdf>
- PO : <https://www.dcaf.ch/sites/default/files/publications/documents/SSRG-West-Africa-Toolkit-Tool-6-PO.pdf>

Plenary Session 13: Enhancing Professionalism in Africa's Security Sector

Format: Plenary session
Discussion group

Objectives:

- Examine the status of professionalism in Africa's security sector, particularly within the military, police, and intelligence services.
- Assess the challenges to professionalism in the security sector and the costs of weak professionalism in African military, police, and intelligence services.
- Share knowledge, experiences, and lessons learned to enhance and advance professionalism in Africa's security sector, particularly in military, police, and intelligence services.
- Examine the role of security sector leaders in advancing professionalism in Africa's security sector.

Background:

It is well established that enhancing professionalism in Africa's security sector is critical to improving citizen security and safety, promoting political stability, improving rule of law and governance in the security sector, and cultivating citizens' trust in security officials. Though it is a frequently used term, it is necessary to establish a common understanding of "professionalism" for its application in the security sector. In the armed forces, professionalism is commonly defined in terms of the principles guiding the professional, such as the subordination of the military to democratic civilian authority, allegiance to the state, and a commitment to political neutrality and an ethical institutional culture. The inherent values of professionalism include discipline, integrity, honor, sacrifices, commitment to the greater good of society, dedication to duty, individual responsibility, and accountability for moral agency and service in spite of self-interest.⁶⁹

Despite the call by the African Union for member states to invest in comprehensive capacity-building and professionalism in the security sector⁷⁰, military professionalism in Africa has been weakened as manifested in a recent surge of coups, waning popular trust in militaries, political instability, corruption, and failure to confront the insecurity and violence caused by non-state security actors. Although there are many reasons that explain weak military professionalism in Africa, some factors of primary concern are a lack of systematic checks and balances, politicization of militaries and militarization of politics, and ambiguity over the missions of the militaries that serve to protect government from rather than for citizens.⁷¹ Ultimately, the professionalism of the security services, as well as citizens' perceptions of it, hinge upon having a system of checks and balances that ensures everyone respects civil liberties, human rights, and the rule of law. Formal, national-level oversight institutions – like parliaments, inspectorates, military ombuds institutions, independent anti-corruption and human rights commissions – play a key role in monitoring security force activities and behaviors toward citizens. The everyday practices that security officials exercise with citizens also matter, along with the local oversight of

⁶⁹ Emile Ouedraogo, "Advancing Military Professionalism in Africa." *Research Paper No. 6*. Africa Center for Strategic Studies, Page 1-3, 2014. <https://africacenter.org/publication/advancing-military-professionalism-in-africa/>

⁷⁰ African Union Policy Framework on Security Sector Reform, 2014, https://issat.dcaf.ch/download/60132/986021/AU_SSR_policy_framework_en.pdf

⁷¹ Ouedraogo, *op cit*.

security that may involve civil society organizations, media, customary authorities, and non-state security providers.

The bleak status of military professionalism in Africa notwithstanding, some militaries have exhibited notable levels of professionalism during political transitions, elections, and popular uprisings against autocratic regimes by upholding the rule of law and respecting the constitution and will of the people. Most African security sector professionals are not only satisfied with their profession, but also have a strong sense of pride in embracing the values of professionalism such as duty, responsibility, professionalism, respect, and honesty.⁷² In some African countries, the armed forces enjoy the respect of citizens and become a source of their national pride. This shows military professionalism is a product of policies, strategies, and political leadership, as well as each individual's commitment to the principles of rule of law in the security sector.

Governments and security sector leaders have a vital interest in enhancing the professionalism and accountability of defense and security institutions. The development and implementation of national security strategies will not only provide mechanisms for democratic civilian control and oversight of the security sector to ensure respect for civil liberties, human rights, and rule of law, but will also provide guidance and clarity for the roles, mission, mandate, professional norms and values, and doctrine of security forces.

Discussion Questions:

- How will you describe the level of professionalism of security sector, particularly armed forces, police, and intelligence services in your country/region and the reasons?
- Which security institutions have exhibited quality professionalism and why?
- What do you think is the main challenge to military/security professionalism in your country/region and why?
- What do you think the future of military/security professionalism in your country/region and why?
- Based on your experiences, are there any lessons on how to build and advance a professional armed forces and security services in your country/region?

