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ABOUT THE AFRICA CENTER

Since its inception in 1999, the Africa Center has served as a forum for research, academic programs, and the exchange of ideas with the aim of enhancing citizen security by strengthening the effectiveness and accountability of African institutions, in support of U.S.-Africa policy.

VISION

*Security for all Africans championed by effective institutions accountable to their citizens.*

Realizing the vision of an Africa free from organized armed violence guaranteed by African institutions that are committed to protecting African citizens is the driving motivation of the Africa Center. This aim underscores the Center’s commitment to contributing to tangible impacts by working with our African partners – military and civilian, governmental and civil society, as well as national and regional. All have valuable roles to play in mitigating the complex drivers of conflict on the continent today. Accountability to citizens is an important element of our vision as it reinforces the point that in order to be effective, security institutions must not just be “strong,” but also be responsive to and protective of the rights of citizens.

MISSION

*To advance African security by expanding understanding, providing a trusted platform for dialogue, building enduring partnerships, and catalyzing strategic solutions.*

The Africa Center’s mission revolves around the generation and dissemination of knowledge through our research, academic programs, strategic communications, and community chapters. Drawing on the practical experiences and lessons learned from security efforts on the continent, we aim to generate relevant insight and analysis that can inform practitioners and policymakers on the pressing security challenges that they face. Recognizing that addressing serious challenges can only come about through candid and thoughtful exchanges, the Center provides face-to-face and virtual platforms where partners can exchange views on priorities and sound practices. These exchanges foster relationships that, in turn, are maintained over time through the Center’s community chapters, communities of interest, follow-on programs, and ongoing dialogue between participants and staff. This dialogue—infused with real world experiences and fresh analysis—provides an opportunity for continued learning and catalyzes concrete actions.

MANDATE

The Africa Center is a U.S. Department of Defense institution established and funded by Congress for the study of security issues relating to Africa and serving as a forum for bilateral and multilateral research, communication, exchange of ideas, and training involving military and civilian participants. *(10 U.S.C 342)*
Introduction

This seminar will provide you with enhanced knowledge of the complexities of Africa’s security landscape in order to contextualize and enhance the work of U.S. professionals on policy and programs related to Africa. This seminar will discuss the contemporary security challenges facing African states; provide insight to the drivers of conflict in Africa, showing their interrelated nature; and highlight the key responses to these challenges undertaken by Africans and their partners. You will be challenged to critically assess strategic responses to Africa’s security challenges and identify ways to apply the concepts and lessons from the seminar.

The seminar is divided into three modules. The first will explore current trends in political violence across Africa, key drivers of insecurity, and the current and future security challenges facing African states. The first two plenaries will focus on trends in conflict and political violence in Africa, as well as the security implications of other megatrends on the continent. The remaining modules cover three types of security that are relevant for grasping the full range of security challenges in Africa and that are related to, but also extend beyond, conflict and political violence.

The second module presents in-depth case studies exploring the dynamics of the dominant types of conflict and political violence in Africa: civil wars, violent extremism, and riots and protests. It also analyzes the aspects of governance and political transitions that have shaped the context in which such violence has arisen. Plenaries will showcase recent trends in democratization and governance in Africa and unpack trajectories of violent extremism in the Sahel, riots and protests in Zimbabwe, and civil war in South Sudan. The module concludes with a case study exercise on the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). In the exercise, participants will draw on previous course material to analyze the various dimensions of violence and conflict in the DRC.

The final module sheds light on responses to conflict. Plenaries will examine the challenges facing African Union and United Nations peacekeeping operations; responses of African governments to security challenges; the intervention of external partners in resolving Africa’s security challenges; and the measures needed to strengthen security sector institutions in Africa.

The seminar will succeed only with honest analysis and productive dialogue. To achieve this end, the Africa Center utilizes academic tools to promote frank and open exchange on critical issues and to lay the foundation for effective peer networking. To facilitate your discussion, we have provided an academic syllabus and recommended readings. We encourage you to challenge the analyses and content in all the material we provide. Unless specifically noted, the readings do not reflect official U.S. Government policy. Rather, they are intended to foster a healthy dialogue on the security challenges under discussion, which in turn will help you forge realistic and effective strategies to address insecurity in Africa. As with all Africa Center programs, this seminar will be conducted under a strict policy of non-attribution, which is binding during and after the seminar. We hope that this will allow you to address the sensitive issues under discussion.

Upon completion of the seminar, you will join more than 8,000 individuals with at least two things in common: a shared concern for issues regarding the future of Africa’s stability and security; and participation in an Africa Center program. We will work actively with you and all members of the Africa Center community to build upon the dialogue begun here and to build further a sense of partnership in pursuit of our common interests in a prosperous, peaceful Africa.
Overview of ACSS

Objective
• To provide an overview of the Africa Center mission and programs

Background
The Africa Center for Strategic Studies advances U.S.-Africa policy by strengthening African states’ strategic capacity to identify and resolve security challenges in ways that promote civil-military cooperation, respect democratic values, and safeguard human rights. The Africa Center pursues its mission by engaging African partner states and institutions through rigorous academic and outreach programs that build strategic capacity and foster long-term, collaborative relationships.

Since inception in 1999, the Africa Center has provided academic-style programs for Africa’s security-related professionals to identify and evaluate current and emerging security threats, agree on strategies and shared responsibilities for national and regional security, and reinforce internationally-recognized best practices in their various spheres of activity. The Africa Center’s Community Chapter program promotes peer networking among former participants, affording them an opportunity to continue dialoguing and collaborating on key security issues upon returning to their home countries. Publications from the Africa Center’s research program expand analysis and understanding of Africa’s security challenges.

The Africa Center achieves its objectives by adhering to five core values in its programs and research: an academic approach, partnership, consultation, academic freedom, and non-attribution. The Africa Center employs both an academic approach and outreach strategies in all of its activities and uses academic tools to produce practical results. This is based on the belief that security challenges can be resolved only by asking difficult questions and searching sincerely and creatively for the solutions. Further, the Africa Center believes that the formulation of solutions to security challenges must include both African leaders and subject-matter experts, and the center therefore works with practitioners, academics, military officials, and civilians as facilitators/speakers for its programs. In the same vein, the Africa Center holds several consultative sessions prior to each program, and these are designed to ensure that the programs are relevant to both African and American security interests. In order to facilitate an honest and frank discussion of the security challenges and needs facing Africa, the Africa Center strictly adheres to a non-attribution policy in all of activities.

Required Reading:

Website: www.africacenter.org
Module 1: Security Landscape
This module will explore current trends in political violence and conflict across Africa, key drivers of insecurity, and the current and future security challenges facing African states. The first two plenaries will focus on trends in conflict and political violence in Africa, as well as the security implications of other megatrends on the continent. The remaining modules cover three thematic areas of security that are relevant for grasping the full range of security challenges in Africa and that are related to, but also go beyond, issues of conflict and political violence.
Plenary 1: Conflict Trends in Africa

Objectives:
- Understand the types of conflict and violence in Africa, as well as changes in patterns of conflict and violence over time
- Identify the local and transnational drivers of conflict and violence in Africa
- Consider the types of defense, diplomacy, and developmental responses that might be relevant to addressing these drivers

Background:
Following the cold war, many African states moved away from authoritarianism and experienced varying degrees of democratization. To many analysts, Africa’s democratic reforms would also result in a reduction of political violence and civil war. The experience in other parts of the world bore out such reasoning: as governments became more accountable and legitimate, the probability that grievances among the population would turn violent decreased.

