Enhancing Security-Justice Coordination to Counter Transnational Organized Crime

SYLLABUS

October-
November 2021
ENHANCING SECURITY-JUSTICE COORDINATION TO COUNTER TRANSNATIONAL ORGANIZED CRIME

19-20 October 2021  
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Table of Contents

About the Africa Center for Strategic Studies.................................................................4
Introduction..........................................................................................................................5
Map of Africa....................................................................................................................8
Week 1: Building Resilience to TOC through Security-Justice Coordination .....................11
Week 2: Fostering National-Level Interagency Coordination to Counter TOC.....................15
Week 3: Using Regional and Cross-Border Coordination to Counter TOC........................17
Week 4: Making Coordination Inclusive of Citizens and Communities.............................19
ABOUT THE AFRICA CENTER

Since its inception in 1999, the Africa Center has served as a forum for research, academic programs, and the exchange of ideas with the aim of enhancing citizen security by strengthening the effectiveness and accountability of African institutions, in support of U.S.-Africa policy.

VISION

Security for all Africans championed by effective institutions accountable to their citizens.

Realizing the vision of an Africa free from organized armed violence guaranteed by African institutions that are committed to protecting African citizens is the driving motivation of the Africa Center. This aim underscores the Center’s commitment to contributing to tangible impacts by working with our African partners – military and civilian, governmental and civil society, as well as national and regional. All have valuable roles to play in mitigating the complex drivers of conflict on the continent today. Accountability to citizens is an important element of our vision as it reinforces the point that in order to be effective, security institutions must not just be “strong,” but also be responsive to and protective of the rights of citizens.

MISSION

To advance African security by expanding understanding, providing a trusted platform for dialogue, building enduring partnerships, and catalyzing strategic solutions.

The Africa Center’s mission revolves around the generation and dissemination of knowledge through our research, academic programs, strategic communications, and community chapters. Drawing on the practical experiences and lessons learned from security efforts on the continent, we aim to generate relevant insight and analysis that can inform practitioners and policymakers on the pressing security challenges that they face. Recognizing that addressing serious challenges can only come about through candid and thoughtful exchanges, the Center provides face-to-face and virtual platforms where partners can exchange views on priorities and sound practices. These exchanges foster relationships that, in turn, are maintained over time through the Center’s community chapters, communities of interest, follow-on programs, and ongoing dialogue between participants and staff. This dialogue—infused with real world experiences and fresh analysis—provides an opportunity for continued learning and catalyzes concrete actions.

MANDATE

The Africa Center is a U.S. Department of Defense institution established and funded by Congress for the study of security issues relating to Africa and serving as a forum for bilateral and multilateral research, communication, exchange of ideas, and training involving military and civilian participants. (10 U.S.C 342)
Overview
Dismantling transnational organized crime (TOC) networks often requires joint actions by military, law enforcement, and justice officials, in concert with communities, security strategists, and relevant regional bodies. African security and justice officials may therefore have an interest in intensifying their comparative learning about the range of coordination efforts underway, as well as the strengths and weaknesses of coordination initiatives for countering TOC across contexts: on the cross-border level, on the national level across agencies, and on the citizen and community level.

This Africa Center virtual academic program will encourage practitioners to consider the strategic value of security and justice coordination from these three multidimensional perspectives, as well as through a lens sensitive to gender, youth, and politically marginalized groups affected by TOC. By examining how interdependent security and justice work can be in countering TOC, participants can better synergize their efforts to dismantle TOC networks nimbly, through the rule of law, and with political economy approaches that address the security, development, governance factors enabling TOC. Through peer learning and experience sharing, participants in this Africa Center program will consider different ways to strategize and implement various forms of coordination in their efforts to respond to trafficking, smuggling, and other forms of TOC.