Recommended Readings:

Emile Ouedraogo, "Advancing Military Professionalism in Africa." *Research Paper No. 6*, Africa Center for Strategic Studies, p. 1-3, 2014:

- EN : <https://africacenter.org/publication/advancing-military-professionalism-in-africa/>
- FR : <https://africacenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/ARP06FR-Pour-la-professionnalisation-des-forces-arm%C3%A9es-en-Afrique.pdf>
- PO : <https://africacenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/ARP06PT-Promo%C3%A7%C3%A3o-do-Profissionalismo-Militar-em-%C3%81frica.pdf>

Kwesi Aning and Joseph Siegle, "Assessing Attitudes of the Next Generation of African Security Sector Professionals." *Research Paper No. 7*, Africa Center for Strategic Studies, p. 1-2, 2019:

⁷² Kwesi Aning and Joseph Siegle, "Assessing Attitudes of the Next Generation of African Security Sector Professionals." *Research Paper No. 7*. Africa Center for Strategic Studies, Page 1-2, 2019. <https://africacenter.org/publication/assessing-attitudes-next-generation-african-security-sector-professionals/>

- EN: <https://africacenter.org/publication/assessing-attitudes-next-generation-african-security-sector-professionals/>
- FR: <https://africacenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/08/ARP07FR%20-%20Evaluation%20des%20attitudes%20de%20la%20prochaine%20generation%20de%20professionnels%20du%20secteur%20de%20la%20securite%20en%20Afrique.pdf>
- PO: <https://africacenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/11/ARP07PT-Avaliacao-das-atitudes-da-proxima-geracao-de-profissionais-do-setor-da-seguranca-em-Africa.pdf>

David Novy, “Professionalism in the Armed Forces.” *Research Report*, Air War College, p. iv, 2017. <https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/pdfs/AD1038055.pdf>

African Union, “African Union Policy Framework on Security Sector Reform.” P. 16, 2014:

- EN : https://issat.dcaf.ch/download/60132/986021/AU_SSR_policy_framework_en.pdf
- FR : https://issat.dcaf.ch/fre/download/60132/996775/SSR_policy_framework_fr.pdf
- PO: <https://www.peaceau.org/uploads/policy-framework-po.pdf>

Additional Africa Center resources:

“How Do National Oversight Institutions Influence Security Sector Governance?” webinar, April 26, 2022:

- EN: <https://africacenter.org/programs/2204rol-oversight-security-governance/>
- FR: <https://africacenter.org/fr/programs/2204rol-institutions-controle-gouvernance-securite/>
- PO: <https://africacenter.org/pt-pt/2204rol-instituicoes-supervisao-governacao-seguranca/>

Plenary Session 14: National Security Strategy Development and Implementation

Format: Plenary session
Discussion group

Objectives:

- Examine the rationale, key concepts, and prerequisites for National Security Strategy Development (NSSD) and key elements of the National Security Strategy document.
- Discuss the typical phases of NSSD in Africa.
- Understand some of the key challenges in the development and implementation of National Security Strategy.
- Examine the role of strategic leadership and security sector leaders in the development and implementation of national security strategies in Africa.

Background:

One of the core functions of any nation-state is to provide its own security as well as the security and safety of its citizens. Despite the inordinate resources allocated to the security sector, many states in Africa are becoming increasingly incapable of ensuring the security of all their citizens, and in some instances states themselves have become sources of insecurity. Despite increase in military and security spending in Africa, the Ibrahim Index of African Governance shows a decline in the levels of national security and citizen security and safety as well as a shrinking trust of citizens in security institutions.⁷³ This growing insecurity, the emergence of new security threats, and a shift towards understanding security as security for all as opposed to regime or state security, all demonstrate a need for African governments to re-evaluate how to deliver security and safety to their citizens.

Most African countries do not have an overarching National Security Strategy. Instead, some countries have classified strategies with uncoordinated sectoral security strategies that are formulated with limited or no involvement of citizens, and largely financed by external partners without effective national ownership. This lack of grand strategy as a reference point for decision-makers in the security sector may inhibit effective coordination, alignment of resources and leveraging of partnership, prioritization of security threats, and shared understanding of national security vision. In recognition of this gap, the African Union (AU) has requested its member states to produce national security strategies. The “Solemn Declaration on a Common African Defense and Security Policy” (2004)⁷⁴ and the “Policy Framework on Security Sector Reform” (2014)⁷⁵ provided member states with guidelines for developing such strategies in a fully consultative and participatory process. The United Nations (UN) also provides support to its member states in crafting their national security policies and strategies. Despite this call and guidelines provided by the AU and support facility at the UN, many African countries are unable to develop such strategies, largely due to limited political will, low levels of awareness, and a deficit of the necessary practical tools and experience in developing such strategies.

A well-designed and inclusive process for formulating national security strategy can facilitate the creation of a sound strategy. Such a process also enables decision-makers to make effective plans to address national security threats and to make long-term improvements in delivering security

⁷³ See <https://iiaonline.org/data.html?meas=PubPercSaf&loc=g1&view=table>

⁷⁴ See <https://www.peaceau.org/uploads/declaration-cadsp-en.pdf>

⁷⁵ <http://www.peaceau.org/uploads/au-policy-framework-on-security-sector-reform-ae-ssr.pdf>

to the state and its citizens.⁷⁶ Such a process also ensures national ownership, inclusivity, and consensus; it lays the groundwork for the internal and external partnerships that facilitate the implementation of national security strategy. Based on its experience in socializing the concept of NSSD in all sub-regions of Africa, the Africa Center developed a toolkit entitled *National Security Strategy Development in Africa: Toolkit for Drafting and Consultation*. The main objective of this toolkit is to describe the common phases of the NSSD process, and it serves as a resource to aid national and regional stakeholders in African countries to craft or review their national security strategies. Since the publication and socialization of this toolkit, some additional African countries have started the process of drafting national security strategies. While this toolkit provides guidance for the process, it is not a blueprint, as each country will have to adapt the process to its unique national context and develop homegrown approaches in crafting and implementing strategy.

