West African Parliamentarians Forum 2023:
Strengthening Relationships Between Parliament and the Security Sector

SYLLABUS

February 2023
West African Parliamentarians Forum 2023:
Strengthening Relationships Between Parliament and the Security Sector

27 February - 3 March 2023

SYLLABUS

Table of Contents

About the Africa Center for Strategic Studies .................................................................4

Introduction .........................................................................................................................5

Session 1: What is Security Sector Governance and Why is Oversight Important? ...........8

Session 2: Roles of Parliament in Oversight of the Security Sector .................................11

Session 3: Roles of the Security Sector in Accountability to Parliament ............................14

Session 4: Professionalism and Ethics .............................................................................18

Session 5: Defense Budgeting and Security Strategy .......................................................20

Session 6: Building Relationships with Communities and Civil Society ..........................23
ABOUT THE AFRICA CENTER

Since its inception in 1999, the Africa Center has served as a forum for research, academic programs, and the exchange of ideas with the aim of enhancing citizen security by strengthening the effectiveness and accountability of African institutions, in support of U.S.-Africa policy.

VISION
Security for all Africans championed by effective institutions accountable to their citizens.

Realizing the vision of an Africa free from organized armed violence guaranteed by African institutions that are committed to protecting African citizens is the driving motivation of the Africa Center. This aim underscores the Center’s commitment to contributing to tangible impacts by working with our African partners – military and civilian, governmental and civil society, as well as national and regional. All have valuable roles to play in mitigating the complex drivers of conflict on the continent today. Accountability to citizens is an important element of our vision as it reinforces the point that in order to be effective, security institutions must not just be “strong,” but also be responsive to and protective of the rights of citizens.

MISSION
To advance African security by expanding understanding, providing a trusted platform for dialogue, building enduring partnerships, and catalyzing strategic solutions.

The Africa Center’s mission revolves around the generation and dissemination of knowledge through our research, academic programs, strategic communications, and community chapters. Drawing on the practical experiences and lessons learned from security efforts on the continent, we aim to generate relevant insight and analysis that can inform practitioners and policymakers on the pressing security challenges that they face. Recognizing that addressing serious challenges can only come about through candid and thoughtful exchanges, the Center provides face-to-face and virtual platforms where partners can exchange views on priorities and sound practices. These exchanges foster relationships that, in turn, are maintained over time through the Center’s community chapters, communities of interest, follow-on programs, and ongoing dialogue between participants and staff. This dialogue—infused with real world experiences and fresh analysis—provides an opportunity for continued learning and catalyzes concrete actions.

MANDATE
The Africa Center is a U.S. Department of Defense institution established and funded by Congress for the study of security issues relating to Africa and serving as a forum for bilateral and multilateral research, communication, exchange of ideas, and training involving military and civilian participants. (10 U.S.C 342)
Introduction

Parliaments are critical to democratic and civilian control of the security sector in West Africa. The balance of powers between branches of government is a fundamental principle underlying many regimes with multiparty political competition, but a successful balance demands empowerment of all branches of government. Legislators can be an important bridge between the security sector and citizens. Parliamentarians have a critical role to play in strengthening their country’s system of checks and balances between different branches of government. Achieving a healthy balance is especially important – yet extremely difficult – on issues of national security.

While parliaments are core institutions of defense and security sector oversight, their work is also difficult in many African countries’ strongly presidential systems. Legislators have the potential to play critical security sector governance roles: overseeing security budgets and spending, helping to enhance security service transparency and accountability, and conducting constituent outreach to create people-centered security policies that reflect the interest of all citizens and make use of civil society expertise. African parliamentarians need knowledge, information, and trustful working relationships with defense and security officials to excel in these roles. Frequently, however, neither parliamentarians nor the defense and security officials charged with legislative engagement are as closely networked or as mutually informed as they could be about each other’s work. This hinders their ability to capitalize on common interests in using the security sector governance process to build legitimacy with citizens. This year’s forum will catalyze peer learning on how to strengthen relationships between parliaments and the defense and security sector in service of better security sector governance.

Historically, the planning and delivery of security in many West African countries has been cast as the area of expertise of the military, police, and intelligence actors in the executive branch of government. Yet, more recently, West African definitions of national security have shifted away from state and regime security-oriented constructs to visions that encompass citizen and human security, including more gender-sensitive and otherwise inclusive understandings of national security and public safety. In this context, it is precisely because defense and security sector officials have duties to provide fundamental safety and security to all citizens that they are critical stakeholders in parliamentary oversight of the sector. Defense and security sector officials can enhance the long-term effectiveness and efficiency of their institutions, as well as demonstrate their commitments to transparency and accountability to the populace, by respecting parliament’s power of the purse and participating to the best of their ability in their country’s legally mandated processes for parliamentary oversight.

This five-day, in-person program seeks to provide a forum for West African parliamentarians, their staff, and select defense and security officials to analyze current trends, challenges, and innovations in the work of legislatures to foster democratic and civilian control of the security sector. Innovations, good practices, and lessons will also be generated through a series of country-specific consultations between parliamentary and security officials, with conclusions presented in a comparative brief-back. Thanks to the multi-country nature of the forum, participants will have different political, contextual, and technical experiences to share. The countries included in the forum differ in the depth of their legislature’s involvement in security governance, the electoral rules/political institutions/legal systems that they use, and the strength of the ruling and opposition blocs in parliament. These similarities and differences will facilitate fruitful
comparisons, as well as targeted identification of common and practical approaches and tools for parliamentary as well as defense/security sector involvement in the oversight, accountability, and outreach aspects of security sector governance.