Program Objectives
This four-week virtual seminar is designed to facilitate participants’ engagement in cross-sectoral and interdisciplinary peer learning about the strategic implications of coordination between defense, law enforcement, and justice actors within the security sector to counter TOC, including but not limited to trafficking in persons, drugs, and arms; human smuggling; and natural resource crimes. Participants will consider these themes in relation to their own region (Central, Eastern, or Northern Africa) as well as in comparative regional perspective. This will enable them to collectively reflect about lessons that can be learned at home, in neighboring countries, and in other parts of Africa. To this end, there are three program objectives:

1. Understand the range of current initiatives in different regions of Africa to strengthen security and justice sector coordination in countering various forms of TOC.
2. Assess how well current coordination efforts fit into regional, national, and local-level strategies and approaches to countering TOC, both in theory and in practice.
3. Compare experiences with military, law enforcement, and judicial coordination on countering TOC within and across country borders, in conflictual and peaceful settings.

Academic Approach
Recognizing the diversity of challenges and opportunities in the domain of countering TOC, this workshop will seek to capture important lessons and sound practices through:

a) Academic content in this syllabus to introduce background issues on TOC trends in terms of criminal actors and criminal markets in Central, Eastern, and Northern
Africa, the political economy of TOC and African state resilience to it, and the place of security-justice coordination in this strategic picture.

b) Virtual plenary sessions that reinforce peer learning and problem-solving on three different aspects of coordination to counter TOC: national-level interagency coordination, cross-border and regional coordination, and local-level coordination with citizens and communities. These challenges apply to various types of TOC (human trafficking, natural resource theft, drug and arms trafficking, and more).

c) Small group discussions that reinforce the learning objectives, helping participants exchange lessons learned on coordination and share ideas about coordination that they could implement jointly with colleagues within and across countries.

The workshop will be conducted in English and French. The program will be conducted under a strict policy of non-attribution during weekly discussion group sessions as well as during the question-and-answer portion of weekly plenary sessions. Plenary sessions will be recorded and posted to the Africa Center website after the close of the program.

**Syllabus**
This syllabus is an educational document intended to expose participants to various perspectives to help them take full advantage of the program. It provides an overview of academic goals and key policy questions related to countering transnational organized crime in various local, national, and regional African contexts. The recommended readings are intended to prepare participants for the virtual plenary sessions and discussion groups and should be read prior to the sessions for which they are listed.

For each weekly session listed in the syllabus, we provide learning objectives and an introduction to the theme of the plenary session that week. We also list questions that participants should be prepared to answer in the discussion group meeting held the day after the plenary session. Finally, we include a selection of recommended readings.

The primary purpose of the recommended readings is to help frame the stakes and the challenges of security-justice coordination within the context of available scholarship, empirical evidence, and policy documentation. We also hope that you use these materials as resources after the program concludes. We encourage you to share questions and suggestions about the materials and the seminar, as it will enhance the quality of our programs. We are quite willing to discuss specific topics with you.

Much expertise and knowledge about these topics comes from you, the participants. We encourage you to share your experiences and knowledge. The syllabus content does not reflect the views or official position of the Department of Defense or U.S. government.

**Preparation for the Seminar**
Before the first week of the seminar, we ask that you:
1. Skim this syllabus.
2. Review the Week 1 portion of the syllabus and read the recommended readings.
3. Spend some time thinking about the Week 1 discussion questions and considering what experiences from your work you might share in discussion groups.
4. Be ready to participate in discussion groups and learn from other participants.

Before each subsequent week of the seminar, we ask that you repeat this process.
Map of Africa
Week 1: Building Resilience to TOC through Security-Justice Coordination

Format: Plenary Session: Tuesday, October 19, 1200-1330 GMT
Discussion Group: Wednesday, October 20, 1200-1330 GMT

Objectives:
• Engage with a snapshot of what TOC actors, markets, and resilience look like, based on political economy approaches and the ENACT Organized Crime Index Africa 2019
• Understand why and how security-justice coordination is an important element of African states’ resilience to TOC, as well as why coordination must be linked to a broader strategy of using the security-development-governance nexus to address drivers of TOC
• Review the three strategic aspects of security-justice coordination that the seminar will cover: cross-border coordination, interagency coordination, and inclusive citizen and community approaches to coordination