Indeed, within about a decade after the end of the cold war, the number of conflicts on the African continent fell. According to the Uppsala Conflict Dataset Program (UCDP), after a high of 17 conflicts in 1998, the number of conflicts in Africa dropped significantly; in 2005, there were seven ongoing conflicts in Africa. But particularly since 2010, the number of armed conflicts that involve African states have increased, including those related to Boko Haram in Nigeria, jihadist and Tuareg insurgent activities in Mali, al-Shabaab in Somalia and Kenya, and civil wars in Libya, Central African Republic, and South Sudan.1 Non-state armed conflicts and incidents of one-sided violence against civilians have also increased in number. However, the number of related fatalities is declining.2

Over time, the nature of conflict has also been changing. According to the Armed Conflict Location Events Dataset (ACLED), over the last decade, the most prevalent forms of conflict in Africa have been riots and protests, followed by violence against civilians and battles between state and non-state actors.3 Levels of electoral violence have remained stubbornly persistent for the last 25 years. The number of parties to various conflicts has also increased over time because rebel organizations and violent extremist organizations frequently splinter and multiply. Violent extremist organizations in particular, including Boko Haram, al-Shabaab, and affiliates of Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb and the Islamic State in West Africa Province, influence multiple countries. However, just a handful of African states bear the brunt of armed conflict.4

There are multiple causes of political violence and conflict.5 5 Some important triggers or drivers of violence are poor governance, social exclusion, and weak rule of law. For instance, some of the core drivers of violent extremism in Africa are state-perpetrated human rights abuses and citizens’ perceptions of unjust treatment by the state.6 Similarly, the World Bank’s 2018 Pathways for Peace report shows that “exclusion from access to power, opportunity, services, and security creates fertile ground for mobilizing group grievances into violence,” particularly in fragile states or states that are known for human rights abuses.7 Government corruption and popular demand for accountability have also triggered recent protests in Zimbabwe, South Africa, and Malawi.8 Africa’s future could continue to show increased conflict if changes do not occur in rule of law, the public management of resources, and the inclusion of youth, women, and marginalized groups in governance and politics.9
Questions to Consider:
1. What are some of the most pressing security challenges facing the continent? How have these challenges evolved over time?
2. Has U.S. policy reflected the changing security landscape in Africa? If so, has this succeeded in reducing insecurity? If not, how can it adapt?
3. Beyond the traditional security establishment (e.g., military, police, gendarmerie, and intelligence services), what organizations, structures, and institutions should be included in the national debate over defining security interests and why?

Recommended readings:

“Africa and the Rule of Law: Statement of the International Development Legal Organization,” May 18, 2016,
Plenary 2: Security Implications of Megatrends

Objectives:
- Explore the changing demographic, economic, and sociological factors that may pose security challenges now or in the near future
- Assess the kinds of responses on the domestic, regional, and international levels are needed to address these megatrends in ways that are also likely to mitigate some of the core drivers of conflict and violence

Background:
Several factors will shape Africa’s peace and security in the near term, including demography, economic growth, technological advancement, urbanization, and climate change. Other issues on today’s African security agenda – including transnational organized crime, state fragility, and public health emergencies like the recent ebola outbreaks – will shape the ways that African governments and institutions address human security in the decades to come.

By 2035, Africa is projected to double its population to nearly 2 billion people; such rapid growth will mean that 50 percent of the population will be under 21. These trends will be accompanied by further urbanization, along with rising temperatures that have the potential to foster “environmentally-induced conflict.” Africa also hosts 25 million refugees, internally displaced people, and other vulnerable populations – constituting 35% of the global total. The movement of people within and across national boundaries will also continue to pose a host of political, economic, and societal challenges.

Under the right conditions, a population bulge means opportunity and growth. Africa’s economic growth has been faster than any other continent in the last several years. Yet, it will be difficult to grow sufficiently rapidly to keep pace with the population -- who will need jobs, education, health care, and other services. There will be increased pressures for states to respond to these demands in order to satisfy their political constituents, sustain urban economic activity, and protect the population from public health emergencies. Neglecting rural perspectives on these issues, however, could also lead to political violence and unrest. This is particularly relevant in countries where rural populations are subject to violence, instability, and exclusion, and where non-state armed groups offer protection or other services to compete with the state for power.

Many of these critical emerging security threats facing African countries are collectively-reinforcing and cannot be addressed in isolation. African countries (and their external partners) must think strategically about solutions that are creative, coordinated, and comprehensive.

Questions to Consider:
1. What new types of conflict may future economic and social stressors create?
2. How can the international community assist African governments and institutions with harnessing future changes to result in peace and security?
3. How can the international development agencies and local organizations work to strengthen the link between development and security?
**Recommended readings:**


Anton du Plessis and Anya Kaspersen, “Seven trends shaping the future of peace and security in Africa,” World Economic Forum, June 21, 2016,
[https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2016/06/7-trends-shaping-the-african-security-landscape/](https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2016/06/7-trends-shaping-the-african-security-landscape/)
Plenary 3: Citizen and Community Security

Objectives:
- Understand basic principles of community policing and their relationship to rule of law and human rights
- Assess the ways that security sector actors shape citizens’ interactions with justice systems and affect their experiences with the rule of law

Background:
For much of the post-colonial period, most African leaders defined security in terms of regime survival. More recently, the notion of security has evolved to include a greater focus on citizen-centric and community well-being. Advancing such well-being requires robust rule of law and access to justice.

Citizen security is often concerned with reducing crime and violence, predominately in urban settings. It tends to focus on creating safer neighborhoods through improved law enforcement and community-level prevention efforts. However, the security challenges that individuals and communities face in Africa extend well beyond organized and petty crime. First, state fragility creates more existential vulnerabilities for people living in conflict zones. In order to solve their everyday problems, residents in these areas must interact with several sets of state authorities and other groups involved in the conflict. They must adapt to ongoing changes in the balance of power between such actors on the local level. Furthermore, regardless of a country’s conflict status, state-sponsored violence against residents is a common concern. Violations of fundamental freedoms, civil liberties, or human rights – or fear of them – shapes levels of popular trust in state security and justice actors. It also affects overall safety and rule of law.

A more holistic view of citizen and community security in Africa emphasizes the diversity of security-related problems that people may face and the multiplicity of actors that they could consider approaching for solutions. Accordingly, individuals and communities seek to address their concerns in various ways; a non-exhaustive list of options may include working with local police; filing cases in state court; pursuing mediation through state, customary, or religious authorities; and engaging with community-based groups that patrol, punish, or provide other services. Sometimes, however, people’s safest choice in particularly volatile or risky circumstances is to do nothing, or to seek informal help from family or friends.

Building local trust in the police and the courts is often needed to make citizen and community security work. Local, national, and international stakeholders have had varying levels of success with this through participatory governance processes, community-level dialogues, and community-based paralegal approaches that link people directly to security and justice actors.

Questions to Consider:
1. How can the international community best work with African partners to address security concerns in ways that respect the rule of law and human rights?
2. What unique advantages can community-based security initiatives offer to actors seeking to mitigate Africa’s security challenges?
Recommended readings:


Choose one of the following:


Plenary 4: Maritime Security

Objectives:
- Identify the types of maritime safety and security in Africa, including Africa’s greatest emerging maritime threats
- Evaluate the scope and effectiveness of existing collaborative arrangements to safeguard Africa’s maritime interests

Background:
Africa’s maritime domain has many linkages to Africa’s peace and security. The resources associated with Africa’s maritime domain - fisheries, tourism, minerals, hydrocarbons - play a key role in the economies of coastal states and constitute an important base on which Africa’s prosperity can be anchored. The importance of these resources is expected to increase as regional and global demands grow. African states’ ability to control their maritime domains and to manage the resources therein will determine their ability to provide development to their citizens and, thus, improve both security and development for both states and citizens. Such an end state would be beneficial for the international community, as well, because Africa would be able to play its part as an important contributor to global security and prosperity. However, this requires addressing several common forms of maritime insecurity.

Piracy and Armed Robbery at Sea
While the threat had been abated off Somalia for almost five years, and the modalities and frequency of attacks in the Gulf of Guinea have shifted, the risk of piracy and armed robbery attacks on commercial vessels is as present as ever. Instability caused by Yemen’s conflict has resulted in ideological attacks on ships of certain flags, the use of unmanned underwater systems to harm vessels, and terrorist involvement in piracy activity.

Fisheries
IUU fishing threatens African fisheries, a vital source of food and jobs to millions of Africans. Some estimate Africa’s fishing stocks will be decimated in forty years, while others project a doubling of Africa’s population in that same period. Without drastic collaborative, cooperative and coordinated measures, dwindling fishing resources and population growth will result in food insecurity, with concomitant effects on security.

