

Strengthening Cross-Border Cooperation Across Africa to Combat Illicit Trafficking Networks, Illicit Economies, and Converging Security Threats

Session 2 on Gateways to TNOC through Enabling Crimes

Countering Transnational Organized Crime Seminar Africa Center for Strategic Studies, National Defense University

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PRESIDENT & CEO

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Niamey, Niger



ROADMAP FOR THIS PRESENTATION

Africa Security Landscape: Threat Multipliers: Inter-Connected Layers (Routes, Actors, Threats)

Convergence Crime: Gateways to TNOC through Emerging Crimes

Core Gateway Crimes: Corruption, Money-Laundering/Financial Crime, Cybercrime ----> Drugs, Counterfeits, Human Trafficking, Environmental Crime)

- Porosity of Borders; Unregulated Spaces and Illicit Economies
 - Rise of Terrorism in Africa and Illicit Trafficking Profitability
- Crime-Terror Networks of Exploitation: Trafficking and Smuggling Networks
 - Organized Crime, Corrupt Actors, Terrorist Groups

Full Spectrum Dominance: Cross-Border Information Sharing: Actionable Intel Targeting Centers of Gravity: Corruption+Follow the Money (Threat Finance) Collective Security: Collective Action: Fighting Networks with Networks



Gateways to TNOC through Enabling Crimes

Coup d'œil: the ability to discern at one glance the <u>tactical</u> advantages and disadvantages of the terrain: "There is a gift of being able to see at a glance the possibilities offered by the terrain." (Napoleon)

Bad Actors and Illicit Trafficking & Smuggling Networks

- * Kleptocracy and Complicit Corrupt Officials
- * Criminal Entrepreneurs, Cartels, and Criminal Syndicates, Gangs
- * Terrorists and Criminal Insurgencies
- * Virtual Threat, Cyber Bandits, On-Line Illicit Markets, Dark Web

* Dirty Money: Super Fixers, Professional Service Facilitators, Safe Havens

CONVERGENCE & NET-CENTRICITY







LUNAGL BAL

Map use Location Finding Representation Map Grids, Labeled tics at map edge

Layer Transportation Map use Represent transport of goods and people Representation Roads, rails, infractructure, and cartographic features

Layer Cultural Map use Shows various kinds of human activity Points, Lines, Areas, and Annotation

Layer Administrative Map use Administrative and Legal Boundaries Representation Lines and Areas to support symbols and annotation


Layer Hydrography Map use Surface Water & features for managing water Representation Points, Lines, and Areas

Layer Hypsography Map use Represent Terrain Representation Contours, Elevation pionts, TINS, DEMs and shaded relief

Layer Surface Overlays Map use Themes such as land cover, land use, soils, etc. Representation Areas and Rasters

Layer Image Base Map use Map background and reference Representation Ortho Imagery, USGS DRGs, and other historical images

Layer Page Layout Design Map use Necessary information for effective map reading Representation Map Template document for each product











Sahel Belt: Strategic Illicit Trafficking Flows




- North African powers
- G5-Sahel countries
- Sahel climatic zone



Convergence: Threat Multiplier




SAHEL AND SURROUNDING AREA




THE INTERSECTION OF TRANSNATIONAL ORGANIZED CRIME AND INSTABILITY

FIG. 170:









Updated: January 2019

Note: Compiled by the Africa Center for Strategic Studies, this graphic shows violent events involving the listed groups over the 12-month period ending December 31, 2018. Data on attacks or fatalities does not attempt to distinguish the perpetrators of the events. Group listings are intended for informational purposes only and should not be considered official designations. Due to the fluid nature of many groups, the listed affiliations may change.


Sources: Armied Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED): Daniel Byman; Jane's Terrorism and Insurgency Centre: Thomas Joscelyn: STE Intelligence Group: Stanford University's Mapping Militants Project: Stratfor; Terrorism Research & Analysis Consortium (TRAC): and Aaron Y. Zelin.



