



AFRICA CENTER FOR STRATEGIC STUDIES

SECURITY GOVERNANCE INITIATIVE PARTNERS SEMINAR

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SYLLABUS

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About The Africa Center for Strategic Studies

Since its inception in 1999, the Africa Center has served as a forum for research, academic programs, and the exchange of ideas with the aim of enhancing citizen security by strengthening the effectiveness and accountability of African institutions.

VISION

Security for all Africans championed by effective institutions accountable to their citizens.

Realizing the vision of an Africa free from organized armed violence guaranteed by African institutions that are committed to protecting African citizens is the driving motivation of the Africa Center. This aim supports U.S.-Africa policy and underscores the Center's commitment to contributing to tangible impacts by working with our African partners - military and civilian, governmental and civil society, as well as national and regional. All have valuable roles to play in mitigating the complex drivers of conflict on the continent today. Accountability to citizens is an important element of our vision as it reinforces the point that in order to be effective, security institutions must not just be "strong," but also be responsive to and protective of the rights of citizens.

MISSION

To advance African security by expanding understanding, providing a trusted platform for dialogue, building enduring partnerships, and catalyzing strategic solutions.

The Africa Center's mission revolves around the generation and dissemination of knowledge through our research, academic programs, and community chapters. Drawing on the practical experiences and lessons learned from security efforts on the continent, we aim to generate relevant insight and analysis that can inform practitioners and policymakers on the pressing security challenges that they face. Recognizing that addressing serious challenges can only come about through candid and thoughtful exchanges, the Center provides face-to-face and virtual platforms where partners can exchange views on priorities and sound practices. These exchanges foster relationships that, in turn, are maintained over time through the Center's community chapters, communities of interest, follow-on programs, and ongoing dialogue between participants and staff. This dialogue - infused with real world experiences and fresh analysis - provides an opportunity for continued learning and catalyzes concrete actions.

MANDATE

The Africa Center is a U. S. Department of Defense institution established and funded by Congress for the study of security issues relating to Africa and serving as a forum for bilateral and multilateral research, communication, exchange of ideas, and training involving military and civilian participants. (10 U.S.C 342)

Introduction

“Properly governed and coordinated institutions enable governments to comprehensively and responsibly tackle emerging and complex threats, and provide security and justice to their citizens.”

(Security Governance Initiative 2016 Review)

About the Security Governance Initiative

The Security Governance Initiative (SGI) is a partnership launched in 2014 between the United States and six countries – Ghana, Kenya, Mali, Niger, Nigeria, and Tunisia – designed to improve the management, accountability, and coordination of security and justice sector institutions. SGI offers a process for prioritizing security and governance concerns, jointly setting goals and expectations, and sharing experiences and best practices to efficiently address urgent, persistent, and emerging security challenges.

The SGI approach is based on the recognition that sustainable solutions to security sector challenges require the vision and commitment of multiple stakeholders. The SGI approach includes features such as a focus on partner priorities where U.S. assistance can have the most impact, and where it can complement and leverage other efforts; the aim to garner high-level interest, attention, and commitment to undertake difficult and sensitive reforms; consultation with civil society and other international partners to coordinate efforts and gain a more thorough understanding of the environment; a focus on the institutions, systems, and processes that govern the security and justice sectors; the promotion of U.S. and partner whole-of-government coordination to comprehensively address complex security issues; and the measurement of progress and commitment through consultation with security sector stakeholders, and program monitoring and evaluation.

Academic Approach

Recognizing the diversity of challenges and opportunities in security sector governance, this seminar will seek to more intentionally identify and capture important lessons and sound practices through:

- a) Five plenary sessions that reinforce practical applications and sound security sector governance principles;
- b) Small group discussions that reinforce the learning objectives and challenge participants to address both whole of government and more specific technical issues in an informal setting; and,

- c) Breakout groups that cover the following five thematic areas specifically relevant to stakeholders in greater depth: administration of justice; border management; communication and engagement; national security strategy, planning and coordination; and resource management.

Experienced facilitators will guide the discussions group discussions and breakout groups. Roughly, half of them are African. The facilitators' purpose is not to lecture or to insist on any one "correct" solution, but to ensure smooth dialogue and to provoke thought. Take advantage of the facilitators' wealth of expertise and experiences, but also feel free to challenge them.

The seminar will be conducted in English and French. As is customary, the program will be conducted under a strict policy of non-attribution.

Program Overview

Principles and practices of sound security governance will serve as the central themes of this seminar. Effective security sector governance can be defined as the transparent, accountable, and legitimate management and oversight of security policy and practice. This seminar provides an opportunity for SGI partners to identify and share sound policies, institutional structures, systems, and processes to more efficiently, effectively, and responsibly deliver security and justice to their citizens. Key elements of successful security sector governance models include a constitutional and legal framework, democratic control over the security sector by the state and civil society, security organizations that operate in accordance with international and constitutional law and respect human rights, and sound principles of public sector management such as fiscal discipline.

Core principles such as legitimacy, accountability, and transparency are key for all stakeholders within government and society and link all of the seminar's sessions. Each session and breakout group is inter-related and mutually reinforcing. Participants will conduct two separate brief back exercises identifying and discussing the main issues, observations, and practices explored in the five sessions.

Breakout group discussions afford the opportunity to delve more deeply into systemic, sometimes seemingly intractable challenges and explore applicable lessons learned and sound practices through an environment of peer to peer learning. Each breakout group will brief back the other groups twice and engage in a broader discussion to share knowledge and integrate efforts.

SGI partner delegations will also devote time to discussions in binational dialogues between the U.S. and the six SGI partners—Ghana, Kenya, Mali, Niger, Nigeria, and Tunisia—to further explore how to pragmatically leverage concepts and conclusions.


The Syllabus

This syllabus provides an overview of academic material and key policy questions related to security governance issues in Africa's security sector. The document is organized along the lines of the sessions and breakout groups for this program. For each session, the syllabus provides a brief introduction and frames questions for discussion. We provide selected articles, whose primary purpose is to ensure that you and your colleagues may take maximum advantage of the presentations. We realize that the syllabus probably covers more issues and materials than can be sufficiently discussed in the available time. We hope that you use these materials as resources even after the program concludes. You will notice that there will be some repetition in the discussion questions that relate to the plenary sessions and the roundtables and there are some similar-theme questions that recur throughout the various modules as well. This has been done intentionally to reinforce key concepts and present you with a rich range of ideas on inter-related security governance topics.

We encourage you to bring questions and suggestions about the materials and the course in general to our attention. The quality of our programs and courses has greatly benefited from the enthusiastic willingness of past participants to offer constructive criticisms and suggestions. The planners and facilitators of this course are quite willing to discuss specific topics with you. We encourage you to call upon them, as we also encourage you to read the assigned material and actively participate in your discussion groups.

The benefits of this program should continue after you have returned home. The discussions and written materials as well as the friendships formed over the seminar should help you cope with the sometimes unpredictable challenges you will face in your professions.