**Program Objectives**

The objectives of the Parliamentarians Forum are to:

1. Deepen understanding of parliamentary roles in providing checks and balances for democratic and civilian security sector governance, and contextualize these roles in relation to those that security sector officials play vis-à-vis parliaments in the region.

2. Analyze how parliamentarians and their staff as well as defense and security officials can capitalize on synergies and navigate tensions in their work, particularly on issues like professionalism/ethics, budgets/strategy, and building community relationships.

3. Expand understanding of tools, techniques, and practices that African parliamentarians and security officials can use – both in concert and in tension – to enhance delivery of security to all citizens through the 3As (ability, authority, and attitude).

**Academic Approach**

The Parliamentarians Forum will seek to facilitate cross-country networking, catalyze peer learning and experience-sharing from different African parliaments and security sectors, and bring to light lessons and sound practices about the roles that both parliamentarians and defense and security officials play in the oversight, accountability, and outreach processes that are core parts of legislative involvement in defense and security sector governance. It will do so through:

a) Practical academic content in this syllabus to provide fodder for debate, discussion, and innovative exchanges during the forum;

b) Virtual plenary sessions that reinforce peer learning and experience sharing about common challenges and notable successes on various aspects of parliamentary oversight of the security sector and defense/security officials’ roles in the process;

c) Small group discussions between parliamentarians and staff from different countries and regions that reinforce the learning objectives, helping participants exchange lessons learned and share ideas about the subject matter;

d) Country-specific self-assessment exercises about parliamentary and security sector roles and responsibilities in oversight and accountability, which will inform presentations by each country delegation about steps that they can take upon return home to strengthen parliamentary and security sector contributions to oversight.

The forum will be conducted in English and French. A strict policy of non-attribution applies to the entirety of the Forum’s proceedings. These rules are binding during and after the seminar. We encourage you to share the insights you gain from this seminar with your colleagues, but not to name your fellow participants in relating what you learn. We hope that this will allow you to freely address the sensitive issues under discussion. All program documentation will be posted on the Africa Center website.
Syllabus
This syllabus is an educational document intended to expose participants to various perspectives to help them take full advantage of the program; it does not reflect the views or official position of the Department of Defense or U.S. Government. It provides an overview of key ideas, debates, and policy issues related to parliamentary involvement in defense and security sector oversight, as well as defense and security sector contributions to good security sector governance.

For each session listed in the syllabus, we provide learning objectives and an introduction to the theme of the plenary session. We also list questions that participants should be prepared to answer in the discussion groups held after each plenary session. Finally, we include a selection of recommended readings. Please consider reading them before the sessions for which they are listed.

The primary purpose of the recommended readings is to help frame the stakes and the challenges of security-justice coordination within the context of available scholarship, empirical evidence, and policy documentation. We encourage you to share questions and suggestions about the materials and the forum, as it will enhance the quality of our programs and the learning experience for all. We are eager to discuss specific topics with you.

The lion’s share of expertise and knowledge about these topics comes from you. We heartily encourage you to share your experiences and knowledge with each other, to challenge and debate ideas that are raised at the forum, and to use the forum as you wish to build additional networks that might be useful to you professionally.

Preparation for the West Africa Parliamentarians Forum
Before each session of the forum, we ask that you:
1. Review the relevant portion of the syllabus and consult the recommended readings.
2. Think about the relevant session’s discussion group questions and consider what experiences from your work you might share with your colleagues.
3. Be ready to participate in discussion groups and interact with other participants.
Session 1: What is Security Sector Governance and Why is Oversight Important?

Format: Plenary Session (Monday, February 27, 2023, 1000-1115)
        Discussion Group (Monday, February 27, 2023, 1130-1230)

Objectives:
- Understand the range of executive branch, legislative, and judicial institutions that facilitate democratic and civilian oversight of the security sector, as well as why strengthening relationships between the security sector and parliamentary officials is important for making oversight effective
- Explore how security sector governance can help to address the current security threats and emerging security trends in West Africa that parliamentary and security sector officials encounter in their work
- Get familiar with a practical framework for analyzing the quality of oversight of the security sector, based on assessing the “3As”: ability (whether legislators have the resources and capacity to conduct oversight), authority (whether legislators have the legal mandate and standing orders to conduct oversight), and attitude (whether legislators have the motivation and incentives to conduct oversight).

Background:
Parliamentary oversight of the defense and security sector plays a fundamental role in facilitating good security sector governance. However, the two are not one and the same. Democratic and civilian control of the security sector is an aspect of good security sector governance that depends on multiple institutions working in complementarity to ensure that the defense and security forces, who “hold and deploy the means of coercion on behalf of, and for the protection of the entire society,…do not end up functioning as a threat to the same elements they were supposed to protect in the first place.”\(^1\) In contrast, parliamentary oversight of security and defense is just one part of that broader set of institutional interactions that lead to good security sector governance. This creates an environment in which the provision of security to citizens that is based on seven core principles: accountability, transparency, rule of law, participation, responsiveness, effectiveness, and efficiency.\(^2\) Formal oversight institutions (like parliaments, inspectorates, ombuds institutions, independent anti-corruption and human rights commissions) play a key role in monitoring security force activities and behaviors toward citizens. The everyday practices that security officials exercise with citizens also matter for ensuring that rule of law applies to all rights-bearing citizens, and for ensuring that people’s rights are respected despite differences in age, gender, religion, ethnicity, wealth, political affiliation or other characteristics. Public oversight in security sector governance also depends upon the steadfast work of non-governmental institutions such as civil society organizations, media, customary or religious authorities, women and youth groups, and non-state security providers that function within the rule of law.

