The Continental Peace and Security Agenda: Reinventing the Architecture (APSA)?

By Michelle Ndiaye

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The APSA: Reinventing Collective Security?

➤ Time when APSA was referred as the AU due to the entire organization being in reactive mode to face security challenges on the continent

➤ The launch of Agenda 2063 and the AfCFTA: The repositioning of the economic development agenda vis a vis the Peace and Security Agenda

➤ However PS continued to dominate the work of the African Union

.

➤ Before that, Let us take a journey back on the factors behind the establishment of the APSA and its achievements so far.

❑ The analysis of the evolution of the APSA has demonstrated that Peace and Security still represent the core activities of the AU- 60% of the AUC budget (if we include peace operations) are still dedicated to PS activities.

➤ The future of the AU and that of the APSA are intertwined.

As the AU is going through its current reform process, the question in all minds is, when will be the reform of the architecture? Linked to that is another obious question... what is the future of the APSA? This will be the focus of my presentation and hofully, it will generate much debate about one of the most proniment AU normative, political & operational instruments in servive of Africa's collective security.

The African Peace and Security Architecture

Peace and Security Council	**Continental Early Warning Systems**
	Panel of the Wise
AU-Commission	**Mediation**
	African Standby Force
Regional Economic Communities & Regional Mechanisms	**PCRD**
	Peace Fund

- ❑ <u>Normative Framework</u>: Promotion of Peace, Security and Stability as the primary objective of the African Union (Constitutive act of the AU – 2000 – Art. 4H provide the mandate) + Art. 7 of the PSC Protocol – Art. 8 of the PSC – Integration of the RECS mechanisms (Subsidiarity).

- ❑ **Components:**
- ➢ Instruments for conflict <u>prevention</u> (Early Warning and Response, Preventive Diplomacy);
- ➢ <u>Crisis Management</u> and Resolution (Mediation, PSOs);
- ➢ <u>Peace building</u>: Post- Conflict, Reconstruction and Development;
- ➢ <u>Funding</u> mechanism: The Peace Fund

- ❑ The importance of the principle of <u>Subsidiarity</u>

- ❑ **Africa through the APSA is fulfilling its global responsibility to maintain Peace regionally.**

The African Peace and Security Architecture (Continued)

Couple of turning points in the history of the Union that led to the establishment of the APSA

The 3rd Turning point: More ownership of the provision of continental security

What triggered the establishment of the APSA? – 1st turning point:

❑ Failed experiences of the international community as well as the OAU was not able to intervene stopping the genocide in Rwanda

❑ Ownership linked The renewal discourse & quest for African centred-solutions. New narrative on Africa-rising (Ownership of development agenda and of security)

❑ **More importantly, the necessity to respond to complex Security environments & threats.**

2nd turning point: A normative shift!

❑ In 2002 the adoption of the principle of non-indifference as opposed to the principle of non-intervention

❑ **Today these security threats are of greater impact as they combine conventional (Links btw violent conflicts, organised crime and terrorism and VE) and none-conventional (pandemics, migration, displacements, climate change).**

The Peace and Security Agenda in practice

Achievements and challenges

Continental & regional Early warning system

Panel of the Wise

Mediation support Unit (Support the work of the Special Envoys and Reps & Mediation Panels);
Case study: Burundi (Coercive diplomacy Vs Sovereignty)

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Post conflict, Reconstruction and Development

Increased African Led-PSOs:
1. Somalia (AMISOM),
2. CAR (MICOPAX/MISMA), Mali (AFISMA), Guinea Bissau (ECOMIB), in fighting the LRA (LRA-RTF), AMIS in Sudan, AMIB in Burundi, AMISEC in Comoros, recent ECOMIG in the Gambia (ECOWAS)
3. DRC (SADC Brigade within MONUSCO),
4. Darfur (UNAMID Hybrid Mission of UN and AU),
5. New arrangements - G5 Sahel, MNJTF (The debate)

Division of labour with the RECS/ Subsidiarity /Comparative Advantage (Gambia +The African Union Technical Support to The Gambia (AUTSTG));

Efforts to overcome the recurring financing question:
❑ The alternative sources of funding
Reform with the 0.2% levy on imports (expected to fund 100% of running costs, 75% of programmes and 25% of AU/REC-led peace support operations).

❑ Peace Fund (more than 100 Millions voluntary contributions end of May 2019 & assessed contributions from 2020).