Extremist Attacks in Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger










* 2019 attacks between Jan. 1 - Oct. 31

Attacks depicted have been carried out by JNOM, ISSS, Assampli Islam, Coordination of Azawad Movementia, Roko Haram, Amar Dine, and a hondbil of locur known externist groups.




AFRICA










Source: Thomson Reuters, IOM



Staggering Size of Illicit Economies/Illicit Markets: **+8-15% of World's GDP** (\$80 trillion, 2018, The World Bank)





Estimated Global Illegal Trade, Corruption and Illicit Markets

CRIMES	Estimated Annual Dollar Value	
Money Laundering	At least \$2.6 trillion	
	(between 2 and 5 percent of world GDP)	
Transnational Crime	\$1.6 trillion to \$2.2 trillion	
Bribery	Significant portion of \$1 trillion	
Narcotics Trafficking	\$750 billion to \$1 trillion	
Counterfeited and Pirated Products	\$500 billion to \$1 trillion	
Environmental Crime	\$91 billion to \$258 billion	
(illegal wildlife trade, logging, IUU Fishing, trade in CFCs, and		
toxic waste)		
Human Trafficking/Modern Slavery	Up to \$150 billion	
Illegal Tobacco	\$40 to \$50 billion	
Illegal Mining	\$12 to \$48 billion	

** Sources: World Economic Forum, World Bank, UNODC, OECD, ILO, GFI



The Global Threat of the Illegal Trade

The Retail Value of Transnational Crime

Counterfeiting	Ē	\$923 billion to \$1.13 trillion	
Drug Trafficking		\$426 billion to \$652 billion	
Illegal Logging	<u> </u>	\$52 billion to \$157 billion	
Human Trafficking	රීර්	\$150.2 billion	
Illegal Mining	\bigcirc	\$12 billion to \$48 billion	
IUU Fishing		\$15.5 billion to \$36.4 billion	
Illegal Wildlife Trade		\$5 billion to \$23 billion	
Crude Oil Theft		\$5.2 billion to \$11.9 billion	
Small Arms & Light Weapons Trafficking		\$1.7 billion to \$3.5 billion	
Organ Trafficking		\$840 million to \$1.7 billion	
Trafficking in Cultural Property		\$1.2 billion to \$1.6 billion	
Total		\$1.6 trillion to \$2.2 trillion	



Source: Transnational Crime and the Developing World



OECD Task Force on Countering Illicit Trade


Mapping Illicit Trade

Global illicit markets thrive in the shadows of the global economy. Due to the clandestine nature of illicit transactions, the profits from illicit trade are hard to estimate. Data is accessed through seizures, law enforcement data and cross-comparisons with parallel legal markets.

A global Challenge


While the profits are hard to quantify, the harmful impacts on consumers, the environment, tax revenues and jobs are apparent in all societies. Traffic areas such as humans and narcotics exact a very heavy toll on societies. Illicit trade is also linked to criminal violence and even the financing of terrorism. Illicit trade can cause longer-term damage to the rule of law, public trust, human capital and public health, as well as deter foreign investment due to its close linkages with corruption.

For more information on the OECD Task Force on Countering Illicit Trade, and to read the full 2016 Report: Converging Criminal Networks, click here.



Global Movement of Ships: 2012 [90% of all goods moved across the world by ships]

Ship.org: Container (e.g. manufactured goods): yellow; Dry bulk (e.g. coal, aggregates): blue; Tanker (e.g. oil, chemicals): red; Gas bulk (e.g. liquefied natural gas): green; Vehicles (e.g. cars): purple [Kiln Map, Business Insider]





KEY

Cocaine

Methamphetamine

Heroin

OECD Mapping: Illicit Drugs

Mapping the Illicit Drug Flows (UNODC 2016)

541

number of New Psychoactive substances (NPS) identified in 2014 in over 95 countries. Source: UNODC 2016