As articulated in the ECOWAS Policy on Security Sector Reform and Governance, in countries with good security sector governance, there are checks and balances in place to ensure that people are being provided the security that they need and want, through the intermediaries of their “legally and regularly chosen representatives in decision-making processes.”\(^3\) Whether the key issues of concern relate to violent extremism, transnational organized crime, cybersecurity,
environmental and food security, migration and refugee issues, youth unemployment, or otherwise, the involvement of all branches of government – as well as both state and society – in security sector governance is critical to providing legitimate security for everyone. Ideally, parliaments are part of a wider institutional architecture of people-centered security provision in their country. The system’s parts work in concert and in tension to ensure that defense and security services are held to clear standards in their provision of people-centered security; that people of various genders, ages, parts of society, geographies, and sectors are consulted in creating defense and security strategies and policies; that a range of oversight institutions internal and external to the defense and security services are actively involved in regulating security provision in accordance with the rule of law; that there is independent information available about the quality of security being provided; and that there are plans to manage security resources in a coordinated and capable manner.4

Parliamentary oversight of the defense and security sector – as well as the defense and security sector’s accountability to parliament and the people – can influence these outcomes in several ways.5 First, parliaments exercise their “power of the purse” by overseeing the passage and proper implementation of the defense and security budget each year. In addition, parliaments can hold governments accountable for their defense and security decisions by working with independent bodies like ombudsmen, supreme audit institutions, and independent anti-corruption and human rights commissions to gather information, study the issues at hand, and generate recommendations on strategies, policies, and activities. Defense and security sector officials have requisite duties and responsibilities that they are mandated to play. In particular, they are obligated to provide information about certain aspects of their activities to parliament, have opportunities to explain their decision-making about security and defense before parliament, and are expected to consider the recommendations of parliament carefully in their work. The success of the security sector governance process thus depends upon the extent to which parliamentarians, their staff, and the defense and security officials who liaise with parliament each fulfill their “essential interlocking obligations” in ways that are practical, creative, and reverent of the constitution.

According to the foremost analysts of African parliaments, the quality of parliamentary oversight is a function of three basic elements: ability, authority, and attitude. Ability refers to whether legislators have the financial, technical, and human resources to conduct oversight; authority concerns whether legislators have the legal mandate and sufficiently specific standing orders to be able to conduct oversight; and attitude pertains to whether legislators have sufficient motivation, will, and incentives to conduct oversight.6 A mix of these factors affects oversight and security governance outcomes; these outcomes also differ according to specific countries’ histories, institutional configurations, and political and economic contexts. Nevertheless, in many countries, power is heavily concentrated in the executive branch, which has made it difficult for legislatures to oversee security force budgets, missions, and conduct. Some difficulties arise from a culture of secrecy about defense and security, as well as past tendencies of governments prioritizing state security over citizen and human security. Despite these challenges, analysts also note that African parliaments are making a difference in their countries’ governance.7 Some even argue that African parliaments are in the midst of a massive “awakening.”8

These assertions are well worth examining in relation to parliament’s efforts in oversight of the defense and security sector specifically. Are there ways that defense and security officials as well
as parliamentarians and their staff could enhance their relationships with each other to make oversight and accountability processes even more impactful in delivering citizen security?

Discussion Questions:

• In your country or region, do you find that African legislatures are increasingly asserting their oversight roles, and are defense and security officials comfortable in their role of being held to account for their activities? Why or why not?

• Does the “3As” model initially appeal to you as a way of further understanding the quality of parliamentary oversight of the defense and security sector in your country? What appear to be its strengths and weaknesses?

• How would you describe the capacity of parliaments in your country or region to understand, represent and respond to security and justice challenges in an inclusive and people-centered way?

Recommended Readings:


Session 2: Roles of Parliament in Oversight of the Security Sector

Format: Plenary Session (Monday, February 27, 2023, 1330-1500)
Discussion Group (Monday, February 27, 2023, 1530-1700)

Objectives:
- Understand the core roles that parliaments play in democratic and civilian security sector governance
- Delineate parliamentarians’ key responsibilities in the domains of oversight, accountability, and outreach
- Analyze the range of successes and challenges that West African parliamentary officials have experienced in the exercise of these roles and responsibilities

Background:
Parliamentary oversight is an essential tool for holding defense and security officials to account on the scope and limits of their mandate. Parliament’s oversight powers contribute to a system of checks and balances that help to facilitate the development of security policies and programs that meet the needs of all people without discrimination. Because one of the functions of legislatures and their constituent political parties is to represent citizen interests, parliament “has both a duty and a right to exercise judgement over all facets of public life, including the security sector.”

Parliaments have a range of roles and responsibilities that they exercise through their work. Frequently, Members of Parliament can use their institutional vantage points to approve or modify defense budgets, oversee troop deployments, and review defense and security procurements. West African legislators are mandated to oversee the management of security resources by ensuring adherence to sound principles of public financial management. Beyond these oversight roles, parliamentarians may also have opportunities to enhance the security sector’s accountability to citizens on issues linked to respect for human rights and rule of law. For example, the competency and willingness of legislators to apply a gender perspective in their security sector oversight work can directly shape the performance of the security sector in ways that affect every citizen. Parliamentarians can help to ensure that the armed forces’ duties to all citizens are clearly delineated in the law and that their constituents understand security actors’ standards of ethical and professional conduct. Furthermore, parliamentarians play a critical outreach function in their representational role. Through their electoral connection with their constituents, they have a unique vantage point for shaping defense and security policy into something that meets all citizens’ security needs. Ideally, parliaments may also have a say in security strategy development and implementation, if the process follows the principles of inclusivity and participation and solicits inputs from a wide range of society, including those who have traditionally been excluded such as women or some minorities. Through such channels, parliamentarians and their staff can help advance people-centered security policies that reflect the lived realities of their constituents and incorporate civil society voices and expertise.

