



**AFRICA CENTER
FOR STRATEGIC STUDIES**

Countering Transnational Organized Crime Seminar

SYLLABUS

Niamey, Niger

13-17 January

2020



AFRICA CENTER FOR STRATEGIC STUDIES

COUNTERING TRANSNATIONAL ORGANIZED CRIME SEMINAR

Niamey, Niger
13-17 January 2020

SYLLABUS

Table of Contents

About the Africa Center for Strategic Studies.....	5
Introduction.....	6
Map of Africa.....	9
Session 1: The Political Economy of Transnational Organized Crime: Drivers, Patterns, Consequences.....	11
Session 2: Gateways to Transnational Organized Crime through Enabling Crimes	13
Session 3: Human Trafficking.....	15
Session 4: Natural Resource Theft and Poaching.....	17
Session 5: Drug Trafficking and Goods Smuggling.....	19
Session 6: Citizen and Community Based Approaches to Response.....	21
Session 7: Linking Local Perspectives and Responses to National Security Strategy.....	25
Session 8: Leveraging Military, Police, and Judicial Capabilities Within Borders.....	26
Session 9: Coordinating Responses Across Borders.....	27

ABOUT THE AFRICA CENTER

Since its inception in 1999, the Africa Center has served as a forum for research, academic programs, and the exchange of ideas with the aim of enhancing citizen security by strengthening the effectiveness and accountability of African institutions, in support of U.S. - Africa policy.

VISION

Security for all Africans championed by effective institutions accountable to their citizens.

Realizing the vision of an Africa free from organized armed violence guaranteed by African institutions that are committed to protecting African citizens is the driving motivation of the Africa Center. This aim underscores the Center's commitment to contributing to tangible impacts by working with our African partners – military and civilian, governmental and civil society, as well as national and regional. All have valuable roles to play in mitigating the complex drivers of conflict on the continent today. Accountability to citizens is an important element of our vision as it reinforces the point that in order to be effective, security institutions must not just be “strong,” but also be responsive to and protective of the rights of citizens.

MISSION

To advance African security by expanding understanding, providing a trusted platform for dialogue, building enduring partnerships, and catalyzing strategic solutions.

The Africa Center's mission revolves around the generation and dissemination of knowledge through our research, academic programs, strategic communications, and community chapters. Drawing on the practical experiences and lessons learned from security efforts on the continent, we aim to generate relevant insight and analysis that can inform practitioners and policymakers on the pressing security challenges that they face. Recognizing that addressing serious challenges can only come about through candid and thoughtful exchanges, the Center provides face-to-face and virtual platforms where partners can exchange views on priorities and sound practices. These exchanges foster relationships that, in turn, are maintained over time through the Center's community chapters, communities of interest, follow-on programs, and ongoing dialogue between participants and staff. This dialogue—infused with real world experiences and fresh analysis—provides an opportunity for continued learning and catalyzes concrete actions.

MANDATE

The Africa Center is a U.S. Department of Defense institution established and funded by Congress for the study of security issues relating to Africa and serving as a forum for bilateral and multilateral research, communication, exchange of ideas, and training involving military and civilian participants. (10 U.S.C 342)

Overview

Transnational organized crime is a growing threat in Africa as technology and growth in trade link the continent ever more closely to licit and illicit opportunities in the global marketplace. Political instability and weak state control or legitimacy in some countries also amplify structural conditions that facilitate transnational organized crime, whether through human trafficking, drug trafficking and goods smuggling, or natural resource theft and poaching. These multiple forms of transnational organized crime are shaped by a complex web of formal and informal actors, who have varying degrees of linkage and organizational cohesion. Seeking to evade detection, arrest, or sanction, they adapt to states' evolving legal, policy, and kinetic responses and strategically navigate multi-crime spaces to achieve their goals.

These developments call for nimble actions by military, police, justice sector officials, and communities within countries, as well as harmonized approaches to countering relevant threats on the regional and continental levels. Although the African Union (AU), Regional Economic Communities (RECs), and national governments have made progress, significant challenges persist. Within countries, there is a need for military, police, intelligence, and judicial actors to consistently coordinate and mutually leverage their responses. Citizen- and community-based approaches to addressing the drivers of transnational organized crime are also worthy of attention; furthermore, there are notable opportunities to integrate local concerns and perspectives on transnational organized crime into national security strategy. Cross-border, regional, and continent-wide collaboration mechanisms also pose institutional, political, and operational challenges and opportunities in this domain. Finally, in strong and fragile states alike, there is diversity in the will and capacity to respond in ways that appropriately balance security, development, and human rights concerns. Through peer learning and experience sharing, African security and justice sector actors participating in this Africa Center seminar will have an opportunity to consider different ways to address these challenges in responding to transnational organized crime in their ongoing work.

Program Objectives

This week-long seminar on Countering Transnational Organized Crime is designed to facilitate participants' engagement in peer learning about tools, techniques, and approaches for effectively countering transnational organized crime in their countries, in the region, and across the continent. To this end, there are four specific program objectives:

1. Identify the generalized drivers of transnational organized crime, its consequences, and the security and justice challenges that those responding to it often encounter.
2. Compare the challenges that military, police, and judicial actors face when seeking to counter specific aspects of organized crime (namely, human trafficking, natural resource theft and poaching; drug trafficking and goods smuggling).
3. Understand the importance of tailoring state responses to transnational organized crime to local and national contexts, including the balancing of militarized, developmental, and human rights-based approaches in a variety of contexts.
4. Analyze possible responses to transnational organized crime, identifying necessary synergies between domestic security and justice actors to facilitate collaboration, as well as ways to harmonize regional and continental level initiatives with domestic endeavors.

Academic Approach

Recognizing the diversity of challenges and opportunities in the domain of countering transnational organized crime, this workshop will seek to capture important lessons and sound practices through:

- a) Plenary sessions that reinforce peer learning by focusing on practical ways to understand the drivers, patterns, and consequences of various forms of transnational organized crime (including human trafficking, natural resource theft and poaching, and drug trafficking and goods smuggling);
- b) Small group discussions that reinforce the learning objectives, helping participants exchange lessons learned and further develop new ideas;
- c) A simulation exercise and briefback session that gives participants an opportunity to apply concepts and techniques raised in the seminar, and that asks them to design a response to a fictitious country's transnational organized crime challenges.

The workshop will be conducted in English, French, and Portuguese. The program will be conducted under a strict policy of non-attribution.

The Syllabus

This syllabus provides an overview of academic goals and key policy questions related to countering transnational organized crime in various African countries and regional contexts. The first several sessions provide political economy and gateway crime frameworks for understanding transnational organized crime quite broadly; a second set of sessions give participants an opportunity to take a "deep dive" into the workings and consequences of specific forms of transnational organized crime (human trafficking and human smuggling; natural resource theft and poaching; and drug trafficking and goods smuggling); and a third set of sessions focus on ways to design state responses to transnational organized crime, from the community and citizen level to the national, regional, and international levels.

For each session listed in the syllabus, we provide a brief introduction to the topic and list questions for discussion. We also include selected articles, whose primary purpose is to help frame the issues within the context of available scholarship, evidence, and policy documents. The syllabus most likely covers these issues in more detail and in greater breadth than can be sufficiently discussed in the available time during the seminar. It is beneficial to read some or all of the recommended readings on the syllabus prior to the seminar, because the readings will place participant and speaker comments into appropriate context. However, we also hope that you use these materials as resources even after the program concludes, and that you return to them for relevant details. We encourage you to bring questions and suggestions about the materials and the course in general to our attention. The quality of our programs and courses has greatly benefited from the enthusiastic willingness of past participants to offer constructive criticisms and suggestions. We are quite willing to discuss specific topics with you.

Furthermore, as the syllabus shows, research on countering transnational organized crime in Africa is a relatively new field; therefore, a great deal of expertise and knowledge also lies in the seminar participants themselves, many of whom are practitioners who have spent their careers addressing related issues. We encourage you to share your experiences during the sessions as well in order to maximize learning during the week.

The outside materials and academic content included in this syllabus do not reflect the views or official position of the Department of Defense or the United States government. This syllabus is an educational document intended to expose participants to a variety of views and perspectives to help prepare them to take full advantage of the program.

Preparation for the Seminar

Before the seminar, we encourage you to:

1. Read this syllabus.
2. Read some or all of the recommended readings.
3. Spend time thinking about and answering the discussion questions.
4. Consider what experiences from your work might be relevant to share in discussion groups.
5. Be prepared to participate actively in discussion groups and to learn from participants from other countries.

