



**AFRICA CENTER**  
**FOR STRATEGIC STUDIES**

**Managing Security Resources in  
Africa:  
Southern Africa**

**SYLLABUS**

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## **PROGRAM OVERVIEW**

### **Introduction**

The Africa Center for Strategic Studies supports the United States' Africa policy by working with African countries to provide security for all Africans championed by effective institutions accountable to their citizens. Since its inception in 1999, the Africa Center has fostered democracy and enhanced professionalism in Africa's security sector through programs that promote productive interaction among senior military and civilian leaders, and establish viable professional networks. It has provided an academic-style forum for Africa's security-related professionals to identify and evaluate current and emerging security threats, agree on strategies and shared responsibilities for national and regional security, and reinforce internationally recognized best practices in their various spheres of activity. The Center's Community Chapter program promotes peer networking among thousands of individuals who have participated in its programs by affording them an opportunity to continue the dialogue and collaboration on key security issues upon return to their home countries.

### **Background**

Southern African countries – as elsewhere on the continent – face challenges generating, allocating and managing security sector resources for reasons that include: weak institutions, capacity constraints, inadequate oversight and lack of transparency. Although some countries are taking steps to address these issues, significant challenges persist. The resulting fragility, inefficient institutions and (in some cases) human rights violations impact force readiness and the attainment of national/regional security goals. Thus, the judicious management of available security sector resources in Southern Africa is both urgent and critical.

This workshop introduces participants to strategic-level implications of resource management in Southern Africa's security sector and combines case-based and experiential educational engagement to attain clear strategies. The week-long program aims to: (a) reinforce the link between effective resource management and the attainment of national security goals, (b) demonstrate the importance of adopting appropriate, internationally-recognized practices, (c) emphasize the role of appropriate governance and effective oversight in the management of security sector resources; and (d) evaluate the opportunity cost of waste and mismanagement in the security sector.

Anticipated outcomes include: developing an enhanced capacity among Africa's civilian and military officials responsible for the design, implementation and oversight of security sector budgets; the eventual adoption of sound practices for the management of security resources across Africa, with effective democratic oversight; successfully identifying key policy, institutional and capacity gaps; the stimulation of innovative thinking in the areas of policy

development, process efficiency and practical research; and the promotion of informed policy debate relating to the allocation and utilization of national resources.

By pitching this workshop at the strategic level, participants will be challenged to go beyond identifying the problems and will be required to work as a group to develop effective, Africa-centric solutions to enhance resource management capacity at national and regional levels. By so doing, participants will be encouraged to focus on the "ways" (i.e. how best to define successful solutions), the "means" (i.e. how best to judiciously utilize available domestic and external resources) and the "ends" (i.e. how best to define the desired end-state) that are required to address Africa's multifaceted security challenges. The emphasis would be on sharing sound practices, learning lessons from case studies and formulating practical solutions that could be adapted, adopted and sustained.

## **Workshop Structure**

This workshop is divided into three modules.

The **first** module provides thematic and regional context by focusing on the nature and scope of security sector resource management trends in Southern Africa. Plenary Session 1 "*Scope and Sources of Security Sector Resources in Southern Africa*" examines the sources of funding, institutional/regulatory frameworks and implications of resource management trends in Southern Africa. Plenary Session 2 "*The Resource-Security Nexus*" provides a conceptual foundation by analyzing the relationship between effective resource management and the efficacy of national and regional security strategies. This plenary will also consider a range of theoretical concepts and empirical findings that inform this debate.

The **second** module challenges participants to develop appropriate, strategic-level responses to a variety of resource management challenges in this region. These include: Transparent budgeting and procurement processes (Plenary 3); the role of legislative oversight (Plenary 4); and corruption (Plenary 5).

The **third** module focuses on strategy development. Plenary Session 6 "*Alignment of Resource and Security Strategies*" discusses how the principles and lessons from the previous sessions could help design effective resource management strategies that are consistent with national security goals. Plenary Session 7 "*Leveraging External Resources*" acknowledges the importance of mutually-beneficial partnerships in Southern Africa's security sector and explores modalities that would improve coordination and complementarity.

The Simulation Exercise is based on the fictitious state of Nicolesia, which faces threats and challenges similar to those facing Southern African countries. Participants will represent the Nicolesian Security Oversight Budget and Planning Commission (NSOBPC) in their discussion groups and will be asked to complete three related tasks. The first entails conducting a review and assessment of the sources of funding and finance for the Nicolesian Security Forces, the

second focuses on trade-offs involved in the resource allocation process (to include opportunity costs and impact assessments), and the third task involves strategy articulation and rationalization. Each group will present their finding and recommendations during plenary sessions.

During this workshop, participants will participate in plenary sessions, small group discussions and a simulation exercise. The plenary sessions will be led by thematic/regional experts who will share key concepts and high-level field experience. Their brief presentations will be followed by moderated question and answer sessions during which participants will be encouraged to share experiences, question assumptions and think through creative approaches. The small group discussions will focus on problem solving. Participants will be encouraged to share perspectives and learn from each other. A team of experienced facilitators will work with participants to this end.

All Africa Center programs are conducted under a strict non-attribution policy. This allows participants to contribute and exchange views without reservation, thereby creating an effective and productive learning environment. Simultaneous interpretation will be provided to allow the workshop to be conducted in English, French and Portuguese. All workshop materials will be provided in these languages.

### **Academic Material**

This document does not purport to provide conclusive solutions for enhancing security sector resource management in Southern Africa. It is intended to provide a range of material and perspectives to facilitate dialogue, a key objective of the workshop. We have not covered all the perspectives, and count on participants' experiences, expertise and knowledge to supplement this document and further enrich the discussions. We therefore strongly encourage you to familiarize yourself with the material for each session and come prepared to share ideas and compare experiences (which may or may not be very different from what is presented in this document). Do not hesitate to articulate your views and to challenge the assumptions and arguments in this document. Arguably, this document covers more issues and materials than can be sufficiently discussed in the available time. There is no expectation that all or even most of the issues and questions will be discussed. We do hope that the materials will encourage critical thinking and evaluation of policy development/goals across the continent, while also serving as useful resource material in the future.

