Countering Transnational Organized Crime Seminar

Simulation Exercise: Criminals Without Borders

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Disclaimer

This document contains educational material designed to promote discussion by participants in the Countering Transnational Organized Crime Seminar. The scenario is not an official prediction of the future; nor is it meant to depict an actual country. Any similarities to actual countries are not intentional. The scenario, briefing points, and other exercise materials do not reflect the views of the Africa Center for Strategic Studies, the National Defense University, the Department of Defense, or any other component of the United States Government.
Exercise Introduction

This exercise highlights key transnational criminal challenges facing African countries. It requires participants to use the elements of national power at their disposal to negotiate a national strategy incorporating both uniformed and civilian justice sector actors to mitigate these challenges. The region and scenario for this exercise are both fictional. The background information provided is not intended to be exhaustive. Participants should focus on broad themes and use their experience to fill in gaps. Teamwork, innovative solutions and time-management must be emphasized.

Background

In this exercise, participants will represent security and justice officials from the fictional country of Webonia. Webonia faces several transnational organized crime threats, including human and narcotics trafficking, as well as goods and people smuggling. These threats have become increasingly salient in Webonia as it has experiences rapid urbanization and a youth bulge. Although the current, democratically elected president has made combatting corruption and criminality in Webonia a policy priority, many urban youth struggle to find stable employment, which pushes them to seek the alternative livelihoods offered through illicit markets and criminal actors.

Transnational organized crime in Webonia is exacerbated by violent activities in the Tri-Border Region, a weakly governed space where the Webonian state has historically struggled to project power. Recently, jihadist and other armed group activity has intensified in these borderlands, which connect Webonia to Deron (a country that recently transitioned to civilian rule with active armed conflicts in its hinterlands, and that has strained relations with Webonia) and Tshukano (a stable democracy with significant clout in the ARECO regional economic community, and which has collaborative relations with Webonia). In the Tri-Border Region, politically and economically marginalized groups take advantage of weak governance, the ongoing armed conflict in Deron, and terrorist threats to engage in organized criminal activities. While some residents of border communities have turned to small-scale goods smuggling to subsist in a region with few economic opportunities, other domestic and international actors have used the Tri-Border Region to build the transnational networks to perpetrate larger-scale trafficking in persons or narcotics. These activities further empower non-state, violent actors including rebels, militias, and terrorists.

Webonia is also increasingly embedded in a growing international narcotics trafficking route. Narcotics flow by sea from South America to Webonia’s island neighbor, Los Pachecos, and then into Webonia and Bulutha (a natural resource-rich neighbor, historically in conflict with Webonia over the gas-rich Biong Delta). Once narcotics enter Webonia, traffickers move them first through urban areas and then through borderlands for transport to other countries in the region. They rely on the northern-oriented land routes that goods smugglers established centuries ago and have maintained. Drugs are moved through illicit networks for transport to Europe from the airport in Webonia’s capital, Olatunji.

Detailed Information

The economic, political, and social dynamics of governance in Webonia and its neighbors continue to shape the evolution of these threats. This document includes a map of Webonia and the region (Annex A); further details on transnational organized crime threats (Annex B); the politics, economics, and social structures of Webonia (Annex C); and the profiles of Webonia’s four neighbors (Annex D).
Exercise Information

Your discussion group will represent one of four subgroups of a task force of security and justice sector officials convened at the request of the Office of the President of Webonia. The President has asked the task force to prepare a plan to address Webonia’s outstanding transnational criminal threats. The subgroups of the task force will divide their labor such that they collectively produce a strategy that details: priority actions; necessary contributions for each of the major security and justice sector actors; expected outcomes; and the required human and financial resources, domestic cooperation, and external partnerships. You and your task force subgroup are mandated to prepare parts of this plan, per the division of labor below. To accomplish your subgroup’s tasks, you may draw upon all tools of Webonian national power, as well as proposed cooperation with Webonia’s neighbors and international cooperation at the regional and international level.

Participant Roles

Participants will represent a senior official from their actual service or branch of government, allowing them to leverage their experience and expertise to consider how to address in the most realistic way possible the transnational criminal challenges included in the simulation. However, participants should bear in mind that the goal of the simulation is to develop a unified action plan for the entire country, rather than specific individual plans for each sector or service.

Participants should begin by electing a chairperson who will help manage time and act as a rapporteur presenting the group’s plan during the brief back session after the simulation.