Map of Africa



Session 1: The Political Economy of Transnational Organized Crime: Drivers, Patterns, and Consequences

Format: Plenary Presentations and Moderated Question-Answer Session

Objectives:

- Get familiar with political economy frameworks for understanding the drivers, patterns, and consequences of transnational organized crime in Africa
- Identify the roles and the range of licit and illicit markets, as well as political and criminal actors involved in transnational organized criminal networks
- Assess the ways that African countries' experiences with transnational organized crime have changed with recent developments in the global economy, including the role that megatrends play in fostering or constraining patterns of transnational organized crime

Background

Transnational organized crime in Africa has become an increasingly relevant subject in national security and foreign policy discussions. During the Cold War, African countries also saw an influx of small arms and light weapons during the Cold War that enabled increased trafficking, poaching, and smuggling. The 1990s brought "the growth of the container trade, the rise of mobile phone use and accessibility to the Internet," factors that later facilitated stronger linkages between global criminal networks and local criminal groups.¹ In the 2000s, changes in the routes and volume of the global drug trade increased the salience of West and East African ports as transshipment points. Finally, political instability – along with economic development dynamics in stable and fragile states alike – have bolstered human smuggling and risks of human trafficking.

There are many forms of transnational organized crime perpetrated in Africa – from human, drug, and wildlife trafficking to natural resource theft and poaching; piracy; and smuggling of licit and counterfeit goods. Yet policymakers define transnational organized crime broadly, in a way that transcends these specialized forms. There is no agreed-upon definition of organized crime, but a common one is "a number of illegal activities, often within an illicit economy, conducted by organized groups or networks of people over time and for profit," often fueled by the use of violence and/or corruption.² Organized crime is transnational when networked activities cross official political borders. Networked activities, however, range widely in scale and in their degree of globalization. As scholarship on African politics points out, not all people engaged in transnational organized crime necessarily think that their activities are illegitimate, even if they are formally defined as such; some, when asked, believe that their work is no more criminal than that of certain officials in the states whose laws they are breaking when they traffic, poach, or smuggle.³

Political economy frameworks are useful tools for understanding the drivers, patterns, and consequences of transnational organized crime in Africa. Political economy is "the study of rational decisions in the context of political and economic institutions," which shape various actors' incentives to behave in certain ways.⁴ Thus, political economy frameworks are based on the idea that both political and economic factors shape the incentives of individuals and groups to make decisions that can, in aggregate, either foster or discourage activities like human trafficking, goods smuggling, or poaching. Using a political economy approach helps to trace the sources of various actors' incentives to enable or engage in organized crime, accurately assess the ways they must interact with others to do so, and think systematically about the repercussions that such crime has on the individual, community, and national levels. For instance, one political economy

factor to pay attention to is local livelihoods. Understanding local livelihoods in areas with high rates of transnational organized crime can help us to understand what economic alternatives to it exist and how profitable they are. A political economy approach might also assess laws and governance. Legal frameworks and law enforcement shape how much effort, risk, and reward are involved in perpetrating transnational organized crime.

Because they demand analysis of people's incentives to support or work against various illicit activities, political economy frameworks are also useful for understanding ways to counter and build resilience to transnational organized crime. One prominent model for Africa focuses on the joint workings of three different kinds of actors: certain "senior figures within the state," "local power brokers," and "professional criminals."⁵ For each actor, one can analyze who has the power to tax and control the flows of trafficking, poaching, or smuggling, and how each actor depends on the others to profit from such crimes. It is key to analyze *how* each actor is involved – through direct participation or indirect facilitation; through activities in licit or illicit markets; and through violent or peaceful tactics. These factors are also shaped by the structure of particular illicit markets, which may differ in terms of international and national sources of demand and supply.⁶

Discussion Questions:

- What forms does transnational organized crime take in your country? To what extent do these forms fit and/or deviate from the definition of transnational organized crime proposed for this seminar?
- How do political economy frameworks for diagnosing the drivers and patterns of transnational organized crime apply to the dynamics of transnational organized crime that you observe in your country? What aspects are more difficult to make sense of with political economy approaches?
- What kinds of criminal groups and networks operate in your country to engage in human trafficking, poaching, drug trafficking, and goods smuggling? What kinds of non-criminal actors and licit markets intersect with these activities?

Recommended Readings:

1. Mark Shaw, "Africa's Changing Place in the Global Criminal Economy / L'évolution de la place de l'Afrique dans l'économie criminelle mondiale," ENACT Continental Report 1, September 2017
 - a. English: <https://enact-africa.s3.amazonaws.com/site/uploads/2017-09-26-enact-continental-report1.pdf>
 - b. Français: <https://enactafrica.org/research/continental-reports/levolution-de-la-place-de-lafrique-dans-leconomie-criminelle-mondiale>
2. Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime, "Organized Crime Index Africa 2019," https://globalinitiative.net/wp-content/uploads/2019/09/enact_report.pdf

Additional Readings:

Mark Shaw & Stephen Ellis, "Does Organized Crime Exist in Africa?" *African Affairs* 114 (2015), 505-528, <https://openaccess.leidenuniv.nl/handle/1887/360>

Session 2: Gateways to Transnational Organized Crime through Enabling Crimes

Format: Plenary Presentation and Moderated Question-Answer Session

Objectives:

- Understand how the core gateway crimes (money laundering/financial crimes, high-level government corruption, cybercrime) enable human trafficking, natural resource theft/poaching, drug trafficking, and goods smuggling
- Consider the merits and the challenges of addressing gateway crimes as a means of countering transnational organized crime
- Analyze the architecture of the transnational “crime-terror” nexus in Africa, distinguishing the motives, behaviors, and techniques of criminal group leaders and members from terrorist group leaders and members

Background:

Transnational organized crime is often facilitated by “enabling” or “gateway” crimes like money laundering, cybercrime, and the complicity of certain high-level government officials. **Money laundering and other financial crimes** facilitate the movement of profits that groups and networks have made from transnational organized crime.⁷ Money laundering seeks to make ill-gotten gains or illicit flows look as if they came from licit, legal sources; in so doing, it allows the perpetrators of transnational organized crime to retain access to vast profits from their activities. Furthermore, financial crimes in Africa are ever more frequently enabled by **cybercrime** originating on and off of the continent. Finally, the AU High Level Panel on Illicit Financial Flows notes that **corruption** among certain high-level African officials is a driver of transnational organized crime.⁸ Often, when this is the case, high-level government officials act in a private capacity to enable others’ conduct of illicit activities.⁹ This fosters a parallel political economy that undermines state legitimacy and economic development.¹⁰

Seeking to deter enabling crimes can help to “prevent criminal elements from growing or from becoming more entrenched.”¹¹ This makes stopping enabling crimes a useful element of broader efforts to counter transnational organized crime. However, countering human, drug, and wildlife trafficking through anti-money laundering and anti-corruption initiatives will also require enhanced inter-agency collaboration with financial intelligence units, state and private banks, state anti-corruption commissions, and civil society. In addition, countries need robust domestic legal frameworks and practical capabilities to sanction such activities, as well as the investigative capacities to collect physical and electronic evidence of wrongdoing.

Enabling crimes for transnational organized crime also serve as gateway crimes for terrorism in some cases. Weapons smuggling and financial crimes are central components of the “crime-terror nexus” in several of Africa’s fragile states. For example, Al-Shabaab is reported to engage in human and drug trafficking, charcoal and sugar smuggling, cattle rustling, and piracy, using those activities to recruit organized criminal actors and to gain knowledge from them about government vulnerabilities and information about transportation routes.¹² Similarly, Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) finances itself in part by taxing cargo (drugs, cigarettes, weapons) that organized crime groups smuggle within and across porous borders.¹³ In these ways, there is some “convergence” in the methods and tools of terrorist/violent extremist networks and transnational organized crime networks.¹⁴ However, there are also major goal-related differences between these two types of groups. While both exploit weakly governed territories to engage in their principal

activities, terrorist and violent extremist groups have ideological and political goals. In contrast, transnational organized crime groups may fulfill governance functions at times, but they have overarching economic motives for doing so.