Discussion Questions:

- Do you know whether your country/region has a security strategy? If yes, do you know how it was developed, if citizens were engaged, or if it was approved by parliament? Is the document public?
- If your country/region does not have a security strategy, do you see any rationale for your country/region to have such a strategy? What would be the role of leadership in such a process?
- Who initiates the NSSD process and why? Who should be involved and consulted in the NSSD process, why, and at what stage of the process? Should the media, women, youth, and civil society be involved in the process, and if so, how?
- Should a security strategy be approved by the parliament and why? Should it be kept secret and why or why not?

Required Readings:

Africa Center for Strategic Studies, "National Security Strategy Development in Africa: Toolkit for Drafting and Consultation."

- EN: <https://africacenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/01/National-Security-Strategy-Development-in-Africa-Toolkit-for-Drafting-and-Consultation-Africa-Center-for-Strategic-Studies-2022-01.pdf>
- FR: <https://africacenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/01/Developpement-dune-strategie-de-securite-nationale-en-Afrique-Centre-dEtude-Strategiques-de-lAfrique-2022-01.pdf>
- PO: <https://africacenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/02/Desenvolvimento-da-Estrategias-de-Seguranca-Nacional-em-Africa-Um-kit-de-ferramentas-para-consulta-e-preparacao.pdf>

Luka Kuol and Joel Amegboh, "Rethinking National Security Strategies in Africa." *Journal of International Relations and Diplomacy*, Vol. 9 (1): 1-17, 2021.

<http://www.davidpublisher.com/Public/uploads/Contribute/60a72058556ba.pdf>

⁷⁶ Mark Cancian et al., "Formulating National Security Strategy: Past Experience and Future Choices." Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), 2017. <https://www.csis.org/analysis/formulating-national-security-strategy>

African Union, “The Solemn Declaration on Common African Defense and Security Policy.” 2004:

- EN : <http://www.peaceau.org/uploads/declaration-cadsp-en.pdf>
- FR : <https://www.peaceau.org/uploads/declaration-cadsp-fr.pdf>

Africa Union, “Policy Framework on Security Sector Reform.” 2014:

- EN: <http://www.peaceau.org/uploads/au-policy-framework-on-security-sector-reform-ae-ssr.pdf>
- FR: <https://www.peaceau.org/uploads/policy-framework-fr.pdf>
- PO: <https://www.peaceau.org/uploads/policy-framework-po.pdf>

Additional Africa Center Resources:

National Security Strategy Development and Implementation program, April 20 – May 5, 2021:

- EN: <https://africacenter.org/programs/nssd-2021-04-05/>
- FR : <https://africacenter.org/fr/programs/fr-nssd-2021-04-05/>
- PO : <https://africacenter.org/pt-pt/pt-nssd-2021-04-05/>

National Security Strategy Development Process: Lessons Learned program, March 9-24, 2021:

- EN: <https://africacenter.org/programs/national-security-strategy-development-lessons-learned/>
- FR : <https://africacenter.org/fr/programs/fr-nssd-mar-2021/>
- PO : <https://africacenter.org/pt-pt/pt-nssd-mar-2021/>

Plenary Session 15: Managing Security Resources in Africa

Format: Plenary session
Discussion group

Objectives:

- Assess the trends, patterns, and drivers of security/military expenditures in Africa.
- Discuss the link between budget cycle and national security strategy development and implementation.
- Examine core budgeting approaches and principles, considering how they can guide the planning, allocation, and alignment of security resources through national security strategy.
- Share challenges of introducing and implementing the principles of public expenditure management and resource mobilization in the security sector, particularly as they relate to off-budget revenues and expenditure, military businesses, payroll, and procurement.
- Examine the role of security sector leaders in the judicious and transparent management of security resources in Africa.