Exercising these oversight, accountability, and outreach functions also calls for parliamentarians and their staff to employ multiple tools and techniques. Some apply in plenary session and others are useful within committees focused on defense, security, justice, budgetary, and foreign policy, issues. The “standard” toolbox consists of items like holding public hearings on critical security
issues, undertaking commissions of inquiry, posing official questions to ministerial authorities about strategies, policies, and budgets, conducting side visits to defense and security installations or to constituencies within a country that are experiencing insecurity, consulting with civil society to gather information about key security issues, liaising with the media to deliver messages to government and citizens about parliamentary oversight, and demonstrate a commitment to transparency through open and critical public discourse about security and public safety issues.

A mix of factors related to ability, authority, and attitude (the “3As”) influence the ways in which legislatures fulfill these roles and responsibilities. On the one hand, African parliaments are often depicted as weak counterparts to powerful executive branches, or as vehicles prone to rubber stamping defense budgets and other national security measures. Since independence from colonial rule, certain African legislatures have had more opportunities than others to develop the institutional autonomy that can make them effective at oversight, both generally and in relation to defense and security. Furthermore, the legal authority of parliaments to do this work has been threatened in several countries by military coups. On the other hand, various analysts argue that African legislatures are on the rise and should be embraced as such. There are promising examples of parliamentarians and their staff doing such work diligently and tenaciously, even when adaptations are necessary to navigate barriers like a “culture of secrecy” surrounding access to information about defense and security, or limitations in resources for parliamentary capacity building, logistical support, or independent research and analysis. In the face of entrenched cultures of institutional sexism, some African parliaments have also led the world in introducing measures to diversify legislative authority by improving women’s representation.

Parliamentarians must also exhibit “agility” in working with their staff and their defense and security sector counterparts. Being creative, adaptive, and contextually flexible will also determine the kind of mark they can make on peace and security in the region. The good news is that even across West African countries with varied histories and experiences of legislative development, there is notable demand for the oversight and accountability that parliaments and their defense/security counterparts can provide. In aggregate, the latest Afrobarometer public opinion surveys done in over thirty African countries demonstrate that African citizens are favorable to strengthened oversight of the executive branch and expect transparent and accountable governance. At the same time, the Ibrahim Index shows that public perceptions of the actual quality of African governance are in decline. Strong parliamentary oversight of security and defense force budgets, actions, and policies – coupled with transparent and accountable outreach by parliamentarians to constituents concerned about security policies and challenges – are tools for building trust with constituents.

Capitalizing upon this “4th A” (agility) calls for an inclusive effort. The first form of inclusion is geographic. The regional parliamentary body, ECOWAS Parliament, is a useful tool for coordinating national approaches to defense and security challenges, and on the continental level, the Pan-African Parliament is making related strides. These bodies offer opportunities to Members of Parliament and their staff share of knowledge, experiences, tools, and practices for effective oversight, accountability, and outreach across countries. The second form of inclusion is based on gender and ensuring all people have the opportunity for representation without discrimination due to social factors like age, wealth, ethnicity, education, or religion. Including youth and women parliamentarians and staffers in these opportunities is also valuable for ensuring that the kind of defense and security policies and budgets that the country produces
respond to the actual security concerns of all citizens. The third form of inclusion is based on strengthening the institutional structures of parliaments and their staff. Investing in the professional development of parliamentary clerks and permanent staff, too, is an area where modest efforts could yield significant gains in institutional effectiveness. Staffers’ tenure often outlasts those of parliamentarians rotating through one or two years of service on defense committees. Staffers can also work with current and former committee presidents to facilitate necessary transfers of conceptual and technical knowledge.

Discussion questions:
• The quality of parliamentary oversight of the security sector is said to be a function of the “3As”: ability (whether legislators have the resources and capacity to conduct oversight), authority (whether legislators have the legal mandate and sufficiently detailed standing orders to conduct oversight), and attitude (whether legislators have the motivation and incentives to conduct oversight). Where does your national parliament stand on each of these three factors in relation to defense and security oversight and why?

• How do you think that parliaments’ successes and challenges with security sector oversight have been affected by factors like the intensity of partisanship in a country, as well as the current state of civil-military relationships in the country? Are there approaches, tools, or techniques that can be used for parliamentarians and defense/security officials to address some of these challenges?

• What makes for an effective legislator, even in a system where there may be a heavy concentration of power in the executive branch of government relative to the legislature and the judiciary?

Recommended Readings:


Session 3: Roles of the Wider Security Sector in Accountability to Parliament

**Objectives:**
- Understand the core roles that various parts of the security sector play in democratic and civilian security sector governance
- Delineate the responsibilities that the military, law enforcement, and judicial officials play in the domains of oversight, accountability, and outreach
- Analyze the range of successes and challenges that West African security sector officials have experienced in the exercise of these roles and responsibilities

**Background:**
Ideally, security is a public good provided to the populace according to standards of excellence that are monitored and enforced through a system that relies on all branches of government. The system’s functionality depends not only upon parliamentarians acting as effective representatives of their constituents, but also upon the widest range of defense and security officials embracing their duty to render themselves accountable to the public through parliament. The security sector generally includes “all the structures, institutions and personnel responsible for security provision, management and oversight at national and local levels.”