Time Management

The simulation will take place in two 90 minute sections, before and after the one hour lunch break. After the second session, a 30 minute coffee break will take place before a one hour simulation brief back session concluding the exercise. The chairpersons should plan to allow adequate time to complete the assignment, and assist their group with prioritization to ensure that all important aspects of the problem are considered in the limited time allotted.

Output Goals

The spokesperson for each subgroup of the task force will have 10 minutes maximum to present the subgroup’s portion of the plan during the brief-back plenary. Each group will be assigned two specific questions to answer in the briefback session.

Individual Group Goals

Each discussion group working as a subgroup of the task force will be assigned to focus their 10-minute briefback on a specific aspect of the strategy that they have devised. Groups will be numbered before the exercise and will be assigned briefback questions as follows:
**General Question (Groups 1-4 all answer):** What is your simplified analysis of the threats related to transnational organized crime that Webonia faces? Please provide the task force’s assessment of how to prioritize such threats, how various threats are interrelated, and what the actual and potential impact of these threats are. *(The President’s Chief of Staff and Council of Ministers recommend using political economy frameworks as part of this analysis).*

**Group 1:** Based on a situational assessment, develop a clear and concise national strategy (in terms of specific national vision, objectives, specific programs, and activities and if possible implementation plan) to address the transnational organized criminal threats that your subgroup has identified.

**Group 2:** Provide an analysis of main actors and institutions in security sector including justice, the division of labor and assignment of roles and responsibilities for addressing the aforementioned transnational criminal threats and mechanisms needed for cooperation, collaboration, information sharing and trust-building.

**Group 3:** Suggest a position and analysis on the role of citizen and community approaches, and how they can contribute or be leveraged, as well as how the security and justice sector can best work with residents, citizens, and community authorities.

**Group 4:** Suggest a position and analysis on bilateral and regional cooperation with Webonia’s neighbors, and what frameworks are needed to ensure fruitful cooperation, collaboration, information sharing and collective response to these transnational criminal threats.
Annex A: Map of Webonia
Annex B: Key Transnational Criminal Challenges in Webonia

Webonia’s security challenges related to transnational organized crime are geographically concentrated around the Tri-Border Region and around the country’s major urban transportation hubs, Port Boukhars and the capital, Olatunji.

Tri-Border Region

The border region shared by Webonia, Deron, and Tshukano is characterized by a history of weak state control, violent political competition, long-standing marginalization of the local Tsowe and Milong ethnic minority groups. Webonian security challenges in the Tri-Border Region are also shaped by long-standing political instability in Deron, as well as the more recent emergence of transnational terrorism threats that originate from Deron. Major actors in this area include the New Army of the Prophet (NAP), a jihadist group composed of both Tsowe and Milong people as well as some foreigners; the Tsowe National Peoples Force (TNPF), which seeks autonomy or independence from Webonia; and many small, Milong-dominated armed groups with opportunistic objectives. Many communities stand up local vigilante groups for protection. Some of these vigilante groups have also come to engage in cattle rustling and banditry. Other vigilantes are increasingly drawn into human and drug trafficking by foreign kingpins operating in the Tri-Border Region who seek to capitalize on the vigilantes’ familiarity with local communities and illicit trade routes.

The Webonian state’s weak governance of the Tri-Border Region in the context of a wide range of armed group activity has fostered the consolidation of several types of transnational organized criminal activity, most notably human trafficking, smuggling and arms trafficking.

**Trafficking in Persons:** Many of the armed groups directly participate in human trafficking through ungoverned spaces in Deron, where they are able to move people relatively freely to the Middle East, Europe and other African destinations for the purposes of sex and labor trafficking. Relatively small but well-organized criminal cartels have taken advantage of the breakdown of state control in the region and work with some of the armed groups to use it as a hub for trafficking in persons. Enabled by their international connections, the New Army of the Prophet (NAP) is particularly notorious for this crime. Many other recruiters, informal service providers, and fixers are involved in human smuggling, which in the Tri-Border regional context puts smuggled people at greater risk of human trafficking. Although most of the humans trafficked move beyond the part of the Tri-Border Region where the NAP operates, NAP also engages in trafficking through the recruitment and enslavement of ‘wives’ for soldiers. Many armed groups in the region collect significant revenues taxing or receiving bribes from people involved in human smuggling and human trafficking networks.