Crude Oil Theft
Crude oil theft is a highly organized and financed operation that deprives oil-producing countries of much needed revenue streams and destabilizes local communities. This often happens with the complicity of the police and military who turn a blind eye to these nefarious activities of pirates or oil bunkering.11

Human Trafficking, Drug and Weapons Smuggling, and Organized Crime
Human trafficking from Africa, mostly to European destinations, is already a major security concern for both the African citizens making the perilous journey and for the recipient countries. The sea is not only an avenue of choice for trafficking of humans out of Africa, but also a favored conduit for the smuggling of drugs and weapons into Africa. Drugs corrode the fabric of affected communities and weaken both polities and economies; in turn, there is a direct connection between the illicit flows of cash and the demand for weapons. Guinea-Bissau, an extreme case,
has become the continent’s first “narco-state.” Given prevailing institutional weaknesses in the region, the adverse impacts of drugs on political stability will likely grow. The effects on economies are equally devastating as large inflows of illicit cash fuel inflation and crowd out licit enterprises.\textsuperscript{12}

In many cases, there is a convenient partnership between drug traffickers, other criminals and insurgents. Once organized, these individuals and groups can pose major threats to ports, ships, and offshore installations with important security implications at the national, sub-regional, regional, and global levels. The insecurity associated with such threats has a negative impact on perceptions of Africa as a destination for people and capital. For example, as a result of an increase in piracy attacks on coastal East African countries, international shipping companies have begun to seek alternative routes.

Questions to Consider:

1. What are the key regional, continental and international African maritime interests and how do they intersect with global considerations?
2. To what extent do legal and policy responses on land affect the enhancement of safety and security at sea in Africa?
3. How can the U.S. support African countries’ efforts to enhance their collaboration, cooperation, and coordination on maritime security issues?

Recommended readings:

Plenary 5: Cyber Security

Objectives:

- Understand the importance of cyber security for a wide range of issues in Africa – including election transparency, terrorism and organized crime, intelligence-sharing, and military preparedness
- Identify the domestic and international actors often involved in perpetrating cybercrime and the local and transnational needs for response
- Assess the strengths and weaknesses of state, regional, and African Union attempts to address cyber security challenges

Background:
Africa’s rapid technological development, including its e-commerce industry and mobile technologies, has generated a proliferation of cybercrime and illicit online activities. Taking advantage of the continent’s weak information technology infrastructure, criminal networks are designing such threats as ransomware, new malware and social media scams to achieve their goals. Online identity theft is also a rising phenomenon, with the threat of terrorists purchasing forged documents as part of “packages” sold online to enter other countries. Individuals’ privacy and personal security are increasingly at risk.

The collective security implications of these cyber trends are also wide-ranging. Cybercrime places private sector businesses, as well as public and private financial institutions, at heightened risk. This in turn affects countries’ prospects for economic growth and development. Electoral integrity and political stability can be compromised if hackers gain access to the data of election oversight bodies or electronic voting machines, as was the case in Kenya’s 2017 presidential election. Linkages between cyber criminality and organized crime are currently not that abundant in Africa. However, they are critical to monitor in case this pattern changes, especially as organized criminal groups diversify their activities (to include trafficking in drugs, people, arms, cultural artefacts; smuggling of fake medicines; poaching; and illegal logging and mining).

Legislative responses that strengthen cyber security in Africa are necessary but not sufficient. By mid-2016, just eleven African countries had promulgated legislation on cybercrime and electronic evidence: Botswana, Cameroon, Cote d’Ivoire, Ghana, Mauritania, Mauritius, Morocco, Mozambique, Rwanda, South Africa, Sudan, Tunisia, and Zimbabwe. The African Union Convention on Cyber Security and Personal Data Protection (2014) tackles several major issues but just fourteen countries have signed it thus far. Improving law enforcement and prosecution of suspected perpetrators could deter offenders, but states would be wise to avoid passing laws that define cyber criminality in a superficially broad way (for example, to include legitimate forms of political expression online). Effective approaches will balance the state’s need to regulate certain cyber activities for security purposes and the state’s obligations to protect its citizens’ rights to exercise fundamental freedoms and civil liberties, both online and offline.
Questions to Consider:
1. In what ways might enhanced cyber security in Africa mitigate other security challenges on the continent?
2. What are the possible benefits and costs of African countries pursuing stricter legislation and enhanced prosecution of cybercrime?
3. What can the U.S. do to help African governments take practical steps to address threats in the future?

Recommended readings:
Nir Kshetri, “Cybercrime and Cybersecurity in Africa,” *Journal of Global Information Technology Management*, April 9, 2019, 77-81,  

https://www.lawfareblog.com/improving-electoral-cybersecurity-kenya
Module 2: Conflict Dynamics in Africa
This module presents in-depth case studies exploring the dynamics of the dominant types of conflict and political violence in Africa: civil wars, violent extremism, and riots and protests. It also analyzes the aspects of governance and political transitions that have shaped the context in which those forms of violence have arisen. Plenaries in this module will showcase recent trends in democratization and governance in Africa and unpack trajectories of violent extremism in the Sahel, riots and protests in Zimbabwe, and civil war in South Sudan. The module concludes with a case study exercise on the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). In the case study exercise, participants will draw on the plenary discussions of the first and second modules to analyze the various dimensions of political violence and civil conflict in the DRC.
Plenary 6: Democratic Transitions

Objectives:

- Identify democratization trends in Africa and recognize the factors related to both structure and agency that shape regime trajectories
- Analyze connections between contested democratic transitions and violence
- Identify the role of elections in democratization processes, as well as in triggering violence in Africa

Background:

Despite the widespread belief that independence and self-rule would allow for more responsive governance, colonial legacies of repression, divide-and-rule politics, and inequitable development were surprisingly resilient. From soon after independence until 1989, African states were generally seen to have stalled in their transition towards democracy, with multiparty regimes in Botswana, The Gambia, Mauritius, Senegal, and Zimbabwe being the most notable exceptions. After the end of the Cold War, Western and Soviet aid to Africa declined, leaving many leaders of authoritarian regimes more exposed to popular pressures than before. Beginning with Benin, from 1989-1995, thirty-five African countries embarked upon “democratic experiments,” transitioning to multiparty regimes. Somewhat regimes grew into democracies, and others reformed their constitutions but remained largely or partially authoritarian in practice.

Previously, in the 1908s, African countries had taken austerity measures as part of the structural adjustment programs they adopted through the World Bank and International Monetary Fund. With stronger laws, smaller public bureaucracies, and reduced funding streams, incumbents resorted to new, and often violent methods to stay in power. Meanwhile, globalization, neoliberalism, and shifts in international development assistance led to the mobilization of students, workers, professionals, and other civil society groups for constitutional reform. This also empowered political opponents to challenge entrenched political elites.

Recognizing that political problems drove much of Africa’s insecurity, donors invested considerably in democracy assistance. Elections became a special focus, partly due to their contained timelines and relatively measurable outcomes. Early on, some African candidates worried that domestic manipulations of the electoral process would drive away international support. However, the tendency by international observers to qualify elections with major irregularities as “generally free and fair” eventually eroded this concern. Thus, many autocrats, while investing in sophisticated technology to rig results more subtly, nevertheless seem unconcerned by donor criticism.