Map of Africa



Plenary Session 1: Principles of Security Sector Governance

Format: Plenary presentation
Discussion groups

Objectives:

- Consider the wider definitions of security, justice, transparency, accountability, and legitimacy in constitutional frameworks.
- Examine security governance oversight (policy, budgetary, administrative, etc.) principles, organizations, stakeholders, and processes.
- Define civil control of the security sector and examine the role and relationship of civil society with security governance institutions.

Background:

Throughout much of the post-colonial period, African leaders defined security in terms of state and regime survival. This approach was imbued with the logic of force projection and hard power, and yielded highly personalized regimes headed either by men in uniform, or by those with enduring ties to military institutions. During this period, much of the continent's state security apparatus was concerned with supporting and extending regime control over the public and private sphere. Over the past few decades, however, the notion of security has evolved to include "human security," which promotes the protection of the individual over regime security. This period has seen an expansion of democratic, civilian control over Africa's security sector, with constitutionally-mandated presidential term limits gradually becoming the norm. Thus, in addition to the state's preoccupation with hard security, there is now a greater focus on citizen-centric and community well-being.

The changing nature of African insecurity demands a recalibration of the roles and missions of the security sector, both internally and with respect to civilian institutions, communities, and individuals. Efforts to enhance security have therefore been undertaken within a broader context of good governance, citizen security, and effective conflict management. This process, known as security sector reform (SSR), calls for an integrated approach to transforming institutions responsible for state and human security, drawing on a range of stakeholders from across the government, civil society, and the private sector.

Local ownership of reform—whereby initiatives are locally or nationally conceived of and led—is one of the bedrocks of SSR. While external donors or partner countries can provide support for institutional change, reform efforts should ultimately originate from within. Ownership of SSR cannot be operationalized unless a broad range of local, regional, and national interests are captured and reflected in the process. This means

engaging local and non-state organizations—civil society, the media, political and religious groups, etc. – to identify citizen preferences and priorities and convey them to policymakers.

The subordination of the security sector to sovereign, civilian institutions is another crucial feature of security sector reform. And while issues central to security governance—transparency, accountability, and legitimacy chief among them— have long since entered common parlance in the field, military exceptionalism and excessive secrecy remain problematic in Africa.

Within a framework of democratic civilian control, security sector institutions play a crucial role in overseeing the planning and execution of security sector policy directives in Africa. In the aggregate, these oversight bodies provide for greater security sector transparency and accountability, ultimately reducing levels of corruption and impunity, minimizing cronyism, and ensuring human rights are respected. Transparency also guards against fiscal indiscipline and misappropriation, promotes operational effectiveness, and enhances overall levels of professionalism and trust. Because of the state’s monopoly on the use of force, democratic civilian control is necessary to ensure that this power is used effectively and accountably to provide for state and human security.

Discussion Questions:

- How has the definition of “security” evolved in Africa to reflect the changed security environment?
- How does legitimacy and accountability in security governance impact institutions and individuals? Why does it matter?
- What are some of the most pressing security governance challenges? How have these challenges evolved over time?
- Beyond the traditional security establishment (e.g., military, police, gendarmerie, and intelligence services), what other stakeholders and institutions should be included in the national debate over defining security governance interests?

Recommended Readings:

Julie Chalfin and Linda Thomas-Greenfield, “The Security Governance Initiative,” *PRISM*, Vol. 6, No. 4, 2017.

http://cco.ndu.edu/Portals/96/Documents/prism/prism_6-4/5-Chalfin_Thomas-Greenfield.pdf?ver=2017-05-12-110304-557

Emile Ouédraogo, “Advancing Military Professionalism in Africa,” Africa Center for Strategic Studies, Africa Center Research Paper No. 6, July 2014. In English and French: <https://africacenter.org/publication/advancing-military-professionalism-in-africa/>

World Development Report 2011 Overview: Conflict, Security, and Development, World Bank, 2011. In English and French: <http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/806531468161369474/World-development-report-2011-conflict-security-and-development-overview>

Security Sector Governance SSR Background, Geneva Center for the Democratic control of Armed Forces (DCAF), 2015. In English and French: <http://www.dcaf.ch/security-sector-governance-applying-principles-good-governance-security-sector-0>

Plenary Session 2: Coalition Building

Format: Plenary presentation
Discussion groups

Objectives:

- Examine the legislature’s roles, responsibilities and relationships in the context of security governance
- Compare and contrast processes, challenges, and successes in building coalitions for inter-ministerial vs intra-ministerial cooperation
- Examine the roles, relationships and communications within government and between government and civil society in the context of the security sector

Background:

Security is one of the most important public goods a state provides to its citizens. It is critical, therefore, that citizens are able to shape the national security objectives. One way to achieve this goal is by undertaking broad-based consultations, both within and outside the government. Building and maintaining effective coalitions, then, is crucial to effecting structural change in the security sector.

A whole-of-government approach to security sector challenges, while necessary, is insufficient unless the media, civil society, and the private sector are taken into account. Reformers are therefore encouraged to undertake a whole-of-*society* approach, leveraging all stakeholders to effect SSR objectives. All stakeholders within the government, at all relevant levels – national, regional, and local – whose activities impact on a state’s ability to provide security to the citizens must have a voice in the process. Improving coordination and breaking down bureaucratic silos is part of the security sector reform process, both within and between ministries.

Citizens must also be provided with an opportunity to have their voices heard as well – either directly or indirectly. Direct participation can take the form of individual submissions or “town-hall” type meetings. Indirect participation is often done through organizations representing women, youth, workers, etc. To this end, society and media outlets play important roles in providing a feedback mechanism between the people and the states. The objective is to ensure all relevant citizens and groups are engaged and have a stake in the process.

Discussion Questions:

- What practices are in place in your country to identify and engage a broad variety of stakeholders, including civil society, in the processes of security sector governance?
- To what degree are civilian stakeholders empowered to communicate their views on security matters?
- What mechanisms are in place for capturing all voices and incorporating them in key decisions and priorities impacting governance?
- What roles might the legislature have in oversight of the security sector? What are the challenges to the effective implementation of that oversight?
- What role does civil society play in security sector governance and oversight? How can tensions between civil society and the security sector be mitigated and communications improved?

Recommended Readings:

AU Policy framework on Security Sector Reform, 2013.

<http://www.peaceau.org/uploads/au-policy-framework-on-security-sector-reform-aessr.pdf> <http://www.peaceau.org/uploads/ua-cadre-d-aorientation-sur-la-reforme-du-secteur-de-la-securite.pdf>

Communication for Governance and Accountability Program, “Coalition Building,” World Bank.