Breci


246m

Global adult population who used at least one illicit drug type in 2013 Source: UNODC (2016)


158% Growth in annual seizures of methamphetamine in 2014 Source: UNODC (2015) Heroin and Cocaine consumption levels and demand for Drugs such as Heroin and Cocaine have remained relatively stable over the past 15-20 years. Synthetic drugs Demand and supply of synthetic drugs, such as Amphetamine Type Stimulants (ATS), and New Psychoactive Substances (NPS), have grown considerably: Amphetamine Type Stimulants (ATS) are now the second most widely abused drug in the world, and pose considerable harm to their users in a wide variety of forms.

Narcotics Flow: Africa (UNODC Data)

Main trafficking flows of cocaine



Narcotics Flow: Africa (UNODC Data)





OECD – EUIPO: Charting Counterfeits

In 2016 trade in counterfeit and pirated products amounted to as much as **USD 509 billion**. This represents up to **3.3% of world trade**.

The share of fakes in world trade grew significantly. In 2013 up to 2.5 % of world trade was in fake goods (up to USD 461 billion).

This growth was reported during a period of a relative slowdown in overall world trade. The intensity of counterfeiting is on the rise – big risk for the knowledgebased, open and globalised economy!





Economic Impacts of Counterfeits and Piracy

THE ECONOMIC IMPACTS OF COUNTERFEITING AND PIRACY

		2013	2022 (forecast)
	Value of counterfeit and pirated goods.	US \$1.13 trillion €882.6 billion	US \$2.81 trillion €2,194.7 billion
at	Displacement of legitimate economic activity.	US \$597 billion €449.6 billion	US \$1,244 billion €936.8 billion
(\$	Wider economic and social costs.	US \$898 billion €676.2 billion	US \$1,870 billion €1,408.2 billion
ŧŶ.	Employment losses.	2.6 million	5.4 million

ource. The Economic Impacts Of Counterfeiting And Piracy, A Report prepared for BASCAP and INTA by Frontier Economics. All figures reflected here have been provided by Frontier Economics.



Mapping the Impact: Fakes

SOECD Q EVIPO



Data Source: Trade in Counterfeit and Pirated Goods: Mapping the Economic Impact

Data Source: Trade in Counterfeit and Pirated Goods: Mapping the Economic Impact





Mapping Illicit Routes: Fakes

Ukraine Mongolia China Albania Armenia Azerbaijan Tunisa Turkey Kuwait Morocco Egypt Iran Hong Kong (China) Pakistan Mexico Saudi United Macau (China) Arab Emirates Bangladesh Arabia Belize Philipines Panama Yemen India Thailand HIGH INTENSITY Nigeria Cambodia Ethiopia of producing or transiting Malaysia fakes in many categories Singapore Kenya Indonesia Paraguay Producers Transits The probability for producing fakes is based LOW INTENSITY on the average GTRIC scores for the analysed of producing or transiting economy. For more details on the GTRIC index

Main producers and transit points for fake goods.


fakes in few categories

see the OECD/EUIPO report.





Complex trade routes







Complex trade routes






Environmental Crime: \$91-\$258 billion annually

The rising transnational environmental crime smuggling networks










HUMAN TRAFFICKING: \$150 BILLION






FREE TRADE ZONES

About 90% of all trade is conducted via maritime containers of which more than 500 million are shipped yearly in the trade supply chain, and of this amount, less than 2% are inspected. (UNDOC-WCO CSI)

OECD Recommendation: FTZs





- Promote transparency in order to deter the abuse of FTZ as conduits for illicit trade.
- Members and non-Members take measures to encourage FTZ to implement the Code of Conduct for Clean Free Trade Zones.
- Members and non-Members use trade agreements, as appropriate, to encourage adherence to the principles for combatting illicit trade in FTZ.
- Cooperate internationally in the exchange of law enforcement information, and consult with competent authorities and affected industries in investigations and other legal or administrative proceedings concerning specific cases of misuse of FTZ related to illicit trade.