Today, political transitions remain violent in many countries. On average, nearly 60 percent of all African elections from 1990-2008 were accompanied by some level of violence -- ranging from harassment to mass atrocities. Another study of 50 African elections from 2011 to 2017 found that the vast majority of them involved some sort of violence but that the risk was especially high when incumbents tried to change the constitution to expand their term limits. On the whole, electoral violence is most likely in countries with quasi-independent judiciaries, where it is possible but not certain that citizens can rely on the courts to fairly resolve election disputes.
Preventing electoral violence remains a challenge. However, empowering domestically based election observation groups not only to monitor, but to actively mitigate, political conflict can reduce electoral violence. Effective approaches must also unpack how electoral violence affects men and women differently – in particular female political candidates, who face a barrage of harassment and intimidation. 23

Currently, despite 25 years of democratization, only 11% of Africans live in countries that Freedom House scores as “free” (Senegal, Cape Verde, Ghana, Benin, Mauritius, Namibia, Botswana, South Africa, and Sao Tomé and Principe).24 At the root of stalled democratization efforts lie weaknesses in governance and institutions. While governance indicators improved at first after transitions to multiparty politics, many of them stalled or worsened as of the mid-2000s.25 Nevertheless, 34 countries have also been able to improve their scores on the Ibrahim Index of African Governance. Continuing to strengthen various aspects of governance – particularly safety and the rule of law – could be critical for further improvements.26

Questions to Consider:

1. What do recent attempts to unconstitutionally extend power and subsequent citizen responses indicate about the state of democracy across Africa?
2. How can partner governments engage African governments on issues of fundamental freedoms, civil liberties, and transparent oversight of elections?
3. What practical steps could be taken to encourage free and fair elections, prevent electoral violence, and mitigate unconstitutional changes or extensions of power, in Africa?

Recommended readings:


Plenary 7: Violent Extremism: Case Study of the Sahel

Objectives:
- Assess the security environment as it relates to violent extremism in the Sahel
- Understand the drivers of violent extremism specific to the Sahel, as well as those that apply more generally across Africa
- Distill the roles played by local government and non-government actors, as well as the international and regional communities, in countering and preventing violent extremism

Background:
African states have devoted considerable energy and resources to the fight against terrorism and violent extremism on the continent. Anti-terrorism (AT), focused on target hardening and dissuasion against attack, is sometimes distinguished from the active pursuit of terrorists of counterterrorism; similarly, preventing violent extremism (PVE) or threats that may emerge tomorrow, is sometimes distinguished from countering violent extremism (CVE) to address the threats of today. Countering terrorist groups often requires kinetic capabilities, intelligence assets, and correctional facilities, whereas CVE might demand new legal codes, public awareness campaigns, and strategic communications skills. PVE, meanwhile, could involve strategic investments in building rule of law institutions, promoting inclusive policies and practices, or supporting community-based dispute resolution and civic education.

Since 2010, militant Islamist activity has increased steadily in Africa. Whereas in 2010 there were five recognized groups and 675 extremist events, in 2017, there more than 20 active groups and 2,769 extremist events recorded. Overall, militant Islamist activity is concentrated in Mali, the Lake Chad Basin, Somalia, the Maghreb, and the Sinai Peninsula. For the U.S. Government, countering violent extremism has focused heavily on Somalia, the Lake Chad Basin, and the Sahel region. African governments have responded to terrorism with a range of kinetic, diplomatic, and development strategies; they have also worked at the local, national, and regional level, including through African peace support operations.

The Sahel
While militant jihadist groups have been present in the Sahel since the early 2000s, the 2012 coup d’état in Mali precipitated their spread. The coup took place not long after the toppling of the Libyan government in 2011 and the associated outflow of weapons and fighters who had trained under Libyan leader Mu’ammar Qaddafi. With the security and political vacuum created by the coup and the return of armed Tuaregs to northern Mali from Libya, rebels and extremists moved quickly to take control of the major cities in northern Mali. Tuareg separatists launched a rebellion in northern Mali in 2012 and initially gained support of local jihadist groups like Ansar Dine and al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM). With the Malian National Army’s losses in the north and disenchantment with the President Amadou Toumani Touré’s handling of the crisis, junior officers mounted a coup in March 2012.

After one year of political indecision, French troops deployed in 2013 at the invitation of the Malian government to drive out armed jihadist groups and restore national sovereignty. The African Union followed with a peace operations mission, which was eventually re-hatted as the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA). It has since become the most deadly of UN peacekeeping missions.
Mali returned to civilian rule in 2013, when multiparty presidential elections brought Ibrahim Boubacar Keïta to power. The Algiers Peace Accord was signed in 2015, but its implementation continues to stall. Armed conflict and violent extremism have also moved from the northern regions to the central regions of the country, where a coalition of jihadist groups now operate. The Malian Government has launched an Integrated Security Plan for the Central Regions (PSIRC). Focused largely on the plan’s “security” prong, it has struggled to make progress on the other three areas, governance, socioeconomic development, and communications.

As violent extremism has intensified in Mali, it has also spread to neighboring countries like Burkina Faso and Niger. Violent events perpetrated by militant Islamist groups have doubled every year since 2016. As analysts and research try to understand motivations for joining extremists groups, many conclusions point to the failure of governance. In Mali, violent extremist organizations recruit members by focusing on structural grievances about social mobility and opportunity – rather than on religious arguments. In Burkina Faso, Niger, and Mali, state-sponsored violence against civilians, as well as perceptions of injustice from such violence, also play major roles.

Reforms that address these drivers are needed, as is regional cooperation. To the latter end, Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali, Mauritania, and Niger have all contributed troops to the Joint force of the G5 Sahel, an intergovernmental organized founded in 2014. While the G5 Sahel was originally created to promote regional development and reduce insecurity, it is currently quite invested in securing specific borders affected by militant Islamist activities. The G5 Sahel’s first two joint military operations were in 2017 and 2018.

Questions to Consider:
1. In what ways are the challenges of violent extremism domestic, and in what ways are they transnational?
2. What would evidence-based responses to violent extremism on the part of African governments look like? What are the relative merits of defense, development, and/or diplomatic responses?
3. What role could the international community play in alleviating the underlying drivers for violent extremism?

Recommended readings:


Plenary 8: Riots and Protests: Case Study of Zimbabwe

Objectives

- Unpack the underlying reasons for the rise in riots and protests in Zimbabwe
- Discuss state responses to riots and protests and their effects on human rights and law/order
- Consider how the international community can respond to worsening riots or protests

Background

Riots and protests have steadily risen to the dominant form of conflict in Africa. Recent research based on the Armed Conflict Location and Event Dataset (ACLED) finds that “the number of non-violent protests and violent riots have increased twelvefold since 2001 and particularly rapidly after the start of the Arab Spring in 2010.” While the freedom to protest can be seen as a positive expression of the freedom of speech, it can also turn deadly, as security forces clamp down violently on protesters.

Democracies and autocracies have been part of the recent wave of riots and protests. In 2017 in South Africa, students protested high university fees, forming the #FeesMustFall and #RhodesMustFall campaigns; as the public mood shifted against former president, Jacob Zuma, the #ZumaMustFall movement formed. Since October 2016, Cameroon’s Anglophone regions have violently protested against the Francophone dominant government; some groups are calling for secession to form the Republic of Ambazonia. Ethiopia’s new Prime Minister, Abiy Ahmed, was elected by the ruling party after several years of protests concentrated in the Amhara and Oromo regions of the country. Activists seeking to mobilize citizens for more transparent governance in Senegal, Burkina Faso, and Democratic Republic of Congo have also used marches and protests to send their message.

2019 has already been a banner year for protests. While those in Sudan and Algeria have made the most headlines, the ongoing sequence of protests in Zimbabwe is also gaining attention because of the human rights concerns that it raises.

Zimbabwe

In November 2017, Robert Mugabe, who had ruled Zimbabwe for thirty years under a notoriously repressive regime, was ousted in a military coup. In the wake of pressures from protesters and parliament for Mugabe to formally step down, Emmerson Mnangagwa became president. He had long been considered Mugabe’s likely successor, having been Vice President until days before the coup.

President Mnangagwa struggled to repair Zimbabwe’s economy, which had been devastated by massive hyperinflation, unemployment, and corruption under Mugabe. He was re-elected president in 2018 in a race marked by fraud and repression. The most recent wave of protests began in January 2019 in response to the state’s decision to increase fuel prices to a rate that is the highest in the world. Already saddled by “persistent fuel shortages compounded by manipulation and mismanagement of a currency crisis,” thousands of people took to the streets in the capital, Harare, and elsewhere. State security forces brutally cracked down on protesters,
resorting at times to murder, torture, rape, and indiscriminate home raids. Several prominent civil society figures were arrested – including several trade union leaders and Pastor Evan Mwawire, whose viral video with the hashtag #ThisFlag inspired protests in 2016. Zimbabwean lawyers were also in the streets, denouncing the state’s treatment of jailed protesters. Now, over six months after these initial events, protests and crackdowns continue, most recently against political opponents seeking to hold demonstrations. These abuses are expected to have negative effects on civilian trust in security sector actors like the police.