Background:
Coordination across the security and justice sector is a critical component of building African state and societal resilience to transnational organized crime (TOC). Although easily overlooked in broader strategic discussions, security-justice coordination mechanisms and processes have great potential to contribute to resilience, defined here as improving the ability of leaders, institutions, systems, and citizens to deal with TOC in ways that are adaptable, mitigate harm, and reduce future vulnerabilities. Coordination is the process of trying to make different parts of a system and various organizations work together more effectively. Coordination can be a precursor to effective cooperation for achieving national security goals, and when it is done well, it can help to minimize competition and enhance complementarity among the entities involved. This can in turn help to solve long-term problems that no single institution or agency could deal with as well alone.

Security-justice coordination to address TOC also hinges upon African state actors having a similar understanding of what TOC is in the first place. Regrettably, there is no consistently agreed-upon definition of organized crime, but the UN Convention on Transnational Organized Crime (Palermo Convention) – which a majority of African countries have ratified – defines “organized criminal groups” as consisting of three or more people, existing for a period of time, that act together with the aim of committing at least one crime punishable by four years’ incarceration. To qualify as organized criminal groups, members must be acting together to commit those crimes in order to obtain a financial or other material benefit, whether directly or indirectly. Often, these pursuits are fueled by the use of violence and/or corruption. Organized crime is transnational when relevant activities cross official political borders, and are thus are “planned, prepared, committed, or have significant consequences in multiple states,” as per the Palermo Convention.

Understanding TOC through a political economy approach is useful for designing coordinated responses that build state and societal resilience to TOC. Political economy is “the study of rational decisions in the context of political and economic institutions,” which shape various actors’ incentives to behave in certain ways. Thus, political economy approaches prioritize identifying the contextual factors shape the incentives of strategic actors to make decisions that can, in aggregate, either foster or discourage TOC activities. There are many factors spanning the security, development, and governance arenas that shape people’s everyday life circumstances, as well as the incentives that they may (or may not) have for involvement in the licit and illicit parts of the economy that are connected to trafficking and smuggling. Some prominent ones are the availability of alternative livelihoods to TOC, how much citizens perceive TOC to be a viable endeavor despite
its illegality, how legitimate the state is, and how the transparency and accountability of the security and justice sectors affect those perceptions of legitimacy.

One example of a political economy framework for understanding TOC comes from the Organized Crime Index Africa 2019 (just recently updated for 2021) by the ENACT Consortium, a grouping that consists of INTERPOL, the Institute for Security Studies-Africa, and the Global Initiative against TOC. According to the Index, organized crime is perpetrated in Africa by four primary criminal actors: state-embedded actors, criminal networks, foreign actors, and mafia-style actors. One of the most prominent patterns related to TOC across African countries is the collusion and interdependence between state-embedded actors and criminal networks to perpetrate TOC. The complicity of certain high-level state actors in the corruption facilitating organized crime is documented notably in the UN Economic Commission for Africa’s Report of the High-Level Panel on Illicit Financial Flows from Africa. The Index also discusses African state vulnerabilities to TOC and tracks the presence and intensity of ten different criminal markets: human smuggling, human trafficking, arms trafficking, flora crimes, fauna crimes, non-renewable resource crimes, and various drug trades (heroin, cocaine, cannabis, synthetics). Finally, the Index suggests twelve factors likely to affect African state resilience to TOC: political leadership and governance, government transparency and accountability, international cooperation, national policies and laws, judicial capacity, law enforcement, anti-money laundering, economic regulatory capacity, victim and witness support, prevention, non-state actor involvement in response, and territorial integrity.