Background:

African countries face challenges in generating, allocating, and aligning security sector resources, particularly when they have not yet developed inclusive and locally owned national security strategies. Intensified security threats in Africa have caused many security leaders to call for more spending in the security sector. According to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), military spending in Africa exceeded \$43 billion in 2020, up from \$15 billion in the 1990s. Defense expenditures accounted for an average of 8.2% of government spending across Africa in 2020, compared to a global average of 6.5%. The countries that increased their military expenditures in 2020 tended to be autocracies and/or countries exposed to violent conflict. Despite the rise of military expenditures in Africa during the last decade, national security, citizen security and safety, and trust of citizens in the police and military have been deteriorating.⁷⁷

These statistics show that more military spending *per se* does not necessarily improve security and safety. It can instead create a conducive environment for the abuse of state power, leading to the state's use of violence against citizens, the misalignment and deficient allocation of public resources, and corruption in the use of security resources.⁷⁸ Military expenditures need to be guided by citizen-centered public policies and subjected to budgetary principles and civilian oversight. Otherwise, they risk sustaining an insecure environment in which conflict can become a lucrative enterprise that allows the security sector to sustain and justify high levels of expenditure.⁷⁹ The unconstrained rise in military expenditures without policy guidance is counterproductive and unlikely to win the trust of citizens, because higher military expenditures crowd out investment in much-needed public services - such as health, education, and justice. In addition, there are growing concerns that the security sector in Africa is not adhering to core budgetary principles including contestability, accountability, and transparency, which has led to

⁷⁷ Kuol and Amegboh, *op cit*.

⁷⁸ Chimere Iheonu, Kingsley Odo and Davidmac Ekeocha, "Estimating the effect of democracy, governance and militarization on peace in Africa." Research Africa Network, WP/20/046, 2020. <http://publications.resanet.org/RePEc/abh/abh-wpaper/Estimating-the-effect-of-Democracy-Governance-and-Militarisation-on-Peace-in-Africa.pdf>

⁷⁹ Maurice Ogbonnaya, "Has counter-terrorism become a profitable business in Nigeria." Institute for Security Studies (ISS), 2020. <https://issafrica.org/iss-today/has-counter-terrorism-become-a-profitable-business-in-nigeria>

increased corruption and off-budget expenditures and revenues.⁸⁰ All of this suggests that more military spending alone cannot address security threats without an overarching national security strategy in which resources are prioritized and aligned.

The COVID-19 pandemic has further exposed the challenges of aligning available national resources with national strategic goals while meeting unanticipated needs in an uncertain environment. The budgets that were appropriated before the pandemic have become less adaptable, with far-reaching cuts in public expenditure to meet urgent needs and pressing priorities. This has caused some misalignment of the available national resources and constrain states' ability to make strategic trade-offs in their allocation of resources across different sectors affecting security, development, and governance.⁸¹ Current conditions call for revisiting the link between National Security Strategy and the management of security resources within the public financial management principles. The fiscal challenges caused by the pandemic may provide opportunities for rethinking how to make security strategies and security budgets agile and adaptive.

Discussion Questions:

- Based on the security threats and development challenges in your country, do you think more resources need to be allocated to the security sector and why?
- Based on the most recent approved budget of your country, which security sector institution/agency is allocated the most resources, and is that allocation justifiable?
- Which security sector institution/agency in your country should be allocated more public resources and why?
- Why do you think having a National Security Strategy that is developed through an inclusive and participatory process will help in the effective allocation and alignment of security resources?

Required Readings:

Bernard Harborne, William Dorotinsky and Paul Bisca (Eds.), "Securing Development: Public Finance and the Security Sector." The World Bank, p. 7-14, 25-47, 2017:

- EN: <http://www.sipotra.it/wp-content/uploads/2017/05/SECURING-DEVELOPMENT.-Public-Finance-and-the-Security-Sector.pdf>
- FR: <https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/bitstream/handle/10986/25138/210766ovFR.pdf?sequence=4&isAllowed=y>

Luka Kuol and Joel Amegboh, "Rethinking National Security Strategies in Africa". *Journal of International Relations and Diplomacy*, Vol 9(1): 1-17, 2021.

<http://www.davidpublisher.com/Public/uploads/Contribute/60a72058556ba.pdf>

Chimere Iheonu, Kingsley Odo and Davidmac Ekeocha, "Estimating the effect of democracy, governance and militarization on peace in Africa." Research Africa Network, WP/20/046, 2020. <http://publications.resanet.org/RePEc/abh/abh-wpaper/Estimating-the-effect-of-Democracy-Governance-and-Militarisation-on-Peace-in-Africa.pdf>

⁸⁰ Bernard Harborne, William Dorotinsky and Paul Bisca (Eds.), "Securing Development: Public Finance and the Security Sector." The World Bank. Pg. 7-14, 25-47, 2017. <http://www.sipotra.it/wp-content/uploads/2017/05/SECURING-DEVELOPMENT.-Public-Finance-and-the-Security-Sector.pdf>

⁸¹ Tian, *op cit*.

Maurice Ogbonnaya, "Has counter-terrorism become a profitable business in Nigeria?" Institute for Security Studies (ISS), 2020.