Questions to Consider:
1. What role can the international community play as riots and protests continue?
2. At what point is it appropriate for the international community to intervene?
3. Are riots and protests indicators of conflict or civil liberties?

Recommended readings:


Plenary 9: Civil War: Case Study of South Sudan

Objectives:
- Assess the security and political environment as it relates to civil war in South Sudan since independence in 2011
- Distill the roles played by the national government, regional organizations, and international community in hindering/advancing the progress toward peace
- Understand the contributing factors to the civil war in South Sudan

Background:
South Sudan gained its independence from Sudan with the 2011 referendum, after nearly 40 years of civil war. However, in December 2013, South Sudan plunged into civil conflict as the ruling party, the Sudanese People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM) split into rival factions led by Salva Kiir and Riek Machar. The UN Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS) had already been in place since 2011, with an original mandate to help the new nation transition following its independence from Sudan. However, the outbreak of fighting brought a more robust mandate and increase in peacekeepers. Presently, nearly 16,000 peacekeepers serve with UNMISS.

The Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) leads peacemaking efforts in South Sudan. While a new peace agreement was signed on August 7, 2018, the peace process has been stalled for two years – the Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in the Republic of South Sudan (ARCISS), signed in August 2015, collapsed a year later. In that time, renewed violence has led to a humanitarian emergency with nearly 2 million South Sudanese internally displaced.41 In September 2018, IGAD brokered a signing of the Revitalized ARCISS, but IGAD has also reported several violations.42

After the latest peace deal, President Kiir offered amnesty to the opposition faction of the SPLM, including Vice President Machar. This decision could affect how transitional justice takes place in South Sudan. Currently, the domestic justice system does not have the resources or capabilities to meet existing demands for justice on its own. Therefore, the ARCISS provides for a hybrid court run jointly by the AU and South Sudan to prosecute war crimes. It also calls for a Commission for Truth, Reconciliation, and Healing, as well as a Compensation and Reparations Authority. Whether amnesty is extended to former fighters in the civil war could influence prospects for lasting peace. The question of amnesty affects whether some of the major perpetrators of wartime violence are brought to justice; it also affects the way that survivors of the violence are likely to feel about their current government, courts, and fellow citizens.

Questions to Consider:
1. What role do institutions and individuals play in fomenting violence?
2. What leverage can regional and international bodies use for conflict resolution?
3. To what extent is a political settlement at odds with transitional justice? In particular, what tensions might arise between the provisions made in the ARCISS for transitional justice, on the one hand, and President Kiir’s recent extension of amnesty to Machar and other parties to the conflict?

Recommended readings:

Case Study Exercise and Brief-Back: A Complex Emergency in the Democratic Republic of Congo

Objectives:
- To understand the different challenges to conflict resolution and political transition in DRC
- To apply the insights from the modules on security challenges and conflict drivers to the Congo case
- To benefit from the opportunities of small group discussions to unpack different aspects of a case.

Format:
- Participants will be assigned to one of three sub-groups: crisis of political transitions; the conflict in Kasai, or the UN Organization Mission in DRC.
- **Readings identified for each of the sub-groups are required, in order to facilitate discussion.**
- As participants meet in their sub-groups, they will discuss the following:
  - The pathway to the security challenge and how it has evolved;
  - The ways that the security challenge creates obstacles to achieving peace and political development;
  - The role and/or limitations for the international and regional communities to improve security.
Background

The Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) is the largest Francophone country in Africa. Since independence in 1960, the history of the DRC has been marked by successive conflicts, weak governance, economic mismanagement, and widespread corruption. The DRC is natural resource-rich and is home to over 80 million people. Slightly over 60% live in rural areas. According to the World Bank, “with 80 million hectares of arable land and over 1,100 listed minerals and precious metals, the DRC has the potential to become one of the richest countries on the continent and a driver of African growth if it can overcome its political instability and improve governance.”

ECONOMIC OVERVIEW

The economic development of the DRC has been severely undermined by decades of instability and violence. Poor economic management aggravated by repeated political crises has constrained economic freedom and trapped much of the population in persistent poverty. Arbitrary taxation, poor infrastructure, marginal enforcement of property rights, and the weak rule of law have driven many people and enterprises into the informal sector, which accounts for more than 80 percent of economic activity. The Democratic Republic of Congo ranked 176 out of 189 countries on the United Nations Human Development Index. On Transparency International’s 2018 Corruption Perceptions Index, the DRC ranked 161 out of 180 countries. The World Bank estimates GDP per capita annual income at $561, or 211th out of 221 economies surveyed. Although DRC experienced economic growth 2005-2012, the country experienced a downturn 2015-2017, when global commodity prices declined. By 2018, the economy grew at a rate of 4.1%, a significant increase from the two years before, largely due to increases in world prices for cobalt and copper.

QUICK FACTS

- **Official name:** Democratic Republic of the Congo
- **Capital:** Kinshasa
- **Borders:** Angola, Atlantic Ocean, Burundi, Central African Republic, Republic of the Congo, Rwanda, South Sudan, Tanzania, Uganda, Zambia.
- **Population:** 80 million (World Bank 2018 est.)
- **Size:** 2,334,858 sq. km (CIA 2018 est.)
- **Independence:** June 30, 1960 from Belgium
- **Ethnic groups:** over 200 African ethnic groups of which the majority are Bantu; the four largest tribes - Mongo, Luba, Kongo (all Bantu), and the Mangbetu-Azande (Hamitic) make up about 45% of the population
- **Languages:** French (official), Lingala (a lingua franca trade language), Kingwana (a dialect of Kiswahili or Swahili), Kikongo, Tshiluba
- **Religion:** Roman Catholic 50%, Protestant 20%, Kimbanguist 10%, Muslim 10%, other (includes syncretic sects and indigenous beliefs) 10%
- **GDP:** USD 41 billion (2017 est.)
- **Minerals:** Copper, gold, diamonds, cobalt, uranium, tin, tantalum, tungsten, coltan and oil
- **MONUSCO:** Current strength (15 September 2017) 16,215 military personnel, 660 military observers, 391 police, 1,050 personnel of formed police units
Conflict Dynamics
The Democratic Republic of Congo’s present conflict dynamics date to the mid-1990s, when refugees from Rwanda’s genocide fled across the border to the DRC’s eastern region. However, the nearly 60 years of independence have been defined by instability and insecurity in several regions. With 4.5 million internally displaced and several episodes of violence, Congo faces an unprecedented humanitarian crisis. For some analysts, it underscores Congo’s weak institutions, pervasive corruption in government and the security services, and poor strategies for resolving conflict.45

In 1994, approximately one million Rwandan Hutus fled into Congo (called Zaire at the time), which was also inhabited by Congolese Tutsi. With the influx of Rwandan Hutus, Congolese Tutsi suffered increased violence and attacks were launched at the Tutsi-led Rwandan government. 46 Congo’s Tutsi (Banyamulenge) received help from the Rwandan government to defeat the Hutu refugees; the Ugandan government also offered assistance as eastern Congo served as a base for anti-Museveni forces. Laurent Desire-Kabila, long a dissident of then-President Mobutu Sese Seko, led the Congolese Tutsi in the effort to retake control of Eastern Zaire. 47 In 1997, then-President Mobutu Sese Seko was overthrown and Kabila assumed the presidency, renaming the country the Democratic Republic of Congo. However, stability proved elusive. In 1998, regional war resumed, as Rwanda and Uganda continued to charge that their national security was threatened by the Hutus in the border region. This time, the conflict involved seven countries, 48 earning the name, “Africa’s First World War.” In 2001, Kabila was assassinated by his bodyguard, and replaced by his son, Joseph Kabila, who has governed from the 2003 peace agreement through the most recent 2018 elections.