**Goods Smuggling:** The Tsowe and Milong pastoralists who live in the Tri-Border Region have long-standing trade routes in all three nations and beyond. As Webonian state control of its part of this region has weakened, these routes and networks have been put in the service of several types of goods smuggling. Perhaps the most dangerous smuggling trade is in light arms, which some members of the Webonian and Buluthan security services are in the habit of selling to others. These weapons are in high demand due to the endemic violence in the Tri-Border Region. They are moved relatively easily on traditional Tsowe and Milong pastoralist trading and migration routes. Livestock theft within the Tri-Border Region and along its outskirts has become increasingly common as the involved communities
have become more and more heavily armed and organized for violence. The black market trade in commodities is less directly linked to politically violent actors in the region, but several armed groups, particularly the NAP and the TNPF, garner significant revenues taxing this trade.

**Webonian Border Crackdown:** Following an escalation of violence in the Webonian portion of the Tri-Border Region culminating in a tragically bloody battle between different Tsowe groups in 2017, the Webonian government began a military takeover of security on the border led by the elite Special Service Brigade and supported by the National Police. The Special Service Brigade performed well against the armed groups in combat, and the intervention initially appeared to be successful in re-establishing Webonian territorial and border control. Over time, problems began to emerge, and many of the initial gains have been lost in the subsequent two years. Some components of the Special Service Brigade are accused of committing abuses against the local population, and some of these accusations carry an ethnic dimension due to the distrust between the majority Bamato Special Service Brigade and the local Tsowe communities, who are also targeted as suspected perpetrators of transnational crime largely based on their ethnicity rather than individual activities or behaviors. There are also reports that the large amount of illicit wealth involved in the criminal enterprises involved at the border have enticed some Special Service Brigade soldiers to accept bribes or even engage in these criminal enterprises themselves.

The Special Service Brigade and the National Police have had difficulty coordinating both operationally and legally, as the military is not well prepared to support the evidentiary requirements of the judicial system in the prosecution of transnational organized crime. This is further complicated in cooperation with Tshukano security services, which have but a limited presence on their side of the border. Webonian security services find operational communication to be difficult with their Tshukano counterparts and differences between the Webonian Common Law based legal system and the Tshukano Civil Law Code further complicate the legal picture.

Despite the problems with efforts at border control, violence and extortion by the armed groups has alienated many in the area, and the Tsowe Women’s Peacebuilding Society has assembled a loose alliance of NGOs and traditional leaders opposed to the traffickers and armed groups. While these groups are prepared to work with the Webonian government, they are also seeking respite from harsh treatment they report experiencing at the hands of the Special Service Brigade.

**International Narcotics Networks**

International narcotics networks involved in smuggling cocaine from South and Central America to Europe are also increasing their operations in Webonia and the region.

**Drug Smuggling Routes:** Large, well organized international cartels are seeking to use Los Pachecos, Bulutha, and Webonia as transit routes to narcotics Europe. Narcotics are smuggled into Los Pachecos by sea using illicit and informal networks whose actors evade maritime law enforcement. From Los Pachecos, the narcotics are then moved to Webonia and Bulutha, also by sea.

In Webonia, the main narcotics trafficking route is through Webonia’s main national harbor, Port Bouhkaris, where international narcotics traffickers use corrupt practices (including bribing high-level Webonian officials) to avoid interdiction. From Port Bouhkaris, the narcotics travel by truck down the busy L3 highway to the capital, Olatunji. Drugs are concealed in licit goods shipments among a large volume of truck-based transport on the main access route for Olatunji, and for landlocked Deron. Networks at the airport facilitate the shipping of the narcotics via air to European destinations.
secondary narcotics shipment route in Webonia is through the Biong Delta, which is difficult to police due to its complex waterways, swampy terrain, and limited cooperation from local communities that distrust the central government. While this traffic is lower in volume, it allows the international drug cartels to avoid paying bribes at the port.

The route in Bulutha follows a similar pattern, arriving at Bulutha’s Raygil National Harbor, or arriving elsewhere offshore via small boats to be smuggled through the Biong Delta. From Raygil National Harbor, narcotics move overland to the airport at Balaouma and then are loaded onto planes for shipment to Europe.

