Maritime Safety and Security:
Whole of Africa Maritime Dialogue – Clarifying the Architecture of Maritime Security in Africa

Syllabus

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ABOUT THE AFRICA CENTER

Since its inception in 1999, the Africa Center has served as a forum for research, academic programs, and the exchange of ideas with the aim of enhancing citizen security by strengthening the effectiveness and accountability of African institutions, in support of U.S.-Africa policy.

VISION

Security for all Africans championed by effective institutions accountable to their citizens.

Realizing the vision of an Africa free from organized armed violence guaranteed by African institutions that are committed to protecting African citizens is the driving motivation of the Africa Center. This aim underscores the Center’s commitment to contributing to tangible impacts by working with our African partners – military and civilian, governmental and civil society, as well as national and regional. All have valuable roles to play in mitigating the complex drivers of conflict on the continent today. Accountability to citizens is an important element of our vision as it reinforces the point that in order to be effective, security institutions must not just be “strong,” but also be responsive to and protective of the rights of citizens.

MISSION

To advance African security by expanding understanding, providing a trusted platform for dialogue, building enduring partnerships, and catalyzing strategic solutions.

The Africa Center’s mission revolves around the generation and dissemination of knowledge through our research, academic programs, strategic communications, and community chapters. Drawing on the practical experiences and lessons learned from security efforts on the continent, we aim to generate relevant insight and analysis that can inform practitioners and policymakers on the pressing security challenges that they face. Recognizing that addressing serious challenges can only come about through candid and thoughtful exchanges, the Center provides face-to-face and virtual platforms where partners can exchange views on priorities and sound practices. These exchanges foster relationships that, in turn, are maintained over time through the Center’s community chapters, communities of interest, follow-on programs, and ongoing dialogue between participants and staff. This dialogue—infused with real world experiences and fresh analysis—provides an opportunity for continued learning and catalyzes concrete actions.

MANDATE

The Africa Center is a U.S. Department of Defense institution established and funded by Congress for the study of security issues relating to Africa and serving as a forum for bilateral and multilateral research, communication, exchange of ideas, and training involving military and civilian participants. (10 U.S.C 342)
PROGRAM OVERVIEW

Introduction
The Africa Center for Strategic Studies (ACSS) supports the United States’ Africa policy by working with African countries to provide security for all Africans championed by effective institutions accountable to their citizens. Since its inception in 1999, the Africa Center has fostered democracy and enhanced professionalism in Africa’s security sector through programs that promote productive interaction among senior military and civilian leaders, and establish viable professional networks. It has provided an academic-style forum for Africa’s security-related professionals to identify and evaluate current and emerging security threats, agree on strategies and shared responsibilities for national and regional security, and reinforce internationally recognized best practices in their various spheres of activity. The Center’s alumni program promotes peer networking among thousands of individuals who have participated in its programs by affording them an opportunity to continue the dialogue and collaboration on key security issues upon return to their home countries.

Background
In March 2018, the Africa Center hosted the first “Whole-of-Africa Maritime Dialogue” in Victoria, Seychelles, bringing together twenty-six (26) African countries and thirteen (13) African regional organizations to discuss how to enhance maritime security around the continent. Arising out of those discussions was a strong call to continue such a dialogue as an annual fixture, and to focus 2019’s iteration on “clarifying the architecture of maritime security in Africa.” This event is being organized in direct response to that request on the part of the delegates present in 2018.

Over the last decade, a substantial number of new instruments and institutions have sought to create cooperative regimes for maritime security, governance and sustainability around Africa. They have not been developed, however, in a coordinated fashion that maintained a common vision for what the architecture of cooperation around the continent should look like. The result is that there is a patchwork of institutions and instruments that are making progress within their respective areas of responsibility, but are coming up against gaps and overlaps in the wider continental structure.

The aim of this event is therefore multifold:
1. Assess the current status of the maritime security architecture around Africa to identify what is and is not working.
2. Identify the gaps and overlaps between different architectural elements.
3. Examine how the architecture could help respond to emerging or evolving threats.
4. Develop recommendations for how to turn the current patchwork of initiatives into a more functional framework.
5. Enhance existing relationships and form new ones between maritime professionals around the continent.