Discussion Questions:

- What kinds of linkages between gateway crimes and transnational organized crime have you observed or experienced in your own work? What kinds of tools and techniques do security and justice sector actors need in order to address gateway crimes in ways that counter transnational organized crimes like human, drug, and wildlife trafficking?
- To what extent do you observe convergence between different forms of transnational organized crime in your country? In other words, are there groups or networks that are increasingly prone to engaging in more than one form of transnational organized crime? If not, why not? If so, what do you think explains the convergence?
- How robust is the nexus between transnational organized crime and terrorism in your country or region? To what extent is it useful to treat terrorist and transnational organized criminal groups separately, as distinct entities requiring government response?

Recommended Readings:

1. INTERPOL, "Overview of Serious and Organized Crime in Africa / Evaluation stratégique de la criminalité organisée en Afrique 2018," ENACT Analytical Report, 29 October 2018
 - a. English: <https://enactafrica.org/research/analytical-reports/interpol-overview-of-serious-and-organised-crime-in-africa-2018>, pp. 4-7, 29-34 (Executive Summary, Enabling Crimes and Criminal Convergences, Illicit Flows of Money and Assets).
 - b. Français: <https://enactafrica.org/research/analytical-reports/evaluation-strategique-de-la-criminalite-organisee-en-afrique-2018>, pp. 4-7, 38-45 (Résumé, Infractions de facilitation et activités criminelles convergentes, Flux illicites de fonds)
2. Serigne Bamba Guèye, "Connections between Jihadist groups and smuggling and illegal trafficking rings in the Sahel / Connexions entre groupes djihadistes et réseaux de contrebandes et de trafics illicites dans le Sahel," Freidrich Ebert Stiftung, 2017
 - a. Français: <https://library.fes.de/pdf-files/bueros/fes-pscc/14175.pdf>, pages 13-24.
 - b. English: <http://library.fes.de/pdf-files/bueros/fes-pscc/14176.pdf>, pp. 13-24.

Additional Readings:

Richard Chelin, "Southern Africa: Three Key Organized Crime Threats," ENACT Observer, July 10, 2019, <https://enactafrica.org/research/trend-reports/three-key-organised-crime-threats>

"The Hague Good Practices on the Nexus Between Transnational Organized Crime and Terrorism / Bonnes pratiques de la Haye sur les liens entre la criminalité transnationale organisée et le terrorisme," Global Counterterrorism Forum

- a. English:
https://www.thegctf.org/Portals/1/Documents/Framework%20Documents/C/GCTF-Good-Practices-on-the-Nexus_ENG.pdf?ver=2018-09-21-122246-363
- b. Français:
https://www.thegctf.org/Portals/1/Documents/Framework%20Documents/C/GCTF-Good-Practices-on-the-Nexus_FR.pdf?ver=2018-09-21-122246-363

Session 3: Human Trafficking

Format: Plenary Presentations and Moderated Question-Answer Session

Objectives:

- Examine the nature and scope of human trafficking that prevails in multiple regions of Africa, as well as the factors in the political economy that drive such patterns.
- Examine the linkages and differences between migration, human smuggling, and human trafficking in Africa.
- Consider the harms and consequences of human trafficking for politics, the economy, and society.

Background

Most African countries are source, transit, and destination countries for human trafficking.

Human trafficking is the recruitment, harboring, transport, transfer, or reception of people for the purposes of exploitation. Trafficking occurs through means like coercion, abduction, fraud, abuse of power, or deception.¹⁵ According to the UN's Palermo Protocol – which the vast majority of African states have signed and ratified – trafficking's main purpose, "exploitation," refers to sexual exploitation, forced labor, slavery, organ removal, and other related practices.¹⁶ **Human smuggling** and **migration** are two current trends that are different from human trafficking, but linked to it under certain conditions. Human smuggling is the process through which individuals voluntarily engage in irregular migration, seeking assistance at evading border controls to enter another country, often for financial or material gain. While human smuggling by definition entails voluntary illicit movement across borders, human trafficking is perpetrated through deception or coercion, is not voluntary, and can be (but is not always) transnational.¹⁷

Many people who are willfully smuggled at the start of their journeys are at higher risk of human trafficking; furthermore, refugees trying to leave conflict zones, regular migrants who are "dislocated from community and family support structures," or people working in informal or hidden formal sectors of employment are at greater trafficking risk.¹⁸ The links between migration, human smuggling, and human trafficking are often amplified in conflict zones, where the state is not reliably present to engage in the standard policy responses to trafficking: prevention of trafficking acts, prosecution of perpetrators, protection of victims, and partnership-building for responses.¹⁹ Factors such as the reduction in legal opportunities to migrate, as well as effective border controls in transit and destination countries, have bolstered markets for human smuggling. As journeys get more complex or dangerous, relatively ad hoc smuggling actors get "crowded out" by professionally criminalized syndicates, which tend to inflict more harms on victims.²⁰

Flows from human smuggling and human trafficking occur along several routes. Among them, a "southern route," with South Africa as the prime destination country, entails the movement of people for labor and sex trafficking from countries in Southern, Eastern, and the Horn of Africa.²¹ In Central Africa, illegal mining activities and rebel group recruitment of children can lend themselves to transnational forms of human trafficking. Human trafficking for organ removal has been reported as well.²² Several North African countries are transit hubs for human smuggling and trafficking of people from West and Central Africa to Europe. Additional risks of human trafficking arise in transit countries for irregular migrants, who work illegally in order to pay to continue on to their final destinations.

Discussion Questions:

- In what ways is your country a source, transit, and destination country for human trafficking? Have you observed any relationships between human smuggling and human trafficking in your work?
- What groups and networks are perpetrating human smuggling and human trafficking in your country? How, if at all, do these actors interact with those involved in legal economic activities and markets?
- How can the harms that result from human trafficking be mitigated through state responses?

Recommended Readings:

1. Lucia Bird & Tuesday Reitano, "Trafficking in Persons in Conflict Contexts: What is a Realistic Response from Africa?" ENACT Consortium Policy Brief 10, June 2019, <https://globalinitiative.net/wp-content/uploads/2019/07/2019-06-30-tip-policy-brief-10.pdf>
2. Ekaterina Golovko, "Players of Many Parts: The evolving role of smugglers in West Africa's Migration Economy / Des acteurs aux multiples rôles: L'évolution des rôles des passeurs dans l'industrie de la migration en Afrique de l'Ouest," Dakar: Mixed Migration Center, June 2019
 - a. English: http://www.mixedmigration.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/06/065_briefing-paper_smugglers_wa.pdf
 - b. Français: http://www.mixedmigration.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/11/065_briefing-paper_smugglers_wa_french-.pdf
3. Bram Fouws & Christopher Horwood, "Smuggled South: An updated overview of mixed migration from the Horn of Africa to Southern Africa with specific focus on protection risks, human smuggling, and trafficking," Danish Refugee Council, March 2017, https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/Smuggled_South.pdf

Additional Readings:

"Human Smuggling and Human Trafficking: What is the Difference and Why Does it Matter?" ENACT Observer, <https://enactafrica.org/research/explainers/human-smuggling-and-human-trafficking-what-is-the-difference-and-why-does-it-matter>

Session 4: Natural Resource Theft and Poaching

Format: Plenary Presentations and Moderated Question-Answer Session

Objectives:

- Examine the nature and scope of natural resource theft and poaching that prevails in multiple regions of Africa, as well as the factors in the political economy that drive such patterns.
- Consider the harms and consequences of natural resource theft and poaching for politics, the economy, and society.