Foster partnerships among stakeholders to counter illicit trade emanating from high risk FTZ.

OECD Task Force on Countering Illicit Trade

Governance and Security Landscape

Africa

- On-Going Conflicts

- High Insecurity and Instability
- Corrupt War Economy/Illicit Economies
 - Network of Exploitation
- Armed Militias, Organized Crime, Corrupt Actors
 - Terrorism and Criminal Insurgencies
 - Oil Bunkering, Banditry, Smuggling, Piracy
 - Porous Borders fuel Illicit Trafficking
 - Cash-based Economies and Illiquidity

UNAGLOBAL Africa: Illicit Threats = Dirty Money

Lucrative illicit markets across Africa include:

- organized banditry (highway/ports/checkpoint raids, carjacking and burglary) - illicit trafficking of weapons

- Narcotics (cocaine, heroin, hashish) and opioids/synthethics

- fake medicines and pharmaceuticals (e.g., tramadol)

- alcohol and tobacco

- human smuggling and trafficking

- Extortion and kidnapping for ransom

- pillaging and trafficking of illegally-mined gold and other natural resources


oil bunkering, banditry, and petroleum smuggling

Maritime Piracy

Fraudulent letters of credits, False invoices, e-cards

Enact Organised Crime Index Africa 2019

Figure 2: ENACT Organised Crime Index, scoring of criminal markets in Africa



Source: ENACT, 201949



Criminal Markets: Enact Organised Crime Index Africa 2019

https://enactafrica.org/organised-crime-index

Criminal markets – highest- and lowest-scoring countries

HIGHEST-SCORING

LOWEST-SCORING	j
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
1.	NIGERIA	7.65
2.	DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO	6.45
3.	TANZANIA	6.25
4.	CAMEROON	5.95
4.	CÔTE D'IVOIRE	5.95
6.	LIBYA	5.90
6.	MALI	5.90
8.	CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC	5.85
9.	SUDAN	5.75
10.	KENYA	5.65


45.	SEYCHELLES	3.60
46.	EQUATORIAL GUINEA	3.55
47.	NAMIBIA	3.50
48.	DJIBOUTI	3.45
49.	TUNISIA	3.40
50.	ESWATINI	3.35
51.	BOTSWANA	3.30
52.	COMOROS	3.10
53.	LESOTHO	3.05
54.	SÃO TOMÉ AND PRÍNCIPE	2.00




Opioids: Tramadol Seizures Increased 14x

Global opioid crisis







IVORY TRAFFICKING ROUTES

SPILANK

DUBAI

This map shows a selection of ivory trafficking routes for large-scale (500kg or over) consignments that have originated from Africa. It does not include trafficking routes for ivory from Asian elephants, which are also threatened by the ivory trade as well as habitat loss.

Large-scale consignments of ivory are a reliable indicator of the involvement of organised crime. Disrupting these criminal networks will require intelligence-led enforcement operations and conducting forensic analysis on large-scale ivory seizures, as directed under CITES.

/environmentalinvestigationagency
@ElAinvestigator

TRUE NOTION

VIETNAM

HONG KONG

TAIWAN

I IDDING



The role of each country (i.e. source/transit/consumer) is based on a selection of ivory trafficking routes that have been identified by EIA and mapped above This map is not necessarily a true reflection of a country's entire role in the global ivory trade (i.e. some operate as both source and transit countries).

CENT

MO2AMBIOUR

ZANZIBAR

CENTRAL AFRICAN

DR CONGO

SOUTH AFRIC

CAMEROON

GABON

DNA SOURCE

TRADE ROUTE

rits Country is sarily stages of free work

SOURCE COUNTRY

TRANSIT COUNTRY

CONSUMPTION COUNTRY

which the exact souls


CONGE

In Africa, tens of thousands of people (esp. children) die every year from fake medicines; people resort to black markets due to the lack of access to quality medicines or high prices; more than 30% of all medicines in Africa are fake.