All workshop documentation will be posted on GlobalNet, our online educational tool. You will receive an email with details of how to log on to this website. Please contact us if you have any difficulty accessing the website. Ideally, we would like to initiate discussion about the key questions and objectives before the workshop starts. Our facilitators will be available to respond

to your questions, discuss your perspectives on the topic and the academic materials, share experiences and examine relevant case studies.

### **Academic Preparation**

Consultation and partnership are hallmarks of the Africa Center's program development process. Formal and informal consultative meetings were held with a wide range of regional and non-regional experts, representatives of African governments, and stakeholders in relevant U.S. government entities to determine the scope and focus of this workshop. A number of academics and practitioners were particularly helpful in reviewing the content and relevance of the academic material for this workshop. The full report on the consultative process of this workshop is available upon request.

## **MODULE ONE: UNDERSTANDING TRENDS IN SOUTHERN AFRICA**

The **first** module provides thematic and regional context by focusing on the nature and scope of security sector resource management trends in Southern Africa. Plenary Session 1 *“Scope and Sources of Security Sector Resources in Southern Africa”* examines the sources of funding, revenue envelope, the global commodities, the oil and gas prices, the role of China as the main importer of these commodities and implications for security resource management trends in Southern Africa. Plenary Session 2 *“The Resource-Security Nexus”* provides a conceptual foundation by analyzing the dichotomy between the dwindling resources and mounting security challenges as well as relationship between effective resource management and the efficacy of national and regional security strategies. This plenary will also consider a range of theoretical concepts and empirical findings that inform this debate. Plenary Session 3 addresses transparent budgeting and procurement processes and practices.

## *Session 1: Scope and Sources of Security Sector Resources in Southern Africa*

**Format:** Plenary Presentation

Discussion Session

### *Session Objectives:*

- Outline and map the trends of diversity of economic activity, revenue sources and revenue envelope for countries in the Southern African sub-region;
- Assess the trends of the flow of resources to the security sector and military in relation to the dwindling revenue envelope;
- Recognize the shrinking scope and sources of security sector resources and implications for effective management of security sector resources for both security and economic development.

### *Background*

The economic fortunes of many African countries rise and fall with the global commodity market. Fueled by soaring commodity prices, Africa's vast hydrocarbon and metal reserves produced breakneck economic growth between 2002 and 2014. The subsequent collapse of oil prices and inflationary pressures—and, crucially, a slowdown in demand for such commodities by China, one of the top markets for African commodities—has reduced the scope, sources of revenue, and revenue envelope, with serious impacts on the resources available for security and development in the Southern African sub-region.

Defense spending in sub-Saharan Africa fell by 12.8% between 2015 and 2016, following 11 years of consecutive growth that began in 2003. The decline is commensurate with a global commodity slump, particularly in metals and oil, dating back to mid-2014. In Southern Africa's agrarian economies, the effects of these shocks were compounded by drought. Indeed, the Southern African sub-region experienced the lowest levels of GDP growth on the continent in 2016—1.9%, compared to 4.0% in sub-Saharan Africa overall. Economic powerhouses Angola and South Africa—which, together with Nigeria, account for nearly two-thirds of GDP and 45% of defense spending in sub-Saharan Africa—were among the worst hit in recent years. Domestic political crises have further undermined investor confidence in some of these countries.

Even during Southern Africa's boom years, increased spending did not always translate into improved security. The main reason is weak planning capacity and anemic oversight institutions. Over-dependence on external funding sources can also undermine ownership and sustainability. There are additional, unseen costs associated with overreliance on foreign aid, including the creation of perverse incentives wherein officials intentionally oppress their populations in an effort to receive the maximum amount of aid.



Development policies have long viewed regional integration as an important strategy for both development and security. With the assistance of international donors – EU, UN, USAID, and International Financial Institutions – the sub-region is moving aggressively to promote efficiency and inclusion to sustain fast-growing countries, while offering new opportunities to poorer countries. Yet progress has been uneven.

### *Discussion Questions*

1. Evaluate current and future trends of scope, sources and envelope of revenues in your country and which sectors will be most affected in the process of budget allocation?
2. Do extractive industries (e.g. oil, natural gas, minerals, and gold) come with greater security challenges?
3. Surveys of citizens often report that peace and security are the most important service that the government can provide. Would it help to spend more? What would be the advantage to the security sector of getting more value (i.e. greater security) for the same expenditure?

### *Recommended Reading*

Collier, Paul. "Security Threats Facing Africa and its Capacity to Respond" PRISM Vol. 5, No. 2 (2015): 31-41. [http://cco.ndu.edu/Portals/96/Documents/prism/prism\\_5-2/PRISM5-2\\_Security\\_Threats.pdf](http://cco.ndu.edu/Portals/96/Documents/prism/prism_5-2/PRISM5-2_Security_Threats.pdf)

Le Roux, Len, "The defence sector and the defence budget: Minimizing Costs and Maximizing Benefits," ISS Africa, 2004. <https://issafrica.s3.amazonaws.com/site/uploads/CIVILLEROUX.PDF>

### *Additional Reading*

The Economist. "Arms and the African" (November 2014) <http://www.economist.com/news/middle-east-and-africa/21633901-continents-armies-are-going-spending-spree-arms-and-african>

### *Case Study*

A.1 (Nigeria); A.2 (South Africa)

## *Session 2: The Development-Security Nexus*

**Format:** Plenary Presentation

Discussion Session

### *Session Objectives:*

- Review the importance of rationally predicting, prioritizing and aligning resource availability with various national objectives
- Define and articulate the concept and objectives of national security policy in an African context, keeping in mind the interrelationships of peace and security with prosperity and development;
- Provide a theoretical foundation for the workshop.

### *Background*

African countries face new and increasingly complex threats to security. These threats may be internal, reflecting communal confrontations or political groups seeking to influence government action through violence. Security threats have also assumed a regional and transnational dimension, including economic crimes, illicit trafficking and violent extremism. Although countries may not be witnessing totally new forms of violence, a shift in the frequency of types of violence can have profound implications for the distribution of resources among different parts of the security sector.

A number of theories have been promulgated to describe the relationship between development and security. One of the most prominent is the “guns versus butter” model, which illustrates the zero-sum relationship between defense and civilian investment. The model suggests that, given a finite number of resources, states must sacrifice defense spending to fund non-military ventures, or vice-versa. Another longstanding argument in development and conflict theory has been that of “greed-versus-grievance:” “grievance” partisans argue conflicts stem from religious and ethnic grievances, while “greed” theorists believe wars are driven by unmet economic needs.