Background

Natural resource crimes and poaching take many forms in Africa. Both African and international criminal networks, linked to legitimate businesses and smaller-scale local groups involved in poaching and resource theft, facilitate flows through illicit flora and fauna supply chains.²³ The **poaching and trafficking of wildlife** – particularly “the trafficking of elephant ivory, great apes, rhino horns, and pangolins” – are identified by INTERPOL as “major threats” throughout sub-Saharan Africa.²⁴ Poaching rings, whose leaders rely on locals with knowledge of the terrain to help them succeed in their endeavors, may offer security and social welfare benefits to individual poachers. They may also provide social welfare benefits to local communities that feel neglected by the state or are disempowered by state actions like land seizures for establishing wildlife reserves.²⁵ AU strategy documents say that corruption also “plays a key role in obtaining illegitimate or falsified permits for the transportation of illegally procured wildlife and timber products, or for laundering such products into legal supply chains.”²⁶

Illegal mining of minerals like gold often involve a complex supply chain of local artisanal miners, their managers, buyers of gold, and dealers who export it.²⁷ However, commercial and artisanal mining in weakly governed spaces can also lend itself to forced labor, particularly among vulnerable groups like women and migrants. **Oil bunkering** occurs in several resource-rich countries, with perpetrators tapping into pipelines and moving the oil elsewhere for refinement and sale.²⁸ This yields immense revenue losses for African governments. It also increases the risk of oil spills and explosions, which threaten public health and degrade the environment.²⁹

Illegal, unregulated, and unreported (IUU) fishing is also a transnational organized crime when it involves catching fish in a particular country’s waters and transporting the catch elsewhere for processing or sale.³⁰ **Illegal logging** is another notable trend in West and Central Africa. Research by the leading experts shows that South African ports are popular sites of export, with China as a major destination country, although illicit timber has also reached European cities.³¹ Leading research finds that illegal logging is difficult to curb because of “inconsistent laws and regulations, collusion between state officials and companies engaged in deforestation, including corruption in the permit systems, ineffective record keeping for licensing and trade, and the failure to mount effective law-enforcement operations.”³² Logging moratoriums have had the unintended effect of consolidating illicit networks’ control over the sector at the expense of smaller scale, licit loggers.³³

Natural resource crimes and poaching pose a series of threats to African states and societies, including local communities. For instance, markets for the taxation of poaching and illegal mining tend to emerge in spaces where the state has a weak presence; the opportunity to tax illicit flows in these contexts can fortify armed groups and increase their capacity for violence. As a second

example, IUU fishing threatens fisheries, a vital source of food and jobs to millions of Africans. Some estimate Africa's fishing stocks will be decimated in forty years, and Africa's population is expected to double in the same time period. These factors will heighten risks of food insecurity and political instability. Furthermore, as the African Union has pointed out, the livelihoods of many Africans depend upon the ongoing availability of plant and animal resources.³⁴ Conservation is thus a critical issue linked to natural resource theft and poaching as well.

Discussion Questions:

- In what ways is your country a source, transit, or destination country for natural resource theft and/or wildlife trafficking? Based on what you've seen in your work, what factors explain why there are markets for protecting or enabling these illicit activities in your country?
- What groups and networks are perpetrating natural resource theft and poaching in your country? How, if at all, do these actors interact with those involved in legal economic activities and markets?
- How can the harms that result from natural resource theft and poaching be mitigated through state responses?

Recommended Reading:

1. Christopher Vandome & Alex Vines, "Tackling Illegal Wildlife Trade in Africa: Economic Incentives and Approaches," Chatham House Africa Programme Research Paper, October 2018, <https://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/default/files/publications/research/2018-10-11-tackling-illegal-wildlife-trade-africa-vandome-vines-final2.pdf>
2. African Union, "African Strategy on Combating Illegal Exploitation and Illegal Trade in Wild Flora and Fauna in Africa / Stratégie Africaine sur la lutte contre l'Exploitation Illégale et le Commerce Illicite de la Faune et de la Flore Sauvages en Afrique" May 2015, https://au.int/sites/default/files/documents/33796-doc-african_strategy_strategy_africaine_au.pdf
3. André Standing, "Criminality in Africa's Fishing Industry: A Threat to Human Security / La criminalité dans la pêche commerciale en Afrique / Criminalidade na indústria pesqueira de África," Africa Security Brief 33, Africa Center for Strategic Studies, June 6, 2017:
 - a. English: <https://africacenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/06/ASB33EN-Criminality-in-Africas-Fishing-Industry-A-Threat-to-Human-Security.pdf>
 - b. Français: <https://africacenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/11/ASB33FR-La-criminalite-dans-la-peche-commerciale-en-Afrique-une-menace-pour-la-securite-humaine.pdf>
 - c. Português: <https://africacenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/11/ASB33PT-Criminalidade-na-industria-pesqueira-de-Africa-Uma-ameaca-a-seguranca-humana.pdf>

Additional Reading:

Vanda Felbab-Brown, "Wildlife and Drug Trafficking, Terrorism, and Human Security," *PRISM* 7:4, 124-136, https://cco.ndu.edu/Portals/96/Documents/prism/prism7_4/181204_FelbabBrown_PDF.pdf?ve r=2018-12-04-161238-260

Hassoum Cisse, Laurent Kadima Mavinga, Jackson Miller, Oscar Nkala, Riana Raymonde Radrianariosa, Tuesday Reitano & Babar Turay, "Razing Africa: Combating Criminal Consortia in the Logging Sector," ENACT Research Paper 06, September 2018, <https://enact-africa.s3.amazonaws.com/site/uploads/2018-09-20-research-paper-06-logging.pdf>

Deo Gumba, "Cattle Rustling, Drought, and Conflict: Is Regional Policy the Missing Link," ENACT Observer Trend Reports, 29 March 2018, <https://enactafrica.org/research/trend-reports/cattle-rustling-drought-and-conflict-is-regional-policy-the-missing-link>

Session 5: Drug Trafficking and Goods Smuggling

Format: Plenary Presentations and Moderated Question-Answer Session

Objectives:

- Understand the nature and scope of drug trafficking and goods smuggling that prevail in multiple regions of Africa, as well as the factors in the political economy that drive such patterns.
- Consider the harms and consequences of drug trafficking and goods smuggling for politics, the economy, and society.

Background:

Drug trafficking has increasingly been a policy concern of African governments over the last several decades. West Africa became a prime transshipment point for drug trafficking to Europe in the 1990s and 2000s, when new legislation made it more difficult to ship drugs from Latin America through the Caribbean to Europe.³⁵ In addition to West African countries, various states in Central Africa are cocaine transit hubs on routes from South America to the Gulf States.³⁶ Heroin trafficking, as well as the regional smuggling of licit pharmaceuticals are additional notable trends.³⁷ The Eastern and Southern African drug routes became more popular in the 1990s, when policing increased on land-based smuggling routes from South Asia through the Balkans to Europe. Maritime routes through Eastern and Southern African ports have since become more common, with African countries functioning as transit and destination locations for narcotics. Drugs are usually trafficked inland from spots along the coast. They are consolidated before moving down the east African coast.³⁸ People often move drugs along with sugar, charcoal, and arms; they send them out of the region concealed in shipments of licit goods.³⁹

The consequences of drug trafficking touch many domains: public health (when drug flows increase local use), economics (when trafficking activities facilitating corruption that reduces public finance and weakens licit trade), and national security (when armed groups are able to lean on trafficking proceeds or networks to sustain themselves through illicit trade).⁴⁰ Experts argue that to minimize these harms, solutions must address “how public officials and local authorities benefit from their links with drug traffickers and vice versa.”⁴¹

The **smuggling of cigarettes, stolen vehicles, fake medicines, and counterfeit electrical products** is another form of transnational organized crime.⁴² Generally, smugglers exploit cross-border variations in the prices of particular goods – or create counterfeit products worth less than the goods they are imitating – and transport these goods to where they make profit. In some contexts, where there are few alternative economic livelihoods available, the profit margin offered through goods smuggling need not be high for the activity to be attractive.

Goods smuggling is not always prioritized in efforts to counter transnational organized crime because policymakers do not always see goods smuggling as a practice that is as harmful as drug trafficking, human trafficking, or poaching. In some cases, the individual smugglers within Africa are not strongly linked to criminal syndicates. Sometimes, local people smuggle goods as a “survival strateg[y] adopted in the face of neglect of the state.”⁴³ Nevertheless, the existence of goods smuggling routes across borders can facilitate the trafficking of drugs, people, and small arms.⁴⁴ The state also loses tax revenue from smuggling. However, closing borders can have the unintended effect of fueling illicit trade while slowing formal economic activity.

Discussion Questions:

- In what ways is your country a source, transit, or destination country for drug trafficking and/or goods smuggling? Based on what you've seen in your work, what factors explain why there are markets for protecting or enabling these illicit activities in your country?
- What groups and networks are perpetrating drug trafficking and/or goods smuggling in your country? How, if at all, do these actors interact with those involved in legal economic activities and markets?
- How can the harms that result from natural resource theft and poaching be mitigated through state responses?