<http://siteresources.worldbank.org/EXTGOVACC/Resources/CoalitionBuildingweb1.pdf>

Parliaments, Roles and responsibilities in good security sector governance, Security Sector Reform Backgrounder, *DCAF*, 2015. In English and French:

<http://www.dcaf.ch/parliaments-roles-and-responsibilities-good-security-sector-governance>

Plenary Session 3: Strategy and Resources

Format: Plenary presentation
Discussion groups

Objectives:

- Discuss goals, processes, and roles of key actors that should be involved in security sector strategy development and implementation
- Discuss the importance of aligning budgets with national security priorities
- Analyze the key principles and practices of security resource management
- Discuss the major components of a security sector budget including procurement, operations and maintenance, and personnel

Background:

A national security strategy is intended to identify future threats, assess capabilities, and provide guidance on meeting security challenges. While it may foresee changes in the threat environment, it cannot predict shocks to the system. As such, security shocks – terrorist threats, natural disasters, volatility of commodities prices, conflicts, and public health emergencies – may elicit responses that temporarily or permanently change a national security strategy.

There are three goals of a national security policy or strategy process. First, it must prioritize threats to the state and its citizenry, as well as provide security against those threats. Second, it must institutionalize civilian control and oversight over the various uniformed security agencies and determine suitable roles for each within the legal limits of the national constitution and the priorities established in the national security strategy. Third, the process must ensure the affordability and rationality of the security budgets, while providing for sufficient levels of transparency and accountability.

Once the national interests are determined and prioritized, the threats and risks to those interests as well as the capabilities needed to address those threats and risks must be assessed. In simplest terms, this process prioritizes national interests to determine the objectives - ends - that the strategy is intended to accomplish. Ways and means – referring to the resources required (means) and how those resources will be applied (ways) - are then aligned with the strategy's objectives to generate the desired strategic outcomes. This combination of ends, ways and means forms the core of a national security strategy.

Leadership on national security strategy is about strategic choices, long-term planning and accountability. These attributes are particularly relevant to Africa's security sector, where fiscal resources are sometimes scarce. Therefore, decisions on how to efficiently allocate and utilize them to attain national security goals should be guided by efforts to

optimally promote the public good. A complex external donor environment further complicates resource management efforts, with donors displaying a variety of motivations and limitations on assistance. In addition to managing human resources, budgeting and procurement reflect two areas where security sector stakeholders must show sound judgment and unimpeachable ethics if they are to successfully address the continent's security challenges.

Discussion Questions:

- What is the difference between “policy” and “strategy” and is there a difference between national security policy, national security strategy and security sector reform?
- How can a country implement security sector transformation without national security policy and national security strategy?
- Which budgetary system does your country use? Which system would be most effective (given current institutions, arrangements, personnel)?
- Should exceptions be made for confidentiality and urgency in the security sector?
- How could government and military officials; parliamentarians; the media; and civil society improve your country's security sector budgeting and procurement?

Recommended Readings:

Nicole Ball and Len Le Roux, “A model for good practice in budgeting for the military sector,” in Wuyi Omitoogun and Eboe Hutchful, eds. *Budgeting for the Military Sector in Africa: The Processes and Mechanisms of Control*, SIPRI, 2006.

<https://www.sipri.org/sites/default/files/files/books/SIPRI06OmHu/SIPRI06OmHu.pdf>

Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces, “National Security Policies,” *SSR Backgrounder Series* (Geneva: DCAF, 2015).

http://www.dcaf.ch/sites/default/files/publications/documents/DCAF_BG_9_National%20Security%20Policies.11.15.pdf

http://www.dcaf.ch/sites/default/files/publications/documents/DCAF_BG_9_Les%20politiques%20de%20securite%20nationale.11.15.pdf

Harborne, Barnard, Dorotinsky, William, and Bisca, Paul, ed. *Securing Development: Public Finance and the Security Sector*, *The World Bank Group*, 2017. In English and French.

<https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/handle/10986/25138>

Brief back on Sessions 1, 2 and 3

Each discussion group will have the opportunity to brief the plenary on key discussion points from the first three sessions.

During the discussion group prior to the brief back, participants will select a briefer and chair, to guide the discussion. It may also be useful to select a note taker.

Participants should highlight a minimum of two salient observations or conclusions from their discussions. They should also answer the following question:

Group 1:

What role does civil society play in security sector governance? How can tensions between civil society and the security sector be mitigated and communications improved?

Group 2:

What are some key challenges to transparent and effective management of resources in the security sector?

Group 3:

What stakeholders should be involved in the development of national security policy and strategy?

Group 4:

What is the significance of focusing on human security versus state security?

Group 5:

What roles might the legislature have in oversight of the security sector? What are the challenges to the effective implementation of that oversight?

Each briefer will have between 5 - 7 minutes to present the discussion group's conclusions. The brief back is oral without slides.

After all the presentations are heard, the other plenary members will have a chance to discuss.

Plenary Session 4: Justice and Inclusion

Format: Plenary session
Discussion group

Objectives:

- Examine the role of an independent judiciary and the principles and processes that compose a potentially effective system of justice and law enforcement sector
- Consider legal protections and reforms to protect citizen rights, particularly in marginalized communities, and to institutionally mitigate impunity and injustice
- Examine how gender impacts security in Africa for both men and women and critically assess recent efforts to improve gender mainstreaming
- Evaluate the roles of ethnicity and other socio-demographic and geographic factors in shaping challenges and solutions to effective security governance

Background:

The aspiration of just and inclusive governance informs the development of security sector institutions, priorities and frameworks. But many challenges exist in the form of divisions and preferences by gender, ethnicity, language, location, family ties, economic status, etc. Segments and sometimes even majorities of African societies do not trust the institutions designed to deliver justice, from the highest courts to the policemen on the street.

The establishment and nurturing of effective and independent judicial institutions forms a key component of functional governance. These institutions do not just uphold the rule of law but play a further role in oversight of the security sector. Some of the key judicial organizations and mechanisms include courts at multiple levels; military justice systems; alternative dispute mediation mechanisms; prisons, detention, and correctional facilities; and oversight bodies.

All components of effective justice systems are apolitical and ensure equal and impartial treatment before the law. The justice sector plays a key role in oversight of effective law enforcement institutions, themselves accountable before the law. Human security is impossible if law enforcement and other security institutions are unaccountable and regularly act with impunity.

Many African countries to include SGI partners have a diverse mix of ethnicities, tribes, and languages. Ethnic and other divisions can be exacerbated by urban-rural cleavages, economic disparity, and geographic and topographic differences and distances. Mali and Niger are each roughly twice the size of France. Nigeria is a complex mix of dozens of languages and tribes, religious and geographic diversity, and a population that is

approaching 200 million people. High population growth rates and a youth bulge further complicate the development and implementation of inclusive policies by burdening social service and justice systems. Elements of security organs that act with impunity amplify both legitimate and perceived grievances of a broad spectrum of marginalized communities.