The demands for security are increasing at a time when economic and fiscal constraints continue to limit resources. Efforts to reform security sectors recognize that the core governmental forces – military, police, customs authorities, and others – will need to be reshaped to meet emerging challenges. Determining the appropriate mix of forces is only one step in the reform process. African governments also want each part of the security sector to become more efficient – to get greater security while limiting expenditures. Thus, creating effective methods to evaluate the effectiveness of the sector now include assessments of efficiency. And government forces now share the stage with non-state actors such as private security companies and local militia. Both

government forces and non-state actors face scrutiny from civil organizations determined to uphold human rights and the rule of law, underscoring the importance of the judiciary and skilled investigative and prosecutorial services. Oversight institutions will have well-defined roles, but must work comprehensively to guard against abuse and misuse of funds.

### *Discussion Questions*

1. What does an analysis of your national security sector budget reveal about the type of threats that your country is prepared to face? How would you adjust your budget to better prepare for emerging threats?
2. How do you determine the need for regional and continental security strategies?
3. How does a national security strategy (ways) pave the way for sound management of security resource (means)? And how does the maintenance of an optimal resource-security nexus help in achieving the national security and development objectives (ends)?

### *Recommended Readings*

World Development Report 2011. "Conflict, Security, and Development". World Bank.  
[http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTWDRS/Resources/WDR2011\\_Overview.pdf](http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTWDRS/Resources/WDR2011_Overview.pdf)

Keane, Rory and Thorodd Ommundsen, Money Matters: Addressing the Financial Sustainability of Security Sector Reform, Security Sector Reform Papers, DCAF, 2015, "Financial Sustainability in SSR Support", pp. 6-10 and "Lessons Learned for SSR Practitioners", pp. 19-25,  
<http://www.dcaf.ch/Publications/Money-Matters-Addressing-the-Financial-Sustainability-of-Security-Sector-Reform>

van Nieuwkerk, Anthoni and Hofmann, Katharina (ed.), Southern Africa Security Review 2013, "Chapter 7: Mozambique's economic transformation and its implications for human security."  
[http://www.fes-mozambique.org/media/pdf/publications/Southern\\_African\\_Security\\_Review.pdf](http://www.fes-mozambique.org/media/pdf/publications/Southern_African_Security_Review.pdf)

### *Additional Reading*

European Centre for Development Policy Management (ECDPM). "Peace and Security in Africa - The story of peacebuilding, conflict prevention and conflict monitoring in the African Peace and Security Architecture".  
<https://social.shorthand.com/ECDPM/nCJUna3ZNf/peace-and-security-in-africa>

### *Session 3: Budgeting and Procurement Processes and Practices*

**Format:** Plenary Presentation

Discussion Session

#### *Session Objectives:*

- Clarify ways in which budget and procurement processes translate the goals of the national security plan into prioritized and targeted expenditures;
- Analyze the key principles and practices of security resource management, including Public Financial Management (PFM) systems;
- Focus on transparency and accountability and identify procedures to improve communication of budget information among organizations within the security sector.

#### *Background*

Leadership is all about strategic choices, long-term planning and accountability. These three attributes are particularly relevant in the sphere of resource management in Southern Africa's security sector. Fiscal resources are scarce. Therefore, decisions on how to best allocate and efficiently utilize these resources in order to attain national security goals should be guided by the desire to promote the public good and not personal gain. The decisions should also demonstrate an awareness of how these resources would address the full range of human security challenges each country faces. Other issues to consider include secrecy, confidentiality, classification, and level of urgency.

#### *Budgeting*

Since independence, African countries have experimented with a wide range of approaches to budgeting. These have included: line budgeting, program budgeting, incremental budgeting, cash-based budgeting, accrual budgeting, zero-based budgeting, and the Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System (PPBS). While a lot of attention has been paid to analyzing the pros and cons of these systems for PFM in Africa, in general, relatively little attention has been paid to the identification of systems that best suit Africa's security sector.

The formulation and implementation of the security sector budget has far-reaching implications for the attainment of national security goals in Africa. At the macro level, defense planners need to determine how much of the government's budget should be devoted to the defense sector, and what impact such spending would have on the attainment of pre-determined security objectives, on the one hand, and macroeconomic stability, on the other. Research suggests that the allocation process is extremely important. Many African countries still have a backward-looking budget allocation system that incrementally replenishes line items on an annual basis. It is hardly

surprising that in many cases the allocations bear little relationship with existing security challenges. At the micro level, the emphasis is on ensuring the optimal use of scarce resources to achieve security goals. Many African countries are taking steps to improve public expenditure management, rationalize government procurement procedures, and strengthen oversight institutions. To this end, an integrated Public Financial Management Systems (PFM) can effectively guide the processes and tools of budgeting and procurement.

### *Procurement*

Procurement is an important aspect of resource management. In most cases, discrepancies between security sector budgets and actual expenditures are traceable to poorly executed procurement strategies. Defense procurement is frequently shielded from scrutiny in secret budgets and off-budget account, ostensibly because of their alleged sensitivity. Not surprisingly, it has been difficult to attain desired outcomes and budget estimates are regularly exceeded. Reasons advanced to explain this problem include: poor procurement and contracting practices; unclear roles and responsibilities at various stages of the procurement cycle; corrupt officials; and weak judicial institutions. Indeed, entrenched informal institutional practices and norms, including such as clientelism and graft, play a significant (and often deleterious) role in the procurement process. There are also challenges associated with military ownership of private and civilian ventures, including private security companies. Urgent action is needed to address these problems, which are by no means unique to the security sector.

Formally speaking, defense procurement involves four groups – the oversight bodies, government officials (uniformed and civilian) who issue the tenders, the bidders, and the national treasury. Current efforts to promote transparency and adherence to relevant legislation must be intensified. All branches of government and civil society (particularly NGOs and the media) have a crucial role to perform.

### *Discussion Questions*

1. How do you evaluate your organization's budget performance (process and execution)? What areas need further improvement?
2. What changes would you make in your procurement processes or practices to assure that your organization receives "value-for-money" in its purchases?
3. What are some of the principles underpinning sound budgeting practices? Should the security sector be exempted from internal/external audits, transparent procurement practices, or other standards that apply to non-security bodies? Why or why not?
4. What mechanisms are currently in place to ensure sufficient levels of transparency and accountability in your organization's budgeting process? Identify three areas where the process could be improved.