Fundamentally, this event is designed to be a dialogue between African states, institutions and experts. A cross-cutting objective of this event, therefore, is to recognize the potential for intra-African capacity building born of the sharing of ideas, lessons and experiences among African maritime professionals. Finally, an additional and important overarching objective is to experience Namibia and to hear from Namibians about their own efforts to secure, govern and develop the maritime domain.
Workshop Structure
This workshop, spanning five days, will be comprised of plenary sessions, discussion groups, exercises and an offsite visit. The plenaries will focus primarily on hearing from African maritime professionals about various matters – both challenges and successes – related to the maritime architecture around the continent. The brief presentations will be followed by moderated question and answer sessions during which participants will be encouraged to share reflections, question assumptions and think through creative approaches. The discussion groups will provide an opportunity to engage in dialogue with other African states and institutions about their experiences and views on how to address the current and forthcoming threats facing the collective African maritime domain, in light of the work that has been done over the last decade. Furthermore, a series of exercises will allow for table-top testing of the cooperative architecture using real or realistic scenarios. This bridging of the strategic-operational divide will help tease out some of the issues that need to be addressed. Finally, an offsite visit will allow for the participants to interact in a less formal setting and enjoy together the beauty and history of Namibia.

All Africa Center programs are conducted under a strict non-attribution policy. This allows participants to contribute and exchange views without reservation, thereby creating an effective and productive learning environment. Simultaneous interpretation will be provided to allow the workshop to be conducted in English, French and Portuguese. All workshop materials will be provided in these languages.

Academic Material
This Syllabus aims to provide a useful reference document and starting point for discussions; it does not pretend to offer comprehensive treatment of the issues or contain all the answers. Relatively little good information is available in the literature on maritime security in Africa. Part of the problem is that much of the analysis focuses on what security is supposed to look like on paper, rather than what it actually looks like in practice. To find out what is really going on, one must speak directly with the maritime leaders around the continent. That is part of the reason for having a Whole-of-Africa Maritime Dialogue.

This Syllabus, therefore, seeks to compile the information and analysis most salient to the present discussion. But the principal resources will be in the room – the experts and practitioners who dedicate their lives to making Africa’s maritime domain safer and more secure. This workshop seeks to draw on those resource and to greatly increase the network of professionals who can reach out to each other for ideas and assistance.

All workshop documentation will be posted on the Africa Center website. Please contact us if you have any difficulty accessing the website. Ideally, we would like to initiate discussion about the key questions and objectives before the workshop starts. Our facilitators will be available to respond to your questions, discuss your perspectives on the topic and the academic materials, share experiences and examine relevant case studies.

Preparation for the Dialogue
In advance of the Dialogue, we encourage all participants to do the following:
1. Read this Syllabus
2. Read some or all of the recommended readings.
3. Spend time thinking about and answering the discussion questions.
4. Consider what experiences might be relevant to share with the group.
5. Prepare questions for participants from other parts of the continent.
Methodology
Consultation and partnership are hallmarks of the Africa Center’s program development process. Formal and informal consultative meetings were held with a wide range of national, regional and international experts, representatives of African governments, representatives of international partners, and stakeholders in relevant U.S. government entities to determine the scope and focus of this workshop. A number of academics and practitioners were particularly helpful in reviewing the content and relevance of the academic material for this workshop.
SESSION 1: EVOLUTION IN THE SECURITY SEASCAPE

Format: Plenary Presentation & Discussion Session

Session Objectives:
- Examine how maritime security threats have changed both in response to and independent of the security architecture around the continent;
- Apprise the evolution of maritime security cooperation in Africa over the last decade;
- Compare the evolution of “maritime security” cooperation to “fisheries protection” cooperation in Africa over the last decade;
- Provide reflections on recent developments and how they will affect or be affected by the cooperative architecture around the continent.