In 2009, the African Union adopted a Gender Policy and Action Plan, which seeks to improve gender equality across the continent; as a follow-on, in 2015, the AU launched a five-year Gender, Peace, and Security Program to improve coordination between the AU, RECs, member states, and civil society. Still, while many individual countries have developed gender action plans, challenges remain to understanding gender perspectives on security and adapting relevant policies.

Gender is often equated with women, but gender-sensitivity weighs the needs and perspectives of men and boys, as well as women and girls. Such gender-sensitivity forms an important component of security sector reform (SSR) in Africa. Gender mainstreaming and promoting the equal participation of men and women are two common strategies that can be applied “both to the SSR process itself (e.g., by ensuring gender training for personnel responsible for SSR policy and planning) and to the institutions undergoing SSR (e.g., by including gender training for new recruits as part of a police reform process).”¹ The AU’s 2013 *Policy Framework on SSR* identifies gender equality and women’s empowerment as core principles for SSR activities on the continent.

Discussion Questions:

- What role does an independent judiciary play in governance? What are the challenges to establishing and maintaining an effective and independent judiciary?
- What are the challenges to including gender perspectives in security?
- How do Africa’s security challenges affect women and men differently?
- What are some key challenges and opportunities regarding issues of ethnicity, tribe, and language that impact the security sector?

Recommended Readings:

World Development Report 2017: Governance and the Law, World Bank. In English and in French: <http://www.worldbank.org/en/publication/wdr2017>

Zipporah Musau, “Les femmes, la paix et la sécurité,” *Afrique Renouveau*, Décembre 2015
<http://www.un.org/africarenewal/fr/magazine/d%C3%A9cembre-2015/les-femmes-la-paix-et-la-s%C3%A9curit%C3%A9>

Gender Equality and Good Security Sector Governance, (DCAF), 2015. In English and French: <http://www.dcaf.ch/gender-equality-and-good-security-sector-governance-gender-equality-state-and-human-security>

Sylviane Guillaumont Jeanneney et al, *Linking Security and Development: A plea for the Sahel* or *Allier sécurité et développement Plaidoyer pour le Sahel*, Ferdi, 2016.

http://www.ferdi.fr/sites/www.ferdi.fr/files/publication/sahel_anglais-_vol1-final.pdf

http://www.ferdi.fr/sites/www.ferdi.fr/files/evenements/presentations/allier_securite_et_developpement_-_volume_1.pdf

Plenary Session 5: Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism

Format: Plenary session
Discussion groups

Objectives:

- Examine the relationships among terrorism, violent extremism, and insurgency
- Analyze the political, economic, social, and ideological drivers of terrorism and violent extremism
- Consider the implications and trends in terrorism and violent extremism in Africa
- Distinguish between preventing and countering violent extremism
- Evaluate the potential roles that security institutions play in either exacerbating or preventing/countering violent extremism

Background:

By nearly every measure, terrorism and violent extremism in Africa is on the rise. The present decade has experienced a remarkable increase in the number of attacks, casualties, zones affected, active groups, and so on. The challenge has come from groups across different regions, from Al-Shabaab in the Horn and al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) in the Sahel to Boko Haram in the Lake Chad basin and the Islamic State in Libya in the Maghreb, with many splinter and rival groups in between. Small cell and lone actor terrorists operating at a distance from organizations and their leaders have exacerbated the challenge. Recently, first-time attacks have taken place in several countries, and recruitment into the Islamic State has extended into new areas. Environments and communities of support, sympathy, or tolerance for terrorism and violent extremism are making the problem more complex and intractable still.

The impact of these threats sparks a wide set of concerns. The growth and expansion of terrorism and violent extremism have unleashed rising levels of death, destruction, and disruption on the continent, such that terrorism is beginning to rival other major sources of insecurity on the continent. Today's terrorism and violent extremism is shaking the stability of some African governments, radicalizing vulnerable youths, exacerbating religious and communitarian tensions, fueling large-scale migration, undermining economic and development plans, affecting diplomatic commitments, and more. Responses therefore implicate a diverse set of policies and actors involved in security governance, from ministries of finance to civil society organizations working with young people.

Effective responses rely on accurate analyses, but understanding terrorism remains difficult. Debates persist around the term *terrorism* and its relation to terms like *violent extremism* and *insurgency*. Interactions among these concepts are inevitably mirrored by

convoluted definitions of responses, which are compounded by their multiplicity. Anti-terrorism (AT), focused on target hardening and dissuasion against attack, is sometimes distinguished from the active pursuit of terrorists in *counterterrorism*; similarly, *preventing violent extremism* (PVE) or threats that may emerge tomorrow in an area, is sometimes distinguished from countering the violent extremist threats of today. These refinements add another layer of complexity to threat analysis and policy/strategy formulation.

Countering terrorist groups often requires kinetic capabilities, intelligence assets, and correctional facilities, whereas countering violent extremism might demand new legal codes, public awareness campaigns, and strategic communications skills. Preventing new terrorist and violent extremist threats, meanwhile, could involve strategic investments in educational programs, infrastructure developments, and political reconciliation mechanisms. Defining the response shapes which state or non-state actors should lead and support in policy and programs, and can also determine such tasks as timelines, resource allocation, and monitoring and evaluation measures. De-conflicting responses to preventing/countering violent extremism from responses to terrorism is essential, since research indicates that government actions (e.g., excessive use of force by defense and security forces; ineffective judicial systems and poor prison conditions; corruption and impunity among officials, etc.) can ultimately become drivers of, rather than responses to, terrorism and violent extremism.

The rising tide of terrorism has gradually forced many African governments to address the problem with multiple tools of national power – such as, military, intelligence, diplomacy, law enforcement, economics, and development. African countries have responded at the local, national, and regional level, including through African peace support operations. Thinking through effective and legitimate security governance is critical to ensure defense and security professionals and their allies can achieve citizen security and overcome terrorism and violent extremism threats.

Discussion Questions:

- How does preventing violent extremism differ from countering violent extremism?
- What are the major drivers of terrorism and violent extremism in your country and/or (sub) region?
- How can African nations develop national strategies, determining *ends, ways, and means* (especially through effective resource management), in order to respond to terrorism and violent extremism?
- How do government communications and public affairs shape the information environment and affect violent extremism in your country and/or (sub) region?

Recommended Readings:

Peter Romaniuk “Does CVE Work? Lessons Learned from the Global Effort to Counter Violent Extremism.” Global Center for Cooperative Security, September 2015.

http://www.globalcenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/09/Does-CVE-Work_2015.pdf

Mercy Corps, ““Motivations and Empty Promises”: Voice of Former Boko Haram Combatant and Nigerian Youth,” April 2016

https://www.mercycorps.org/sites/default/files/Motivations%20and%20Empty%20Promises_Mercy%20Corps_Full%20Report_0.pdf

Abdisaid M. Ali, “Islamist Extremism in East Africa,” *Africa Security Brief No. 32*, Africa Center for Strategic Studies, August 9, 2016. In English and French:

<http://africacenter.org/publication/islamist-extremism-east-africa/>

UN Development Program (UNDP). *Journey to Extremism in Africa: Drivers, Incentives, and the Tipping Point for Recruitment*, 2017. <http://journey-to-extremism.undp.org/content/downloads/UNDP-JourneyToExtremism-report-2017-english.pdf>

Brief back on Sessions 4 and 5

Each discussion group will have the opportunity to brief the plenary on key discussion points from sessions four and five.