### *Recommended Reading*

Harborne, Barnard, Dorotinsky, William, and Bisca, Paul, ed. *Securing Development: Public Finance and the Security Sector*, The Work Bank Group, 2017.

Omitoogun, Wuyi and Hutchful, Eboe (ed.), *Budgeting for the Military Sector in Africa: The Processes and Mechanisms of Control*, Oxford University Press, 2006.

[http://books.sipri.org/product\\_info?c\\_product\\_id=229](http://books.sipri.org/product_info?c_product_id=229)

### *Additional Reading*

Justice Africa Draft Report, '[Defence Procurement, Corruption and Illicit Financial Flows](#),' February 2014.

<http://fletcher.tufts.edu/~media/Fletcher/Microsites/World%20Peace%20Foundation/Programs/Defence%20Procurement%20IFFs.pdf>

### *Case Study*

Budgeting: A.3 (Kenya); A.4 (Ethiopia)

Procurement: A.5 (Uganda); A.6 (Rwanda)

## **MODULE TWO: KEY ISSUES IN SECURITY SECTOR RESOURCE MANAGEMENT**

The **second** module challenges participants to develop appropriate, strategic-level responses to a variety of resource management challenges in this region. These include the role of various formal and informal oversight organizations and institutions in overseeing security sector budgeting and management processes (Plenary Session 4, *Oversight Organization and Institutions*). Plenary Session 5, *Measuring and Countering Corruption*, discusses the negative effects associated with corruption, and reviews methods to combat it.

## *Session 4: Oversight Organization and Institutions*

**Format:** Plenary Presentation

Discussion Session

### *Session Objectives:*

- Understand the role of civilian government—executive and legislative—at each stage of the process of managing security sector resources;
- Examine the role of checks and balances in security resource management and, more broadly, in the formulation of defense policy;
- Assess the capacity for effective oversight of existing institutions in the Southern African sub-region.

### *Background*

Generally, security sector resource management processes mirror those in other sectors of the economy (e.g. health, education, and other social services). Likewise, the budgeting process—how funds are used, and to what ends—should to be subjected to checks and balances and open to public scrutiny. There will always be an inherent tension between security and safety prerogatives; security sector practitioners must seek to strike a balance between the two.

There are number of institutions—both formal and informal—responsible for providing oversight of security sector resource management processes. These include:

- Parliament and parliamentary subcommittees
- Accountants General
- Auditors General
- Civil Society Groups
- Media
- Judiciary

These institutions and organizations play a crucial role in overseeing the planning, budgeting, and execution of security sector policy directives in Africa. Defense budgets in the region are frequently closed to public scrutiny, with few operational or financial controls exercised over defense expenditure. Unfortunately, this situation creates huge distortions in the areas of governance and public financial management. This also creates fertile conditions for corruption, mismanagement and waste of resources. These can further exacerbated existing gaps between security outputs and national strategy and security policy. Alternatively, corruption may arise as a means for society to circumvent a flawed legal environment. Efforts aimed at progressively



correcting those distortions would necessarily need to focus mainly on the area of trust building. Reconciling the two bodies could provide a solid base for “openness” and further collaboration.

### *Discussion Questions*

1. In your country, what are the key functions of the executive and the legislative branches of government related to the military and other parts of the security sector? How is the relationship between the leaders of parliament/executive and leaders in the military and security sectors?
2. What institutions of the legislature and/or the executive branch are directly responsible for fulfilling these functions? Are responsibilities within and between institutions well defined?
3. Does your country have national defense or security policy? If so, is it openly debated in your country’s legislature/parliament?
4. What mechanisms should be made available to parliamentarians to facilitate scrutiny/oversight of defense matters? Does the defense/security sector follow the same principles and processes of resource management as non-security sectors?
5. What are the benefits/drawbacks of a parliamentary system in terms of reducing corruption in defense or security sector?

### *Recommended Reading*

Transparency International, UK. Executive Summary in “Watchdogs? The quality of legislative oversight of defense in 82 countries”. UK: Transparency International Defence and Security Program, September 2013, 5-13.

[http://transint.xred.cz/doc/130905\\_exec\\_summary\\_Watchdogs\\_low\\_v5\\_embargo.pdf](http://transint.xred.cz/doc/130905_exec_summary_Watchdogs_low_v5_embargo.pdf)

Masson, Nicholas, Lena Andersson and Mohammed Salah Aldin. “Guidebook: Strengthening Financial Oversight in the Security Sector” Toolkit – Legislating for the Security Sector, Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces, 2012.

<http://www.dcaf.ch/Publications/Guidebook-Strengthening-Financial-Oversight-in-the-Security-Sector>

### *Additional Reading*

“African Legislative Effectiveness,” The North-South Institute, 2013.

<http://www.nsi-ins.ca/wp-content/uploads/2013/10/2013-African-Legislative-Effectiveness1.pdf>

## *Case study*

A.7 (Tanzania); A.8 (South Africa)

## *Session 5: Measuring and Countering Corruption*

**Format:** Plenary Presentation

Discussion Session

### *Session Objectives:*

- Analyze the ways corruption contributes directly and indirectly to insecurity;
- Recognize the role of national and international organizations designed to counter economic crimes;
- Discuss the challenges associated with measuring corruption

## *Background*

The defense and security sectors on the continent have long been undermined by corruption. Certain procurement initiatives and defense policy directives are, necessarily, shrouded in secrecy, further increasing the sector's vulnerability to corruption. There are a number of costs associated with corruption, not least of which is the increased financial burden incurred by the state when funds are lost to graft. Other negative effects are less easy to quantify: lower levels of operational effectiveness; increased scarcity; and lower levels of morale and public trust. More broadly, there is evidence that corruption feeds insecurity and can exacerbate state fragility.

Measuring Corruption: Transparency International's Defense Anti-Corruption Index assigns scores to each country based on five risk areas: 1. Political; 2. Financial; 3. Personnel; 4. Operational; and 5. Procurement. The TI report illustrates the challenges Africa faces in combatting corruption: scores across the continent ranging from D ("high risks") to F ("critical risks"). Low scores were attributed to governments' failures in redressing institutionalized corruption, especially corruption pervading defense sectors. TI concluded that in Africa, "corrupt governments are the architects of their own security crises", noting that corruption acts as a "push" factor that fuels insecurity. The institutions necessary to overcome corruption—both formal and informal—take time to build. Many states must overcome deeply entrenched autocratic structures, including large patronage networks that favor certain ethnic groups or regions.