Recommended Readings:

1. Kwesi Aning & John Pokoo, "Understanding the nature and threats of drug trafficking to national and regional security in West Africa / Trafic de drogue et menaces pour la sécurité nationale et régionale en Afrique de l'Ouest"
 - a. English: available in *Stability: International Journal of Security and Development* 3:1, 2014, <https://www.stabilityjournal.org/articles/10.5334/sta.df/>
 - b. Français: disponible comme un Document de référence de la Commission Ouest-Africaine sur les Drogues, June 2013, <http://www.globalcommissionondrugs.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/02/trafic-de-drogue-et-menaces-pour-la-securite-national-et-regionale-en-AO-2013-07-16.pdf>
2. Mark Shaw, Simone Haysom & Peter Gastrow, "Tackling Heroin Trafficking on the East African Coast / Combater o tráfico de heroína na costa da África Oriental," ENACT Policy Brief 4, June 2018:
 - a. English: <https://enact-africa.s3.amazonaws.com/site/uploads/2018-07-02-tackling-heroin-trafficking-policy-brief.pdf>
 - b. Português: <https://enactafrica.org/research/policy-briefs/combater-o-trafico-de-heroína-na-costa-da-africa-oriental>
3. Alexander Babuta & Cathy Haenlein, "Commodity Smuggling in the Maghreb: A Silent Threat," Policy Centre for the New South, May 2018, <https://www.policycenter.ma/sites/default/files/OCPPC-PB1814.pdf>

Session 6: Citizen and Community Based Approaches to Response

Format: Plenary Presentations and Moderated Question-Answer Session

Objectives:

- Explore the various ways that residents, citizens and communities in rural and urban Africa experience transnational organized crime.
- Consider how various local actors – from elected officials, state bureaucrats, customary leaders, armed groups, youth, women, and civil society – fit into the political economy of transnational organized crime and its countering.
- Analyze good practices for state security and justice actors to support local community-based responses to transnational organized crime, as well as to build community resilience to transnational organized crime.

Background

Citizens and communities often fashion their own responses to the security challenges that arise from transnational organized crime. There are a variety of local dispute resolution, livelihood generation, civic advocacy, and security provision mechanisms that citizens and communities create and use to deal with transnational organized crime and its consequences. Particularly in borderlands, local innovation in response arises in a context of “low state presence, mistrust between local communities and the state, and high levels of crime, insecurity, and poverty.”⁴⁵

People-centered approaches, which African government and civil society actors can use in their own design of responses, are approaches to response that recognize the agency of citizens and communities in solving problems they face. People-centered approaches also seek to further “strengthen the capacity of borderland communities and existing security providers to offer their own solutions to security.” This type of response also recognizes that there is much to learn about transnational organized crime through the perspectives of residents and citizens of the communities most affected by it.⁴⁶

Residents, citizens, and communities in rural and urban Africa experience transnational organized crime in many ways. Some participate in poaching, goods smuggling, or drug trafficking, and others do not; some gain prosperity and status based on financial flows from transnational organized crime, while others suffer negative consequences of such activities (and of state responses to them), from land seizures to impunity for violence related to transnational organized crime and its countering. Ultimately, the state’s presence and reputation as a reliable provider of services – as well as an enabler of alternative economic livelihoods – has an influence on (a) whether people trust state authorities seeking to respond to transnational organized crime in specific locations; and (b) whether people are drawn to transnational organized criminal activities and/or believe that such activities are legitimate in the local context.⁴⁷ Sometimes, drug trafficking, goods smuggling, and poaching are “resilience strategies” that help people ensure citizen and community security and survival “in the face of weak governance, corruption, food insecurity, and conflict.”⁴⁸

These dynamics affect the kind of local responses that citizens and communities have to transnational organized crime, as well as the kinds of people-centered responses that the state and civil society are best able to promote country-wide. To design effective country-level policy responses, understanding local responses to transnational organized crime is key. Including communities in dialogues or consultations to shape the contours of state response is equally

important. Furthermore, researchers suggest that the responses with the greatest chances of long-term success display a carefully calibrated balance between militarized, development-focused, and human rights-based approaches. A key element to all three of these approaches is strengthening the state's ability to ensure citizen and community security in ways that respond to people's everyday life, realities, experiences, problems, and needs.

Discussion Questions:

- How do residents, citizens, and local communities experience transnational organized crime in your country or region? In your capacity, how do you get the information you need about the concerns or experiences that citizens and communities have about transnational organized crime?
- How might various local actors – whether elected officials, state bureaucrats, customary leaders, armed groups, youth, women, and civil society– play into the perpetuation or, alternatively, the countering of transnational organized crime? Under what conditions might various actors be most amenable to building community resilience to the attraction of organized criminal activities?
- What roles can military, police, intelligence, and justice sector actors play in responses that build community resilience to transnational organized crime? What roles can development-based and human rights-based approaches play in this?

Recommended Readings:

1. Mark Shaw & Tuesday Reitano, “People’s Perspectives of Organized Crime in West Africa and the Sahel / Points de vue de la population sur la criminalité organisée dans l’Afrique de l’Ouest et le Sahel / A perspectiva da população em relação ao crime organizado na África Ocidental e no Sahel,” Institute for Security Studies – Africa Paper 254, 2014.
 - a. English: <https://issafrica.s3.amazonaws.com/site/uploads/Paper254.pdf>
 - b. French: https://issafrica.s3.amazonaws.com/site/uploads/Paper254_Frenchv2.pdf
 - c. Português: https://issafrica.s3.amazonaws.com/site/uploads/Paper254_Port.pdf
2. Dominic Naish, “Security and Conflict Management in the African Borderlands: A People-Centered Approach,” African Centre for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes (ACCORD), April 24, 2017, <https://www.accord.org.za/conflict-trends/security-conflict-management-african-borderlands/>

Session 7: Linking Local Realities of Transnational Organized Crime to National Security Strategy

Format: Plenary Presentations and Moderated Question-Answer Session

Objectives:

- Understand how security threats and risks are prioritized in a national security strategy development process.
- Discuss the benefits and the challenges of integrating transnational organized crime threats into national security strategy in a complex security environment.
- Evaluate the ways that transnational organized crime could legally, strategically, and operationally be included in national security strategies in African countries.

Background

African governments are often confronted with security challenges that relate to transnational organized crime. Yet, transnational organized crime has not always been prioritized in national security strategy development, particularly in ways that accurately reflect local experiences with and responses to transnational organized crime. Nevertheless, technical guidance holds that “it is possible to build explicit considerations of the drivers, harms, and dynamics of transnational organized crime into national efforts to design national security strategies,” or even to build those considerations into state efforts to “prevent crime; gather intelligence; ensure border security; fight corruption; and engage in justice sector, police, or prison system reform.”⁴⁹

This panel examines the value of a vision-led national security strategy that provides a country with a clear framework for addressing security threats like transnational organized crime in ways that sustain human, societal, and state security. Generally, national security policy “establishes a national understanding of the threats and risks of the security environment, and the values and principles that will guide the state in providing state and human security.” Ideally, the public – including residents, citizens, and community leaders – are included in the consultations to formulate policy. In turn, a national security strategy describes the tools, approaches, and means that will be used to implement the national security policy.⁵⁰ Effective national security strategies must therefore prioritize vulnerabilities, risks, and threats to the state and its citizens. Once threats are prioritized, the national security strategy designates the institutions charged with addressing them. Policies, regulations, and legislation reinforce the designated division of labor.

Transnational organized crime is a security challenge worthy of specific attention in national security strategy development. Particularly in countries where stakeholder inputs into national security policy indicate concerns about transnational organized crime, African states have an interest in accurately diagnosing the relevant associated threats, risks, and vulnerabilities. Doing so entails state actors working together across inter-agency boundaries to understand the political/economic and technical challenges of combating the entrenchment of transnational organized crime networks. Furthermore, doing so entails state actors building into their plans, processes, and policies nuanced, applied knowledge about why certain residents and communities are (or are not) likely to buy into proposed state initiatives to counter transnational organized crime. This requires incorporating analysis of those residents’ and communities’ social, political, and economic situations into policymaking processes and devising responses that address national interests but also respect the rights of every citizen, even if the ultimate response is not to unanimous liking. Such an approach fits within the human security paradigm, which upholds the

protection of the individual at its core, and acknowledges the shortcomings of the state- or regime-centric approaches to national security.