During the discussion group prior to the brief back, participants will select a briefer and chair, to guide the discussion. It may also be useful to select a note taker.

Participants should highlight a minimum of two salient observations or conclusions from their discussions. They should also answer the following question:

Group 1:

What are the challenges to including gender perspectives in security? How do Africa's security challenges affect women and men differently?

Group 2:

What role does an independent judiciary play in governance? What are the challenges to establishing and maintaining an effective and independent judiciary?

Group 3:

What are some of the benefits to more inclusive policies and practices in the security sector?

Group 4:

What are some key differences between violent extremism, terrorism and insurgency? How might they inter-relate or overlap?

Group 5:

What are some key challenges and opportunities regarding issues of ethnicity, religion, and language that impact the security sector?

Each briefer will have between 5 – 7 minutes to present the discussion group's conclusions. The brief back is oral without slides.

After all the presentations are heard, the other plenary members will have a chance to discuss.

Breakout Groups

Introduction:

Each participant will be assigned to one of five breakout groups based on related SGI focus areas: administration of justice; border management; communication and engagement; national security strategy, planning and coordination; and resource management. Breakout group discussions afford the opportunity to explore and share applicable sound practices through an environment of peer to peer learning.

While we have broken participants into five thematic areas, it is worth noting all five are interdependent. Effective local community engagement and communication, for instance, is an essential component of successful border management policy. Multiyear budgeting systems, meanwhile, cannot be implemented in the absence of a national security strategy.

Brief Backs:

Each breakout group will brief the other groups on two occasions and engage in a broader discussion to share knowledge and integrate efforts. For each brief back session, participants will select a briefer and chair to guide the discussion. It may also be useful to select a note taker.

All breakout groups will answer questions provided in the sections that follow. Breakout groups are not limited to topics or questions specified in the various sections. They may alternatively summarize discussions on other impactful questions and topics that surface.

Supplementary Materials:

Supplementary materials specific to individual breakout groups may be distributed during the seminar.

Breakout Group 1: Administration of Justice

Background:

Administration of justice is an umbrella term that refers to the processes, activities, norms, and procedures relating to the application of criminal and civil law by the justice sector constituted by the judiciary (judges, magistrates, and prosecutors), police, lawyers, advocates and paralegals. The functions of the justice sector, in particular the criminal justice system, are circumscribed not just by the mandates of individual institutions such as courts, police, and directorates of prosecutions but also by rights to which users in general or citizens in particular are entitled. The three core rights that frame the work of the justice sector are: 1) the right to a fair trial; 2) the right to have one's cause heard by an independent and impartial tribunal; and 3) the right to an effective remedy.

As the working definition above indicates, administration of justice encompasses numerous issues and challenges that vary according to country needs and capacity levels. Three of the major areas of interest particularly relevant to SGI partners, despite varying levels of institutional capacity, are: *access to justice*; *case management*, and *plea bargaining*.

On Access to Justice:

Access to justice, as a right, entitles one to access legal services – including adjudicative services that are affordable, physically accessible, without procedural impediments and on a non-discriminatory basis. The first three elements respectively represent the three facets of access – economic (cost), physical (distance) and procedural (language, time/speed and procedures). It is worth noting that the institutions to which individuals turn for justice are not limited to courts and tribunals. National laws often provide for additional forums, which may or may not interface with courts, that should be factored in access to justice debates including: commissions (constitutional or statutory) that provide for public complaints mechanisms, and; traditional justice mechanisms which operate alternative dispute resolution methods such as mediation. To enhance access to justice, legal aid programs can be instituted to ensure that the marginalized can afford legal services. In addition, procedures for obtaining legal aid should not constitute a barrier to access to justice.

On Case Management:

This refers to the practices, activities and procedures by which cases are managed within the criminal justice system to ensure efficiency and effective dispensation of justice. The process aims to streamline the 'case cycle' and the steps or procedures encompassed therein. The case cycle involves several steps: investigation, plea bargaining, prosecution, sentencing (criminal sanction and compensation) and appeal. Case management practices should ensure that rights are respected, e.g the right of parties and victims/complainants to be informed, and operate on the basis of the principles identified above. Technology could be deployed in case management to enhance

efficiency, accountability and transparency, and ensure the respect for rights (to be informed or consulted).

On Plea Bargaining:

Plea bargaining can be an important tool for reducing case backlogs and improving the efficiency of the criminal justice system. While guaranteeing convictions and therefore justice for victims, it may at once constitute an impediment to access to justice for plaintiffs when deals are cut without their knowledge, thereby obliterating their right to truth (about wrongdoing and its authors) and reparations (restitution, compensation, rehabilitation)¹. Consideration must be given to: a) building into the process the right to be consulted by the prosecutor (possibly with court supervision); b) providing an opportunity for the victim to impact the charges preferred and the sentence meted out; c) providing an opportunity for victims to request and obtain compensation from the accused (in addition to the negotiated prison sentence and/or any fines).

Notional Questions for Brief Back and Discussion I

- Identify key security sector governance gaps (legal and regulatory frameworks, instruments, and coordination mechanisms) related to the administration of justice.
- What shared lessons could help SGI countries address these gaps?
- How would national security strategies (documents and processes) be strengthened if these gaps are addressed?

Notional Questions for Brief Back and Discussion II

- Briefly describe a problem-driven, iterative approach to the administration of justice in SGI countries.
- How does a lack of access to legal institutions infringe on basic human rights? Or fuel radicalism? Outline strategies for preventing and countering radicalism within the prison system.
- What practical steps could SGI countries use to (a) capitalize on opportunities and (b) mitigate challenges?

Recommended Readings:

World Development Report 2017: Governance and the Law, World Bank. In English and in French: <http://www.worldbank.org/en/publication/wdr2017>

¹ Francophone systems such as Mali provide for *partie civile* procedure by which a victim can trigger a criminal investigation or be joined in a criminal case in order to obtain compensation at the end. Common law countries such as Kenya provide for a limited procedure that allows the judge to make a compensatory order following conviction.