Background

A lot is changing in Africa’s maritime domain. Much of the focus tends to be on negative aspects, particularly the dramatic issues like piracy, terrorism, illegal fishing and some forms of trafficking. But there have been some incredibly positive developments in recent years, as well. While criminality went unchecked for many years in many places in Africa’s waters, maritime crime now operates in juxtaposition to ever-improving maritime law enforcement. In other words, maritime officials and maritime criminals are now engaged in a dance where one leads, one follows, and the question at any given time is – who is in control? African states and institutions have established cooperative architecture around the continent to try to take control of the maritime space and ensure that it is secure, well-governed and able to be developed such that the blue economy may thrive. But given the dynamic nature of the maritime law enforcement dance, constant reappraisal is needed to ensure that security actors are, at all times, either in the lead or at least choreographing an achievable approach to taking the lead. This session provides that reappraisal.

On the one hand, it is important to reflect on how maritime criminal activities have evolved in recent years. New tactics, new organized groups, and new trends are evident all around the continent. At the same time, however, it is equally important to reflect on how maritime law enforcement activities have evolved over the same period. In the last decade, such initiatives as the Djibouti and Yaoundé Codes of Conduct, the Jeddah Amendments the Africa Integrated Maritime Strategy (AIMS) 2050, the Lomé Charter and numerous regional and sub regional strategies have set forth approaches that are aimed at addressing various maritime insecurities.

The main focus of this workshop is to answer the questions: Is the architecture of maritime security working? If not, what needs to be done to make it work? And if so, what can be done to enhance it further?

This session, therefore, seeks to provide the key background for the overall discussion by reviewing recent developments – both positive and negative. Just in the last year, a major increase in focus on the blue economy has been demonstrated by new ministries, strategies and conferences around the continent. At the same time, a major increase in certain threats, most notably kidnap for ransom on the water, has the shipping community and both national and international institutions concerned. This session explores both what has changed and how the architecture of security cooperation has responded to those changes.

Finally, fisheries protection is a major feature of any maritime discussion in Africa. But fisheries crime is often lumped with fisheries management, divorcing it from “law enforcement” and
placing it as an added task, rather than central function of maritime law enforcement. While most African navies and coast guards recognize that fisheries crimes pose a threat to security as well as the blue economy, some of the cooperative mechanisms facilitated by external actors have sought to separate fisheries crime from other law enforcement. That separation has created a seam that criminals have exploited. And it is exactly those sorts of seams this workshop seeks to highlight and address.

**Discussion Questions:**

1. How have the maritime security challenges changed in your country or region in the last five years? How have your security approaches changed?
2. Have you noticed a response to law enforcement efforts?
3. Are the regional threats different than the national threats?
4. Has the security architecture of which you are a part been effective in enhancing national maritime security efforts?
5. Is there a discrepancy between “maritime security” and “fisheries protection” in your country? Region?
6. How has the blue economy been approached in your country? Region? How has that affected maritime security?

**Recommended Readings:**


SESSION 2: OVERLOOKED MARITIME SECURITY CONCERNS

Format: Plenary Presentation & Discussion Session

Session Objectives:

- Identify overlooked maritime concerns;
- Recognize the importance of health and environmental issues for maritime security, governance and development;
- Assess how the cooperative architecture could be used to address overlooked maritime security concerns.

Background

Sea blindness is not the phenomenon it once was. But as is the case in every maritime jurisdiction around the world, the process of prioritization tends to create blind spots. Around Africa, certain maritime issues receive a lot of attention, but other matters get ignored. This session aims to bring those overlooked maritime security concerns to light. One area that undeniably needs greater attention is that of public health in the maritime domain. The 2014 to 2016 Ebola outbreak in Sierra Leone, Liberia, and Guinea brought disease into international consciousness as a potentially destabilizing factor at not just the national, but regional and even global levels. Since then, however, the maritime aspects of public health crises have not entered the mainstream dialogue on maritime security. With an ongoing and growing Ebola outbreak in the Democratic Republic of Congo, and infectious disease taking hold in areas devastated by Cyclone Idai, maritime security and maritime governance officials around Africa must be prepared to address health issues and the maritime movement of disease and disease agents, including through passengers and cargoes arriving to Africa from other parts of the world. This session seeks to begin the process of sensitizing African leaders to that need.