Coordination across various parts of the security and justice sector to counter TOC has the potential to influence many of the above resilience factors. A political economy approach to coordination will require understanding who the different actors are, what kinds of strategies they may adopt based on African states’ criminal markets and vulnerabilities, and how resilience factors can change high-level actors’ incentives to pursue TOC in particular places. One challenge, however, is that TOC networks quickly adapt to evade African states’ efforts to detect and punish them. To build African state resilience to TOC, state security and justice actors will need to anticipate these possibilities for adaptation and put mechanisms and practices in place to respond nimbly to TOC networks’ evolution and behavior. Here again, coordination can come in handy. Several different aspects are useful: (i) interagency and inter-ministerial coordination on the national level, within and across different levels of the bureaucratic hierarchy; (ii) cross-border coordination between different countries’ security and justice actors; and (iii) state-society coordination that is inclusive of a diverse cross-section of citizens and communities and is rooted in people’s knowledge, perspectives, and experiences related to activities that qualify as TOC. Weeks 2-4 of this seminar will cover each of these three aspects of coordination.

Discussion Questions:

- Given your current understanding of how security and justice responses to TOC are linked, what do you hope to learn through this seminar?
- Which kinds of criminal actors and criminal markets mentioned in the ENACT Organized Crime Index are most strategically relevant in your country or region?
- What kind of work is your country or region doing in relation to the twelve resilience factors that the ENACT Organized Crime Index highlights for Africa?
- What do you think are the main challenges to coordinating security and justice on the three different levels we will examine in this seminar: the interagency level, the cross-border level, and the citizen and community level?
Recommended Resources:

1. Dr. Catherine Lena Kelly, “An Introduction to Coordination of Security and Justice Responses to Countering Transnational Organized Crime,” Africa Center for Strategic Studies, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=gORTFAb1ILw&t=1s
   « Coordonner les réponses de sécurité et de justice à la criminalité transnationale organisée : Une introduction, » https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=nGeziZFrwgI


   To find the report on your country, visit: Data Analysis Portal for Organised Crime Index Africa 2019, https://ocindex.net/


Additional Resources:


Week 2: Fostering National-Level Interagency Coordination to Counter TOC

Format: Plenary Session: Tuesday, October 26, 1200-1330 GMT
Discussion Group: Wednesday, October 27, 1200-1330 GMT

Objectives:

- Understand why national-level interagency coordination, both within and outside of the security sector, is important to countering TOC
- Compare and contrast the perspectives of defense/security, intelligence, and justice actors on the benefits and limits of coordination to counter TOC
- Identify key strategy, policy, and technical elements of interagency coordination that have an influence on African states’ resilience to multiple types of TOC

Background

Developing stronger working relationships between various kinds of security sector actors, as well as between state security and justice actors, is another core element of coordination that can help to counter TOC. Some of the national-level coordination mechanisms to counter TOC may be interagency (streamlining the work of agencies within the same department or ministry), while others could be inter-ministerial (streamlining the work of different departments or ministries). Implementing strategies and policies on TOC will vary, but are generally likely to include elements of horizontal coordination between different central government bodies responding to TOC, as well as vertical coordination between national and subnational level officials within security and justice sector agencies that are involved in responding to TOC.

Some examples of measures that certain countries have taken to enhance national coordination include passing provisions for judicial police to deploy jointly with the military to counter TOC; standing up special units focused on TOC that combine military officers, police, and gendarmes in their strategic deployments to borderlands; and linking special judicial units or justice sector focal points to their counterparts in the military, law enforcement, and intelligence branches of the security sector. The success of coordination structures depends on government initiative to make those structures work, as well as the commitment of individuals to participate fully within them.

When strategizing coordination to counter TOC, leaders should consider both the positive and negative potential aspects of it. When done well, security and justice coordination will be based on clear definitions of roles and responsibilities and can thereby facilitate long-term problem solving. However, too much coordination, or the wrong kind of coordination, can also be damaging. A certain degree of specialization in training and responsibilities related to TOC may be desirable for swift and impactful state responses; at the same time, certain degrees of overlap between different agency and ministry roles and responsibilities for particular aspects of TOC response can help to ensure that states mount a holistic, multisectoral response to TOC. Striking an appropriate balance in context is central to mastering the art and the science of policy coordination.