**Corruption:** As the narcotics smuggling route has grown over the last decade, corruption in government has grown with it. Large-scale corruption at Port Boukhars has hindered the function of Webonia’s main national harbor. This has become increasingly politically relevant as the current Webonian administration has sought to encourage economic growth by increasing agricultural exports and light manufacturing. Both of these formal economic activities are undermined by the extra costs and inefficiencies caused by narcotics-fueled corruption at Port Boukhars. Actors engaged in narcotics trafficking can relatively easily appeal to Webonian youth to support them in their activities, given that a growing number of youth tend to locate in urban areas in search of employment opportunities, but have difficulty finding sufficient work in licit enterprises, whether in the formal or informal sector. Additionally, certain members of the National Police are alleged to be subject to bribery by narcotics traffickers, who ask police to turn a blind eye to the transit of narcotics over land and at the airport. Public perceptions of police complicity in drug trafficking are damaging to the reputation of the National Police. As volumes of drug trafficking have increased and bribes to facilitate it have grown, narcotics-related corruption has moved up the chain of command into higher levels of the Webonian government. A major news story was published over the summer accusing a senior cabinet minister of receiving bribes from the drug cartels, causing a major national scandal.
Annex C: Politics and Economy of Webonia

**VITAL STATS**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Details</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Independence</td>
<td>1965 (from Great Britain)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Population</td>
<td>30 million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethnic groups</td>
<td>Bamato 40%; Arika 30%; Kumalu 12%; Tsowe 10%; Milong 6%; eight smaller</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>ethnic groups comprise remaining 2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Languages</td>
<td>English (80%) French (20%); African languages are spoken widely.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religions</td>
<td>Christian (70%), Muslim (30%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cities</td>
<td>Olatunji (capital); Port Boukhars (major port city)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| Economy           | GDP is $1225 per capita

Export revenue: agricultural products (40%); mineral resources (35%); energy resources (15%); light manufactured goods (10%)

**CURRENT POLITICAL SITUATION**

Webonia’s current government was elected in 2017. The election, deemed relatively free and fair by international observers, is a continuation of coalition-building dynamics that have seen Bamato and Arika political elites split most major offices, largely excluding people from the northern pastoralist Tsowe and Milong ethnic groups.

Corruption in government is an ongoing challenge in Webonia and political patronage networks are critical to political survival, policymaking, and electioneering. These practices have made Webonia more vulnerable to transnational organized crime, and in turn, transnational organized crime proceeds have been known to fuel certain political parties and candidates.

Northern Webonia is part of the Tri-Border Region in Webonia, Tshukano and Deron. Politically and economically marginalized minorities in all three nations – the predominantly pastoralist and Muslim Tsowe and the Milong – live in the region. Due to a variety of factors, a host of armed groups including community militias, armed groups claiming to fight on behalf of Tsowe and Milong communities, and the jihadist New Army of the Prophet (NAP) currently contest control of various parts of this region.

The current president, Richard Amegchow, is in his first term, and is up for reelection in 2021. Amegchow has made combatting corruption and criminality in Webonia one of his three key priorities, alongside combating terrorism (particularly the NAP), and encouraging economic growth by strengthening agricultural exports and expanding Webonia’s light manufacturing sector.
FOREIGN RELATIONS OF WEBONIA

The Webonian government has identified regional cooperation as a key ingredient to addressing the president’s three policy priorities. It is working to expand the existing Webonia-Tshukano cooperation to Webonia’s other neighbors, both bilaterally and through the ARECO regional economic community, which includes Webonia and its neighbors.

Webonia has historically had good relations with Los Pachecos and Tshukano, and has maintained cooperation agreements with Tshukano to try to stabilize the Tri-Border Region.

Historically, relations with Bulutha have been strained, as Webonia and Bulutha contest resources in the gas-rich Biong Delta. In the past, both countries supported insurgencies in each other’s territories, creating tensions that were exacerbated by opposed Cold War alignments. However, in the early 1990s Webonia and Bulutha gradually achieved rapprochement, and have a cautious working relationship.

Relations between Webonia and Deron have also been historically contentious. Deron has experienced several violent seizures of power over the course of its history, and while some of Deron’s governments have had productive relationships with Webonia, others have accused Webonia of meddling in Deron’s internal affairs and had more confrontational stances. At times, this has escalated to supporting armed groups in each other’s territory, a practice that, along with historically poor Deron-Tshukano relations, has contributed to proliferation of armed groups and lawlessness in the Tri-Border Region. However, some degree of working relationship has consistently been maintained as the KV1 international highway through Webonia is land-locked Deron’s key import-export artery. Relations with the current Deron government are cordial, but useful cooperation is limited by the weakness of the Deron government which has difficulty exercising territorial control in the border regions and is not able to fully secure its portion of the KV1 international highway.