To provide for the national defense, the armed forces must have “the professional skills, equipment, training, and management capacity to fulfill their missions without becoming a danger to the population or the state.” Effective parliamentary oversight is expected to ensure these minimum requirements for those in the security sector who put their lives on the line for their country. Yet because the armed forces are allowed to employ lethal force in service of their mission, they also bear the responsibility of being held accountable under relevant rule of law and human rights frameworks for their decisions about the use of such force. Each system differs in how it provides for civilian democratic control and parliamentary accountability: In some systems, uniformed personnel cannot be summoned to testify directly to their parliament (or to its responsible committees) and accountability instead passes through the office of the responsible executive official who can be called to account to parliament. In other systems, the chiefs of defense staff and/or ministers of defense, security, and interior who lead their sectors can be asked to appear before parliament to answer questions. Those questions can cover sectoral policies and budgets, procurements, troop deployments, force structure, and other topics. Parliamentary committees of inquiry are also authorized to work within specific remits that could warrant cooperation and coordination with members of the security sector. Every parliamentarian must discern how to ensure accountability within their own institutional system.

The “3As” model has not conventionally been applied to analyzing the accountability of the defense/security sector to parliament. However, the utility of the “3As” model is worth testing in this context. The model allows us to compare and contrast their strengths and weaknesses of defense/security officials in fulfilling their roles and responsibilities with those of parliamentarians. Some might argue that as a part of the executive branch, the security sector’s authority is clearly delineated and amply facilitated by the state; and while the ability of security sector officials to answer their calls to account in front of parliament is notable, there may not be
quite as much openness or eagerness to participate in the process overall (i.e., attitude). Evidently, the assessment may shift according to country, security service, and type of official as well. Overall, however, defense and security sector officials tend to have more resources than their parliamentary overseers, as well as much greater access information and opportunities for outreach to citizens in their work, even if their linkage to those citizens is not partisan or politically representational (as is the case with legislators). Experts from the defense and security sector are among those best placed to inform parliamentarians and their staff on the evolving threat landscapes, strategic decision-making, personnel issues, and the workings of the complex security and defense systems needed to respond to security concerns. Their active contribution to parliamentary processes can enhance the quality of both security policy and oversight.

Are there ways to put these strengths to use more fully, so as to produce mutually improved outcomes from the oversight process? In some countries, militaries have liaison officers who visit or work in parliament; in others, there are opportunities for all types of security officials to link up with multi-partisan groups of parliamentarians interested in defense. In other places, uniformed personnel are legally forbidden from interacting with parliaments, which can make the need to enhance exchange between the civilian executive defense and security officials and parliaments all the more important. Strengthening these and other forms of relationships between parliamentarians and the security sector could reveal more pathways for defense/security officials to help new parliamentary counterparts better understand security management and provision, identify the sources of government information they need, and act as thoughtful stewards of the budgetary resources the sector will require to meet citizen needs.

Discussion questions:

- How would you apply the “3As” model to assessing the quality of defense and security sector accountability to parliament and the people?

- How do you think that the security sector’s fulfillment of its obligation to be held accountable is affected by factors like the intensity of partisanship, the nature of political parties and electoral laws, and the specific security challenges in the country?

- What makes for an effective relationship between parliamentarians and the defense/security staff who work with them on oversight and accountability?

- What are good practices for defense/security officials seeking to uphold their duties to the public while also fulfilling their fundamental defense/security mission for the country?

Recommended Readings:


Session 4: Professionalism and Ethics

Format: Plenary Session (Wednesday, March 1, 0900-1030)
         Discussion Group (Wednesday, March 1, 1100-1230)

Objectives:
- Explore similarities and differences in the professional norms and ethical codes of conduct that define the relationships of parliamentarians and the wider security sector to the citizens that they serve, identifying points of synergy and areas of tension in the approaches of different institutions to their respective missions
- Analyze the ways and means that parliamentarians have to foster security service professionalism vis-à-vis citizens, and how best they can use those tools to address security actors’ abuses or breaches of ethics and conduct
- Compare and contrast the tools that parliamentarians and security sector officials have to ensure transparency in security and defense procurement, and how these different actors can best use the tools at their disposal to improve the management of security resources

Background:
By constitutional design, parliamentarians and their staff play different roles in security sector governance than defense and security officials do. The oversight process is intentionally structured to ensure that the security services’ power over the use of force is constrained by the parliament’s power over the purse that must open to deploy it. These limits on the use of power for each respective institution create the need for them to work in mutual respect while also providing a basis for the public to trust that their rights will be protected from abuse (whether by misuse of force or misuse of public funds). Yet even in this institutional context, parliamentarians and the defense and security officials who liaise with legislatures share some common interests. Both have public service missions tailored to their role in the state, and both want the government to provide safety and security to the citizens they serve.

Parliamentarians and security sector officials do not have identical codes of ethics or cultures of professionalism, but there is significant potential for parliamentarians and security officials to capitalize on their synergies in this domain and work together in service of the public, while effectively navigating natural tensions that may arise in their respective approaches to accountability. For instance, lasting peace and security are more likely when citizens have reasons to: (i) trust elected officials to represent and provide for their security interests accurately and competently, and (ii) trust the security sector to respect the constitutional parameters of civilian oversight. Thus, high standards of professionalism and clear ethical codes are core tools that parliamentarians and security sector officials have an interest in cultivating.