Additionally new security concerns are beginning to come to light. Part of that is thanks to technology, part of it is thanks to a few key cases, and part of it is thanks to greater attention being paid to the continent in general. One major overlooked maritime security concern is illegal transshipment at sea. This has a number of different implications. First in the fisheries context – a lot of illegal, unregulated and unreported fishing operates using transshipment. Fishing operations fill giant reefers at sea, never landing their catch or coming into the ports of the country whose fish they are taking. Not surprisingly, another context for this is trafficking. These offshore transshipment operations provide traffickers with the ability to move illicit goods, or even human beings, across entire regions without touching the shore. And perhaps the most overlooked context has been in the oil and fuel market. Technology has recently allowed for identification of ship-to-ship transfers of oil and fuel at sea, as well as bunkering operations. In the Gulf of Guinea alone, one European company has engaged in over 300 such illegal transfers at sea in the last two years. The penalty per transfer can be up to $500,000 per incident. In other words, that one company, which is not necessarily even the biggest offender, may be guilty of crimes that would, if prosecuted, bring $150 million into the region. One of the reasons the penalties are so high is that such operations come with a high risk of oil spills. As Gabon recently experienced, such a spill can be very costly both to the marine environment and to the state’s finances, particularly if the culprits are not identified. Environmental crimes pose a grave threat to the work African states and regions are doing to secure and govern the maritime space, ensure
food security and food sovereignty, and develop the blue economy. These issues have to be addressed.

Somewhat related, and certainly not new to many regions of the continent, is the trafficking or smuggling in “benign” goods. Charcoal, honey, antiquities and fuel are among the goods most frequently used by terrorist groups and transnational criminal organizations. The international attention to charcoal in East Africa has helped to reduce the extent to which it funds Al Shabab but the figures are still in the millions of dollars. Conversely, too little attention has been paid to fuel smuggling and the extent to which that funds transnational organized crime. While oil theft in Nigeria has been well-publicized, fuel theft and smuggling continues to threaten the marine environment and facilitate other security threats. Wildlife, also remains a major source of funding for criminal groups and countering the maritime trafficking of wildlife and ivory needs to be a higher priority. Finally, the looting and trafficking of antiquities and cultural property have received almost no attention in Africa, but with major operations in the Middle East having driven new illegal markets, the appetite for cultural property has grown and attention must be paid to ensure that the African maritime space does not become a venue for trading in cultural heritage.

Finally, human trafficking and migrant smuggling have become a major concern in Africa. An exposé recently revealed that 20,000 children are living as slaves for fishing operations on Lake Volta. The trans-Mediterranean migrant smuggling and human trafficking routes have been the source of tremendous international controversy for a number of years. And numerous countries in Africa were criticized in the U.S. State Department’s annual Trafficking in Persons Report. More needs to be done to address both the intra-African and international smuggling of migrants and trafficking of persons in Africa.

Discussion Questions:

1. Of the “overlooked” security concerns mentioned, which have you experienced as a threat? Which have you integrated into your planning?
2. What other overlooked security concerns have you noticed?
3. How can priorities be shifted to address these concerns when law enforcement agencies are already operating with insufficient resources?
4. How could cooperation help address some of these concerns?

Recommended Readings:


SESSION 3: THE GULF OF GUINEA ARCHITECTURE

Format: Plenary Presentation & Discussion Session

Session Objectives:

- Review the current architecture of maritime security cooperation in the Gulf of Guinea;
- Identify new developments in the region – both positive and negative – related to the architecture;
- Provide examples of where the architecture has worked and where areas for improvement have been revealed;
- Analyze the current trajectory of what will happen with the architecture in the next five years.