ECONOMY

Webonia is a rapidly growing economy, and passed the middle income threshold in 2014. After a period of stagnation in the 1980s and 1990s Webonia has grown consistently in the 21st century. Exports are 18% of GDP. Growth has been led by increasing agricultural exports and post processed agricultural goods, most notably locally canned coffee and increasingly high quality leather goods, forming the foundation of a light manufacturing sector. Webonia also exports natural gas.

Like many African countries, Webonia is experiencing the combination of rabid urbanization and a large youth bulge. The majority of Webonians are under the age of 30 and these young people increasingly live in the urban center of the capital, Olatunji. Unemployment is extremely high in this demographic group, at close to 50%. Youth unemployment is one of the major reasons for the current government’s development push.

Almost all exports are conducted through Port Boukhars, which is connected to agricultural central Webonia and mining industries in the eastern highlands through the L3 national highway. 80% of Deron’s imports and exports also pass through Webonia, traveling on the KV1 international highway connecting Notchay and Olatunji, and from there transiting the L3 national highway to Port Boukhars.

Two of the main obstacles to continued growth are corruption and infrastructural limitations. Corruption has been problematic in the long term and has accelerated in recent years due to the
growing narcotic smuggling and trade. As Webonian exports grow, Webonia’s aging highways and international harbor at Port Boukhars are approaching capacity. These infrastructural challenges are worsened by corruption and criminality on the narcotics transit route from Port Boukhars to Olatunji. On the critical KV1 international highway connecting Webonia to Deron conditions are even worse as the route is not fully secured and travelers face the risk of violence from armed groups and extortion from corrupt law enforcement as well as local militias.

Energy Production:
- Significant natural gas fields (9th largest in Africa) at 52 tcm, but limited refinement capability.
- Webonia’s natural gas fields are largely in and around the Biong Delta, in the Kumalu homelands. This area was subject to conflict for much of the 1970s and 1980s and resource extraction and usage are still contentious.
- Energy accounts for 15% of export revenue.

Agriculture:
- Subsistence agriculture exists throughout Webonia.
- Northern Webonia is largely pastoralist, focused on cattle and goats.
- Export agriculture is primarily concentrated in central and southern Webonia. Primary export crops are cotton, cocoa, coffee, and bananas.

PEOPLE AND POLITICS

In Webonia, ethnicity, politics and patronage have remained closely linked. The salience of ethnic identity in national politics – as opposed to other identities or affinities for certain programs or ideologies – is a problematic legacy of the British colonial period that Webonia has yet to overcome.

- **Bamato:**
  - Dominant ethnic group in Webonia, majority ethnic group in the capital.
  - Predominantly Christian
  - Live in the wide fertile plain in Western Central Webonia, including the capital region.
  - 3 of Webonia’s 5 presidents have been Bamato.
  - Largely engaged in agriculture.

- **Arika:**
  - Second largest ethnic group
  - Predominantly Christian
  - Live in south-western Webonia including the region of Port Boukhars.
  - 2 of Webonia’s 5 presidents have been Arika.
  - Engage in mixed agriculture in mountainous Western Webonia.

- **Kumalu:**
  - Minority ethnic group (English-speaking)
  - Majority Christian, significant Muslim minority
  - Live along Webonia’s southern coastal border with Bulutha, on the land around natural gas deposits in the Biong Delta, Webonia’s only major energy extractive resource.
  - The Kumalu Nation Resistance Movement (KNRM) fought a long and unsuccessful insurgency in the 1970s with the backing of Bulutha.
Webonia relations in 1991, the KNRM entered politics in exchange for local national gas resource sharing agreements. However, many Kumalu still feel marginalized.

- **Tsowe:**
  - Minority ethnic group (mix of English- and French-speaking)
  - Predominantly Muslim
  - Live in the arid northwestern Webonia and across the border in Deron, regularly crossing the border as a part of season pastoral migrations and trade patterns.
  - Most practice a pastoral lifestyle. They were driven out of the southern plains by Bamato farmers during the late colonial period, with the assistance of the British.
  - Many Tsowe communities support small militias of armed young men for protection. These militias also engage in cattle-raiding, smuggling, and at times violent feuds. They sporadically associate with larger militant groups based upon opportunity or necessity.
  - The Tsowe National Peoples Force (TNPF) is a rebel group that claims to represent the interests of the Tsowe. The TNPF traces its rebel operations to the colonial era, when colonization displaced them from their ancestral lands in western central Webonia. Since that time, TNPF have been striving, alternatively peacefully and violently, to regain their lost homeland, influence, and power. The TNPF is a loose alliance of community based militias, supporting itself by the proceeds from smuggling and human trafficking in the tri-border region and on the Webonia-Deron border.
  - The New Army of the Prophet (NAP) includes both Tsowe and Milong members and is one of the more powerful actors in the Tri-Border region. Espousing a strict Islamist ideology the NAP offers a violent vision of justice and independence to marginalized Tsowe. However, brutal punishments for dissenters, harsh taxation and heavy involvement in human trafficking have alienated many others.