Several common themes have emerged across the region:

- Institutional capacity to manage the additional resources is often lacking. In many cases, oversight functions exist in the form of anti-corruption bodies, audit functions, and/or

parliamentary committees, but security institutions are either exempt from scrutiny or lack the mechanisms to enforce findings.

- Increases in security spending are not necessarily enhancing security. Too often procurement decisions are taken with little reference to strategic requirements; military effectiveness is eroded by poor controls on personnel, while forces are sometimes repurposed for commercial ends.
- Corruption undermines public trust in governments and their security apparatus, and poses a major threat to operational effectiveness.
- International arms dealers are profiting from conflict and insecurity.

### *Discussion Questions*

1. How does your country rank in the Transparency International Corruption Perceptions Index? Is its placement accurate? How does your country react to the publication of the corruption perception index of your country and does it help in reducing the corrupt practices in your country?
2. Discuss the effects of defense corruption on state institutions. How does corruption undermine national security objectives?
3. What oversight institution in your country identifies corruption? Is it effective in preventing and punishing corruption? If not, why not?
4. What has been the role of local civil society in measuring and countering corruption in your country?

### *Recommended Reading*

Abbas, Tehima. "Defence Procurement – understanding, identifying and addressing corruption risks" in Public Procurement in 33 Jurisdictions Worldwide, Getting the Deal Through, 2014, [http://s173807.gridserver.com/publications/dsp-pubs/285-chapter\\_defproc\\_publicproc.html](http://s173807.gridserver.com/publications/dsp-pubs/285-chapter_defproc_publicproc.html)

"Regional Results: Africa," TI UK: Government Defence anti-Corruption Index <http://government.defenceindex.org/downloads/docs/GI-Africa-results-web.pdf>

Gerring, John and Thacker, Strom, "Political Institutions and Corruption: The Role of Unitarism and Parliamentarism," Cambridge University Press, 2004. [https://www.hks.harvard.edu/fs/pnorris/Acrobat/stm103%20articles/Gerring\\_Thacker\\_Institutions\\_Corruption.pdf](https://www.hks.harvard.edu/fs/pnorris/Acrobat/stm103%20articles/Gerring_Thacker_Institutions_Corruption.pdf)

### *Additional Reading*

Transparency International UK. "Corruption Threats & International Missions: Practical" [Africa Center for Strategic Studies](#)

Guidance for Leaders” Transparency International UK Defence and Security Programme, September 2014, <http://ti-defence.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/03/140930-Corruption-Threats-International-Missions.pdf>

### ***MODULE THREE: TOWARDS EFFECTIVE AND SUSTAINABLE STRATEGIES***

The **third** module focuses on strategy development. Plenary Session 6 “*Alignment of Resource and Security Strategies*” discusses how to apply principles and lessons from the previous sessions towards the design effective resource management strategies that are consistent with national security goals. Plenary Session 7 “*Leveraging External Resources*” acknowledges the importance of mutually-beneficial partnerships in Southern Africa’s security sector and explores modalities that would improve coordination and complementarity.

## *Session 6: Alignment of Resource and Security Strategies*

**Format:** Plenary Presentation

Discussion Session

### *Session Objectives:*

- Analyze links between the prudent management of security sector spending and sustainable human security;
- Explore mechanisms that create, sustain and institutionalize effective resource management for successful national and regional security strategies in Southern Africa.

### *Background*

A national security strategy is nothing more than a rational way in which society mobilizes all of its assets and resources to protect its interests. A good strategy is even more useful to resource-weak and fragile countries. Strategy gives societies the means to shape the future, rather than simply reacting to it. National security is more than just military security, of course, and the “shaping” process is directed at a range of issues and conditions that a society should influence.

The components of any strategy are: “ends,” “ways” and “means.” In other words, a strategy must contain ultimate objectives (ends), resources to be used in achieving the objective (means) and a course of action that specifies how the resources will be used to accomplish the ends (ways). A good strategy, by definition, will display some balance between ends, ways, and means. A simple way to test the relevance and balance of a strategy is to ask three questions: Is the strategy appropriate to the problem (ends)? Is it feasible (ways)? Is it supportable (means)?

Quite often, Africa’s security sector professionals do not focus sufficiently on resource management in national security discussions. Instead, security planning is often guided by two faulty assumptions. On the one extreme, some security planners and professionals believe that the strategy should determine resources, and that the officials at the finance ministry should find the resources to implement the required plan. On the other extreme, others believe that the plan should be tailored to fit available resources (both national and donor resources). Neither approach is correct or helpful. Resource management is an integral part of security strategy and must be viewed as part of a generic whole.

Understanding the importance of effective resource management in the attainment of national security goals within a democratic context will be essential in meeting future African security

challenges. Optimal modalities for resource allocation and utilization must occupy the minds of Africa's security professionals who are charged with the responsibility of developing strategies. It is, therefore, essential for them to have a firm grasp of the fundamentals necessary to finance and implement national security strategies.

### *Discussion Questions*

1. Why is a national security strategy a necessary component of the security resource management process? How does a NSS facilitate optimal alignment of resources and security challenges?
2. Does your country/organization have a national security strategy? If not, how does it align its limited resources to address the rising security threats facing your country/region?
3. What practical steps have been taken by African governments and regional institutions (like the African Union) to overcome resource management challenges in the security sector?
4. How can Southern African countries align long-range security goals and near-term budgeting realities?

### *Recommended Reading*

Kennedy, Robert. "Chapter 2: The Elements of Strategic Thinking: A Practical Guide" Teaching Strategy: Challenges and Responses (2010: Strategic Studies Institute of the US Army War College Carlisle, United States). [http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/ssi/teaching\\_strategy.pdf](http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/ssi/teaching_strategy.pdf)

### *Additional Reading*

Willett, Susan. "Development and Security in Africa: A Challenge for the New Millennium" <https://www.issafrica.org/uploads/ACHIEVINGWILLETT.PDF>

## *Session 7: Leveraging External Resources*

**Format:** Plenary Presentation

Discussion Session

### *Session Objectives:*

- Identify and evaluate external sources of security sector assistance available to Southern African states, including the merits and demerits of security sector assistance;
- Critically examine the role of strategic partnerships (with bilateral, multilateral and commercial partners) in enhancing resource management in Southern Africa's security sector;
- Emphasize the centrality of coordinated external support.