Video (EU Report) Fake drugs claiming more lives in Africa





RANK SCORE COUNTRY/TERRITORY 88 Denmark 1 2 87 New Zealand Finland 3 85 3 85 Singapore Sweden 3 85 Switzerland 3 85 7 84 Norway 82 Netherlands 8 9 81 Canada 9 81 Luxembourg 11 80 Germany United Kingdom 11 80 Australia 13 Austria 14 Hong Kong 14 14 Iceland 17 Belgium 18 Estonia 18 Ireland 18 Japan 21 France **United States** 22 United Arab 23 Emirates Uruguay 23 25 Barbados 25 Bhutan Chile 27 Seychelles 28 Bahamas 29 Portugal 30 Brunei 31 Darussalam Taiwan 31 33 Qatar Botswana 34 61 Israel 34 Poland 36 36 Slovenia 38 Cyprus 38 Czech Republic 38 Lithuania

58	Georgia	41
58	Latvia	41
58	Saint Vincent and the Grenadines	41
i 8	Spain	41
57	Cabo Verde	45
57	Dominica	45
7	Korea, South	45
6	Costa Rica	48
56	Rwanda	48
5	Saint Lucia	50
i4	Malta	51
3	Namibia	52
12	Grenada	53
2	Italy	53
2	Oman	53
1	Mauritius	56
0	Slovakia	57
9	Jordan	58
9	Saudi Arabia	58
8	Croatia	60
7	Cuba	61
7	Malaysia	61
7	Romania	61
6	Hungary	64
6	Sao Tome and Principe	64
6	Vanuatu	64

CORRUPTION PERCEPTIONS INDEX 2018



46	Vanuatu	64
45	Greece	67
45	Montenegro	67
45	Senegal	67
44	Belarus	70
44	Jamaica	70
44	Solomon Islands	70
43	Morocco	73
43	South Africa	73
43	Suriname	73
43	Tunisia	73
42	Bulgaria	77
41	Burkina Faso	78
41	Ghana	78
41	India	78
41	Kuwait	78
41	Lesotho	78
41	Trinidad and Tobago	78
41	Turkey	78
40	Argentina	85
40	Benin	85
39	China	87
39	Serbia	87
38	Bosnia and Herzegovina	89
38	Indonesia	89
38	Sri Lanka	89

3	Swaziland	89
7	Gambia	93
7	Guyana	93
7	Kosovo	93
7	Macedonia	93
7	Mongolia	93
7	Panama	93
3	Albania	99
3	Bahrain	99
3	Colombia	99
-	Philippines	99
3	Tanzania	99
5 3 3 5	Thailand	99
5	Algeria	105
5	Armenia	105
5	Brazil	105
5	Côte d'Ivoire	105
5	Egypt	105
5	El Salvador	105
5	Peru	105
5	Timor-Leste	105
5	Zambia	105
1	Ecuador	114
1	Ethiopia	114
1	Niger	114
3	Moldova	117
3	Pakistan	117

-		
33	Vietnam	117
32	Liberia	120
32	Malawi	120
32	Mali	120
32	Ukraine	120
31	Djibouti	124
31	Gabon	124
31	Kazakhstan	124
31	Maldives	124
31	Nepal	124
30	Dominican Republic	129
30	Sierra Leone	129
30	Togo	129
29	Bolivia	132
29	Honduras	132
29	Kyrgyzstan	132
29	Laos	132
29	Myanmar	132
29	Paraguay	132
28	Guinea	138
28	iran	138
28	Lebanon	138
28	Mexico	138
28	Papua New Guinea	138
28	Russia	138

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Compiled by Berlin Based Transparency Inernational