- **Milong:**
  - Smallest politically active ethnic group (mix of English- and French-speaking)
  - Predominantly Muslim, pastoralists
  - Live in Webonia’s arid and mountainous northwest, inland from the coast.
  - Milong pastoralist communities are spread across the Tri-Border Region, so pastoralists cross national borders easily and regularly.
  - A wide array of localized armed groups operate in Milong homelands. They range from Islamist and separatist groups to community militias and their goals range from ideological to opportunistic.
  - The New Army of the Prophet (NAP) includes both Tsowe and Milong members and is one of the more powerful actors in the Tri-Border Region. The NAP’s sharia law system appeals to some as a source of regularity and stability where the state is weakly present. However, brutal punishments for dissenters, harsh taxation, and heavy involvement in transnational crime including human trafficking have alienated many others.

**JUSTICE SECTOR**

Webonia is a common law country, with 160 judges on the High Court and 400 in the Magistrate Courts. In Webonia’s common law system, police autonomously investigate various forms of transnational organized crime, but must seek warrants from judges if the investigation requires
coercive measures like arrest. The initial classifications of various forms of transnational organized crime that the state might investigate for possible prosecution therefore hinge upon police having clear understanding of how the domestic criminal code and promulgated international laws define acts like human trafficking, drug trafficking, poaching, and natural resource crimes. Once the police complete an investigation, a prosecutor receives the dossier of evidence and decides whether to indict suspect(s) on relevant criminal charges. If a trial takes place, the prosecutor represents the plaintiff in the courtroom. Judges preside over the trial and manage adversarial presentations of the prosecution and the defense, basing their decisions largely on previous domestic case law.

Webonia’s neighbors, including Bulutha, Deron, and Tshikano, have civil law traditions. Prosecutors are the ones who lead preliminary investigations to determine whether there is enough evidence for the state to pursue a criminal case on transnational organized crime issues. If the prosecutor and the investigators working with her determine that there is sufficient evidence to pursue a case, then an investigating judge leads a deeper investigation with the help of specialized judicial police officers who may make arrests and collect evidence. Trial judges rely on detailed legislation, not case-based precedent, to consider evidence and make decisions.

In rural Webonia, customary justice institutions are often the forum of first resort for civil dispute resolution and for redress on certain criminal activities. In the northern provinces of Webonia that are predominantly Muslim, customary leaders often use a syncretic combination of customary and sharia law. People who are not from the Bamato ethnic group are not usually inclined to use the state courts as a venue of first resort when they experience criminal and civil issues; on the latest Afrobarometer public opinion survey, 45% of the population indicates it trusts the courts “not at all” or “a little,” partially because ethnic minorities perceive state courts to be working in favor of Bamato court users.

In the parts of Webonia’s Tri-Border Region, there is state judicial infrastructure but state judicial actors are not always able to keep the courts running in the context of armed violence and terrorist threats. Non-state armed groups have turned to administering their own forms of justice and dispute resolution. Over the last decade, the Webonian government trained and funded local Milong vigilante groups in two provincial capitals to administer law and order in the name of the state. While these initiatives were initially effective in providing stability and respecting citizens’ rights, the recent escalation of the civil conflict in Deron and the intensification of terrorist and armed group activities in the Tri-Border region led to Webonia’s deployment of a Special Forces Brigade, which has degraded the previously collaborative relationship between local vigilantes and the Webonian security services.

MILITARY AND SECURITY FORCES

Webonia’s security apparatus consists of the military (including the Army, Navy, Air Force, and Special Service Brigade) and the National Police Force.

**Webonia Military:** All components of Webonia’s uniformed military share similar problems – an Officer Corps dominated by the Bamato leading a more diverse enlisted body, and corruption impacting readiness due to the frequent occurrence of contracting and payroll fraud, which causes mismatches between actual strength and paper-based calculations of it.

- **Army:**
Standing Army of 30,000 volunteer troops. Long-standing corruption issues and funding de-prioritization since the 1990s have left most units under-trained and under-equipped, and many units are well under their paper strength due to corrupt paycheck cashing and contracting schemes. Many commanders turn a blind eye to absenteeism as soldiers supplement their pay with other jobs near their garrison stations.