Justice Sector Roles and Responsibilities in Good Security Sector Governance, DCAF, 2015. In English and French:

<http://www.dcaf.ch/justice-sector-roles-and-responsibilities-good-security-sector-governance>

Toolkit on Police Integrity, DCAF, 2012.

http://www.dcaf.ch/sites/default/files/publications/documents/Toolkit_ENG_screen.pdf

Breakout Group 2: Border Management

Background:

Africa's security sector professionals face the formidable task of balancing national security priorities with policies that promote economic integration. While the continent is host to 109 international boundaries totaling 45,000 kilometers, less than 25% are clearly demarcated. These frontiers intersect 177 distinct ethnic or linguistic groups, many of whom are unbounded by traditional borders.² Recent years have also witnessed an increased cooption of legitimate border trade by human, narcotic, wildlife, and other illicit networks. Trafficking gangs have seized on local grievances in border regions, underlining the dangerous intersection between border security, corruption, and terrorism. Extremist movements are further fueled by the movement of illegal contraband (and cross-border arbitrage) along well-worn trade routes, where networks of lawlessness are sustained by corruption and fragility.

A number of factors underlie Africa's border management challenges, including a lack of uniform institutional and legal frameworks, toothless and discordant oversight mechanisms, and human, financial, and infrastructural shortfalls. Border management agencies must develop legal, regulatory, and institutional instruments to address these inefficiencies and enhance levels of vertical and horizontal coordination and cooperation. These efforts should be targeted at three levels: intra-agency (or ministry), interagency, and international. The African Union's Border Management Strategy outlines approaches for reform in the following areas:

1. Legal and regulatory framework
2. Institutional framework
3. Procedures
4. Human resources and training
5. Communication and information exchange
6. Infrastructure and equipment

Strong community outreach programs are also crucial to an effective border management strategy. These include policies to address longstanding tensions in the East Rift Valley and elsewhere, where large pastoralist communities remain at odds with the government over access to grazing land and wells. Efforts to engage the local community should be embedded in an integrated border management strategy.

Current Developments

SIG countries with border equities have made progress in implementing effective border and maritime policies, but a number of obstacles remain. The proliferation of agencies with sea and land border management writs, for instance, remains problematic. Moreover, the roles and responsibilities of border security institutions remain ill-defined,

making it difficult to effectively plan and allocate appropriate human and financial resources across different agencies. The development of a common risk strategy and contingency plans are crucial to overcoming these challenges. Joint training centers can also facilitate higher levels of interagency trust, a common language, and a shared sense of vision, while clarifying roles and responsibilities within and between ministries and agencies.

Regional Cooperation

While local stakeholders are the primary drivers and key players of cross-border cooperation, it is also important for border management agencies to coordinate their work at national and international levels. While Kenya is party to four Regional Economic Communities, East Africa does not have a common protocol establishing free movement of persons. ECOWAS member states, conversely, do enjoy freedom of movement, and Ghana is implementing plans for visa-free travel for all Africans by 2018. On the other hand, channels of communication with Ghana's French-speaking neighbors are limited, with language barriers proving a major obstacle to collaboration and communication.

Maritime Security

African states' ability to govern their maritime domains and to sustainably harness and manage its resources will determine their ability to deliver an array of benefits to their citizens, improve their provision of security and development, and effectively contribute to global security and prosperity. To achieve this, African states must continue to work at the national, zonal, regional, inter-regional and continent-wide levels to address the full spectrum of concerns in the maritime space including piracy and armed robbery at sea; illegal, unreported and unregulated (IUU) fishing; illegal trafficking of persons, drugs, weapons, counterfeit goods, cultural property and contraband; oil, fuel and other resource theft, smuggling, adulteration and fraud; threats to ships, offshore installations and ports; and issues related to safety of navigation (hydrographic surveys, search and rescue), marine pollution, and overall capacity building.

Illicit Trafficking

Illegal human trafficking from Africa, mostly to European destinations, is already a major security concern for the African citizens making the perilous journey - by land or sea - and for the recipient countries. While the sea is an avenue for human trafficking, it is also a major conduit of drugs and weapons into and through Africa. Moreover, large inflows of illicit cash fuel inflation and crowd out licit enterprises. Furthermore, there is a convenient partnership between drug traffickers, other criminals and insurgents; seemingly benign criminal activities like fuel theft have become increasingly prominent funding sources for transnational criminal organizations, insurgent movements and terrorist groups. African states cannot ignore any criminal activity in the maritime space.

Notional Questions for Brief Back and Discussion I:

- Identify key security sector governance gaps (legal and regulatory frameworks, instruments, and coordination mechanisms) related to border management.
- What shared lessons could help SGI countries address these gaps?
- How would national security strategies (documents and processes) be strengthened if these gaps are addressed?

Notional Questions for Brief Back and Discussion II:

- Briefly describe a problem-driven, iterative approach to border management in SGI countries.
- What benefits and barriers have you experienced from information sharing for border management at any level?
- What are the benefits and downsides of sharing information with local border communities, NGOs, and private sector entities?
- Should the AU or other regional and international organizations play a bigger role in border management and maritime security? Why and how?
- What practical steps could SGI countries use to (a) capitalize on opportunities and (b) mitigate challenges?

Recommended Readings:

Ian Ralby, "Cooperative Security to Counter Cooperative Criminals," *Defence IQ*, 2017, <https://www.defenceiq.com/naval-and-maritime-defence/articles/cooperative-security-to-counter-cooperative>.

Okumu, Wafula, "Border Management and Security in Africa," *The Borders Institute*, June 2011. https://www.researchgate.net/publication/308983535_Border_Management_and_Security_in_Africa

Draft African Union Strategy for Enhancing Border Management in Africa, African Union Border Program, May 2012. <http://www.peaceau.org/uploads/AU-DSD-WORKSHOP-MARCH-2013/Border-Programme-docs/AU-BM-Strategy-Revised%20Draft.pdf>

National Maritime Security Strategy Toolkit, Africa Center for Strategic Studies, July, 2016. In English and French: <https://africacenter.org/publication/national-maritime-security-strategy-toolkit/>

Breakout Group 3: Communications and Engagement

Background:

When the state is disconnected from the local population, citizens will inevitably seek alternative means of expression, including public protest and violence. Indeed, exclusion and marginalization, more than religious ideology, has been a driving force behind radicalization and extremist recruitment. Maintaining open channels of communications between the community and the government is crucial to institutionalizing state and local accountability to the broader population. Poorly developed lines of communication between local and national governments, and between and within government ministries, has the effect of further eroding popular support for national and local security interventions.

Many African countries report an overall disconnect between central decision-making mechanisms and implementation agencies. Moreover, formal mechanisms to elicit feedback from local communities are often minimalist or non-existent. Some countries are working to stand up public affairs structures to more effectively communicate security priorities to the public. However, implementers have found it difficult to reconcile competing priorities, as national security usually takes precedence over efforts to engage civil society or even parliament. Limited engagement with parliament on security issues remains another major challenge, and security budgets are routinely approved without parliamentary scrutiny.