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27	Comoros	144
27	Guatemala	144
27	Kenya	144
27	Mauritania	144
27	Nigeria	144
26	Bangladesh	149
26	Central African Republic	149
26	Uganda	149
25	Azerbaijan	152
25	Cameroon	152
25	Madagascar	152
25	Nicaragua	152
26	Tajikistan	152
24	Eritrea	167
23	Mozambique	158
23	Uzbekistan	158
22	Zimbabwe	160
20	Cambodia	161
20	Democratic Republic of the Congo	161
20	Haiti	161
20	Turkmenistan	161
19	Angola	165
19	Chad	165
19	Congo	165
18	Iraq	168
18	Venezuela	168
17	Burundi	170
17	Libya	170
16	Afghanistan	172
16	Equatorial Guinea	172
16	Guinea Bissau	172
16	Sudan	172
14	Korea, North	176
and on the local division of the local divis		176
14	Yemen	
14 13	Yemen South Sudan	178
14 13 13		



GLOBAL CORRUPTION BAROMETER

AFRICA 2019

11 July 2019

www.transparency.org

- The results: A majority of African citizens (55 per cent) think corruption increased in their country in the previous 12 months;

- Governments not doing enough;

- High levels of corruption among police (47%), Gov officials (39%), parliamentarians (36%);

- Bribery demands are a regular occurrence for many;

- Two-thirds of citizens fear retaliation if they report corruption. Yet, despite this, more than half of citizens surveyed (53 per cent) think ordinary people can make a difference in the fight against corruption.



Case Studies: Cooperative Cross-Border Operations and Joint Coordinated Responses: Successes

Global Operation Pangea (Counterfeits), INTERPOL, Global LEAs

- USALAMA Global Operations and interlinked crimes (trafficking in humans, drugs, arms trafficking, people smuggling, car theft, environmental crime)
 - Global Operation Folosa (Europol, Interpol, WCO, Africa, LATAM, GCC Partners)
 - Regional Cross-Border Case in Africa: Piracy
 - Sub-Regional Case in Africa: Wildlife Trafficking
 - Bilateral and Joint Cooperation: Asset Forfeiture and Stolen Assets
 - National Inter-Agency Cooperation: Corruption



2019 GLOBAL TERRORISM

THE IMPACT OF TERRORISM

VERVICH HOM MEDIUM LOW VERVLOW NO IMPACT NOT INCLUDED

10 8 8 4 2 0



Cross-Border Information Sharing: Actionable Intelligence

Promoting Trusted Channels for Cross-Border and Regional Cooperation

- Enforcement of Laws
- Fighting Corruption and Money Laundering
 - Special Investigative Techniques
 - Financial Technologies
 - Public-Private Partnerships
 - Fusion Intelligence Center
 - **Collective Security: Collective Action**

Whole of Society Information in Action

OODA

LOOP



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
Anti-Illicit Trade Institute(AITI), TRACCC

A <u>Global Hub</u> for <u>Research</u> and <u>Training</u> to Fight Multi-Trillion Dollar Illegal Economy

- * Advance academic excellence: pioneering research, best-in-class training curriculum
 - foster comprehensive dialogues, exchanges, and understanding on the array of harms caused by illicit trade and accompanying money laundering;
 - support international conferences and workshops; and
 - undertake outreach via dynamic public-private partnerships.
- 2020, AITI will begin to a core of AIT courses; 2021-2022 online instruction related to:
 - understanding today's **global illicit commerce**; strategies to fight illicit markets/FTZs; **investigating and prosecuting illicit trade** (information-sharing across borders);

 - targeting webs of corruption and criminality by following the money and "value" (moneylaundering/trade-based money-laundering); tackling cybercrime and dismantling on-line markets related to Intellectual Property
 - (IP) crime including counterfeit and pirated goods; and other important anti-crime and criminal justice areas; leveraging transformative technologies to fight illicit trade





QUESTIONS?

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