Background

No region of Africa and likely no region of the world has seen a more rapid and extensive build-up in maritime security architecture over the last six years than the Gulf of Guinea. With a cascading set of instruments and institutions, the 26 states of the Yaoundé Code of Conduct are grouped into 5 maritime zones, each backed by regional coordination centers – one for ECOWAS (CREMAO), one for ECCAS (CRESMAC) – and served at the apex by an Inter-Regional Coordination Center (CIC) overseen by three regional bodies – ECOWAS, ECCAS and the Gulf of Guinea Commission (GGC). An older, IMO-backed institution, the Maritime Organization of West and Central Africa (MOWCA), recently signed a cooperative agreement with the CIC, bringing the maritime industry into the cooperative fold. The Yaoundé Architecture for Maritime Safety and Security (YAMSS) is increasingly well-developed with a few key success stories.

The hijacking of the M/T MAXIMUS was a major test of the YAMSS and the successful interdiction of that case in February 2016 was a big credit to the region’s cooperative efforts. That case, however, brought up new considerations. Some of them have been addressed, but some of them remain a challenge. For example, what should the command and control structure between zones and between regions be? If crossing from Zone E to Zone D, should the chain be from the Nigerian MOC to the Zone E MMCC, to CRESMAO to CIC to CRESMAC to Zone D MMCC to Cameroon’s MOC? That is a highly inefficient and ineffective approach, so standard operating procedures need to be developed to ensure that the YAMSS is not breaking down some barriers to cooperation only to create new ones.

Similarly, recent cases have highlighted the need for operational agreements in other zones. While Zone D has been a success story in terms of overcoming natural barriers to cooperation, including issues of hot pursuit, and Zone E has had a good legal agreement in place, more work is needed to operationalize the Zones and both CRESMAC and CRESMAO. That said, good progress is visible throughout the Gulf of Guinea.

But things are changing. Morocco has asked to join both the Economic Community of Western African States and the Gulf of Guinea Code of Conduct. If admitted, Mauritania would likely be offered admission, as well. This creates a potential new dynamic, where the geographical cooperation is not so focused on a single maritime area. Morocco is far too removed from the actual Gulf of Guinea to be considered even part of its wider region. Indeed, a shift may be afoot to look at a new regional dynamic involving Safety and Security in Atlantic Africa (S2A2).

Discussion Questions:
1. Should the Gulf of Guinea Architecture be fully operationalized before considering an expansion?
2. Is “The Gulf of Guinea” an outdated construct already?
3. Is the YAMSS too complicated when considering all the different related entities?
4. How should MOWCA and the GCC relate with the YAMSS?
5. What are some of the key lessons from successes that can help influence further development in the Gulf of Guinea? What about the lessons for other regions?

Recommended Readings:


SESSION 4: THE EASTERN, SOUTHERN AND INDIAN OCEAN ARCHITECTURE

Format: Plenary Presentation & Discussion Session

Session Objectives:

- Review the current architecture of maritime security cooperation in Eastern, Southern and Indian Ocean Africa;
- Identify new developments in the region – both positive and negative – related to the architecture;
- Provide examples of where the architecture has worked and where areas for improvement have been revealed;
- Analyze the current trajectory of what will happen with the architecture in the next five years.

Background

The Eastern, Southern Africa – Indian Ocean (ESA-IO) region has seen significant development in the last two years. On the one hand, the Jeddah Amendments to the Djibouti Code of Conduct, and the MASE program have rapidly advanced the integration of the region on maritime law enforcement and other maritime security considerations. On the other hand, the conflict in Yemen and a spike in the drug trade have brought new threats and challenges. The expansion of the Djibouti Code from a single crime – piracy – focused initiative to a full-spectrum maritime security initiative via the Jeddah Amendments has to be heralded as a positive development. Furthermore it shows the extent to which East and West influence each other. The Djibouti Code served as the groundwork for the Yaoundé Code which, in turn, helped inspire the Jeddah Amendments.