Parliament and the security sector have both done work on these issues, with somewhat different processes and results. Over the last decade, several West African parliaments have established relevant codes that are based upon constitutional law, legislative rules of procedure, or some combination. Yet, there is variation in the mechanisms available to enforce ethical codes. Effectively implemented codes, however, can be useful tools for parliament to reinforce citizen confidence in the integrity of their elected leaders. They are also useful guidelines for parliamentarians as they navigate a political environment in which they may wear multiple hats
In the armed forces, principles like the subordination of the military to democratic civilian authority, allegiance to the state, commitment to political neutrality, and an ethical institutional culture, are key elements of professionalism. Its inherent values include discipline, integrity, honor, sacrifice, commitment to the greater good of society, dedication to duty, individual responsibility, and accountability for moral agency and service in spite of self-interest. West Africa set a world-leading example in adopting in 2011 the ECOWAS Code of Conduct for Armed Forces and Security Services which provides an extensive basis for security provision rooted in integrity, respect of democratic governance and the rights of citizens. Despite this long-standing example and the recent launch of the ECOWAS Policy Framework for Security Sector Reform and Governance, which asks signatories to develop codes of conduct for their national forces, military professionalism in some countries has been weakened through the recent surge of coups. Yet, there are also examples of African security services showing notable professionalism during political transitions, elections, and protests. This can garner the respect of citizens and be a source of national pride. Ultimately, professionalism is a complex product of policies, strategies, political leadership, and personal commitment to rule of law in the security sector.

In terms of ethics and professionalism, parliamentary oversight of defense and security tends to amplify certain “culture clashes” or institutional tensions between these key stakeholders on two issues: transparency in defense sector procurements, and accountability of the security sector to the public for civilian harm. Lack of transparency in defense and security affairs (and especially in procurement and acquisitions) is concerning to many Africans. Research shows that countries with less “defense integrity” face more serious threats to security and stability. The Ibrahim Index of African Governance notes that while anti-corruption efforts have improved in Africa over the last decade, there has been less law enforcement against companies violating public procurement rules. Whistleblower protections, as well as legislative oversight that is free of clientelism and graft, can help to mitigate challenges related to poor procurement or contracting practices and counterbalance any weaknesses in internal inspections and audits. Similarly, parliamentarians often have leeway to influence how the defense and security sector can bolster protections of human rights in their work. Parliamentarians can work with ombuds institutions or civilian complaints committees to facilitate their reporting and adjudication of security sector abrogation of rule of law. Where other accountability mechanisms have failed, parliamentarian also have the unique power of privilege to bring to light information about security abuses that may otherwise be denied to the public. They can also acquaint citizens with their defense and security counterparts, inform citizens of the standards that those officials follow, and gauge popular opinion about resource management in the security sector.

Parliamentarians also need access to reliable information as a basis for their oversight. Defense and security sector institutions that are committed to the civilian oversight process may themselves serve as valuable providers of relevant information. Even when this is the case, some information about defense and security procurement may be excluded from public scrutiny, sometimes in secret budgets or off-budget accounts, allegedly because of the information’s sensitivity. The classification of information is necessary to protect national security sometimes.
However, the over-classification of information about national security can “seriously undermine the main institutional safeguards against government abuse: independence of the courts, the rule of law, legislative oversight, media freedom, and open government.” Overall, freedom of information laws could mitigate some of these challenges to legislative oversight; so could the establishment of military ombuds units that are civilian run, independent, and well-resourced to alert legislatures to ethical issues in the armed forces. It also falls within the remit of legislators to reshape the classification laws that can limit their own work.

**Discussion questions:**

- What are some areas of synergy in the codes of ethics that apply to your country’s parliament and to your country’s military or police services? Where do these entities’ codes of ethics and sense of professionalism differ from one another?

- What have been the parliament’s strengths and weaknesses in the oversight of defense procurements, and what have been the defense sector’s strengths and weaknesses in its accountability to parliament for these procurements? How can the 3As (ability, authority, attitude) explain these outcomes?

- What have been the parliament’s strengths and weaknesses in facilitating security sector accountability for upholding the rule of law in its conduct towards citizens? What have been the security sector’s strengths and weaknesses in its accountability to parliamentarians and their constituents for upholding human rights and rule of law? Can the 3As (ability, authority, attitude) explain these outcomes?

- What steps can parliamentarians as well as defense/security officials take to protect classified information while also addressing challenges related to the culture of secrecy in parliamentary oversight of the defense and security sector?

**Recommended Readings:**


   « Pour la professionalisation des forces armées en Afrique, » Papier de recherche no. 6, Centre d’Etudes Stratégiques de l’Afrique, 21 juin 2016.


Session 5: Defense Budgeting and Security Strategy

Format: Plenary Session (Thursday, February 2, 0900-1030)
Discussion Group (Thursday, February 2, 1100-1230)

Objectives:
- Analyze the ways and means that security sector officials have to engage with parliamentarians in order to develop and implement national security strategies and policies that facilitate the delivery of security and justice to citizens
- Assess the ways and means that parliamentarians have to engage with the security sector in order to effectively oversee defense and security budgets
- Discuss and debate how parliamentarians and security sector officials should deal with secret and classified information that is relevant to budgetary oversight and national security strategy making

Background:
Defense/security officials and parliamentarians play complementary as well as adversarial roles on security strategy making and in defense and security budgeting. Because strategies are the bridge between policy and budgets and all are essential in providing citizen security, they are arenas that are ripe for enhanced engagement between parliament and the security sector. There are certain aspects of strategy and budgeting in which the two stakeholders’ approaches differ, but the inherent tensions can be productively navigated.

Defense and security budgeting is a promising area for innovation. Parliamentarians must be actively involved in all aspects of security and defense management, including organizing debates on security and defense matters, considering relevant bills, scrutinizing budgeting processes, and contributing to the strategy-making that informs budgeting. They have an interest in bringing defense and security officials into the oversight process to provide explanations, information, or strategic and technical expertise to properly evaluate the budget. Budgets also need to be vetted to ensure they reflect the security needs of all parts of the population, for example, including based on gender.