Media

Technology has transformed African communications in ways that were unimaginable just twenty years ago. Mobile phone and internet penetration has increased markedly over the last decade, particularly in urban areas, and migration to mobile broadband is accelerating across the continent. Although community outreach opportunities face challenges in funding and prioritization, technology is an increasingly valuable asset. SGI partners are pursuing a variety of community outreach programs, including media mapping projects, communications workshops, and efforts to prevent or counter violent extremism in the context of broader criminal justice reform initiatives. As government agencies seek to leverage technology platforms to improve public outreach, they remain hesitant to engage another important form of media, the press.

Cyber Crime and Security

Africa is host to the world's fastest growing telecommunications market, and millions of Africans have benefited from a proliferation in mobile telephony, and to a lesser extent, internet availability. The downside of higher penetration rates, however, is that states and individuals are increasingly vulnerable to cyber threats. Recent activities across Africa and the globe have demonstrated how attackers have stolen, modified, and destroyed data and software, occasionally shutting down entire systems and networks.

Security breaches can cost organizations millions of dollars in response actions, lost productivity, or lost data. Cybersecurity prioritizes confidentiality, integrity, availability, and authentication of digital information. Risk management processes can be tailored for any organization to assist with the identification of threats, vulnerabilities, and risk mitigation techniques.

Notional Questions for Brief Back and Discussion I:

- Identify key security sector governance gaps (legal and regulatory frameworks, instruments, and coordination mechanisms) related to communications and engagement.
- What shared lessons could help SGI countries address these gaps?
- How would national security strategies (documents and processes) be strengthened if these gaps are addressed?

Notional Questions for Brief Back and Discussion II:

- Briefly describe a problem-driven, iterative approach to communications and engagement in SGI countries.
- What mechanisms exist for coordinating and sharing information related to the defense and security sector...
 - Within and between ministries, departments, and agencies?
 - Between ministries and parliament?
 - Between local, regional, and national governments?
 - Between the state and its citizens?
- Discuss the role of civil society in fostering dialogue between the people and the state on security and defense.
- What practical steps could SGI countries use to (a) capitalize on opportunities and (b) mitigate challenges?

Recommended Readings:

Civil Society Involvement in Security Sector Reform and Governance: Toolkit for West Africa, DCAF, 2015. In English and French.

<http://www.dcaf.ch/tool-6-civil-society-involvement-security-sector-reform-and-governance>

The Department of Defense Cyber Strategy, April, 2015.

https://www.defense.gov/Portals/1/features/2015/0415_cyber-strategy/Final_2015_DoD_CYBER_STRATEGY_for_web.pdf

Gordon, Eleanor, "Security Sector Reform, Local Ownership and Community Engagement," *Stability: International Journal of Security and Development*, July, 2014.
<https://www.stabilityjournal.org/articles/10.5334/sta.dx/>

Fred Schreier, Barbara Weekes, Theodor H. Winkler, "Cyber Security: The Road Ahead," *DCAF Horizon 2015 Working Paper No. 4*.
<http://www.dcaf.ch/sites/default/files/publications/documents/Cyber2.pdf>

"Spotlight 11: From transparency to accountability through citizen engagement," *World Bank Development Report 2017: Governance and the Law*
<http://www.worldbank.org/en/publication/wdr2017>

Breakout Group 4: National Security Strategy, Planning and Coordination

Background:

A national security strategy is a powerful strategic communications tool in the sense that it articulates the strategic vision for the country. This vision should provide a clear picture of the national goals to be achieved over a period of time. The document should be based on a realistic assessment of current and projected internal and external threats, and expressed in terms of available resources.

The ultimate goal of a national security strategy process is three-fold. First and foremost, it must prioritize threats to the state and its citizenry, and it must also provide security against those threats. Second, it must institutionalize civilian control and oversight over the various uniformed security agencies and determine suitable roles for each within the legal limits of the national constitution and the priorities established in the national security strategy. Third, the process must ensure the affordability and rationality of the security budgets, and establish mechanisms to provide for accountability and transparency of those budgets.

Once national interests are determined and prioritized, the threats and risks to those interests, as well as the capabilities needed to address those threats and risks, must be assessed. In simplest terms, this process prioritizes national interests to determine the objectives that the strategy is intended to accomplish. Ways and means are then aligned with the strategy's objectives to generate the desired strategic outcomes. This combination of ends, ways and means forms the core of a national security strategy.

As SGI partner countries work towards developing an integrated and interoperable emergency response framework, they are encouraged to consider the role of non-security sector organizations and institutions in incident/crisis management and response systems. Lessons from the US Department of Homeland Security (DHS) may prove useful in this respect. Post-9/11, the President directed DHS to establish and administer a National Incident Management System (NIMS), which standardized incident management and response processes.

Coordinating and Planning Emergency Response

SGI partner countries have acknowledged the need for improved coordination, reporting, and enforcement mechanisms at the local, state, sub-regional, and international levels. At the operational level, a number of challenges crisis responders are faced with include:

- Too many people reporting to one supervisor;
- Different emergency response organizational structures;
- Lack of reliable incident information;
- Inadequate and incompatible communications;

- Lack of structure for coordinated planning among agencies;
- Unclear lines of authority;
- Terminology differences among agencies;
- Unclear or unspecified incident objectives.

Challenges

Some SGI partner countries reported that no structures currently exist within their Ministries of Defense to coordinate between the military and civilian arms of the security sector. Current defense policymaking bodies are often comprised of senior military officers, while some MOD offices are staffed with civilian technical advisors who do not liaise with their uniformed counterparts. Inter-ministerial coordinating mechanisms have yet to be approved because of bureaucratic and coordination challenges within and between the very ministries that would benefit from the mechanisms. Broader challenges to developing high-level, impactful strategic documents include problems achieving consensus, a lack of strategic development processes, and difficulty prioritizing security challenges. Likewise, strengthening regional security coordinating mechanisms remains a major priority.

Notional Questions for Brief Back and Discussion I:

- Identify key security sector governance gaps (legal and regulatory frameworks, instruments, and coordination mechanisms) related to the development and implementation of national security strategies.
- What shared lessons could help SGI countries address these gaps?
- How would national security strategies (documents and processes) be strengthened if these gaps are addressed?

Notional Questions for Brief Back and Discussion II:

- Briefly describe a problem-driven, iterative approach to the development and implementation of national security strategies in SGI countries.
- How should national security be defined? How do national interests and priorities flow from this definition of national security?
- Identify the instruments of national power (diplomatic, information, military, economic, financial, intelligence, justice and law enforcement) in your state. How do these elements interact, communicate, and coordinate in the formation and execution of policy and strategy?
- Do inter/intra-ministerial procedures and channels of communication vary between routine policy coordination implementation and emergency conditions? How?
- What practical steps could SGI countries use to (a) capitalize on opportunities and (b) mitigate challenges?