At the same time as the code-based efforts at cooperation, the EU-funded MASE programme has established both the Regional Center for Operational Coordination (RCOC) in Seychelles and the Regional Maritime Information Fusion Center (RMIFC) in Madagascar. This architecture is producing results. Combined with the regional emphasis on the blue economy – demonstrated by the Kenya Blue Economy Conference, the Seychelles’ work on establishing and implementing a blue economy strategy, and the efforts of other countries in the region to emphasize the blue economy, such as Mauritius – the ESA-IO region has significant momentum to celebrate. But it also has new challenges.

Drugs threaten the fabric of society in the region, as heroin flows more and more from Asia through East Africa and towards Europe. Arms are being trafficked more regularly through the region, and the ongoing presence of floating armories poses concern for regional safety and security. Charcoal smuggling to the Middle East helps fund Al Shabab terrorism. And innovative criminality and new security threats emanating from the Middle East pose a risk to regional stability.

Discussion Questions:

1. Does the EU-funding of the MASE programme diminish its significance?
2. Do the Jeddah Amendments need international support to be implemented?
3. What can the rest of the continent learn from the ESA-IO region?
4. How can other cooperative initiatives in other parts of the continent coordinate with the cooperative blocks of the ESA-IO Region?
5. Is there cause to think of “Safety and Security in Indian Ocean Africa” like in the Atlantic?
6. Who is being left out of the current structures?
Recommended Readings:


SESSION 5: THE NORTHERN ARCHITECTURE

Format: Plenary Presentation & Discussion Session

Session Objectives:

- Review the current architecture of maritime security cooperation in North Africa;
- Identify new developments in the region – both positive and negative – related to the architecture;
- Provide examples of where the architecture has worked and where areas for improvement have been revealed;
- Analyze the current trajectory of what will happen with the architecture in the next five years.

Background

Of all the regions in Africa, the architecture for security cooperation in the North has probably been the least well publicized, despite being the oldest. The 5+5, established in the 1990s is a cooperation regime quite distinct from other parts of the continent. The mechanism bridges the maritime space between Northern Africa and Southern Europe, bringing the states of Portugal, Spain, France, Italy, and Malta together with Mauritania, Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, and Libya. Not only is this an example, initiated in 1983 and operational since 1990, of broad spectrum cooperation that goes beyond maritime security, it is also an example of how states can cooperate at the regional and inter-regional levels despite bilateral tensions. The border between Morocco and Algeria has been closed for decades and relations between the neighbors remain strained. Yet Morocco and Algeria, along with the other states of the region, are able to cooperate with each other on maritime security through their participation in the 5+5. While in many cases, maritime security cooperation has only occurred because of the relationships between certain states and even certain individuals, the 5+5 shows that the shared benefits of maritime security cooperation can actually inspire states and individuals to overcome animosity and pursue a common interest collaboratively.

In terms of the threat picture, migrant smuggling remains a concern in the Mediterranean. Furthermore, spillover from the conflict in Libya raises the specter of terrorism for the region, with radicalization a real concern. Linked to that spillover is the prolific fuel smuggling being used to fund some of the militant and terrorist activity. While much of that fuel moves into Europe, cross-border smuggling in the North of Africa, including by maritime means, erodes the rule of law in the region, and diminishes border security.

Discussion Questions:

1. Does the North need a “Code of Conduct”?
2. Does Atlantic Africa work as a concept? What about Namibia and South Africa? What would happen to the 5+5?
3. Is it better to keep cooperative initiatives small, or does a larger block benefit more countries?
4. Does expanding the Yaoundé architecture mean bringing new challenges into its ambit like the Mediterranean fuel and migrant smuggling? Or should it be seen to be bringing new resources into the fold? And does that mean that Gulf of Guinea piracy would be a problem for the North?
5. What can the rest of the continent learn from the 5+5?
Recommended Readings:

The 5+5 Defence Initiative, 5+5, found at: https://www.defense.gouv.fr/english/dgris/international-action/allies-and-partners/5-5-defence-initiative.