- EN: <https://issafrica.org/iss-today/has-counter-terrorism-become-a-profitable-business-in-nigeria>
- FR : <https://issafrica.org/fr/iss-today/la-lutte-contre-le-terrorisme-est-elle-devenue-une-activite-rentable-au-nigeria>

Additional Africa Center Resources:

Aligning Resources with National Security Strategies in Africa program, November 30 – December 15, 2021:

- EN: <https://africacenter.org/programs/msra-nssd-2021-aligning-resources-national-security-strategies-in-africa/>
- FR: <https://africacenter.org/fr/programs/msra-nssd-2021-alignement-ressources-strategies-nationales-securite-afrique/>
- PO: <https://africacenter.org/pt-pt/msra-nssd-2021-alinhamento-recursos-estrategias-seguranca-nacional-africa/>

Africa Center for Strategic Studies, 2021. "National Security Strategy Development in Africa: Toolkit for Drafting and Consultation". Pages 40-41 :

- EN : <https://africacenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/01/National-Security-Strategy-Development-in-Africa-Toolkit-for-Drafting-and-Consultation-Africa-Center-for-Strategic-Studies-2022-01.pdf>
- FR : <https://africacenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/01/Developpement-dune-strategie-de-securite-nationale-en-Afrique-Centre-dEtude-Strategiques-de-lAfrique-2022-01.pdf>
- PO : <https://africacenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/02/Desenvolvimento-da-Estrategias-de-Seguranca-Nacional-em-Africa-Um-kit-de-ferramentas-para-consulta-e-preparacao.pdf>

Module III: Regional and International Response to Security Challenge

Plenary Session 16: Regional Responses to Security Threats: Early Warning and Early Response

Format: Plenary session
Discussion group

Objectives:

- Provide an overview of challenges and opportunities of developing preventive regional and sub-regional responses to security challenges.
- Analyze the role of the Regional Economic Communities in collectively addressing regional security threats.
- Assess the strengths and weaknesses of regional security and defense policies, regional mechanisms for security and defense coordination, and early warning/early response mechanisms in addressing regional security challenges.

Background:

The predominant regional security challenges in Africa transcend national political boundaries. Issues related to transnational organized crime, violent conflict, terrorist insurgencies, migration, climate change, small arms and light weapons proliferation, and economic crisis have profound implications for human security, socio-economic development, and legitimacy of political regimes in the affected states. However, recent experiences suggest that it is imperative to address these challenges on the regional and the continental level – and not just through isolated national responses, which are necessary but insufficient.

While the African Union (AU) leads on establishing continent-wide norms for conflict resolution, peacebuilding, and acceptable political conduct, Africa's Regional Economic Communities (RECs) are contributing substantially to conflict resolution and peacebuilding in their neighborhoods. Since the 2000 Lomé Summit of the AU, which laid a foundation for the adoption of the AU Constitutive Act, the RECs have been recognized as critical stakeholders in addressing conflict. They are also mandated to accelerate the continent's economic development by facilitating integration and cooperation between African states. Furthermore, RECs have increasingly become the arenas for forging norms on governance and democratization, and for adopting regional security and defense policies, strategies, and coordination mechanisms. The most elaborate REC mechanisms for collective security and peace are the Early Warning Systems (EWS), which are tools for conflict and violence prevention.

Many lessons have been learned already from the West African experience with ECOWAS's Early Warning and Response Network (ECOWARN), launched in 2003, and from the Horn of Africa's experience IGAD's Conflict Early Warning and Early Response Mechanism (CEWARN), established in 2002. These early warning and early response systems are intended to identify and analyze conflict trends, alert stakeholders to elevated risks of conflict, support decision-makers with timely information, and initiate swift responses to prevent conflict and violence.

However, in repositioning the RECs as agents of conflict resolution and peacebuilding, there has been a growing recognition among African countries that there are insufficient political incentives to mainstream regional commitments and agreements into national plans. Narrowly defined post-colonial sovereignties further inhibit cooperation and collaboration. Furthermore, the effectiveness of RECs varies can greatly based on leadership dynamics, political and cultural

cleavages, and the depth of integration. Yet when conflict and violence know no borders, prevention cannot either. Enhancing the leverage of the RECs on prevention efforts including early warning and early response will be instrumental for peace and security continent wide.

Discussion Questions:

- How effective is your REC at mobilizing member states to collectively address regional security challenges? Please share some examples of successes and challenges.
- Do overlapping country memberships in the RECs help or hurt the RECs' ability to coordinate collective responses to security challenges?
- How much emphasis do you think the RECs should put on prevention of conflict and violence, as opposed to more reactive responses to existing conflicts? Why?
- How can early warning and response systems be made effective in responding timely to security threats in the region?