Interagency and inter-ministerial coordination are useful for several reasons. First, they provide the substantive and technical leeway for African security and justice officials to integrate development- and governance-based approaches into efforts to counter TOC. Research shows that these “integrated approaches” that address TOC as a citizen security, economic livelihood, and state legitimacy and transparent governance issue are more likely to yield sustainable solutions. The factors that enable TOC are, after all, related to a range of issues under the purview of multiple national agencies and ministries. Second, inter-agency coordination can help to
ensure that responses are technically sound and appropriately sequenced. For instance, the work of military, intelligence, law enforcement, and prosecutorial officials to counter TOC is interdependent, and the functioning of the criminal justice chain depends on these actors’ shared commitments to rule of law standards. TOC is easier to deter through the justice system when the military, police, and gendarmes who apprehend and process suspects understand the standards of evidence required to prosecute alleged perpetrators, as well as the detention and investigation practices that the law requires for the state’s cases against these suspects to be viable. Meeting these standards is easiest when defense, security, and justice actors frequently communicate and have the networks and tools to coordinate with each other as they are doing all stages of this work.16 Without coordinated efforts that deliver swift, fair, and visible results, state investigations and prosecutions of TOC can lose their deterrent effect and reduce popular trust in the state. Similarly, intelligence sharing across defense, law enforcement, and financial bodies seeking to interdict traffickers and smugglers can increase the accuracy of detection and reduce the ease with which high-level perpetrators of TOC extract illicit financial flows.

Discussion Questions:

- Are there shared strategic interests in countering TOC across different sectors and agencies in your country? To what extent do the preferences of military, law enforcement, intelligence, and justice actors align on this issue?

- Are there interagency coordination mechanisms in place for your country to address TOC in any of its forms? If so, what do these mechanisms look like, and if not, what kinds of coordination do you think would be most useful in countering TOC?

- What are the current strengths and weaknesses of how security and justice officials in your country jointly address organized crime?

- What are some of the horizontal coordination processes that are used in your country or region to respond to TOC? What are some of the vertical coordination processes? Do you think that horizontal and vertical coordination have similar or different costs and benefits?

Recommended Resources:


   « Susciter la coordination interagence au niveau national pour lutter contre la criminalité transnationale organisée, » Vidéo, Centre d’Etudes Stratégiques d’Afrique, 16 février 2021, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=07Pfkikzka0
Week 3: Using Regional and Cross-Border Coordination to Counter TOC

Format: Plenary Session: Tuesday, November 2, 1200-1330 GMT
Discussion Group: Wednesday, November 3, 1200-1330 GMT

Objectives:

- Understand why regional and cross-border coordination is important to countering TOC, and how it affects state resilience to TOC actors and markets in Central, Eastern, and Northern Africa
- Assess the current strengths and weaknesses of such coordination, whether between neighboring countries or on the REC level, through engagement with examples of cross-border coordination
- Identify key strategy, policy, and technical elements of cross-border coordination that have an influence on African states’ resilience to multiple types of TOC

Background

TOC is a threat that ignores political boundaries and legal jurisdictions. It frequently involves criminal networks that cross official political borders and that concern multiple national governments. For this reason, cross-border coordination between different countries’ militaries, law enforcement agencies, and state judicial systems is desirable. The people who perpetrate TOC work together to exploit cross-border differences in economics and policies, which fuel the illicit markets behind trafficking, poaching, and smuggling. Criminal networks take a pragmatic approach to making profit, adapting to local conditions and shifting between different markets or locations as needed. When done well, coordination can help African states mobilize resources in ways that minimize competition and enhance the complementarity of different countries’ security and justice institutions. Coordination can also help those countries become more swift and agile in countering criminal actors, who take advantage of states that are slow to respond collectively.

Cross-border coordination takes many forms. Regional Economic Communities (RECs) like the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS), East African Community (EAC), Community of Sahel-Saharan States (CEN-SAD), and the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) spearhead certain kinds of coordination; in some cases, there are regional policies and plans to counter TOC as a whole or in particular forms. RECs may also be a vehicle for creating regional action plans and harmonizing national legislation to facilitate mutual legal assistance and extradition. Bilateral coordination between states that share borders is also critical, since many of the foreign actors who perpetrate TOC in African countries are citizens of contiguous states. Inter-regional and continental coordination mechanisms have also been established to address TOC and also have the potential to shape how African state actors work with international organizations and donors on TOC response.