SESSION 6: THE CONTINENTAL ARCHITECTURE

Format:     Plenary Presentation & Discussion Session

Session Objectives:

- Review the Africa Integrated Maritime Strategy 2050;
- Assess the extent to which the regional activities and the continental vision align and the extent to which they differ;
- Examine the whole-of-Africa approach to Search and Rescue as a contrast to maritime security;
- Discuss the role of the African Union in a whole-of-Africa approach to maritime security, governance and development.

Background

The Africa Integrated Maritime Strategy (AIMS) 2050 was adopted by the African Union (AU) in 2014. It sets forth a vision for Africa’s maritime domain over the coming decades and provides a useful ambition for securing, governing and developing the continent’s maritime space. Unfortunately, however, there is no one at the AU with either the portfolio (and thus mandate) or the strategic-level maritime expertise to truly champion the strategy and drive forward its implementation. There is no custodian of the strategy. Similarly, in 2016, the AU’s Lomé Summit failed to either celebrate the good work that was being done at the inter-regional, regional and sub-regional levels, or provide a mechanism for harnessing views throughout the implementation process to make sure that the continent was progressing in unison with the AU. Without a maritime security champion, the AU cannot expect either AIMS 2050 or the Lomé Charter to meet fruition under its own auspices. Furthermore, the addition of the blue economy to the agricultural and development pillar of the AU in the upcoming restructuring ensure that maritime security, governance and development will not be address in conjunction at the AU in the years ahead. Consideration is imperative in order to discern how best to make the continent-wide architecture function.

That said, there are some continent-wide elements that do exist. The African Maritime Rescue Federation has been active in promoting maritime safety around the continent. Engagement between the Federation and states, as well as Regional Maritime Rescue Coordination Centers (RMRCCs) has sought to improve the ability of states and regions to respond to distress signals or other emergencies at sea. The same actors, however, who are responsible for maritime security are often also those responsible for maritime safety operations. Consequently, the continent-wide approach to maritime safety may be a means of enhancing the continent-wide approach to maritime security.

Given the successes of some of the regional initiatives, the other key question for the continent is: notwithstanding any continent-wide vision, how can all the different pockets of success link up to mutually enhance each other? In other words – how can the good work that is being done in the Gulf of Guinea, the North and the ESA-IO regions coordinate better to produce a whole-of-Africa maritime security approach, even without AU involvement?

Finally, there is a growing recognition that the expression “no shipping, no shopping” applies to landlocked sates as well as coastal, island and archipelagic states. If landlocked states do not have access to safe and secure maritime spaces, they cannot benefit from international maritime commerce – either import or export. Furthermore, some of those landlocked states have large, navigable lakes and rivers that provide some of the same blue economic opportunities and pose some of the same maritime security
threats that coastal states face. Including all African states in the maritime security architecture is therefore vital for its ultimate success.

Discussion Questions:

1. What should the role of the AU be in maritime security, governance and development in Africa?
2. What other continent-wide approaches might help create a whole-of-Africa maritime cooperation regime, even in the absence of a custodian at the AU?
3. What can be done to advance AIMS 2050 and the Lomé Charter at the national, zonal, regional and inter-regional levels?
4. How can inter-regional cooperation be better facilitated?

Recommended Readings:


SESSION 7: THE NAMIBIA EXPERIENCE

Format: Plenary Presentation & Discussion Session

Session Objectives:

- Hear from Namibia about its national efforts to secure, govern and develop its maritime domain;
- Learn what has made Namibia so successful in countering distant water fishing fleets;
- Understand Namibia’s experience outside the Codes of Conduct.

Background

Namibia is the only country from Egypt to Senegal that is not in one of the two codes of conduct. It is also the only country in coastal Africa that is not part of the Yaoundé Code, the Djibouti Code or the 5+5. Namibia’s neighbor to the north is a member of the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS), is also a member of the Southern African Development Commission (SADC), is the headquarters of the Gulf of Guinea Code of Conduct, is part ECCAS Zone A, benefits from CRESMAC, holds the deputy director position at the Inter-Regional Coordination Center and is a signatory to the Yaoundé Code of Conduct. Of those instruments and institutions, Namibia is only a member of SADC. Yet Namibia is frequently heralded by academics and policy makers in other parts of the world as a major case study in successfully protecting its waters – both territorial sea and, importantly, its EEZ, as well – from IUU fishing and particularly from distant water fishing fleets.