### *Background*

External security assistance often represent a crucial source of revenue, since most African countries require some level of financial and technical support to sustain their security sectors. However, it is important that countries effectively leverage external assistance towards meeting their strategic objectives. Otherwise, external priorities can overshadow the strategic interests of recipient nations, and lead to the inefficient allocation of security aid.

The 2012 *U.S. Strategy Toward Sub-Saharan Africa* outlines four strategic objectives, namely:

- strengthening democratic institutions;
- spurring economic growth, trade, and investment;
- advancing peace and security;
- promoting opportunity and development.

Underlying these four U.S. objectives is a continued insistence that the U.S.-Africa relationship be one based on partnership and African ownership and responsibility. *Note: the new administration, which assumed office in January 2017, has yet to articulate an overarching Africa policy. Some strategic initiatives outlined below are therefore subject to change.*

Current U.S. security engagement in sub-Saharan Africa include:

- **Africa Contingency Operations Training and Assistance Program (ACOTA):** ACOTA provides equipment and trains African officers to provide training to other military personnel (i.e. "train the trainer"). ACOTA also focuses on improving African militaries' capacities in human rights, management, and civil-military relations. [ACOTA is the Africa-focused component of the Global Peace Operations Initiative (GPOI)].



- **Security Governance Initiative (SGI):** SGI is a new presidential initiative that was launched during the 2014 U.S. – Africa Leaders Summit. SGI is a joint endeavor between the U.S. and six African countries (Ghana, Kenya, Mali, Niger, Nigeria, and Tunisia) to improve security governance capacity. SGI will focus on civilian and military security institutions and the ministerial functions that provide state oversight of the security sector. SGI is housed at the Department of State and operates with support from Department of Defense, the United States Agency for International Development, the Department of Justice, and the Department of Homeland Security.<sup>1</sup>
- **African Peacekeeping Rapid Response Partnership (APRRP, “A-Prep” for short):** APRRP, also launched during the 2014 U.S. – Africa Leaders Summit, is a \$110 million per year investment to train African peacekeeping forces for rapid deployment and response to emerging conflict. APRRP will work with an initial group of six countries: Senegal, Ghana, Ethiopia, Rwanda, Tanzania, and Uganda.<sup>2</sup>

### *Other Partners*

The European Union is also a major player on the continent. At the strategic level, there are now Africa-EU dialogues. At the operational level, some policies that were once bilateral, such as France’s peacekeeping training program (RECOMP), are now under the EU umbrella (EURORECOMP). The European Union has given more than €1.2 billion to the African Peace Facility to support African peace operations and has also launched its own peacekeeping missions on the continent.

A defining feature of Africa’s contemporary security environment is the ever-growing interest and presence of emerging powers such as China, India, Russia, Brazil, Vietnam, South Korea, and Turkey. To varying degrees, all of these countries have taken an increased interest in Africa as a destination for business and a place to procure vital natural resources. These countries are also cultivating ties with African countries to enhance their diplomatic standing and influence in multilateral institutions such as the United Nations. African leaders have largely welcomed the engagement of emerging powers because of the tangible economic benefits these relationships bring. In addition, these emerging powers offer a new partnership model, one that is based on non-interference in internal affairs.

### *Mitigating the Risks of External Assistance*

While external security assistance can provide opportunities for growth, it also holds the potential to drive and prolong conflict if harnessed irresponsibly. In some cases, outside support can exacerbate rather than mitigate these weaknesses, hindering a state’s security sector. External flows can disproportionately empower security forces, shifting the balance of power away from

<sup>1</sup> See: <http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2014/08/06/fact-sheet-security-governance-initiative>

<sup>2</sup> See: <http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2014/08/06/fact-sheet-us-support-peacekeeping-africa>

civilian oversight mechanisms. A “moral hazard” can also develop, as an over-reliance on aid disincentives sustainable security budgeting or procurement processes. Additional issues may surface when the interests of donors and their recipients are not properly aligned. Through their assistance programs, actors risk equipping regimes that use their resources to fuel conflict, or otherwise transfer assistance to dangerous actors. In fragile states, where civilian oversight mechanisms and national strategic planning is weakest, there is an especially high risk of destabilization through security assistance.

The risks associated with external assistance underscore the important role that national security planning occupies within the security sector. Ultimately, ensuring the responsible implementation of external assistance should be a two-way street. To this end, African states should seek to cultivate security partners, rather than patrons.

### *Discussion Questions*

1. Do you think external security assistance is a “blessing” or a “curse”? Has external assistance helped in reducing and combating the security threats facing your country/region?
2. How significant is external assistance and particularly external security assistance in your country/region? How might your country adjust to increases or decreases in security assistance flows?
3. How can your country make use of external assistance to help in achieving your national priorities instead of pursuing exclusively the national security interests of the donors?
4. How well are Southern African countries managing partnerships with traditional and emerging economic powers?
5. What strategies should African countries, RECs, and the AU employ to ensure that African interests are considered on a level basis with those of external actors?
6. How can African countries/institutions best coordinate external assistance?

### *Recommended Readings*

Watts, Steve. “Identifying and Mitigating Risks in Security Sector Assistance for Africa's Fragile States”. Rand Corporation 2015. [http://www.rand.org/pubs/research\\_reports/RR808.html](http://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR808.html)

### *Additional Reading*

Hampton, Daniel. “Creating Sustainable Peacekeeping Capability in Africa”. Africa Center for Strategic Studies, 2014 <http://africacenter.org/publication/creating-sustainable-peacekeeping-capability-in-africa/>

Sköns, Elisabeth, and Ismail, Olawale, *Security Activities of External Actors in Africa*, “Introduction” <https://www.sipri.org/sites/default/files/files/books/SIPRI2014IsSk01.pdf>

## INTRODUCTION TO THE SIMULATION EXERCISE

The simulation exercise, based on the fictitious state of Nicolesia, is designed to give participants an opportunity to apply what they have read, learned and discussed during the program to address specific resource management challenges. The simulation exercise will be realistic, plausible, complex, multi-faceted and adaptable, allowing for multiple possible outcomes. It is not directed toward an intended or preferred solution. Moreover, it is not based on any specific region or country. Each of the four discussion groups will constitute a task force that will operate independently and respond to identical inputs and catalysts. Participants will not be assigned roles or identities on their specific teams. This is done to ensure the simulation is applicable in a wide variety of circumstances, and to an even wider variety of participants. It also ensures that participants contribute freely without being constrained by a specific role or subject matter. If teams lack any experience or knowledge in an essential area, facilitators may need to engage to ensure critical issues are discussed.