Some initiatives in these domains are already underway in Central, Eastern, and Northern Africa, and on a broader continental level. AFRIPOP, the African Union’s institution for police cooperation, is established to “facilitate the prevention, detection, and investigation of transnational organized crime in coordination with national, regional, and international police institutions.” The East African Police Chiefs’ Committee (EAPCCO) and the Central African Police Chiefs’ Committee (CAPCCO) also frequently do work within the Regional Economic Communities and with international organizations like INTERPOL and UNODC to foster coordinated responses to cross-border crime. Entities like the African Women’s Leadership Network (AWLN) could also meaningfully shape strategy and policy on TOC. In addition, there is
the possibility of inter-regional cooperation. For instance, the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS), the Gulf of Guinea Commission (GGC), and the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) have made strides on inter-regional coordination in the maritime domain through the implementation of the Lomé Code of Conduct to reduce piracy, natural resource theft, and IUU fishing. On the judicial side, mechanisms like the Great Lakes Judicial Cooperation Network (GLJC) are designed to help central authorities address international judicial cooperation on criminal issues and to facilitate faster joint action even in the absence of formalized mutual legal assistance agreements. On the neighbor-to-neighbor level, some countries, like Rwanda and Tanzania, have considered signing Memoranda of Understanding to facilitate coordination; others, like DRC hold Joint Permanent Commissions between defense, security, justice, and other ministers of neighboring countries to discuss priority issues. In some places, like the borderlands of Libya and Tunisia, ad hoc civil society groups and local officials have come to more informal agreements related to illicit trade.

Overall, cross-border coordination might involve strengthening mutual legal assistance or intelligence sharing between countries to facilitate investigations and prosecution; conducting joint patrols or civil affairs missions in border regions affected by TOC; or improving communications between different countries’ customs agencies to detect illegal transshipments. It could also involve addressing alternative livelihoods, state legitimacy-building, and local governance needs in border communities, where people who share the same cultural, linguistic, ethnic, or economic ties may be spread across national political boundaries. These cross-national social networks have potential to facilitate coordination on TOC response, including in the context of integrated border management programs that take multisectoral approaches to prevention and consider the knowledge, experiences, and perspectives of a diversity of citizens across the lines of gender, age, ethnicity, and political or economic status.

Discussion Questions:

- To what extent does your country work with neighboring countries to counter TOC? With RECs (like ECCAS, EAC, CEN-SAD, IGAD)? With the AU and INTERPOL?
- What are the current challenges your country faces to cross-border coordination to counter TOC? Are there any examples of lessons learned or of successes and challenges that you can share, or ideas on how to overcome challenges?
- What kinds of security and justice sector coordination roles have you or your peers undertaken to counter TOC? What aspects of cross-border coordination need to be strengthened?

Recommended Resources:


**Additional Resources:**

Abdourahmane Dieng and Martin Ewi, “*Using Regional and Cross-Border Coordination to Counter Transnational Organized Crime*,” (Western/Southern Africa), Video, Africa Center for Strategic Studies, February 8, 2021.


United Nations, “*The Great Lakes Judicial Cooperation Network,*” Bureau for the Special Envoy of the Great Lakes, 
https://ungreatlakes.unmissions.org/sites/default/files/great_lakes_judicial_cooperation_network_flyer_english_0.pdf

“*Le Réseau de Coopération Judiciaire pour la Région des Grands Lacs,*” Bureau de l’Envoyé Spécial pour les Grands Lacs, 
https://ungreatlakes.unmissions.org/sites/default/files/great_lakes_judicial_cooperation_network_flyer_french.pdf
Week 4: Making Coordination Inclusive of Citizens and Communities

**Format:** Plenary Session: Tuesday, November 9, 1200-1330 GMT  
Discussion Group: Wednesday, November 10, 1200-1330 GMT

