# Session 3: How Terrorism Ends in the Horn of Africa

Dr. Amy Pate

# Overview

- Geopolitical context
- Terrorism trends in CJTF-HoA area of operations
- Theorized pathways out of terrorism with historical exemplars
- Policy levers for influencing pathways
- Application to CJTF-HoA area of operations

# Defining Aspects of Geopolitical Context

- Newly democratizing states, weakly institutionalized democracies, and weak authoritarians
    - Lack of avenues for peaceful expression of dissent
    - History of mass protests and violence
    - State repression
- Weak and fragile states
    - Don't necessarily control hinterlands or borders
    - High levels of corruption
    - Informal governance in many areas
- Youth bulges and high youth unemployment
- Large populations of displaced and refugees
- Internal politics along ethnic, tribal and clan divisions

| Decade | Burundi | Djibouti | Eritrea | Ethiopia | Kenya | Rwanda | Seychelles | Somalia | Tanzania | Uganda |
|--------|---------|----------|---------|----------|-------|--------|------------|---------|----------|--------|
| 1970s | 0 | 2 | 0 | 28 | 7 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 2 | 8 |
| 1980s | 0 | 3 | 0 | 10 | 5 | 0 | 2 | 17 | 1 | 74 |
| 1990s | *248* | 13 | 3 | 52 | 66 | *128* | 0 | *151* | 4 | *129* |
| 2000s | *111* | 1 | 5 | 38 | 43 | 6 | 0 | *486* | 10 | *129* |
| 2010s | *228* | 2 | 2 | 35 | *461* | 23 | 0 | *2827* | 36 | 41 |

| Perpetrators 1970-2016 | # Attacks |
|---|---|
| Al-Shabaab | 2683 |
| Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) | 130 |
| Allied Democratic Forces (ADF) | 48 |
| Party for the Liberation of the Hutu People (PALIPEHUTU) | 38 |
| National Liberation Front (FNL) (Burundi) | 32 |
| Mujahideen Youth Movement (MYM) | 23 |
| Eritrean Liberation Front | 20 |
| Uganda Freedom Movement (UFM) | 19 |
| Hizbul al Islam (Somalia) | 18 |
| Uganda People's Army | 15 |
| National Council for Defense of Democracy (NCDD) | 15 |
| Ahlu-sunah Wal-jamea (Somalia) | 12 |
| Islamic Courts Union (ICU) | 12 |
| Tigray Peoples Liberation Front (TPLF) | 11 |
| Rwanda Patriotic Front (RPF) | 11 |

| Perpetrators 2012-2016 | # Attacks |
|---|---:|
| Al-Shabaab | 2358 |
| Mombasa Republican Council (MRC) | 9 |
| Ahlu-sunah Wal-jamea (Somalia) | 9 |
| Allied Democratic Forces (ADF) | 8 |
| National Liberation Front (FNL) (Burundi) | 6 |
| Democratic Front for the Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR) | 6 |
| Jabha East Africa | 5 |
| The Association for Islamic Mobilisation and Propagation (UAMSHO) | 4 |

# How Terrorism Ends

- Successful repression
  - Leader(s) captured/killed
  - Organization defeated
- Terrorism succeeds
- Transition to peaceful process
- Membership dies out
- Loss of popular support
- Transition to other illegal movements
  - Organized criminality
  - Insurgency

# Examples of Successful Repression

- Shining Path (but later had resurgence)
- Kurdistan Worker's Party (but currently has a resurgence)
- Real Irish Republican Army (still low-level activity)
- Aum Shinrikyo
- Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam

# Examples of Terrorism Success

- Irgun
- African National Congress (although leadership of organization had renounced violence prior to success)

# Examples of Unsuccessful Generational Transition

- Red Brigades
- Aryan Resistance Army
- Weather Underground
- (Virtually all the leftist movements in developed democracies from the 1960s/70s)

# Examples of Loss of Popular Support

- Armenian Secret Army for the Liberation of Armenia
- Justice Commandos of the Armenian Genocide

# Transition to Other Forms of Illegality

- Khmer Rouge (transition to insurgency and then revolutionary government)
- FARC (in transition to primarily criminal organization)

# Approaches to Influencing Violent Extremist Organizations

- Coerce: The use or threat of violence

- Deter: Increase costs of attacks and/or reduce benefits

- Coopt: "Buy off" leaders (or potential leaders) or influential members of violent groups

- Alleviate grievances: Make concessions or improve conditions for recruitment communities

- Delegitimize: Undercut support for violent extremists by highlighting flaws or shortcomings

- Incentivize: Decrease costs and or increase benefits of nonviolent pathways to change

- No action

# Examples

- Deterrence: Israeli government publication of lists of Palestinian extremists targeted for capture or extrajudicial killing

- Co-potation: Russian policy of "Chechenization"

- Grievance alleviation: Fujimori's micro-development initiatives

- Delegitimization: U.S. counter-messaging targeting Islamic State support

- Incentivization: Young Arab Voices

# Discussion: Connecting Policy Approaches to Desistance Pathways

- Which influence strategies are more likely to lead to:
    - Defeat?
    - Terrorist success?
    - Transition to nonviolent paths?
    - Loss of membership?
    - Loss of popular support?
    - Evolution to other forms of illegality?
- How may the geopolitical context influence what influence strategy options are available?
- How may the same influence strategies lead to different outcomes in different contexts?

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# Case 1: Lord's Resistance Army

- Coercion
  - Military offensives and more targeted operations
- Deterrence
  - Hardening targets in Northern Uganda/increasing capacity of local communities
- Grievance alleviation
  - Development assistance to communities in Northern Uganda
- Incentivization
  - Amnesty offers, negotiations

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# Outcomes

- LRA still active, but attacks (in terms of number and lethality) have lessened

- Number of active forces substantially reduced, with defections and/or capture of multiple leaders

# Discussion: Future Scenarios

- Which of the pathways are most likely and most enduring?

- Given the geopolitical environment, what policy levers are possible?

- Of these, what policy approaches are more likely to lead to specific outcomes? And are these desirable or not?

- Where and to what degree can United States and CJTF-HoA influence the approach taken towards LRA?

# Case 2: Al-Shabaab

- Coercion:
  - Multiple and continuous military interventions result in loss of territory and feed delegitimization
- Deterrence
  - Hardening of key assets/targets
- Delegitimization
  - Loss of territory counters al-Shabaab's image as a successful organization
  - Use of counter-messaging to prevent foreign support

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# Outcomes

- Loss of territory, but al-Shabaab still firmly entrenched in rural spaces

- Diffusion of attacks in region, in particular into Kenya

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# Discussion: Future Scenarios

- Which of the pathways are most likely and most enduring?

- Given the geopolitical environment, what policy levers are possible?

- Of these, what policy approaches are more likely to lead to specific outcomes? And are these desirable or not?

- Where and to what degree can United States and CJTF-HoA influence the approach taken towards al-Shabaab?

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