As a result, the government relies on a much smaller subsection of the military to address urgent security threats, most notably the 3,500 strong elite Special Service Brigade, supported by a few other better equipped and more reliable units. These units are usually deployed to the gas-rich Biong Delta, the capital, or in the Tri-Border Region. The Special Service Brigade receives the lion’s share of funding and training. It has performed well in combat encounters with armed groups. However, the largely Bamato unit has been accused of serving as a political tool of the incumbent government, and of committing abuses against Webonian minority groups.

**Navy:**

- Small Navy (5,000 personnel, including 350 officers)
- Without a separate Coast Guard, the Webonian Navy is responsible for maritime law enforcement and rescue, although their training and doctrine has historically focused on a more traditional military view of naval responsibilities.
- While more trained than the Army or Air Force, the government has not prioritized the Navy and has only 2 offshore patrol boats capable of blue water operation.
- Historically, the Navy played a role in patrolling the Biong Delta, countering Kumalu separatists in the 1970-80s, and protecting natural gas extraction. It is capable of brown water operation, led by 3 large and 7 small patrol boats and shallow water craft.

**Air Force:**

- Webonia has a very limited air force (3,000 uniformed members, primarily Bamato), composed of 12 Cold War-era fighters of limited reliability and a fleet of 30 transport and scout helicopters.
- Has largely been neglected since rapprochement with Bulutha in the 1990s over the issue of the Biong Delta.
- Due to corruption and funding issues, the maintenance of the aircraft is uncertain.
- Was once the elite of Webonia military and is still among Webonia’s most highly-educated officers and enlisted personnel.

**National Police:** Webonia’s National Police consists of around 35,000 members, the majority of which are Bamato, with a substantial Arika minority. This has led to significant problems throughout the country, as police officials in other regions have met with distrust from local populations of other ethnic groups. Among all security forces, the National Police have been most accused of nepotism and ethnic favoritism, with a history of the government staffing the National Police largely based on personnel of Bamato ethnicity. The National Police play a supporting role to the Special Service Brigade and the army in the state’s attempts to secure the Tri-Border Region, but have taken the lead in efforts to counter narcotics trafficking.
### Annex D: Neighboring Countries in Brief

<table>
<thead>
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<th>Bulutha</th>
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<td>(capital city is Balaouma)</td>
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<td>Former French Colony; independence in 1960; population is 42 million</td>
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**Government**

Current government led by the Bulutha Democratic Reform Party (BDRP) emerged from civil war in the early 1990s, and normalized relations with neighboring states as well as attempting domestic reform. Despite initial success and international acclaim the liberalizing BDRP has refused to leave power and with elections since 2010 showing increasing irregularities, and unresolved corruption problems there is increasing discontent with the BDRP.

**Economy**

GDP US$3050 per capita, but the median income is much lower at around USD$850 due to high income inequality as elites have captured most of the benefits of Bulutha’s natural gas exports.

Natural gas makes up the large majority of Bulutha’s exports and overall dominates the nation’s economy. However there is also substantial farming in the delta region.

**Resources**

Extremely rich gas fields in the delta dominate Bulutha’s economy.

The delta region is also agriculturally rich, and prior to Bulutha’s gas boom fruit cash crops were an important export. However as the gas industry has grown to dominate the Buluthan economy cash crop exports have declined substantially.

**Regional Relations**

History of conflict with Webonia due over the gas rich Biong River delta, exacerbated by opposing Cold War alignments, but the BDRP began a gradual and largely successful process of rapprochement after taking power in the 1990s.

**Security Situation**

Bulutha has a large conscript army of 85,000, inherited from the civil war peace settlement in the 1990s, which incorporated many armed actors into a national military. While the government has worked to downsize and reform the military since that time political sensitivities have limited the effectiveness of these efforts and much of the military is unreliable and corrupt to a degree that severely limits its ability to provide security.
Deron
(capital city is Notchay)

Population is 19 million; Francophone

**Government**
Recent democracy after two decades of military dictatorship. The government struggling is with long-standing inter-community conflict. The Hama Freedom Party (HFM) currently in power, and are trying with limited success to engage TNPF (Tsowe National People’s Front) and other rebel groups with the exception of the New Army of the Prophet, which they have designated a terrorist group, and which appears unwilling to negotiate in any case. Former French colony, independence in 1963.