Required Readings:

Getachew Zeru Gebrekidan and Messay Asgedom Gobena, "Rethinking IGAD's Role in Addressing Emerging Regional Security Threats." Wilson Center, 2021.
https://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/media/uploads/documents/SVNP-2021-Joint-Paper-Getachew-Asgedom_0.pdf

Mark Whitlock and Robert Muggah, "Reflections on the evolution of conflict early warning." *International Journal of Security and Development*, 10 (1), 2022.
<https://www.stabilityjournal.org/articles/10.5334/sta.857/>

L'Organisation pour l'alimentation et l'agriculture (FAO), « Les mécanismes communautaires de réduction des risques de catastrophes pour des moyens d'existence résilients au Sahel. » 2017.
<https://www.fao.org/emergencies/recursos/documentos/recursos-detalle/es/c/1035230/>

West African Network for Peacebuilding, "Annual Report 2021: Adapting Resilient Approaches and Synergies to Peacebuilding in the 'New Normal'." 2021:

- EN:<https://wanep.org/wanep/annual-report-2021-adapting-resilient-approaches-and-synergies-to-peacebuilding-in-the-new-normal/>
- FR:https://wanep.org/wanep/wp-content/uploads/2022/03/Wanep-2021_French.pdf

Plenary Session 17: African Union Responses to Security Challenges

Format: Plenary session
Discussion group

Objectives:

- Understand the African Union's (AU) responses to security issues in Africa, including challenges and opportunities.
- Assess how Africans have responded to security challenges through the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA), identifying successes, challenges, and ways to overcome challenges.
- Examine how security sector leaders can make use of the APSA to deliver better safety and security to citizens.
- Discuss what steps the AU and other regional actors might consider to enhance the APSA's effectiveness and to achieve goals of the 'Silencing the Guns' initiative.

Background:

To what extent can the African Union (AU), a pan-African organization, realize its ambition to lead the continent towards a peaceful, secure, and prosperous future? This is a question of utmost importance not just for security, but also for development and governance across the continent. One of the AU's critical tasks is to use its expertise, diplomatic heft, and security resources to take the lead in resolving conflicts. Historically, the AU has sought to take ownership of appropriate peace and security operations in Africa; or, at least, to participate effectively alongside the UN Security Council in managing them. Since the AU's creation in 2002, the principle of "non-indifference" has at times been in tension with the "non-interference" privileged by the Organization of African Unity, the AU's predecessor. As a result, the AU has been reluctant to intervene in some cases and conflicts.

The AU has enacted the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) to support the vital role that sub-regional and regional cooperation plays in security and development of the continent. APSA is rooted in a decision-making body (the Peace and Security Council), mechanisms for analysis and evaluation (The Continental Early Warning System and the Council of Elders), and an instrument of action (the African Standby Force). Through the APSA, African leaders seek to advance African mechanisms for safeguarding security, responding to threats, mitigating risks, and building peace.

Through APSA, the AU has made significant contributions to African peace and security. The AU has mandated or authorized dozens of peace support operations, from ambitious multidimensional missions such as the recently ended AU Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) to ad-hoc regional initiatives such as the G5-Sahel Joint Force. The AU's commitment to constitutional changes in government and its "zero tolerance" policy has, until recently, been widely credited with significant reductions in the instance and success of *coups d'état*.

Nevertheless, as evidenced by recent rises in both conflict and unconstitutional changes in government, the APSA still faces significant obstacles if it is to achieve its goals of ending conflict and enhancing security in Africa. Recent strategy documents such as the APSA Roadmap 2016-2020 and 'Silencing the Guns in Africa by 2020' (now extended to 2030) lay out ambitious reform agendas. The AU has been a far more robust institution than the former OAU but it must continue to innovate and adapt if it is to lead Africa to a peaceful, secured and prosperous future.

Discussion Questions:

- How effective do you think the AU is in addressing security challenges in your region, and how well does it work with your REC?
- What are your views on the AU's position of non-indifference as opposed to the OAU's non-interference into member states' internal affairs?
- How well is Africa doing with the concept of "African solutions to African problems?"
- How effective is the APSA in addressing security challenges in your region and what can be done to overcome any challenges?
- How can strategic leadership and security sector leaders make use of APSA to deliver security to states and their peoples?

Required Readings:

Paul Nantulya, "The African Union at 20: Much Accomplished, More Challenges Ahead." Africa Center for Strategic Studies *Spotlight*, 2022:

- EN:<https://africacenter.org/spotlight/african-union-20-much-accomplished-more-challenges-ahead/>
- FR: <https://africacenter.org/fr/spotlight/lunion-africaine-fete-ses-20-ans-beaucoup-de-realisation-davantage-de-defis-a-relever/>

Paul Williams, "The African Union's Role in Peace Operations in Africa." Testimony Before U.S. House of Representatives, 2019. <https://docs.house.gov/meetings/FA/FA16/20190430/109339/HHRG-116-FA16-Wstate-WilliamsP-20190430.pdf>

African Union, African Peace and Security Architecture. "APSA Roadmap 2016 – 2020." p. 1-22, 2016. https://au.int/sites/default/files/documents/38310-doc-9_2015-en-apsa-roadmap-final.pdf

Rafaela Pinto Serpa, "A União Africana e o gerenciamento de conflitos no continente: a Arquitetura de Paz e Segurança Africana (APSA)." 2017. <https://www.lume.ufrgs.br/bitstream/handle/10183/187593/001083298.pdf?sequence=1>

Plenary Session 18: United Nations Responses to Security Challenges in Africa

Format: Plenary session
Discussion group

Objective:

- Examine the work of the UN Department of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs (DPPA).
- Explore the link between DPPA, member states, RECs, and the AU on issues related to security.
- Assess the impact of peacebuilding activities on the continent and the rule of law and justice implications for taking a preventive approach to crisis, conflict, and instability.
- Examine how strategic leadership and security leaders can make use of mechanisms available with DPPA to deliver better security to States and citizens in Africa.