Discussion Questions:

- What are the security opportunities and threats (military and non-military, actual and potential) facing your country/region? Where do threats linked to transnational organized crime sit in this list of security priorities?
- Are residents, citizens, and their communities included or consulted in national security strategy or policy conversations in your country? To what extent are the dynamics of transnational organized crime in local communities taken into account in government decision-making about security priorities? Why or why not?
- What methods, techniques, and information can African security and justice sector actors use during national security strategy development to understand the local realities that residents, citizens, and communities face in relation to transnational organized crime? What are the pros and cons of working to include these perspectives in the national security strategy process?

Recommended Readings:

1. Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces, “National Security Policies / Les politiques de sécurité nationale,” SSR Backgrounder Series, 2015
 - a. English: https://www.dcaf.ch/sites/default/files/publications/documents/DCAF_BG_9_National%20Security%20Policies.pdf
 - b. Français: https://www.dcaf.ch/sites/default/files/publications/documents/DCAF_BG_9_Les%20politiques%20de%20securite%20nationale_1.pdf
 2. Emile Ouedraogo, “National Security Strategy Development Burkina Faso Case Study (Preliminary Draft) / L’élaboration d’une stratégie de sécurité nationale, étude de cas de Burkina Faso (Brouillon),” July 2018
 - a. English: <https://africacenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/07/NSSD-WORKING-DRAFT-BURKINA-FASO.pdf>
 - b. Français: https://africacenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/08/NSSD-FINAL-DRAFT-BURKINA-FASO_FRENCH-1.pdf
-

Session 8: Leveraging Military, Police, and Judicial Capabilities Within Borders

Format: Plenary Presentations and Moderated Question-Answer Session

Objectives:

- Examine the mechanisms, institutions, and good practices available for African security and justice sector officials to work together across inter-agency boundaries to devise and implement a state's response to transnational organized crime that partially takes place within its borders.
- Analyze similarities and differences in the types of inter-agency coordination and collaboration that are needed within African states to address transnational organized crime in maritime versus land-based domains.
- Recognize the importance of flexibility and adaptation in the implementation of a country's interagency responses to transnational organized crime.

Background:

Recent research emphasizes the importance of developing state responses that integrate **militarized, development-focused, and human rights-based approaches** to deterring transnational organized crime. It is generally agreed that countering transnational organized crime requires nimble, carefully calibrated joint actions by military, police, justice, and intelligence officials, who must also work in concert with local leaders and relevant regional bodies.

Militarized responses to such activities are swift and forceful, which when executed effectively can abate trafficking, smuggling, or poaching in the short term.⁵¹ However, militarized responses alone do not usually render long-term solutions because they rarely seek to change the political and economic incentives for people to perpetrate transnational organized crime in the first place. Sometimes, barriers to long-term solutions arise if militarized responses are carried out in ways that foster mistrust by the local population, whose information about organized criminal activities and ideas about countering them are critical to success. Development-focused and human rights-based responses are longer term, but often more explicitly seek to address the root causes of transnational organized crime. Security and justice sector actors can pursue all three types of approaches, but their effective integration requires inter-agency collaboration.

Inter-agency collaboration and "whole-of-government" approaches are essential for several reasons. First, they provide leeway for states to integrate militarized, development-focused, and human rights-based approaches into their efforts to counter transnational organized crime. This is more likely to yield balanced, holistic, and sustainable solutions. Second, inter-agency cooperation helps to ensure that responses are technically sound and synchronized. For instance, intelligence sharing across various law enforcement and military bodies seeking to interdict traffickers, poachers, or smugglers can improve detection. Similarly, the prosecution of suspected perpetrators is more likely to be timely if judicial actors communicate effectively with police and investigators, and those police and investigators understand the relevant counts that people may be charged with and the evidentiary requirements for prosecution. Third and finally, "whole-of-government" approaches can facilitate the joint analysis needed to tailor state responses to different local contexts.

There is little applied research on how African countries have effectively used inter-agency and whole-of-government approaches – particularly research written by African analysts. You, as seminar participants, have valuable firsthand knowledge that we hope that you will share.

Discussion Questions:

- Have you ever been involved in designing any “whole of government” or inter-agency responses to transnational organized crime for your country? If yes, what skills and strategies did you rely upon to coordinate with counterparts in other parts of the military, police, and justice sectors? What were key challenges in designing and implementing the response?
- How are roles and responsibilities in coordinating “whole of government” or inter-agency collaboration on transnational organized crime issues assigned in your country? Are there natural tensions or synergies in the roles that uniformed and non-uniformed actors in the security and justice sectors are assigned to play in their efforts to coordinate such responses?
- How can African states make their response mechanisms as nimble and adaptive as the transnational criminal networks that they try to counter?

Recommended Readings:

1. UN Security Sector Reform Task Force, “Key Areas of Security Sector Reform to Tackle Transnational Organized Crime,” in *Security Sector Reform Integrated Technical Guidance Notes: Transnational Organized Crime and Security Sector Reform*, 2016, pp. 16-39, https://www.unodc.org/documents/organized-crime/SSR_TOC_ITGN_2016_WEB.pdf
2. Choose one of the following:
 - a. Constanze Blum, “Complex Networks of Organized Crime and the Need for New Tools,” in *Transnational Organized Crime in Southern Africa and Mozambique*, Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, 2016, <http://library.fes.de/pdf-files/bueros/mosambik/13193.pdf> , especially pp. 20-30
 - b. Tim Goudsmid, Andrea Mancini & Andres Vanegas Canosa, “Security Sector Reform, Crime, and Regional Development in West Africa,” in Albrecht Schnabel & Vanessa Farr, eds. *Back to the Roots: Security Sector Reform and Development*, Geneva: DCAF, 2012, pp. 147-148, 156-165, <https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/d3cf/01a28cbee97e80a96b037e082d64b5aede36.pdf>

Session 9: Coordinating Responses Across Borders

Format: Plenary Presentations and Moderated Question-Answer Session

Objectives:

- Examine the institutions, mechanisms, and good practices available for African governments to devise cross-border responses to transnational organized crime.
- Analyze the different ways that coordinated responses have emerged through ad hoc bilateral or multilateral partnerships between African countries, through regional initiatives catalyzed through international organizations like the United Nations, and through various African Union and Regional Economic Community efforts.
- Identify core challenges to cross-border collaboration and discuss how to mitigate them.

Background

Cross-border responses to transnational organized crime can take shape through bilateral or multilateral partnerships between African countries, through regional initiatives catalyzed by Regional Economic Communities (RECs) or international organizations, or through continent-wide efforts of the African Union (AU). Examples of cross-border collaboration might include: strengthening mutual legal assistance or intelligence sharing between countries to facilitate investigation and prosecution of crimes; conducting joint patrols or civil affairs missions in border regions affected by trafficking, poaching, or smuggling; or improving coordination between national customs agencies to facilitate legal cross-border trade and detect illegal transshipments.

Other examples come from the maritime domain. The June 2013 Lomé Code of Conduct, involving 25 West and Central African states, has helped to establish mutually agreeable modes of cross-border collaboration to reduce piracy, natural resource theft, and IUU fishing.⁵² In counter-piracy operations in Somalia, various countries worked together on naval interventions and the prosecution of pirates. This depended on “Memoranda of Understanding between arresting authorities, prosecuting states, legal capacity building, as well as the sharing of criminal evidence across different national law enforcement bodies.”⁵³ Collaborations like these have the potential to furnish states with valuable additional information about security threats.

Beyond the significant efforts occurring through bilateral and multilateral partnerships between neighboring countries, RECs and the AU are also working on their own and with the United Nations, INTERPOL, and foreign donors to fashion cross-border collaboration. For instance, in the Indian Ocean, a Regional Center for Operational Coordination in Seychelles and a Regional Maritime Information Fusion Center in Madagascar were established to promote cross-border information sharing on drug trafficking, piracy, and IUU threats.⁵⁴ On the REC level, cross-border collaboration efforts are in various stages of development. Some institutions have protocols, conventions, and actions plans on the books, but fully implementing them is complex from political and technical standpoints. Considerable differences also exist between the RECs regarding the commitment, scale, and success of sub-regional collective security initiatives more generally.