Defense and security officials, too, have an interest in being part of these exchanges. Research shows that military expenditures are more effective at combating long-term insecurity when they are guided by citizen-centered public policies; an unconstrained rise in military expenditures without policy guidance may be counterproductive and fail to win the trust of citizens. Unchecked defense expenditures can crowd out investment in much-needed public services that advance human security - such as health, education, and justice. In making these tradeoffs, stakeholders in the budget process can expect that robust debate, professional disagreements, confidence-building, and the triangulating of shared information with independent sources will go with the territory.

When done well, the oversight process will ensure that the budget adheres to core fiscal principles like contestability, comprehensiveness, accountability, and transparency. Beyond the parliamentary authority to oversee and approve the budget, parliamentary ability to analyze the budget also matters. Good analysis can come from several sources: from elected civilian officials with adequate technical training on budgetary oversight, from parliamentary staff who have the
resources and expertise to analyze fiscal and security issues, and a Parliamentary Budget Office (PBO) or some equivalent that provides independent expert analysis of budget documents. Structures that allow for in-depth analysis, debate, and collaboration within and across relevant committees in parliament are also useful. Parliamentarians’ readiness to communicate with the security sector officials responsible for liaising with parliament on the budget, and with officials at the Court of Accounts, further affects budgetary outcomes.

Ideally the budget for defense and security will be set in the context of a national security strategy. Military spending alone cannot address security threats without an overarching national security strategy that helps a country’s leaders align resources to achieve goals. This is a second area of overlap in parliamentary and defense/security leaders’ interests. Frequently initiated by defense and security officials, national security strategies serve as a “north star” reference point for decision-makers across the security sector. The process of developing a national security strategy is even more important than the product itself. The process activates different stakeholders to develop a grand strategy that fosters coordination across agencies and ministries, alignment of resources and leveraging of external partnerships, prioritization of security threats, and promotion of a shared national security vision. Involving diverse stakeholders in the process – including parliament but also citizens on their own terms, without an intermediary – enables decision-makers to provide citizens the security they want and to ensure that those whose interests are traditionally neglected are also provided for.30

Until recently, most West African national security strategies have been classified and drafted without much participation from citizens and representatives of institutions of security sector governance. However, defense and security officials in some countries have begun to make the process more participatory and inclusive. (See some case studies of Niger, The Gambia, Nigeria, and Senegal here). Although parliament does not always approve these strategies, the involvement of civil society in the creation process makes the national security strategy an additional tool for parliamentarians to inform their work.

Discussion Questions:

- What have been the parliament’s strengths and weaknesses in the oversight of defense and security budget, and what have been the defense sector’s strengths and weaknesses in facilitating this process? How can the 3As (ability, authority, attitude) explain these outcomes?

- To what extent does work across party lines influence budgetary oversight in your country, whether formally and informally? How important is multiparty debate and discussion to legislative oversight of security sector budgets and expenditures?

- Where does your country stand in the development and implementation of a national security strategy? What should parliament’s role in the process be and why?

- What are the different strengths and weaknesses that defense/security officials and parliamentarians bring to the table in ensuring that a wide range of citizens (women, youth, civil society, people from marginalized areas of the country) are included in national security strategy development and implementation?
Recommended Readings:


   “Contrôle: Contrôle des budgets de sécurité et de défense, » 2022 vidéo du Forum des Parlementaires Africains.


Session 6: Building Relationships with Communities and Civil Society

Format: Plenary Session (Thursday, February 2, 1330-1500)
Discussion Group (Thursday, February 2, 1530-1700)

Objectives:
- Consider the approaches and tools that parliamentary and security sector officials can use to help governments advance security policies that reflect the interests of an inclusive range of constituents and incorporate civil society expertise
- Compare and contrast different ways that parliamentarians and security sector officials can learn from the citizens they serve, whether through site visits, research consultations, open days at government institutions, constituency funds, civil affairs engagement, or otherwise
- Analyze what tools parliamentarians and security sector officials have to enhance their public media communications with constituents and communities about security issues and policies, so as to build trust with them

Background:
Citizens, civil society, and the media also have leading roles to play in oversight of the defense and security sector. They “have an important oversight function by raising awareness of the role of the military among the general public and drawing attention to areas of reform.”31 They can also put popular pressure on all government institutions to implement reforms and deliver services.32 Some civil society organizations have the knowledge, resources, and expertise to offer trainings that parliament and other government institutions might benefit from, for example, on topics like budget analysis, human rights, international law, code of conduct elaboration, gender analysis of security, and more.33 Parliaments can cultivate ties with such organizations and consider taking advantage of opportunities they offer; defense and security officials who work in areas where these civil society groups do their work may also benefit from working with them on projects of mutual interest, or in learning from the information they provide.

In many ways, citizens are the harshest critics and the most insightful teachers of both parliamentarians and security sector officials. Parliamentarians seeking to ensure adequate defense and security for their constituents are better able to do their work when they have ample information about the security priorities and concerns of their constituents. Parliamentary engagement with local leaders, civil society groups, and community organizations can also improve the delivery of citizen security by linking local concerns with national and regional analysis of threats and the development of responses. Military and police are also better able to do their jobs when they understand not only the physical terrain, but also the everyday lives of the people who are living in the communities they serve. Civil-military engagement missions and community policing missions that the security sector undertakes work towards similar trust and confidence-building goals. Developing and refining their strategies of community engagement is therefore a beneficial step that both parliamentarians and defense/security officials may consider taking.34 Although they approach community engagement differently, there is still mutual learning to do, as well as learning from citizens themselves.