Participants will receive all relevant documentation on Wednesday 21<sup>st</sup> June 2017. The background section provides an overview of the history and current situation in the fictional country of Nicolesia. This includes: governance, politics, political economy, natural resources, domestic security, regional affiliations and external partners. The exercise will unfold in two moves. Move I sets the stage for the simulation by establishing the framework and introducing participants to the simulation environment. It raises issues related to: corruption, the political use of security forces/funds, inadequate transparency, and the misalignment of resources and national interests. Move II introduces a newly-identified regional security threat with both external and domestic components. Participants are tasked to: evaluate the nature of the newly identified threat, determine what resources are necessary to respond effectively, and identify which resources will be utilized and at what opportunity cost.

Guiding Principles for a successful simulation follow: (1) there is no 'right' answer. Participants will chart their own course to their own conclusion. (2) The learning is in the process, not the results. We are more concerned with *how* the participants reach conclusions, rather than what those conclusions are. (3) Less is more. Be as focused and concise as possible. (4) Have fun - it is a simulation, we should all enjoy the process.

## Annex: Selected Case Studies

### A.1 Strategic Planning Case Study: Nigeria

During the 1980s, several Nigerian leaders knew that the country needed to be preparing for low-intensity conflict within and around its borders. The government also wanted to assume a greater role in African peacekeeping missions. These types of conflicts primarily require light, mobile infantry. However, the Nigerian military spent heavily to acquire two hundred tanks, several MiG fighter jets, and surface-to-air missiles. None of Nigeria's neighbors at the time possessed any significant mechanized infantry or air capabilities, raising questions about the wisdom of such acquisitions versus a more strategic use of state resources. Too little money was budgeted for troop training programs and essential replacement materials, even to support the new heavy weapons. A 1992 study found that "training, mobility, maintenance, and logistics support were either grossly inadequate or in some cases virtually non-existent," rendering the expensive equipment essentially useless for combat.<sup>3</sup>

The lack of coordination between security objectives, military operations, and budgeting meant that the security sector was ill equipped to meet the challenges of the next decade. Despite spending large amounts of money, it particularly lacked the means to maintain security in the oil-rich Niger Delta - where armed groups routinely engaged in low-intensity conflict - and to face the threats posed by Boko Haram.

### A.2 Strategic Planning Case Study: South Africa's strategic vision

Over the last decade, South Africa's security force was falling short of meeting national aspirations to be a major player in peace and security across the continent. The Ministry of Defense began a comprehensive review process in 2011 and, in April 2014, published a 400-page strategic plan on how to reinvigorate and restructure the National Defense Force. The review identifies four primary goals for the coming decade: defending national interests, safeguarding borders and infrastructure, promoting peace and security in Africa, and executing more development-oriented tasks such as disaster relief and search and rescue capabilities.

Contrary to the previous defense review in 1998, the new vision defines "expected capability levels" in various tasks, and then works with the budgeting process to prevent operational shortcomings, which have impeded past military campaigns. The report also calls for five-year evaluations to ensure the process remains flexible and is aligned with current realities. If the strategy is successful, it will reverse the perceived decline of the security sector, and enable South Africa to be a major actor in regional and continental peacekeeping.<sup>4</sup>

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<sup>3</sup> Howe, Herbert. *Ambiguous Order: Military Forces in African States*. Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2001. 41-42.

<sup>4</sup> <http://www.issafrica.org/iss-today/a-new-plan-to-halt-the-downward-spiral-of-the-sa-defence-force>

### **A.3 Budgeting Case Study: Kenya**

Prior to 2010 there had been numerous voices within Kenya calling for a new Constitution to replace the 1969 Constitution. After the Constitution was brokered with the help of the African Union and former United Nations Secretary General Kofi Annan, the Public Finance Management Act of 2012, which outlines the procedures and processes for budget making in the country, was also passed. One of the major concepts within the new Kenyan budgetary process is the devolution of numerous functions and revenues. A devolving budget is one where a great number of policymakers are working with people on the ground, in hopes that this will lead to a more efficient use of public resources. Implementing devolution processes can be complex, as it requires governance overhaul at both the national and local levels. Typically, countries that undergo devolution processes are prone to corruption (i.e. Nigeria, Indonesia) and Kenya has been no different.

In May 2014, Embu Governor Martin Wambora was impeached by the Senate and removed from office over allegations of mismanagement and corruption.<sup>5</sup> Since then, Kenyan officials have taken steps to limit corruption including limiting publicly-funded overseas trips and travel by local officials as well as implementing new state-wide audits of hiring and wages.<sup>6</sup>

The devolution process will take time but ultimately giving local communities' greater control of policy making and budgeting could boost the effectiveness of resource allocation.

### **A.4 Budgeting Case Study: Ethiopia**

Ethiopia had a dual budgeting system until 2001 when the Ministry of Finance and end Economic Development (MOFED) was formed to handle all budgeting matters. The budgeting process for the Ministry of National Defense (MOND) is similar to other ministries. The budget department within the MOND conducts its own review and analysis of the budget before submitting it to the Foreign, Security and Defense Standing Committee of the House of Peoples' Representatives. After this committee approves the budget, it is sent to the rest of the House of Peoples' Representatives before being approved by the MOFED. Reporting and auditing is the legal responsibility of the Federal Auditor-General. From an administrative perspective there are mechanisms in place to ensure the salaries of workers as well as the procurement of materials and supplies. However, there are few mechanisms in place to ensure efficient and cost-effective use of resources.<sup>7</sup> The role of the House of Peoples' Representatives in the budgetary process is minimal, even though the Constitution grants the legislature considerable power. Although there is a standing committee for the budget, which is expected to study budget proposals in detail and submit its recommendations to the House, committee members lack the expertise to scrutinize the military budget properly and they do not have the services of experts at hand. Moreover, the budget

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<sup>5</sup> <http://allafrica.com/stories/201502130095.html>

<sup>6</sup> <http://www.oxfordbusinessgroup.com/news/kenya-devolution-still-evolving>

<sup>7</sup> <http://books.sipri.org/files/books/SIPRI06OmHu/SIPRI06OmHu03.pdf>

estimates are scrutinized as a whole, rather than by sector. Extra- or off-budget spending for the military is often not disclosed by the state or the military sector.