Information exchange - Committee of Intelligence and Security Services of Africa: CISSA

Access to UN accessed contributions for POs in Africa

AU PEACE FUND

ESTABLISHED
EST. **1993** June

→

LEGAL BASIS
• AU Peace and Security Council Protocol
2002

→

DR. DONALD KABERUKA
AU High Representative for the Peace Fund
Appointed January 2016

→

REVITALIZED
In July 2016
Assembly/AU/Dec.605 XXVII)

→

PEACE FUND INSTRUMENT
January 2018

GOVERNANCE

O **BOARD OF TRUSTEES** Meets twice a year

- O 5 African Members from Each Region
- O 2 Non-African Partners (EU, UN)

O **EXECUTIVE MANAGEMENT COMMITTEE**

- O AUC Chairperson
- O AUC Deputy Chairperson
- O AUC Peace and Security Commissioner
- O AUC Political Affairs Commissioner

O **PEACE FUND SECRETARIAT**

O **INDEPENDENT EVALUATION PANEL**

O **FUND MANAGER**

FINANCING

AU Member States — Contribute **$400 Million** by 2021

Bilateral and Multilateral Contributions

Private Sector/ Private Donations

Individual Donations

ONE OF 5 APSA PILLARS

PF Peace Fund

PSC Peace and Security Council

CEWS Continental Early Warning System

PoW Panel of the Wise

ASF African Standby Force

WHY DO WE NEED THE PEACE FUND?

The Fund provides:

1 A Clear Strategic Focus

2 A Dedicated Operational Peace and Security Budget

3 A Predictable Source of Funding

4 An Accountable AU Instrument

THREE WINDOWS

Window **1** Mediation and Preventive Diplomacy (MDP)

Window **2** Institutional Capacity

Window **3** AU Peace Support Operations (PSOs)

**Reserve (Revolving) Facility Window**
$50 Million Crisis Reserve Facility to finance unforeseen emergencies

African Union

IPSS © 2018

Conflict intensity in Africa and AU/RECS intervention regime

Conflict intensity in Africa (2014-2017)

Source: APSA IMPACT REPORT 2018.

The Peace and Security Agenda in practice: Successes Vs Sovereignty

Key facts and figures to illustrate some successes of the the APSA (Source APSA Impact Report – 2017, IPSS

52 conflicts of intensity level 3 and above
27 Addressed by AU/RECs

Quality of Interventions (2013-2017)

Legend:
- Mostly low quality
- Medium quality
- Overall high quality

The Peace and Security Agenda in practice: Successes Vs Sovereignty (Cont.)

Key facts and figures to illustrate some successes of the APSA (Source APSA Impact Report – 2017, IPSS

Effectiveness of Interventions (2013-2017)

Legend:
- Rather unsuccessful
- Partly successful
- Overall successful
- Too early to tell

The Future of the APSA?

Lies on its ability to reinvent itself to address 6 key contradictions (Not exhaustive)

> Effective responses to the disconnect between early Warning and early response

> Effective utilization of the full potential of the Panel of the Wise/PanWise/ Femwise

> Revisit the ASF (doctrine, rapid deployment capability, the standby brigades (in light of **the 5 models experimented already (**to flexibility to deal with current challenges) Full integration of the new initiatives; True application of the principle of subsidiarity

> Revisit the **Intervention regime (what tool for what situation?)**

> **Access UN assessed contribution**

> Revisit the PSC working methods (Efficient decision making processes, and work flows

Increased African Led-POs:
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2. CAR (MICOPAX/MISMA), Mali (AFISMA), Guinea Bissau (ECOMIB), in fighting the LRA (LRA-RTF), AMIS in Sudan, AMIB in Burundi, AMISEC in Comoros, recent ECOMIG in the Gambia (ECOWAS)
3. DRC (SADC Brigade within MONUSCO),
4. Darfur (UNAMID Hybrid Mission of UN and AU)
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THE 5 models:
- **Full African Led POs (Rapid deployment offensive mandate, multidimensional for the longer term)**
- **African led POs transitioning to a UN mission**
- **Hybrid mission**
- **Coalition of the willing led by Regional Bodies or AU MS (offensive mandate, rapid deployment, flexibility to deal with a particular treat or Political crisis)**
- **New model of coercion (R2P) - Burundi**

This requiers Strategic and political responses….

Thank you