This session provides our hosts with an opportunity to tell us their experience. What is it like to be outside all these cooperative efforts? How has it managed such internationally recognized success? How would it like to proceed in the years to come as part of the continent-wide vision for maritime security, governance and development?

Discussion Questions:

1. Prior to this presentation what did you know about the Namibian experience?
2. What could you learn from it?
3. How will you stay connected with Namibia after this event?

Recommended Readings:


SESSION 8: GAPS AND OVERLAPS

Format: Facilitated Plenary Discussion

Session Objectives:

- Identify the gaps between the different elements of zonal, regional and inter-regional architecture;
- Identify the overlaps between the different elements of maritime security architecture;
- Distinguish between acceptable overlaps and unnecessary or problematic duplication;
- Itemize areas for improvement or clarification;
- Consider approaches to resolving the gaps and overlaps.

Background

Around the continent, there are numerous gaps and overlaps. Some are longstanding, others new, others forthcoming. In the Gulf of Guinea, even diagraming the institutions gets confusing: where does MOWCA fit? What is the role of the GGC? How do the strategic and operational institutions intersect? In the North, few outside the region are familiar with the 5+5, but what happens to it if Morocco and Mauritania join the YAMSS? Should Egypt be a part of that Northern mechanism? And what, if anything should be done to enhance cooperation in the Red Sea. While the Djibouti Code and Jeddah Amendments cover that area, the MASE program only covers some of it. In the ESA-IO, how should the dive with fisheries crimes be addressed? And does it matter that Namibia is not part of the other inter-regional mechanisms? This is a session to discuss, as a group, the anomalies, inconsistencies, and confusions of the maritime security architecture around the continent. It provides a chance to both air concerns and posit solutions.

Discussion Questions:

1. Does a map or organizational chart of the instruments of maritime security in Africa mirror a map or organizational chart of the institutions of maritime security in Africa?
2. In your experience, what is the difference between maritime security cooperation on paper and maritime security cooperation on the water? How can the paper help improve the practice? How can the practice help improve what goes on the paper?
3. What gaps are ok, what are problematic? What overlaps are helpful, which are duplicative?
4. What mechanisms need to be strengthened? Are there institutions that need to be closed? Are there mechanisms that are missing altogether?
5. How can the different regions connect?

Recommended Readings:


ACSS Working Paper – to be distributed.
SESSION 9: FROM PATCHWORK TO FRAMEWORK

Format: Plenary Presentation & Discussion Session

Session Objectives:

- Advance proposals for how to address issues that have been raised during the week;
- Explore practical ways to advance the effectiveness of the architecture;
- Explore ways to advance legal harmonization;
- Return to the overlooked security concerns and reconceive how they may be addressed;
- Discuss realistic possibilities for how the architecture could be made to function in the next five years.

Background

As the aim of this workshop is to clarify the architecture of maritime security cooperation around the continent by engaging in an Africa-wide maritime dialogue, this final session seeks to harness the ideas of the discussion throughout the week and advance some proposals for next steps. Without criticizing the excellent efforts at maritime cooperation around the continent, the current picture is a patchwork with different pockets of functionality. The aim is to make a framework that allows for diverse approaches, but still ensures quality maritime security around the entire continent. This session will form the platform for future efforts at ensuring that a whole-of-Africa approach to maritime security, governance and development becomes a reality.

Discussion Questions:

1. What approaches from other regions or initiatives might work in your region? How can your region work with others to share lessons, warnings and ideas?
2. What needs to happen next to make inter-regional cooperation around Africa a reality?
3. What steps can be taken at the national, zonal, regional, inter-regional and continent-levels to advance maritime security in a consistent, clear fashion so that the architecture becomes unified into a functional framework?
4. What can you personally do, and what can your institution do to help both clarify the maritime architecture in Africa, and advance a whole-of-Africa approach to maritime security, governance and development?