Crisis of Political Transition and Governance: The 2018 Elections and Beyond
President Joseph Kabila’s term was to have ended in 2016, after he had served his constitutionally mandated two terms as president. However, Kabila’s government injected several delays into the electoral process. Originally scheduled to take place in 2016, elections were postponed on several occasions. Uncertainty swirled around Kabila’s intent to stay beyond his constitutionally permitted two terms. Anti-Kabila protests in Congo’s large cities have resulted in nearly 300 deaths in the last three years, as protesters violently clashed with security services.49 To address the electoral stalemate, the Catholic Church, opposition groups, and government negotiated the 2017 Saint Sylvestre Political Agreement, which required Kabila to step down in December 2018.50

As the end of Kabila’s term moved closer to reality, President Kabila named his successor: Emmanuel Ramazani Shadary, the Secretary-General of the ruling party, and the former Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Interior. This meant that Shadary would be the ruling coalition’s candidate in the 2018 presidential election. Public opinion polls did not suggest that Shadary had good chances of winning the election, and speculations abounded about the extent to which Shadary would be truly independent of Kabila.51 The EU sanctioned Shadary in 2017 for the role he played in the state’s crackdown on anti-Kabila protesters.52 Shadary’s main competitors were Martin Fayulu, a former oil executive backed by other opposition figures, and Félix Tshisekedi, the son of one of DRC’s former Prime Ministers and historical opposition leaders. Tshisekedi was declared the winner, despite speculation that it was Fayulu who had really won based on leaked data from Catholic Church election observers. Rumors held that Tshisekedi had negotiated his victory by promising Kabila influence over the security services.53
Despite the 2018 election’s place in Congolese history as the first peaceful transition of presidential power since independence, analysts suggest that the circumstances of the transition create risks of future violence and instability. The vote-counting process suggested that the Electoral Commission might not be as independent as it is supposed to be, given that Fayulu would have won if the leaked data is correct; and the rumors of a deal between Kabila and Tshisekedi have fostered doubts about how much will change under the new administration. Furthermore, some citizens are now questioning the utility of peaceful forms of dissent. The administration’s ability to deliver on economic and social reforms will shape further prospects for conflict and peace.

Unrest in Kasai
The Kasai region is one of the DRC’s poorest, and usually far off the radar of politicians and diplomats in the distant capital, Kinshasa. After decades of relative peace, Kasai province has experienced conflict since 2016. The conflict started as a dispute between a traditional leader and government officials in Kinshasa, over the naming of Jean-Prince Pandi as a customary chief. Pandi was not recognized by Kinshasa, as Kasai is an opposition stronghold and Pandi was linked to opposition supporters; he was subsequently killed in August 2016, which sparked the violence. A pro-Pandi militia (Kamuina Nsapu) battled government security services and a pro-government militia (Bana Mura).

The fighting between the government and the two militias have left 5,000 dead and a long trail of human rights abuses, including mass rapes, mutilations, and beheadings. It has resulted in 1.4 million internally displaced and 35,000 refugees into Angola. Equally pressing, the humanitarian emergency in Kasai remains poorly addressed. Violence has resulted in a 750 per cent increase in acute food insecurity across the Kasais, and loss of two agricultural seasons, further jeopardizing the food security outlook in 2018.

The situation in Kasai is further complicated as it was an opposition stronghold under former President Kabila. As such, the government’s initial efforts to investigate atrocities, quell the conflict, and address human rights abuses were slow. The December 2018 elections presented new opportunities for progress: President Tshisekedi hails from the Kasai Province, which could change the way that militia leaders evaluate the costs and benefits of violence. Just last month, over one thousand Congolese refugees returned from Angola to Kasai based on post-election changes to the context at home. Despite these promising improvements, risks of renewed or intensified violence remain high. Bacre Waly Ndiaye, who leads the UN’s investigations of human rights violations in Kasai, noted in March 2019 that “although the situation had stabilized somewhat, the crisis was far from over: militias were still active in the province, forced labor was rife, and the numbers affected by sexual slavery were greater than initially thought, as were the numbers of child soldiers.”

UN Organization Stabilization Mission in DRC (MONUSCO)
The UN has deployed peacekeepers in DRC since November 1999. The current mission, the UN Organization Stabilization Mission in DRC (MONUSCO) is among the largest and most expensive UN peacekeeping missions in Africa and the world. Currently, MONUSCO is staffed with 20,486 uniformed and non-uniformed personnel (the largest peace operation in Africa is currently the African Union’s mission in Somalia with 21,000 officers). MONUSCO’s mandate
“[relates to], among other things, to the protection of civilians, humanitarian personnel and human rights defenders under imminent threat of physical violence and to support the Government of the DRC in its stabilization and peace consolidation efforts.”

MONUSCO has faced strong criticism over the years for its failure to adequately protect civilians and respond to crises – such as in the recent violence in Kasai. A main reason for MONUSCO failure to protect civilians has been the “underperformance of soldiers form traditional troop contributing countries.” Accordingly, MONUSCO’s renewed mandate contains provision for addressing underperforming troops. However, the peace operation must also contend with a public that does not think the mission is helping to mitigate the conflict.

Required Readings:

Assessing the Unrest in Kasai


Assessing the Electoral Dynamics


Assessing the Challenges Facing MONUSCO

Yvan Yenda Ilunga, “After Strategic Review, What Should Be Done With MONUSCO?”
International Peace Institute Global Observatory, June 24, 2019,
https://theglobalobservatory.org/2019/06/after-strategic-review-what-should-be-done-monusco/
MODULE 3: RESPONSES TO VIOLENT CONFLICT
The final module features plenary discussions on various responses to conflict. Plenaries will examine the challenges facing the African Union and United Nation’s peacekeeping operations; the responses of African government to conflict; the intervention of non-US partners in resolving Africa’s security challenges; and the measures needed to build and maintain effective security sector institutions in Africa.
Objectives
- Analyze the successes and failures of UN peacekeeping in Africa to date
- Evaluate ways that the Africa Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) has contributed to ending conflict, as well as its implementation gaps
- Identify opportunities for effective partnership between the UN and institutions of Africa’s peace and security architecture to end conflict

Background
Violent conflicts in Africa often have regional dimensions. Insurgents and rebel groups may use a neighboring country’s territory as a base of operations, receive funding from neighboring governments, or rely on co-ethnic kin across borders for support. Local conflicts may also destabilize neighboring states, as arms and refugees spill over borders. The spread of conflict and instability in West Africa in the 1990s offers a powerful example of regional contagion, as do contemporary events in the sub-region.

The regionalization of conflict led to the creation of regional conflict management mechanisms, through the Regional Economic Communities (RECs). First in this regard was the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS). In the early 1990s it forged ad hoc responses to sub-regional security challenges, sending a regional military force to intervene in the Liberian civil war and then in Sierra Leone, when there was an unconstitutional change of government. Today, while all RECs have adopted conflict resolution mechanisms, considerable differences exist between them regarding the commitment, scale, and success of their sub-regional collective security initiatives.

The RECs are recognized as the building blocks of the African Union’s (AU) African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA). In addition to ECOWAS, the eight RECs recognized by the AU are the: Community of Sahel-Saharan States, Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa, East African Community, Economic Community of Central African States, Intergovernmental Authority on Development, Southern African Development Community, and Arab Maghreb Union. Through APSA, the AU aims to address Africa’s security challenges through five components:

- Peace and Security Council (PSC): a standing decision-making body of fifteen AU member states, charged with preventing, managing, and resolving conflicts.
- Panel of the Wise: a group of five eminent Africans who undertake preventive diplomacy efforts, such as fact-finding missions.
- Continental Early Warning System: an observation and monitoring network, used to collect data to inform and advise the PSC.
- African Standby Force (ASF): a sub-regional force of military, police, and civilian components on standby in their countries of origin, ready for rapid deployment.
- Peace Fund: a repository for the resources for peace and security operations.
Much of APSA, including the ASF and its subsidiaries, Rapid Deployment Capability and African Capacity for Immediate Response to Crisis, have yet to be fully operationalized. The AU relies heavily on external partners to fund peace operations; in 2017, 98% of peace operations were externally funded.66

This plenary will discuss the continental response and APSA broadly, but also in reference to several notable examples of conflicts that the AU and RECs sought to address through various mechanisms and techniques.