**Political Situation**
Series of military coups since independence; with excessive corruption and nepotism; widespread economic mismanagement led to decline in living standards.

**Regional Relations**
Deron has had troubled relations with Webonia and Bulutha in the past, although the current HFM government is pursuing cooperation with both, although it is closer to Webonia. During the Cold War both Webonia and Bulutha attempted to influence Deron toward their respective sides, and both have been accused of funding rebellions, supporting coups and other forms of interference.

**Economy**
GDP is US$450 per capita; 40% unemployment; 80% subsistence farming; 20% limited mining, natural gas fields, and light industry. Irresponsibly accumulated foreign debt; external debt is 243% of GDP. Limited access to international markets, chiefly through the KVI international highway to Webonia, and from there through Port Boukhars in Webonia and Raygil National Harbor in Bulutha.

**Resources**
The central lowlands around the capitol are agriculturally rich. Cash crops from this area are Deron’s chief export. Diamond, gold, cobalt resources are available in the West and Southwest but remain largely untapped due to instability and lack of investment/infrastructure.

**Security Situation**
As a result of years of dictatorship and troubled relations with Webonia and Bulutha Deron is plagued by a host of armed groups, particularly in the southern Tri-Border Region. The government is seeking to negotiate with the TNPF (Tsowe National People’s Front) as well as some of the Milong militias, while continuing to fight sporadically with all actors, particularly the New Army of the Prophet. The Government has fully lost control of the tri-border region, and has great difficulty executing any kind of territorial control outside of the capitol.

The current government is pursuing more robust regional security cooperation both bilaterally and through ARECO, but is hindered by lack of capacity.
Tshukano
(capital city is Omou)
Population is 19 million, Francophone

Government
Relatively stable democracy; equitable power sharing among three ethnic groups; bicameral parliament; independent judiciary; strong ties to the U.S. and France. Former French colony, independence in 1960.

Economy
GDP US$950 per capita.
90% subsistence agriculture; 10% small scale industries (mining and manufacturing); 30% unemployment; responsibly managed foreign debt.

Regional Relations
Frequent dispute mediator; good relationships with regional neighbors; founding member of ARECO regional organization – 2 time President of the organization.

Has worked closely with Webonia to attempt to police and stabilize the Deron-Webonia-Tshukano Tri-Border region with military and law enforcement cooperation. Law enforcement cooperation has been hampered by the different legal codes, with Tshukano using a Civil Code while Webonia is based in Common Law.

Security Situation
Southwestern Tshukano is part of the violent and chaotic Tri-Border Region. The Milong, who are heavily involved in many of the armed groups have most of their population in Webonia and Tshukano. Despite cooperation on this issue Tshukano and Webonia have been unable to secure their mutual border.

Armed Forces

- Small moderately trained Army – 30,000 enlisted, 4,000 officers. Ethnically integrated, deployed around the capital and major sea port, limited logistic and support capability, limited movement within the country

- Small Navy, very limited capability

- No Air Force

National Police: 35,000 members, primarily used in controlling violent and property crime
Los Pachecos
(capital city is Fereira)
Population 1.5 million; Lusophone

Government
Los Pachecos is Democratic, with a two party semi presidential system including a president and a prime minister. There is little civil and political turmoil in the country. Los Pachecos is a former Portuguese colony, and achieved independence peacefully in 1975.

Regional Relations
Los Pachecos while stable and relatively wealthy has played a relatively small but cooperative regional role, limited by its small size and population. Los Pachecos has supported the creation and strengthening of ARECO.

Los Pachecos historically has had good relations with Webonia as Webonia has one of the larger continental ports in the region at Port Boukhars and much of the shipping to Webonia stops at Fereira first. Similarly much of the shipping to Bulutha’s Raygil National harbor passes through Los Pachecos. As a result of these economically based relationships Los Pachecos attempted to mediate between Bulutha and Webonia during their Cold War era antagonism and played an important role in facilitating their rapprochement in the 1990s.

Economy
GDP US$2,650 per capita.

Los Pachecos’ economy was historically based on the shipping services at the Fereira harbor, and rich fisheries. However increasing tourism has led to rapid economic growth over the past decade, and the government has eagerly promoted this growth.

Security Situation
Los Pachecos’ economy is largely based on tourism, which is growing steadily. However, narcotics organizations are seeking to use the island nation as a major transshipping point due to it’s convenient geography. This poses a threat to Los Pachecos’ tourism lead growth that the government has largely been responsive to, although unable to prevent.