Background:

Following the reform of the United Nations peace and security infrastructure on January 1, 2019, the UN brought together the former Department of Political Affairs (DPA) and the United Nations Peacebuilding Support Office. DPA and the former Department of Peacekeeping Operations (now the Department of Peace Operations, or DPO) also merged their previously parallel regional divisions to create a single structure, the Department of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs (DPPA), to provide more coherent political analysis and strategic advice in the service of conflict prevention, peacekeeping, and peacebuilding.⁸² DPPA offers support on prevention and mediation, peacebuilding electoral assistance, and the implementation of the Women and Youth, Peace, and Security agenda established by Security Council Resolution 1325 and 2250 respectively. It also works in partnership with entities like the African Union and the Southern African Development Community to promote peace and security.

While not envisioned in the United Nations Charter, peacekeeping has become a key mission of the UN, and numerous operations have been conducted in Africa. Quite often, the former department of political affairs was involved in peacekeeping activities on the continent. The Department of Political Affairs (DPA) used to manage a number of field-based Special Political Missions (SPMs) under very challenging security environments. Many of these missions have complex mandates – including in areas such as the strengthening of national systems of justice, police and corrections, human rights, and transitional justice – which often have implications for the rule of law and security, both directly and indirectly.⁸³

The Department of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs (DPPA) now plays a central role in UN efforts to prevent conflict and build sustainable peace, including in places where there are no UN peace support operations. In light of growing empirical evidence that taking a preventive approach to stemming conflict and crisis can save countless lives and millions of dollars, practitioners in the peacebuilding arena are now seeking to pursue strategies to address security, justice, and governance-related grievances that can fuel conflict and insecurity if left unaddressed. In line with these developments, DPPA is committed to “monitor[ing] and assess[sing] global political developments with an eye to detecting potential crises and devising effective responses.” The Department provides support to the Secretary-General and his/her envoys in their peace initiatives, as well as to UN political missions around the world. DPPA also describes itself as an agile platform for crisis response, able to quickly deploy mediators and other

⁸² See <https://dppa.un.org/en/about-us>

⁸³ See <https://www.un.org/ruleoflaw/un-and-the-rule-of-law/departments-of-political-affairs/>

peacemaking expertise worldwide and cooperating closely with regional organizations on the frontlines of conflicts at host countries' requests.⁸⁴ Entities within DPPA also provide justice and rule of law related support that is critical to the advancement of people-centered security. For example, the work of the Office of Rule of Law and Security Institutions (OROLSI) involves the provision of "high quality technical expertise and advisory support at the request of host-Governments to assist conflict-affected countries to re-establish the rule of law and security institutions necessary to maintain peace."⁸⁵

Although the UN has assisted Africa and despite some progress on the ground, African intervention forces continue to face several perennial challenges, including financing. Other problems include a lack of relevant equipment, challenges to fully integrating local civil society and other non-state actor voices into the peacebuilding processes they support, and such political issues as adequate mandates and rules of engagement.

Discussion Questions:

- How do you assess the effectiveness of the UN in assisting to address the security challenges in your region?
- Do you think the UN is more effective than the AU and RECs in addressing security challenges in your region? Why or why not?
- Have you ever been deployed in UN peacekeeping or peacebuilding activities on the continent? If so, what were the successes and challenges of fulfilling your mission?
- How can security sector leaders make use of the many mechanisms available with DPPA to deliver security to states and citizens in Africa and adapt their work to the UN's increasingly prevention-focused and people-centered approaches to addressing insecurity?

Required Readings:

"Pathways for Peace: Inclusive Approaches to Preventing Violent Conflict, Executive Summary." United Nations and The World Bank, 2018:

- EN: https://www.pathwaysforpeace.org/sites/pathways/files/2018-02/Pathways-for-Peace_ES_eBook.pdf
- FR: <https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/bitstream/handle/10986/28337/211162ovFR.pdf?sequence=13&isAllowed=y>

UN Department of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs (DPPA):

- EN: <https://dppa.un.org/en>
- FR: <https://dppa.un.org/fr/>

UN DPPA, "Partnerships and Cooperation: African Union":

- EN: <https://dppa.un.org/en/african-union>
- FR: <https://dppa.un.org/fr/african-union>

⁸⁴ See <https://dppa.un.org/en/about-us>; <https://dppa.un.org/fr/about-us>

⁸⁵ <https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/office-of-rule-of-law-and-security-institutions> ; <https://peacekeeping.un.org/fr/office-of-rule-of-law-and-security-institutions>

Plenary Session 19: United States Government: Security Assistance and Partnership in Africa

Format: Plenary session
Discussion group

Objectives:

- Examine the objectives and mechanisms of U.S. security assistance to Africa.
- Assess the impact and effectiveness of U.S. security assistance.
- Explore the role of strategic leadership in using and leveraging external assistance to deliver better security to citizens in Africa.

