

AFRICA CENTER FOR STRATEGIC STUDIES

IMPACT THROUGH INSIGHT | 1999-2019

EMERGING SECURITY SECTOR LEADERS SEMINAR

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Session 9: Violent Extremism

Dr. Brandon Kendhammer

Impact through Insight

Violent Extremism and CVE in Africa: Strategies and Approaches



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Background Issues and Definitions

PEACEBUILDING SPECTRUM

COUNTERTERRORISM, COUNTERING VIOLENT EXTREMISM, DEVELOPMENT

- What is "Violent Extremism"? How (if at all) is it distinct from terrorism?
- What is CVE and what is its relationship with CT/COIN and CT strategy?

	СТ	COIN	CVE SPECIFIC	CVE RELEVANT	PVE preventative		PEACEBUILDING	
MAIN	STATE AUTHORITIES	STATE AUTHORITIES SOME NGOS	STATE & LOCAL SOME NGOs & CSOs	NGO	"WHOLE-OF-COM s, CSOs, STATE & LOC/			
		Di Clear, Hold, Build" Security Forces rtner with populace Stra	iress "pull" factors sengage violent extremists Address behavio extremism itegic messaging & punter-narratives	Address "push" Community ral Strengthen Stren	factors	Poverty alleviatio ee, open media aal &	on Good governance Liberal marketization & democratization	
		Provide off-ramps Reintegra			Institution building Prevent radicalization		lding	
	Address cognitive radicalization							
	HARD PO	WER	CM (1	T POWE	n	SOFT	POWER	

From Dyrenforth (2018)

What's Unique about CVE?



THE DEVELOPMENT RESPONSE TO VIOLENT EXTREMISM AND INSURGENCY

Putting Principles into Practice

USAID POLICY

SEPTEMBER 2011

	Push Factors	Pull Factors		
USAID Development Response	 Social marginalisation / fragmentation Poorly governed / ungoverned areas Government repression / violations Endemic corruption and elite impunity Cultural threat perceptions 	 Access to material resources Social status and respect from peers Belonging Adventure Self-esteem / personal empowerment Prospect of glory or fame Social networks Radical institutions / venues Extremist involvement in economics 		
KTI Eastleigh	 Police harassment and corruption Very high youth unemployment Idleness Marginalisation Racial and cultural profiling Lack of social amenities Youth estrangements and frustrations 	 Radicalised religious environment Misinterpretation of religious teachings Personal appeal of radical preachers Concept of global Muslim community Influence of cyber preachers / sheikhs 		
KTI Coast	 Poverty / unemployment Marginalisation Unattended historical injustices Police harassment / cultural profiling 	 'Misinterpretations' of jihad teachings Radicalised religious environment Appeal by charismatic preachers Hero worship of extremist individuals Lack of effective mosque structure 		

What's Unique about CVE?

• CVE's Implicit Theory of Change





Figure 1. Overview of CVE Policy spectrum.

VE Drivers Through the CVE Lens—Empirical Findings and Questions Unanswered



- Marginalization (defined broadly) matters
- Lack of access to education and security as children is correlated with future VE participation
- Economics are a powerful driver of VE engagement decision-making
- Religion? Less ideology, more a sense of cultural/religious "threat"
- Distrust of government and grievances against the political system makes for vulnerable populations
- Experience of state violence is a common "tipping point" in VE engagement

How Do We Know If CVE is Working? Evaluation and Assessment

- National CVE action plans are great. But how do we know if they're "working"?
 - What's your theory of change? Is it consistent with your expected outcomes?
 - Contact is not impact
 - Moving beyond "objectives"—what can we measure? And how?
 - Closing the loop
- Distrust of P/CVE programming and its sponsors is a deterrent to its success (UNDP 2017). Evaluating these programs rigorously can build trust, capacity, and efficacy.
- Different P/CVE efforts (deradicalization, desistance, resiliency) need different types of assessment and evaluation.





Best Practices and Beyond—What does "good" CVE look like in Africa?

- Deradicalization/rehabilitation programs for former combatants can/do work—with important caveats
 - Audience is everything—different communities need different programs
 - Gender matters, and existing programs targeting women fail at high rates
 - Do you care about changing hearts and minds? Or "just" behaviors?
- Evidence for virtually all other CVE programs is mixed and context specific
 - Counter-communication and education changes some attitudes and behaviors, but takes a long time (Mali/Uganda)
 - Resiliency/community engagement programs are *hard* to assess, and changes in attitudes, beliefs, and even actions may not end risk of violence (Kenya/Somalia)



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