Recommended Readings:

1988 *United States National Security Strategy*, U.S. Department of Defense
<http://nssarchive.us/>

2008 *National Incident Management System*, U.S.
Department of Homeland Security
https://www.fema.gov/pdf/emergency/nims/NIMS_core.pdf

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Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces, 2015. "National Security Policies: Formulating national security policies for good security sector governance," SSR Backgrounder Series (9), Geneva, Switzerland.
<http://www.dcaf.ch/national-security-policies-formulating-national-security-policies-good-security-sector-governance>

Breakout Group 5: Resource Management

Background:

Decisions on how to best allocate and efficiently utilize resources should demonstrate an awareness of how policies address the full range of human security challenges. Other issues to consider include secrecy, confidentiality, alignment, classification, and level of urgency.

Budgeting

Since independence, African countries have experimented with a wide range of approaches to budgeting. While the pros and cons of these systems for Public Financial Management (PFM) in Africa have been debated extensively, relatively little attention has been paid to the identification of systems that best suit Africa's security sector. Some SGI partner countries do not have multi-year budgeting systems in place, a problem stemming directly from a lack of unified, coherent security strategy. The Medium Term Expenditure Framework (MTEF), which incorporates aspects of program and performance models, encourages countries to consider budgeting in 3-5 year increments. The MTEF cultivates fiscal discipline by enforcing aggregate spending ceilings, while promoting effectiveness and efficiency. Multi-year military procurement and construction projects are well-suited to this model. Many African countries have adopted a version of the MTEF, but only a handful of states have developed multi-year perspectives below the ministry level.

The formulation and implementation of the security sector budget has far-reaching implications for the attainment of national security goals in Africa. At the macro level, security sector professionals need to determine how much of the government's budget should be devoted to security, and what tradeoffs would be involved. At the micro level, the emphasis is on ensuring the optimal use of scarce resources to achieve security goals. To this end, an integrated public financial management system can effectively guide the processes and tools of budgeting and procurement.

Procurement

Procurement (which involves four groups – the oversight bodies, uniformed and civilian government officials, the bidders, and the national treasury) is an important aspect of resource management. In most cases, discrepancies between security sector budgets and actual expenditures are traceable to poorly executed procurement strategies. Procurement for the security sector is frequently shielded from scrutiny in secret budgets and off-budget accounts, ostensibly because of their alleged sensitivity. Public procurement and anti-corruption laws may specifically exempt the military and security establishment, and investigators may be reluctant to target military officials. Not surprisingly, then, it has been difficult to attain desired outcomes, and budget estimates are regularly exceeded. Entrenched informal institutional practices and norms, including

clientelism and graft, play a significant (and often deleterious) role in the procurement process. There are also challenges associated with military ownership of private and civilian ventures, including private security companies.

Asset Management

Several partner states reported that no systems exist to conduct a realistic appraisal of lifetime costs of purchased or donated weapons and equipment. There is rarely enough money to fully cover the costs of maintaining and serving even donated materiel. Budgetary structures are not often capable of absorbing these big-ticket acquisitions. This has critical implications for budgeting and resource allocation, which in several partner countries remains a largely ad hoc process. Moreover, once funds are allocated, systems for monitoring expenditures are nonexistent.

Personnel

Non-merit based recruitment and promotion systems remain entrenched in some countries, eroding professionalism and fostering corruption. Transparency International's [2015 report](#) found significant risk factors in payroll systems of 34 of 47 states on the continent; only 20% maintained accurate personnel numbers. Some SGI partner countries do not have a functioning, coherent HR system for their police, military, or justice sectors. Hiring and training is ad hoc, with some sectors retaining remnants of Soviet and Chinese personnel management systems. In one country, two years of work have yielded the rudiments of an HR Information Financial Management System, but a complex donor environment has complicated efforts at implementation. Harmonizing and standardizing recruitment and training efforts is a major component of SGI reform efforts.

Donor Assistance

Coordinating between disparate external partners remains a challenge, as yet no formal clearinghouse exists to facilitate synchronicity. Donors may offer assistance to further their own objectives, as when contracts for donations of externally-sourced materiel require recipient nations to purchase equipment for maintenance and repair from the original donor nation. However, domestic political will is rarely enough to overcome pressure to accept equipment from outside donors, on whom many countries rely to meet the bulk of their security requirements.

Notional Questions for Brief Back and Discussion I:

- Identify key security sector governance gaps (legal and regulatory frameworks, instruments, and coordination mechanisms) related to resource management.
- What shared lessons could help SGI countries address these gaps?
- How would national security strategies (documents and processes) be strengthened if these gaps are addressed?

Notional Questions for Brief Back and Discussion II:

- Briefly describe a problem-driven, iterative approach to resource management in SGI countries.
- Compare different budgeting models and approaches to allocating and utilizing domestic and external resources.
- Identify the role of civilian government – executive and legislative – at each stage of the budgeting and procurement process (particularly in terms of oversight authority). How are budget priorities determined and communicated?
- Should human resource management policy and priorities be purposefully inclusive by law or regulation? How might one achieve a more inclusive security work force?
- What practical steps could SGI countries use to (a) capitalize on opportunities and (b) mitigate challenges?

Recommended Readings:

Collier, Paul. "Security Threats Facing Africa and its Capacity to Respond" *PRISM Vol. 5, No. 2* (2015): 31-41. http://cco.ndu.edu/Portals/96/Documents/prism/prism_5-2/PRISM5-2_Security_Threats.pdf

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https://www.effectiveinstitutions.org/media/The_EIP_P_to_P_Learning_Guide.pdf

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<https://issafrica.s3.amazonaws.com/site/uploads/policybrief105.pdf>

Masson, Nicholas, Lena Andersson and Mohammed Salah Aldin. “Guidebook: Strengthening Financial Oversight in the Security Sector” *Toolkit – Legislating for the Security Sector*, Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF), 2012. http://www.dcaf-tunisie.org/adminDcaf/upload/ejournal/documenten_10008.pdf
http://www.dcaf-tunisie.org/adminDcaf/upload/ejournal/documentfr_10008.pdf

McNerney, Michael, et al, *Defense Institution Building in Africa: An Assessment*, RAND, 2016. https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR1232.html

Osinowo, Adeniyi Adejimi, “Combating Piracy in the Gulf of Guinea,” *Africa Security Brief*, No. 30, February 2015. In English and French:
<http://africacenter.org/publication/combating-piracy-gulf-guinea-html/>

Parliamentary Oversight of the Security Sector: ECOWAS Parliament-DCAF Guide for West African Parliamentarians, 2011.
<http://www.dcaf.ch/sites/default/files/publications/documents/ECOWAS%2520Parliament-DCAF%2520Guide%2520eng.pdf>

Gilpin, Raymond, “Examining Maritime Insecurity in Eastern Africa,” *Soundings*, Jan. 2016, http://www.navy.gov.au/sites/default/files/documents/Soundings_No_8.pdf.

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Tamarkin, Eric, "The AU's Cybercrime response: A positive start, but substantial challenges ahead," ISS Policy Brief, January 2015. <https://issafrica.org/research/policy-brief/the-aus-cybercrime-response-a-positive-start-but-substantial-challenges-ahead#>

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