Somalia
The African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) is Africa’s largest peace operation, with approximately 21,000 troops from five countries. Somalia is the epicenter for Al-Shabaab, whose violence has spread to Kenya and Uganda. Economic deprivation, gross inadequacy of basic services, and poor infrastructure have created the conditions for institutionalized poverty for millions and increased communities’ vulnerability to extremist groups like Al-Shabaab. Since 2007, AMISOM has been the main military operation working to defeat Al-Shabaab. It has also sought to train Somali forces to eventually assume the responsibility for national security.68 In contrast, the United States and the European Union have a decidedly smaller footprint in Somalia. For example the U.S. supported many of AMISOM’s operations, while also using “precision strikes... and other capacity-building efforts [in partnership with the U.S. and other allies]”.69

Burundi
In April 2015, Burundi’s President Pierre Nkurunziza declared his intention to run for a third term, in contravention of the 2000 Arusha Accords, which limit presidential terms to two. Demonstrations against Nkurunziza’s third term took place regularly, despite the violent repression by security services. Within a year, nearly 400 were killed and about 250,000 fled to neighboring countries. In December 2015, the AU voted to deploy a 5,000-strong mission to Burundi, but Nkurunziza challenged the decision. Even a scaled down AU response that consisted of the deployment of a five heads of state were unsuccessful in mediating the situation.71 A similar mediation effort, intended to foster intra-Burundi dialogue, spearheaded by the East African Community has also failed.72 In May 2018, Burundians approved a referendum allowing President Nkrunziza to stay in power until 2034.

The Gambia
The Gambia was ruled by Yahya Jammeh from 1994 until he lost the presidential elections of December 2016. A former military officer who took power in a coup d'état, Jammeh had overseen what essentially became an "electoral authoritarian regime." This meant that multiparty elections took place, but political rights and civil liberties were so constrained that there was, for decades, little to no uncertainty about who would win them. Jammeh had been re-elected multiple times under these conditions, but unexpectedly lost the December 2016 race to the opponent, Adama Barrow. Jammeh initially conceded defeat, but later claimed that the elections were flawed and sought to stay in power.73 Leaders from the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) sought to use diplomacy and negotiation to facilitate The Gambia’s constitutional change in power. On January 14, 2017, ECOWAS initiated its Mission in The Gambia (ECOMIG) to further these goals; they also received United Nations Security Council endorsement. Jammeh stepped down from the presidency and left The Gambia several days after ECOMIG troops
moved to the Senegal-Gambia border, and later into the country. President Barrow was sworn into office in Senegal and subsequently returned to The Gambia.

**Questions to Consider:**

1. How viable is the APSA in practice? What are its strengths and weaknesses?
2. What are advantages and disadvantages of regional actors responding to crises?
3. What practical steps could enhance the continent’s peace support operations, and what actors should be involved?

**Recommended readings:**


Plenary 11: National Responses to Security Challenges

Objectives:
- Understand the varied responses by African governments to insecurity and the influences of those responses on residents’ trust in the state
- Consider how security sector reform and rule of law development can improve how Africa’s governments respond to insecurity and protect citizens
- Discuss the relationship between national responses to conflict and regional collective security protocols

Background
Officials in national governments and state institutions have critical roles to play in responding to security challenges. Such responses often include a mix of defense, development, and diplomacy. On the defense side, Africa’s average spending on its militaries (2.1% of GDP) is not more than the global average (2.2%). However, military spending on the continent rose by almost 48% between 2007 and 2016 – an increase driven by rising world prices of oil and commodities. Despite increased spending on security, African citizens generally feel less safe personally. There has been little improvement in how African citizens rate accountability and adherence to the rule of law in the security sector.

In a number of cases, African governments’ response to national security threats have also resulted in the commission of human rights abuses against civilians. For example, in Mozambique, which in recent years experienced violent attacks from the former insurgent group, RENAMO, the government responded with its military and renewed negotiation with its (now deceased) leader, Afonso Dhlakama. While the military response served to ostensibly quell the possibility of a resurgence of RENAMO, investigators charged that the state’s response violated human rights. Similar accusations have surrounded Nigeria’s armed forces in the fight against Boko Haram: after former President Goodluck Jonathan issued a state of emergency, security forces not only responded to Boko Haram more aggressively, but also attacked civilians. An investigation by Amnesty International revealed that between 2012 and 2015 alone, Nigeria’s security forces were responsible for 1,200 extrajudicial deaths of civilians; 20,000 arbitrary arrests; and 7,000 deaths of people in detention.

Mitigating these negative consequences requires African states to consider a range of kinetic and non-kinetic responses. When pursuing kinetic responses, concepts like rule of law, negotiated settlements, and power sharing are important to keep in mind.

Rule of Law
Sustainable peace, as well as political and economic stability, rest to a significant extent upon the rule of law. At its best, the rule of law “consists of institutions with checks and balances, consistent application of laws and policies, equal protection of freedoms and liberties, and access to fair and affordable justice.” This includes not just checks and balances and an independent judiciary, but also a widespread sense that everyone is subject to the same rules of the game. There should be mechanisms in place to make this principle real for everybody. When this is the case, people whose freedoms, liberties, or rights are violated can actually hold perpetrators accountable through a country’s justice systems; this must be the case even when perpetrators are from the state security forces. Both military and civilian courts have played important roles in fostering
civilian control of the military in the midst of security challenges. Some national governments also request assistance in addressing demands for post-conflict “transitional” justice from the International Criminal Court, or pursue bilateral foreign aid to bolster domestic court systems. Central African Republic (CAR), for example, has pursued both of these approaches. Often, national governments do rule of law work in “legally hybrid” environments. This means that constituents may prefer to rely on non-state or informal legal actors (whether customary authorities, religious leaders, or community-based security and justice providers) for dispute resolution. For example, in CAR, Bangui residents are more likely to trust the national police and state courts to deal with murder and sexual and gender-based violence than with financial or family disputes. National responses that take into account these nuances of residents’ preferences and levels of trust in the state institutions may be more likely to foster peace and security.

Negotiated Settlements and Power Sharing
National governments also have a stake in peacebuilding. Since the end of the Cold War, negotiated settlements have grown as a method for ending civil war: whereas between 1945 and 1987, civil wars were mediated about 24% of the time, from 1988 – 2015, 73% of civil wars were mediated. While the presence of terrorist groups in civil wars in the last 15 years has led to a decline in overall numbers of mediations, there is an ongoing norm of negotiating political settlements as a means to terminate civil wars. Nevertheless, negotiated settlements fail about 40% of the time. To explain variations in the success of settlements, scholars look at factors like: the importance of power-sharing and the guarantee of security, economic opportunity, or political access; the timing of specific aspects of a peace agreement; providing a guarantee of security through the provision of peacekeepers; and the degree of social inclusivity – with the inclusion of women in the peace process specifically.

Power-sharing agreements have a mixed record in Africa. Some, like the 2002 Sun City Agreement in the Democratic Republic of Congo, or the 1999 Lomé Agreement in Sierra Leone, were forged after a civil war; others, like the “national unity governments” that formed in Kenya in 2007 and Zimbabwe in 2008, were responses to violence during presidential elections. A power-sharing agreement also fostered the shift from the apartheid regime to an inclusive democracy in South Africa. Through power-sharing agreements, rival political groups agree to share control of various executive branch positions. However, given the dominance of executive branch institutions relative to legislatures and judiciaries in many countries, power-sharing agreements also only tend to endure if post-conflict leaders remain committed. There is potentially a role for domestic civil society – as well as regional or international actors – to play in facilitating national government buy-in to power-sharing, or to other forms of post-conflict peacebuilding that fit specific contexts.

Questions to Consider:
1. What should the security sector focus on to ensure that Africa’s governments are able to both respond to security threats and protect their citizens?
2. How can international foreign policies provide support to improve state and government responses to insecurity in African states?
3. How can the concept of rule of law be institutionalized and operationalized? How does it relate (or not) to negotiated settlements and power-sharing?