Background:

The State Department is the lead agency for U.S. foreign assistance, coordinating interagency efforts to support U.S. partners through the Office of Foreign Assistance. Through various bureaus and funding authorities, the State Department also directly administers assistance aimed at advancing African peace and security. This includes programming to build African security sector capacity, support peace operations, confront terrorism, manage conflict, combat organized crime, and strengthen democratic accountability and the rule of law. While a large proportion of the assistance is bilateral, the Department also takes a regional approach.

The United States Agency for International Development (USAID) operates under the authority of the Secretary of State and delivers the largest proportion of overall U.S. foreign assistance to Africa. USAID advances U.S. foreign policy objectives through support for economic growth, agriculture, trade, global health, democracy, conflict prevention, and humanitarian assistance, among other initiatives.

While the Department of State is the lead agency for foreign assistance and provides some funds for training of foreign military forces (e.g. ACOTA), the Department of Defense is the primary actor with foreign defense establishments. Programs funded by the Department of State are implemented through:

- International Military Education and Training (IMET)
- Foreign Military Financing-funded training (FMF)
- International Narcotics and Law Enforcement (INL)
- African Contingency Operations Training and Assistance (ACOTA)
- Enhanced International Peacekeeping Capabilities (EIPC)
- Foreign Assistance Act (FAA)

In April 2022, the United States released an interagency Strategy to Prevent Conflict and Promote Stability, following the 2019 passage of the Global Fragility Act. The strategy aims to provide integrated, long-term U.S. support to locally-driven efforts to prevent large-scale violence. The coastal West African countries of Benin, Côte d'Ivoire, Ghana, Guinea, and Togo, as well as Libya and Mozambique, have been selected as partner countries for this effort, which will receive up to \$200 million annually.

The Role of U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM):

In 2007, the United States created a new command for Africa. Prior to then, responsibility for the African continent was divided between three U.S. commands: European Command (EUCOM), Central Command (CENTCOM), and Pacific Command (PACOM). The establishment of AFRICOM was driven by the growing strategic relevance of the continent to critical U.S. interests.

To promote U.S. strategic objectives, AFRICOM works with African states and regional organizations to help strengthen stability and security in the region. It does this through a variety of programs and initiatives targeted at improving national and regional security capabilities, military professionalism, and good governance.

Security Assistance Effectiveness:

Research evaluating the effectiveness of US security assistance finds that not all forms of this assistance are created equal. There exists a growing consensus that building defense and security institutions that are civilian-led, representative of society, meritocratic, and capable of independent strategic leadership – as opposed to focusing only on operational and tactical training and the supply of equipment – are key to building security forces capable of meeting Africa’s contemporary security challenges. Key characteristics that make security partnerships more effective at reducing civil wars, insurgencies, terrorism, and government repression in African countries include “regular, intensive contact between international advisers and the partner nation’s security personnel; a relatively long-term commitment; close oversight of the performance of security forces; and the integration of train-and-equip efforts into an overall political strategy.”⁸⁶ Historically, partnerships with these characteristics were more frequently built between US and African forces in countries where security assistance was provided in conjunction with a UN peace support operation.

Discussion questions:

- What are the elements of the U.S. security assistance and the U.S. Department of Defense’s policies toward Africa that are most meaningful to you and your work?
- Are perceptions in your home country different from what you learned today?
- How does the information you learned today change how you will do your work?
- How can strategic leadership and security sector leaders harness and leverage the US security assistance to promote national security priorities and interests in Africa?

Required Readings:

General Thomas Waldhauser, “United States Africa Command 2022 Posture Statement.” 2022. <https://www.armed-services.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/AFRICOM%20FY23%20Posture%20Statement%20%20ISO%20SASC%2015%20MAR%20Cleared.pdf>

U.S. Department of State Bureau of Conflict and Stabilization Operations, “United States Strategy to Prevent Conflict and Promote Stability.” 2022. <https://www.state.gov/united-states-strategy-to-prevent-conflict-and-promote-stability/#goal-4>

Aline LeBoeuf, “La compétition stratégique en Afrique. Approches militaires américaine, chinoise, et russe.” *Focus stratégique* 91, Institut Français des Relations Internationales, p. 17-18, 33-43 et l’annexe, 2019. https://www.ifri.org/sites/default/files/atoms/files/leboeuf_competition_strategique_afrique_2019_0.pdf

⁸⁶ See Stephen Watts et al, “Reforming Security Sector Assistance for Africa,” RAND Corporation Research Brief RB-10028-OSD/AFRICOM, 2018, https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_briefs/RB10028.html