AU efforts to facilitate cross-border collaboration in countering transnational organized crime are well-defined in policy documents, but are still nascent on the practical level of implementation. The African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) Roadmap for 2016-2020 identifies several challenges, including “weak legal codes to address transnational organized crime” and “a lack of information, analysis and response options for members states and RECs.”⁵⁵ However, one of

the objectives of AFRIPOL, the AU's technical institution for police cooperation, is to facilitate cross-border intelligence sharing to combat transnational organized crime.⁵⁶ These efforts go hand in hand with those to prevent terrorism and fight cybercrime.⁵⁷ The APSA Roadmap envisions the establishment of a center providing Member States with guidance about responding to transnational organized crime, and about how to create investigation units with relevant specializations.⁵⁸

Discussion Questions:

- Have you ever been involved in designing any cross-border responses to transnational organized crime for your country? If yes, what skills and strategies did you rely upon to coordinate with your partners from other countries? What were key challenges in designing and implementing the response?
- How are roles and responsibilities in coordinating cross-border collaboration on transnational organized crime assigned in your country? Are there natural tensions or synergies in the roles that uniformed and non-uniformed actors in the security and justice sectors are assigned to play in their efforts to coordinate cross-border responses?
- Do you think that transnational organized crime sits high or low on the list of priorities for achieving peace, security, and good governance in your country and in your country's RECs? Can you think of ways to use ideas or principles in the AU's African Peace and Security Architecture to combat transnational organized crime at home?

Recommended Readings

1. African Union. 2019. "Communique of the 845th Peace and Security Council meeting on Organized Transnational Crime, Peace, and Security in Africa / Communiqué du 845^{ème} réunion tenue le 25 avril 2019 sur la criminalité transnationale organisée, la paix, et sécurité en Afrique" May 22, 2019:
 - a. English: <http://www.peaceau.org/en/article/communique-of-the-845th-psc-meeting-on-organized-transnational-crime-peace-and-security-in-africa>
 - b. Français: <http://www.peaceau.org/uploads/cps-com.criminality-trans.org.ps.-afrique.25-4-2019.pdf>
2. Olga Biegus & Christian Beuger, "Poachers and Pirates: Improving Coordination of the Global Response to Wildlife Crime," *South African Crime Quarterly* 60, June 2017, <https://www.ajol.info/index.php/sacq/article/view/159515/149068>
3. UN Security Sector Reform Task Force, "Integrated Capacity Building," in *Security Sector Reform Integrated Technical Guidance Notes: Transnational Organized Crime and Security Sector Reform*, 2016, pp. 8-12, https://www.unodc.org/documents/organized-crime/SSR_TOC_ITGN_2016_WEB.pdf

Additional Readings

Ian Ralby, "Cooperative security to counter cooperative criminals," *DefenceIQ*, March 21, 2017, <https://www.defenceiq.com/naval-maritime-defence/articles/cooperative-security-to-counter-cooperative>

¹ Mark Shaw, “Africa’s Changing Place in the Global Criminal Economy / L’évolution de la place de l’Afrique dans l’économie criminelle mondiale,” ENACT Continental Report 1, September 2017, p. 4.

² Shaw, *op.cit.*, p. x.

³ Mark Shaw & Tuesday Reitano, “People’s Perspectives of Organized Crime in West Africa and the Sahel,” Institute for Security Studies – Africa Paper 254, 2014, <https://issafrica.s3.amazonaws.com/site/uploads/Paper254.pdf>

⁴ Allan Drazen, *Political Economy in Macroeconomics* (Princeton University Press, 2000), p. 4, citing James Alt & Kenneth Shepsle, eds. *Perspectives on Political Economy* (Cambridge University Press, 1990).

⁵ Stephen Ellis & Mark Shaw, “Does Organized Crime Exist in Africa?” *African Affairs*, <https://core.ac.uk/download/pdf/43502813.pdf>, p. 511.

⁶ Shaw, *op.cit.*, p. 7.

⁷ INTERPOL, “Money Laundering,” consulted November 12, 2019, <https://www.interpol.int/en/Crimes/Financial-crime/Money-laundering>

⁸ AU/ECA Conference of Ministers of Finance, Planning, and Economic Development, “Report of the High Level Panel on Illicit Financial Flows from Africa,” https://www.uneca.org/sites/default/files/PublicationFiles/iff_main_report_26feb_en.pdf, p. 43.

⁹ Ellis & Shaw, *op.cit.*

¹⁰ AU/ECA, *op.cit.*, p. 51.

¹¹ INTERPOL, “Overview of Serious and Organized Crime in Africa,” September 29, 2018, p. 29.

¹² Katharine Petrich, “Cows, Charcoal, and Cocaine: Al-Shabaab’s Criminal Activities in the Horn of Africa,” *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism*, 2019, DOI: 10.1080/1057610X.2019.1678873, pp. 13-14.

¹³ Serigne Bamba Guèye, “Connections between Jihadist groups and smuggling and illegal trafficking rings in the Sahel,” Freidrich Ebert Stiftung Peace and Security Series, 2017, p. 15.

¹⁴ For a more generalized and global discussion of convergence, please see Michael Miklaucic & Jacqueline Brewer, eds. *Convergence: Illicit Networks and National Security in the Age of Globalization* (National Defense University Press, 2013), <https://ndupress.ndu.edu/Portals/68/Documents/Books/convergence.pdf> ; Michael Miklaucic & Hilary Matfess, eds. *Beyond Convergence: World Without Order* (National Defense University Press, 2016), <https://cco.ndu.edu/Portals/96/Documents/books/Beyond%20Convergence/BEYOND%20CONVERGENCE%20%20World%20Without%20Order%20.pdf?ver=2016-10-25-125406-170>

¹⁵ UNODC, “What is Human Trafficking?” Consulted November 28, 2019, https://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/human-trafficking/what-is-human-trafficking.html#What_is_Human_Trafficking ; INTERPOL, “Overview of Serious and Organized Crime in Africa,” *op.cit.*, p. 5.

¹⁶ UNODC, *op.cit.*, Shaw, *op.cit.*, p. 3.

¹⁷ UNODC, *op.cit.*, “Human Smuggling and Human Trafficking: What is the Difference and Why Does it Matter?” ENACT Observer, Consulted November 27, 2019, <https://enactafrica.org/research/explainers/human-smuggling-and-human-trafficking-what-is-the-difference-and-why-does-it-matter>

¹⁸ Fiona David, Katharine Bryant & Jacqueline Joudo Larsen, “Migrants and Their Vulnerability to Human Trafficking, Modern Slavery, and Forced Labor,” International Organization for Migration, 2019, https://publications.iom.int/system/files/pdf/migrants_and_their_vulnerability.pdf, pp. 5-6; Ekaterina Golovko, “Players of Many Parts: The evolving role of smugglers in West Africa’s Migration Economy,” Dakar: Mixed Migration Center, June 2019, http://www.mixedmigration.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/06/065_briefing-paper_smugglers_wa.pdf

¹⁹ Lucia Bird & Tuesday Reitano, “Trafficking in Persons in Conflict Contexts: What is a Realistic Response from Africa?” ENACT Consortium Policy Brief 10, June 2019, <https://globalinitiative.net/wp-content/uploads/2019/07/2019-06-30-tip-policy-brief-10.pdf>. For more on the “4Ps,” see UNODC, “What is Human Trafficking?” *op.cit.*; US Department of State, “Trafficking in Persons Report,” June 2019, <https://www.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2019/06/2019-Trafficking-in-Persons-Report.pdf>

²⁰ Tuesday Reitano, “Understanding Contemporary Human Smuggling as a Vector in Migration: A field guide for migration management and humanitarian practitioners,” Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime, May 2018, <https://globalinitiative.net/wp-content/uploads/2018/05/TGIATOC-Understanding-Contemporary-Human-Smuggling-1936-hi-res.pdf>

²¹ Ciara Aucoin & Edwin Hlase, “Human smuggling: Africa’s southern-bound migrants,” ENACT Observer, May 31, 2018, <https://enactafrica.org/research/trend-reports/africas-southern-bound-migrants>

²² INTERPOL, “Overview of Serious and Organized Crime in Africa,” *op.cit.*, p. 15.

²³ Shaw, *op.cit.*, Vanda Felbab-Brown, “Wildlife and Drug Trafficking, Terrorism, and Human Security,” *PRISM* 7:4, 124-136, https://cco.ndu.edu/Portals/96/Documents/prism/prism7_4/181204_FelbabBrown_PDF.pdf?ver=2018-12-04-161238-260

²⁴ INTERPOL, “Overview of Serious and Organized Crime in Africa,” *op.cit.*, p. 20.

²⁵ Felbab-Brown, *op.cit.*, p. 132.