Nevertheless, parliamentarians in particular have opportunities to raise awareness of relevant policies, catalyze dialogue about them, and facilitate citizen input into legislative oversight of the
defense and security sector. The tools available for this vary, and also depend upon how much defense/security officials are willing to provide information and pursue engagements that facilitate the process of them being held to account. Parliamentarians and their staff can gather independent information on defense and security from civil society and the media. They can also work with civil society to access certain community leaders and sections of society who have insight into niche issues that are the subject of oversight. They can also visit specific areas of the country, in partnership with or separately from the defense and security forces themselves. In other cases, parliamentary committees have set up their own police oversight mechanisms in communities and used civil society and media channels to report on what they have observed. Many other creative ways of engaging with the populace exist, like subjecting relevant bills to public hearing, and using townhalls to consult constituents on defense and security topics.

Media will be a key partner for parliamentarians in reaching the public with their wider message. Parliamentarians might consider linking up with media to raise awareness of parliament’s role in fostering policy discussions are other notable practices. In some cases, parliamentarians can also invite the media into certain sessions to raise awareness of their work. Public interest journalism can enhance good security sector governance when it provides a critical and independent analysis of national defense and public safety issues that concern the public. Fostering a constructive and respectful relationship with critical and independent media is one of the most effective ways that parliamentarians can contribute to public dialogue about security that will serve the principles of accountability and transparency.

Reputable, representative data sources—like the Afrobarometer surveys carried out by local teams in over 30 countries—are additional windows into what constituents think about parliament, the defense and security forces, and everyday security challenges. Generally, the military is a more trusted institution than parliament or the police. Some data indicate the need for parliaments to enhance their efforts to connect with the diversity of their constituents. For example, 77% of Africans surveyed in Afrobarometer agree that the president “must always obey the law and courts” even if (s)he “thinks they are wrong, and 62% believe it is more important for a government to be accountable to the people than to “get things done.” Yet, only four in ten Africans believe that “elections work well to ensure that representatives to Parliament reflect the view of the voters.” To boot, most citizens say that youth unemployment is a pressing issue, yet a minority think their governments are adequately addressing it.

These data attest to the importance of parliaments intensifying the ways that they use their existing tools and techniques to conduct outreach with constituents, to consult civil society experts on security and defense issues, and to work with the media to demonstrate the legislature’s work to address security concerns. Furthermore, parliamentarians can benefit from bringing traditionally underrepresented groups, not only limited to women and youth, into their consultations, debates, and side visits. The defense and security services might have connections with people in particular areas where they work whose input might be useful to parliamentarians as well. Representation itself also matters: having women and youth in parliament is key, and providing them opportunities to serve on defense and security, public accounts, and internal affairs committees is essential for forging better policy. Regional women’s groups—like the ECOWAS Female Parliamentary Association (ECOFEPA)—are notably for fostering further integration of women parliamentarians into defense and security.
Discussion Questions:

• What are the security trends and challenges that you feel the most need to prioritize as a parliamentarian (or a defense/security official) in your country? What do your constituents (or fellow citizens you serve) think about these issues?

• Are there any security issues in West Africa for which joint engagement with communities by the defense/security sector and parliaments would be beneficial?

• What have been some of the successes and challenges that you have had in interacting with the media on defense and security issues? Do the 3As (ability, authority, attitude) help to explain the successes and challenges you have had?

• Community engagement strategies are important elements of public relations for both parliaments and the defense/security establishment. In your country, how do these two different institutions approach their engagement with communities, civil society, and academia? Where are there shared interests in engagement, and where are there tensions in approach and method?

Recommended Readings:


   « Comment le contrôle parlementaire du secteur de la sécurité peut-il intégrer une perspective de genre et faire progresser l’égalité des genres ? » dans Ilja Luciak, Place du genre dans le contrôle parlementaire du secteur de la sécurité, DCAF/OSCE-ODIHR/UN Women, pages 29-38.


3 “ECOWAS Policy Framework for Security Sector Reform and Governance,” adopted 2021, consulted 6 February 2023, https://ecowas.int/wp-content/uploads/2022/08/ecowas-policy-framework-on-ssrg-english-adopted-1.pdf. The African Union also urges its Member States to enable legislative oversight of the security sector. The Security Sector Reform Policy affirms that parliaments need the space to “make and approve laws, rules, and regulations of the respective security sector institutions” and “establish and mandate specialized Committees to exercise oversight on behalf of the legislature.” Parliamentary oversight is also important for upholding various aspects of the African Charter on Democracy, Elections, and Governance, which mentions the need to build the requisite parliamentary capacity to institutionalize transparency and accountability (Articles 27 and 32).


5 The Interparliamentary Union’s 2017 Global Parliamentary Report summarizes this as the “three essential interlocking obligations,” i.e., “the obligation of public authorities, primarily the government, to provide information about their decisions and actions and to justify them to parliament and to the people; the obligation of parliament to scrutinize the decisions and actions of government or other public authorities and provide constructive and appropriate recommendations; the obligation of those accountable to respond appropriately to parliament’s conclusions about the matter under scrutiny” (13).

6 Ebo, op.cit., 10.


9 Ebom op.cit., 6.


15 “Conditions for Effective Parliamentary Oversight,” in Born, Jacond and N’Diaye, op.cit.


17 For more on this in the global comparative context, see National Democratic Institute, “Legislative Ethics: A Comparative Analysis,” 1999.

18 Inter-Parliamentary Union, “Sexism, harassment, and violence against women in parliaments in Africa,” 2021.


24 Ibid: 95.
28 Ouedraogo, op.cit.
30 Cancian 2017
31 Ouedraogo, op.cit.
35 Asunka and Logan, op.cit.