**Recommended readings:**


Plenary 12: Leveraging External Security Partners

Objectives:
- Discuss the nature of security-related collaboration between the European Union and Africa
- Discuss the nature of security-related collaboration between China and Africa
- Interrogate how evolving relationships with new and long-standing external partners impact US-Africa relations

Background:
Many African states build their security services and systems through a reliance on external partners to provide funding. The U.S., European Union, China, and other bilateral partners like Russia are particularly notable in this regard. Each of these bilateral partners can, to some extent, shape African security sectors – as well as their politics and economies – through security assistance, diplomacy, and development aid. While external assistance can help nations address their security concerns, if not properly designed, targeted, coordinated, or implemented, such efforts risk undermining the very security they were meant to strengthen. On the one hand, African leaders must clearly understand their security environments and needs in order to shape discussions with external partners about security assistance; on the other hand, external partners need to understand the influences that their own aid (and that of others) are likely to have on security in Africa. Recently, there has been increasing U.S. concern about the expanding influence of powers like China and Russia in various African countries and the consequences of such influence for peace, security, and democratic development on the continent.

China merits a special focus in this module because of the density of Chinese ties in African countries, the magnitude of economic opportunity it can offer, and the multi-sectoral nature of the relationships that it is currently growing across the continent. China is increasingly coordinating its engagement with Africa under its Belt and Road Initiative, a global infrastructure investment and foreign policy strategy that now includes 39 of 54 sub-Saharan African nations. China-Africa trade now exceeds $200 billion. But, as China becomes ever more engaged with Africa, it has also begun to link the continent’s security with China’s prosperity -- a serious departure from China’s famed foreign policy of non-interference in domestic affairs. In 2017, China built a military base in Djibouti, joining the U.S., Japan, and France. China’s increased focus on security stems from needing to protect investments from the disruptions and damage caused by conflict; China also cares about its global reputation the welfare of Chinese citizens working in Africa. Working towards these ends, the Chinese Ministry of National Defense organized the first China-Africa Defense and Security Forum in summer 2018.

China has also increased its participation in UN peacekeeping. Of China’s approximately 2,500 troops in UN peacekeeping missions, almost 85% are in Africa; of those, nearly 50% are in the peacekeeping missions in South Sudan and Darfur. In South Sudan, China contributed its first ever infantry battalion to a UN peacekeeping mission, and has been active in the mediation process in the internal conflict. South Sudan’s internal conflict has been particularly worrisome for China, given the level of violence and its investment in the country: in 2013, at the time civil war broke out in South Sudan, there were 100 Chinese companies in the country.
Questions to Consider:

1. What motivates China to provide security assistance to Africa?
2. Which aspects of China’s security relationship with Africa reflect Africa’s priorities?
3. How can African countries optimize their partnership with China?

Recommended readings:

Plenary 13: Towards Effective Security Sector Institutions in Africa

Objectives:
- Explore the ways that Security Sector Assistance (SSA) has influenced military professionalization and state-sponsored violence in Africa
- Understand how security sector reform naturally intersects with justice system strengthening and good governance/accountability concerns
- Analyze how gender perspectives on security can be integrated into security sector assistance and reform

Background:
A key challenge in most African countries is creating a secure environment that is conducive to development, good governance and, in particular, institutions based on rule of law. Thanks to support from international partners, security sector reform has been trying to create professional security institutions that meet the needs of citizens, society, and the state and which operate within the rule of law and under effective democratic control.$^{98}$ A security sector cannot be viewed as functional if it is deficient in terms of adequate governance. A security sector can be considered dysfunctional if it provides security to neither the state nor its people in an efficient and effective way or, even worse, if it becomes the very cause of insecurity.

The U.S. Government has the potential to help African governments make progress towards some of these goals through its provision of security sector assistance (SSA). SSA includes many initiatives, from military education and “train and equip” programs with African militaries, to defense institution-building, to programs helping African leaders address security and justice challenges at home. A recent RAND Corporation study about SSA finds that it has not generally reduced rates of civil war, terrorism, and state violence in Africa; however, SSA is associated with such reductions in the countries where the United Nations has peacekeeping operations and thereby “provides many of the prerequisites for a successful approach to security governance.”

Security Governance
The proper governance and regulation of the security sector requires an informed and active legislature, a clear governmental policy framework and laws, effective civilian executive authorities, and an active civil society to keep the security sector accountable, transparent and efficient. Four aspects of democratic governance that are critical for the security sector are: a) transparency; b) accountability; c) the legal basis of the security sector; and d) oversight.$^{99}$ The ultimate purpose is to ensure that security institutions (armed forces in particular) are governed according to the principles of democratic control and accountability. The biggest challenge, however, is to craft ways to reconcile a military strong enough to do anything the civilians ask with a military subordinate enough to do only what the civilians authorize.$^{100}$

Gender
Gender-sensitivity also forms an important component of security sector reform (SSR) in Africa. Gender mainstreaming and promoting the equal participation of men and women are two common strategies that can be applied “both to the SSR process itself (e.g., by ensuring gender training for personnel responsible for SSR policy and planning) and to the institutions undergoing SSR (e.g., by including gender training for new recruits as part of a police reform
process).” The AU’s 2013 Policy Framework on SSR identifies gender equality and women’s empowerment as core principles for SSR activities on the continent. Nevertheless, there are still further strides to make in increasing women’s representation in African security forces and in ensuring that peacebuilding and policymaking processes on security issues effectively incorporate gender perspectives. These perspectives should include those of both women and girls, as well as men and boys.

**Questions to Consider:**

1. What role is there for African civil societies to play in security sector reform, and in security governance specifically?
2. How can U.S. donors and partners modify the existing theories of change about security sector assistance to strengthen the design of future such programs in Africa?
3. How can the U.S. support Africa to improve gender mainstreaming in security sector assistance and reform?

**Recommended readings:**


Publications for Further Reading

**Recent Books**


**Articles, Reports, and Blog Posts, by Plenary Topic:**

**Conflict and Political Violence**


**Megatrends:**


**Citizen and Community Security:**

“Human Rights are Key to Security: A Conversation with Ibrahim Wani,” Africa Center for Strategic Studies, June 23, 2017, [https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=mp7cb_Do1Z8](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=mp7cb_Do1Z8)


Maritime Security:


Cyber Security:


Architectures in Cyberspace, NATO CCD COE Publications, 2015, 

Democratic Transitions and Governance:

Robert Mattes and Michael Bratton, “Do Africans still want Democracy?” Afrobarometer Policy Paper No. 36, November 2016, 
http://afrobarometer.org/sites/default/files/publications/Policy%20papers/ab_r6_policypaper36_do_africans_want_democracy.pdf


“2018 Ibrahim Index of African Governance Index Report,” Mo Ibrahim Foundation, 

Violent Extremism in the Sahel:


Alexis Arieff, “Conflict in Mali,” Congressional Research Service, September 9, 2018, 

Riots and Protests:


Civil War in South Sudan:


Continental and Regional Responses to Security Challenges:


National Responses to Security Challenges:


China and Russia in Africa:
The China-Africa Research Initiative at Johns Hopkins University-SAIS has research, data, and events related to various aspects of Chinese political and economic involvement in Africa: http://www.sais-cari.org/publications


Security Sector Institutions and Assistance:


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3. Armed Conflict Location Event Dataset, [http://acleddata.org](http://acleddata.org)


Luca Raineri, op.cit., “Journey to Extremism,” op.cit.

Jakkie Cilliers, op.cit.


South Sudan,” Enough Project, https://enoughproject.org/conflicts/south-sudan

“Statement from IGAD Special Envoy to South Sudan on Violations of Ceasefire,” https://www.igad.int/programs/115-south-sudan-office/2038-statement-from-igad-special-envoy-to-south-sudan-on-violations-of-ceasefire


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54 Ibid
56 Ibid
57 Ibid
58 “Democratic Republic of Congo Overview,” United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, November 2017, 
59 Ibid
63 “MONUSCO Fact Sheet,” op.cit.
64 Van Laer, op.cit.
65 Ibid.
Africa Center for Strategic Studies


98 Ibid.

