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# Session 3: Effectiveness of Counterterrorism Responses in the Horn of Africa


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# Overview

- Geopolitical context
- Terrorism trends in CJTF-HoA area of operations
- Policy levers for influencing pathways
- Application to CJTF-HoA area of operations

# Defining Aspects of Geopolitical Context

- Newly democratizing states, weakly institutionalized democracies, and weak authoritarians
  - Lack of avenues for peaceful expression of dissent
  - History of mass protests and violence
  - State repression
- Weak and fragile states
  - Don't necessarily control hinterlands or borders
  - High levels of corruption
  - Informal governance in many areas
- Youth bulges and high youth unemployment
- Large populations of displaced and refugees
- Internal politics along ethnic, tribal and clan divisions



Decade	Burundi	Djibouti	Eritrea	Ethiopia	Kenya	Rwanda	Seychelles	Somalia	Tanzania	Uganda
1970s	0	2	0	28	7	0	0	1	2	8
1980s	0	3	0	10	5	0	2	17	1	74
1990s	<b>248</b>	13	3	52	66	<b>128</b>	0	<b>151</b>	4	<b>129</b>
2000s	<b>111</b>	1	5	38	43	6	0	<b>486</b>	10	<b>129</b>
2010s	<b>254</b>	3	2	62	<b>562</b>	25	0	<b>3488</b>	42	54

Perpetrators 1970-2017	# Attacks
Al-Shabaab	3288
Lord's Resistance Army (LRA)	130
Allied Democratic Forces (ADF)	49
Party for the Liberation of the Hutu People (PALIPEHUTU)	38
National Liberation Front (FNL) (Burundi)	32
Mujahideen Youth Movement (MYM)	23
Eritrean Liberation Front	20
Uganda Freedom Movement (UFM)	19
Hizbul al Islam (Somalia)	18
Jabha East Africa	17
National Council for Defense of Democracy (NCDD)	15
Uganda People's Army	15
Islamic Courts Union (ICU)	12
Ahlu-sunah Wal-jamea (Somalia)	12

<b>Perpetrators 2013-2017</b>	<b># Attacks</b>
Al-Shabaab	2727
Jabha East Africa	17
Patriotic Ginbot 7 Movement for Unity and Democracy (PGMUD)	11
Ahlu-sunah Wal-jamea (Somalia)	8
Allied Democratic Forces (ADF)	7
National Liberation Front (FNL) (Burundi)	6
Mombasa Republican Council (MRC)	6
Democratic Front for the Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR)	5

# Approaches to Influencing Violent Extremist Organizations

- Coerce: The use or threat of violence
- Deter: Increase costs of attacks and/or reduce benefits
- Coopt: “Buy off” leaders (or potential leaders) or influential members of violent groups
- Alleviate grievances: Make concessions or improve conditions for recruitment communities
- Delegitimize: Undercut support for violent extremists by highlighting flaws or shortcomings
- Incentivize: Decrease costs and or increase benefits of nonviolent pathways to change
- No action



# Examples

- Deterrence: Israeli government publication of lists of Palestinian extremists targeted for capture or extrajudicial killing
- Co-optation: Russian policy of “Chechenization”
- Grievance alleviation: Fujimori’s micro-development initiatives
- Delegitimization: U.S. counter-messaging targeting Islamic State support
- Incentivization: Young Arab Voices

# Case 1: Lord's Resistance Army

- Coercion
  - Military offensives and more targeted operations
- Deterrence
  - Hardening targets in Northern Uganda/increasing capacity of local communities
- Grievance alleviation
  - Development assistance to communities in Northern Uganda
- Incentivization
  - Amnesty offers, negotiations

# Outcomes

- LRA still active, but attacks (in terms of number and lethality) have lessened
- Number of active forces substantially reduced, with defections and/or capture of multiple leaders

# Discussion: Future Scenarios

- Which of the pathways are most likely and most enduring?
- Given the geopolitical environment, what policy levers are possible?
- Of these, what policy approaches are more likely to lead to specific outcomes? And are these desirable or not?
- Where and to what degree can United States and CJTF-HoA influence the approach taken towards LRA?

# Case 2: Al-Shabaab

- Coercion:
  - Multiple and continuous military interventions result in loss of territory and feed delegitimization
- Deterrence
  - Hardening of key assets/targets
- Delegitimization
  - Loss of territory counters al-Shabaab's image as a successful organization
  - Use of counter-messaging to prevent foreign support

# Outcomes

- Loss of territory, but al-Shabaab still firmly entrenched in rural spaces
- Diffusion of attacks in region, in particular into Kenya

# Discussion: Future Scenarios

- Given the geopolitical environment, what policy levers are possible?
- Of these, what policy approaches are more likely to lead to specific outcomes? And are these desirable or not?
- Where and to what degree can United States and CJTF-HoA influence the approach taken towards al-Shabaab? What can different partners be expected to do and to do well?



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