²⁶ African Union, “African Strategy on Combating Illegal Exploitation and Illegal Trade in Wild Flora and Fauna in Africa / Stratégie africaine sur la lutte contre l’Exploitation Illégale et le Commerce Illicite de la Faune et de la Flore Sauvages en Afrique” May 2015, https://au.int/sites/default/files/documents/33796-doc-african_strategy_strategy_africaine_au.pdf

²⁷ Marcena Hunter, “Pulling at Golden Webs: Combating criminal consortia in the African artisanal and small-scale gold mining and trading sector,” ENACT Research Paper 8, April 2019, <https://globalinitiative.net/wp-content/uploads/2019/04/ENACT-Research-Paper-008-Gold-Mining-24Apr1130-WEB.pdf>, pp. 6-7; Kira Zalan, “Tracing conflict gold in the Democratic Republic of Congo,” Public Radio International, June 23, 2017, <https://www.pri.org/stories/2017-06-23/tracing-conflict-gold-democratic-republic-congo>

²⁸ Marine Guide Blog, “Solutions to Piracy and Oil Bunkering in Nigeria Waters,” 2 May 2018; <https://marineandoffshoreinsight.com/solutions-to-piracy-and-oil-bunkering-in-nigeria-waters/>

²⁹ Emily Mangan, “A Primer on Nigeria’s Oil Bunkering,” Council on Foreign Relations *Africa in Transition* guest post, August 4, 2015, <https://www.cfr.org/blog/primer-nigerias-oil-bunkering>

³⁰ André Standing, “Criminality in Africa’s Fishing Industry: A Threat to Human Security,” Africa Security Brief 33, Africa Center for Strategic Studies, June 6, 2017, <https://africacenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/06/ASB33EN-Criminality-in-Africas-Fishing-Industry-A-Threat-to-Human-Security.pdf>, p.4.

³¹ Hassoum Cissé, Laurent Kadima Mavinga, Jackson Miller, Oscar Nkala, Riana Raymonde Radrianariosa, Tuesday Reitano & Babar Turay, “Razing Africa: Combating Criminal Consortia in the Logging Sector,” ENACT Research Paper 06, September 2018, <https://enact-africa.s3.amazonaws.com/site/uploads/2018-09-20-research-paper-06-logging.pdf> ; INTERPOL, “Overview of Serious and Organized Crime in Africa,” *op.cit.*

³² Shaw, *op.cit.*, pp. 15-16.

³³ Cissé et al., *op.cit.*, pp. 16-19.

³⁴ African Union, *op.cit.*, p. 2.

³⁵ Kwesi Aning & John Pokoo, “Understanding the nature and threats of drug trafficking to national and regional security in West Africa,” *Stability: International Journal of Security and Development* 3:1, 2014, <https://www.stabilityjournal.org/articles/10.5334/sta.df/>

³⁶ INTERPOL, “Overview of Serious and Organized Crime in Central Africa,” September 30, 2018, p. 15.

³⁷ INTERPOL, “Overview of Serious and Organized Crime in West Africa,” September 30, 2018, pp. 9-10.

³⁸ Simone Haysom, Peter Gastrow & Mark Shaw, “Heroin Coast: A Political Economy along the Eastern African Seaboard,” ENACT Research Paper 4, June 2018, <https://enact-africa.s3.amazonaws.com/site/uploads/2018-07-02-research-paper-heroin-coast.pdf>, p. 2.

³⁹ INTERPOL, “Overview of Serious and Organized Crime in Southern Africa,” September 30, 2018

⁴⁰ For further discussions of harms, see West Africa Commission on Drugs, “Not Just in Transit: Drugs, the State, and Society in West Africa,” 2014, https://www.globalcommissionondrugs.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/02/WACD_En_Report_WEB_051114.pdf; Aning & Pokoo, *op.cit.*; and USAID, “The Development Response to Drug Trafficking in Africa: A Programming Guide,” April 2013, https://www.usaid.gov/sites/default/files/documents/1860/Development_Response_to_Drug_Trafficking_in_Africa_Programming_Guide.pdf; Neil Carrier & Gernot Klansching, *Africa and the War on Drugs*, Zed Books, 2012.

⁴¹ Aning & Pokoo, *op.cit.*, p. 9.

⁴² Serigne Bamba Guèye, “Connections between Jihadist groups and smuggling and illegal trafficking rings in the Sahel,” Freidrich Ebert Stiftung Peace and Security Series, 2017, <http://library.fes.de/pdf-files/bueros/fes-pscc/14176.pdf> , p. 12; INTERPOL, “Overview of Serious and Organized Crime in Africa,” *op.cit.*

⁴³ Alexander Babuta & Cathy Haenlein, “Commodity Smuggling in the Maghreb: A Silent Threat,” Policy Centre for the New South, May 2018, <https://www.policycenter.ma/sites/default/files/OCPPC-PB1814.pdf>;

⁴⁴ Babuta & Haenlein, *op.cit.*, p. 3. See also Laurence-Aïda Ammour, “Flux, réseaux et circuits de la criminalité organisée au Sahel et en Afrique de l’ouest,” in “La sécurité du Sahara et le Sahel,” *Cahier du CEREM* 13, December 2009, https://www.irsem.fr/data/files/irsem/documents/document/file/1291/Cahier_du_cerem_n_13.pdf, p. 59.

⁴⁵ Dominic Naish, “Security and Conflict Management in the African Borderlands: A People-Centered Approach,” African Centre for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes (ACCORD), April 24, 2017, <https://www.accord.org.za/conflict-trends/security-conflict-management-african-borderlands/>

⁴⁶ Dominic Naish, “Security and Conflict Management in the African Borderlands: A People-Centered Approach,” African Centre for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes (ACCORD), April 24, 2017, <https://www.accord.org.za/conflict-trends/security-conflict-management-african-borderlands/>

⁴⁷ See the recommendations in Constanze Blum, “Transnational Organized Crime in Southern Africa and Mozambique,” Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, 2016, <http://library.fes.de/pdf-files/bueros/mosambik/13193.pdf>

⁴⁸ Mark Shaw & Tuesday Reitano, “People’s Perspectives of Organized Crime in West Africa and the Sahel,” Institute for Security Studies – Africa Paper 254, 2014, p. 14.

⁴⁹ United Nations Security Sector Reform Task Force. “SSR Integrated Technical Guidance Notes: Transnational Organized Crime and Security Sector Reform,” 2016.

⁵⁰ Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces, “National Security Policies,” SSR Backgrounder Series, 2015, https://www.dcaf.ch/sites/default/files/publications/documents/DCAF_BG_9_National%20Security%20Policies.pdf

⁵¹ Tuesday Reitano, “Situating Militarisation as Part of an Integrated Response to Organised Crime,” in Tuesday Reitano, Lucia Bird Ruiz-Benitez de Lugo & Sasha Jespersen, eds. *Militarised Responses to Transnational Organised Crime: The War on Crime*, London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2016; Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime, “Unexplored Wars: When Military Assets are Used to Fight Organised Crime,” Policy Brief, October 2017, <https://globalinitiative.net/wp-content/uploads/2017/10/TGIATOC-Policy-Note-War-on-Crime-1879-web.pdf>, p.6.

⁵² Ian Ralby, <https://www.defenceiq.com/naval-maritime-defence/articles/cooperative-security-to-counter-cooperative>

⁵³ Olga Biegus & Christian Beuger, “Poachers and Pirates: Improving Coordination of the Global Response to Wildlife Crime,” *South African Crime Quarterly* 60, June 2017, <https://www.ajol.info/index.php/sacq/article/view/159515/149068>, p. 33.

⁵⁴ Daniel Laurence, “New regional information sharing system launched in Seychelles to counter illegal fishing, drugs, piracy,” Seychelles News Agency, September 6, 2018, <http://www.seychellesnewsagency.com/articles/9698/New+regional+information+sharing+system+launched+in+Seychelles+to+counter+illegal+fishing%2C+drugs%2C+piracy>

⁵⁵ African Peace and Security Architecture Roadmap, 2016-2020, <http://www.peaceau.org/uploads/2015-en-apsa-roadmap-final.pdf>, p. 52.

⁵⁶ The AFRIPOL Statute indicates in Article 3 that one of its purposes is to “facilitate the prevention, detection, and investigation of transnational organized crime in coordination with national, regional, and international police institutions.”

⁵⁷ APSA Roadmap, *op.cit.*, p. 53.

⁵⁸ APSA Roadmap, *op.cit.*, p. 53.