**Objectives:**
- Consider the security, development, and governance dimensions shaping how TOC affects citizens (including along the lines of gender, youth, and other relevant distinctions)
- Analyze how community and citizens relationships with state security and justice officials affects their trust in these actors and shapes the coordination of counter TOC efforts locally
- Analyze the preconditions that must be in place to make security-justice coordination effective, especially grassroots elements of rule of law that are frequently overlooked
- Identify various community-based and people-centered coordination approaches to counter TOC from urban and rural areas

**Background:**
When coordinating counter TOC efforts, African policymakers and officials can best build societal resilience to TOC by taking steps to advance the security of citizens as opposed to merely that of the state or the regime. Countering TOC through citizen-centric coordination requires strengthening various state entities’ ability to act in ways that are responsive to people’s everyday life, realities, experiences, problems, and needs. Security and justice actors, as well as TOC policymakers, must attend to the underlying factors that make particular citizens susceptible to TOC, or that embed their communities in economic and political networks that are linked to TOC. Alternative local livelihoods, the perceived legitimacy of illicit commerce, and levels of popular trust in the state are just some of the factors that shape different local actors’ incentives and perspectives as they relate to TOC and state responses to it.23 Harnessing expertise on these issues – including from women, youth, and marginalized groups – is necessary for addressing the range of security, development, and governance factors driving TOC.

To make coordination inclusive of communities and citizens, state security and justice actors can ensure that a wide variety of community and citizen perspectives on TOC are included in dialogues and consultations held to shape the nature of state response. Ideally, residents, citizens, and community leaders will be part of policy and strategy consultations so that the results of those processes effectively prioritize the vulnerabilities, risks, and threats that are important to a wide range of citizens and communities. However, even within specific communities, people of different genders, religions, ages, and socioeconomic backgrounds may experience and view TOC differently, and may experience different political and economic consequences of state and societal efforts to counter TOC. These differences, too, are critical to account for in consultation, planning, and implementation; for cross-border and national-level interagency coordination to work well on the local level, a diversity of community stakeholders must support the efforts in question.

People-centered approaches to addressing TOC go well beyond inclusive national strategy processes, however. People-centered approaches often involve local stakeholders themselves taking the lead in devising ways to address TOC in ways that mitigate the various kinds of harms that TOC can inflict on states and societies. On the local level, non-state actors have looked to a variety of local dispute resolution, livelihood generation, civic advocacy, and security provision mechanisms to address different forms of TOC, both amongst themselves and in partnership with state and international organizations.24 Particularly when a range of local stakeholders stand behind such endeavors, they should be taken seriously in strategic planning and efforts too.
Finally, because state actors’ collusion with criminal networks is a common form of organized crime in Africa, policy responses to TOC must also come from non-state actors, especially civil society. Empowering civil society to exercise independent oversight of the state can help combat government corruption and promote the state’s transparency and accountability to citizens. Security and justice actors can assist by helping their peers understand the importance of oversight institutions, and by advocating as they can for relevant reforms. They can also contribute by building trusting and rights-respecting relationships with civilians in their work to counter TOC.

**Discussion Questions:**

- What aspects of development and governance must security and justice actors take into account as they seek to coordinate with citizens, communities, and civil society to address TOC? (For instance, how relevant are factors like alternative livelihoods, state legitimacy, and the transparency and accountability of the security and justice sectors to citizens).

- What do community leaders and civil society groups in your area think about state security and justice efforts to counter TOC? Do perspectives differ by gender, age, religion, ethnicity, or any other aspect of identity?

- How can security and justice actors forge trusting and collaborative relationships with citizens in communities affected by TOC?

- What can be done to ensure the meaningful inclusion of citizens in strategy development, coordination, and policymaking on TOC, as well as effective civil society oversight of implementation?

**Recommended Resources:**


Additional Resources:


12 Peters, op.cit., p.6.

13 DeWitt & Dillinger, op.cit.


17 AFRIPOL Statute, Article 3.


24 Naish, op.cit.