### **A.5 Procurement Case Study: Ugandan Jets**

Civilian oversight is essential for good procurement practice. Even for classified transactions, parliaments should have a committee that reviews and approves all procurement decisions by the executive branch. In 2011, the Bank of Uganda authorized a request to withdraw \$740 million for the procurement of six fighter jets and related military equipment, allegedly at the behest of the President. Normally, the Public Accounts Committee of parliament must approve such purchases in Uganda beforehand, but in this case Defense officials only sought their approval retroactively, after news of the purchase reached the press. By that point, over half of the money had been spent, and parliament could offer little more than a rubber stamp to regularize the deal. Worse, analysts suggest that Uganda withdrew more than double the amount that the jets should cost, raising questions about what happened to the rest of the money.<sup>8</sup>

The failure of the government to follow established procurement and oversight procedures has resulted in gross mismanagement of public funds, and the lack of a serious response from the public or other branches of government has further embedded a culture of impunity and corruption among the country's political elite.

### **A.6 Procurement Case Study: Rwanda Panel**

One way to increase fairness and reduce the corruptibility of the process is to allow companies to complain about perceived malpractice in procurement. Rwanda established an Independent Panel Review on Public Procurement in 2007 to hear appeals from companies against procurement decisions. The board occasionally receives cases from bidding contractors who feel that they lost a tender due to unfair practices or preferences by either the government or a competing firm.<sup>9</sup> The appeals are published whenever they do not conflict with sensitive national security information. Regardless of the outcome of an appeal, it is vital that those companies do not face future discrimination. As an additional measure, any company found guilty of corruption during the procurement process is barred from making future bids with the Rwandan government.<sup>10</sup>

Although there is room for improvement in Rwanda, establishing an appeals board and taking such cases seriously is an important practice for attracting international investment and partnership. Such

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<sup>8</sup> <http://www.theeastafrikan.co.ke/news/+740m+fighter+jets+scam+sneaks+under+the+radar+/-/2558/1137840/-/3kw0g3z/-/index.html>

<sup>9</sup>In recognition of their reforms, Rwanda was selected for a pilot program allowing countries to use their own system for some World Bank projects: <http://www.tirwanda.org/the-procurement-assessment-system-in-rwanda>

<sup>10</sup> <http://www.unpcdc.org/media/9968/rwana%202.pdf>

mechanisms have increased the perceived legitimacy of government deals, and assured companies that the country is a low-risk environment for investment.

### **A.7 Oversight Case Study: Tanzania Defense and Security Committee**

Defense issues in Tanzania are handled exclusively by the National Defense and Security Council, which is comprised of the President, his appointed ministers responsible for security, and heads of various defense and security bodies. The Constitution calls for parliament to create a Defense and Security Committee, but in practice its power is very weak compared to the President's Security Council. The Committee has repeatedly failed to offer meaningful oversight or demonstrate influence over security policy decisions. This oversight failure is partly because the Committee is stacked with a strong majority of the President's own party members. Also, detailed information on strategic and operational matters, as well as defense budget figures, are closely guarded secrets among the President's inner circle, and often are not shared with members of the committee.<sup>11</sup> Without access to information, the Committee is unable to engage in analysis and perform its constitutional duty.

Simply having an oversight committee is meaningless if it is not respected as an alternative voice to presidential power. The executive monopoly on the defense policy process and the withholding of critical information from Tanzania's legislative committee has created an environment ripe for unaccountable decision-making and corruption.

### **A.8 Oversight Case Study: South Africa Legislative Review**

Parliamentary oversight is critical for accountable governance. A responsible legislature will routinely engage in national debates to set the goals and direction of defense policy, and the records should be publicly available. Citizens should count on an independent legislature to scrutinize defense policy and defense officials. To effectively do so, legislative committees should be established that focus on defense.

South Africa's parliament has established the Portfolio Committee on Defense to independently research and oversee defense policy.<sup>12</sup> Although there are concerns about its independence from the influence of the executive branch and the ruling ANC party, having such a committee that is independent from the military or executive sphere is important for shaping policy and maintaining accountability. The committee makes recommendations to the parliament regarding the military budget, organization, and preparedness, so that the parliament can better engage in military policy debates and hold the defense sector accountable for its responsibilities.

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<sup>11</sup> <http://government.defenceindex.org/sites/default/files/documents/GI-assessment-Tanzania.pdf>

<sup>12</sup> <http://government.defenceindex.org/sites/default/files/documents/GI-assessment-South-Africa.pdf>

## A.9 Resources Management for Peace Support Operations Case Study

Uganda continues to be a leader in regional contributions to African Union (AU) peacekeeping missions and has made rising contributions to AU Peacekeeping missions since 2005.<sup>13</sup> Uganda shows a strong preference for African Union missions over United Nations missions. The security rationale for such contributions is to curb Islamic fundamentalism in the Horn of Africa and the Sahel, limit the threat posed by the Lord's Resistance Army, prevent a proliferation of small arms and light weapons in the region, as well as to manage the increasing number of refugees from other regional conflicts. There are benefits as these missions can enhance the professionalization of the military and police force. In addition, troops are paid roughly \$800 a month, typically with funding drawn from foreign donors.<sup>14</sup> However, there could be hidden costs associated with training the bulk military personnel for peacekeeping missions if peacekeeping-related security issues fail to materialize.

Uganda is taking a lead role in addressing regional security concerns. But increased military spending and using military resources specifically for peacekeeping missions means these resources are not being used elsewhere or may leave the country susceptible to other security issues.

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<sup>13</sup> <http://www.providingforpeacekeeping.org/2014/04/03/country-profile-uganda/>

<sup>14</sup> <http://www.cfr.org/peacekeeping/peace-operations-africa/p9333>