Africa's External Security Partners

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Outline

1. **Trajectory of external assistance and its impact in Africa**

2. **The core external security partners and their leverage**

3. **The Challenges in managing external security assistance**

4. **The case of South Sudan**

5. **Key Takeaway**

AFRICA CENTER
FOR STRATEGIC STUDIES

# 1. Trend in Development and Security Assistance Flow to Africa

Almost 100% of DoD Aid is for Counterterrorism

DoD Assistance 2013-2016

- Counterterrorism (97.79%)
- Counternarcotics (1.52%)
- Leadership Training (0.69%)

**DoD Aid will Significantly Surpass State Aid in 2016**

- Department of State Programs
- Department of Defense Programs

1. External assistance and its impact in Africa

Gross Domestic Product Per Capita
Constant 2005 US$, Weighted by Population

1. External assistance and its impact in Africa

Escaping State Capacity Trap, 1996 - 2013			
State Capacity	**Pace of Growth**		**Total**
	Negative Growth	**Positive Growth**	
Strong	3	5	8 (8%)
Middle	31 **(Time to High Capacity: 8 before the end of century and 4 will take more than 50yrs)**	14	45 (44%)
Weak	36 **(Time to High Capacity: Forever)**	13 **(Time to High Capacity: only 3 in <90yrs)**	49 (48%)
Total	70 (69%)	32 (31%)	102

Source: Andrews, M., Pritchett, L. and Woolcock, M. (ed). 2017. *Building State Capacity: Evidence, Analysis, Action*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

# Militarization of US Foreign Policy to Africa in the Post-9/11

- **Pillars of US Foreign Policy**: Promotion of human rights, democracy, international justice, rule of law, and free trade through liberal policies.

- **Shifts in US engagement in Africa** in accordance with shifts in its strategic interests

- **Trajectory of US Engagements in Africa**:

✓ **The Cold War**: Anti-communists, militarization of some clients and $1.5 billion worth of weaponry to its top arms clients (195-1989).

✓ **The Post-Cold War**: Africa became low priority and at the periphery of US Foreign Policy, African Crisis Response Initiative (ACRI) to gather military intelligence to advance its interests in Africa and promotion of liberal ends.

✓ **The Post-9/11**: Africa gained primacy due to terrorism, creeping and primacy of militarization of foreign policy at the expense of liberal ends, **AFRICOM** to support African civilian efforts to counter terrorism but it turned to do it directly with focus on American interests and excludes state capacity building and socio-economic development and received African unified and opposition, the share of Pentagon in official aid increased from 3% to 22% and that of USAID declined from 65% to 40%. However, Knopf (2012) indicated security assistance remains the same (1/36th or about 2.7% of non-security related assistance)

Source: Knopf, 2012 and Nsia-Pepra, 2014

The Shift to Security Interests in Africa

China's current peacekeeping deployments

UN peacekeeping operations	Experts	Contingent	Individual police	Police units	Total
Côte d'Ivoire (UNOCI)	6	-	-	-	6
Cyprus (UNFICYP)	-	-	6	-	6
Darfur (UNAMID)	-	234	-	-	234
DR Congo (MONUSCO)	13	221	-	-	234
Lebanon (UNIFIL)	-	418	-	-	418
Liberia (UNMIL)	2	512	12	140	666
Mali (MINUSMA)	-	402	-	-	402
Middle East (UNTSO)	4	-	-	-	4
South Sudan (UNMISS)	3	1,051	13	-	1,067
Western Sahara (MINURSO)	7	-	-	-	7
Total	**35**	**2,838**	**31**	**140**	**3,044**

CHINA'S PRESENCE IN AFRICA

- UN peacekeeping mission without Chinese personnel
- 0-100 troops
- 100-500 troops
- 500-1,000 troops
- Over 1,000 troops
- Combat troops
- Naval base
- Anti-piracy operation
- Major arms transfers
- Conducted evacuations
- Aid to African-led operation
- PLA conducted medical assistance
- Rumoured Chinese future bases

500 Km

China's troop contribution to UN peacekeeping by year

129, 123, 358, 1,036, 1,059, 1,666, 1,824, 2,146, 2,136, 2,039, 1,924, 2,078, 1,869, 2,181, 3,045, 3,044

Source: Duchatel et al, 2016

What Drives the Increased Chinese Military Presence in Africa?

The Chinese Blue-Helmet Deployment Trend in Africa

- **1992:** First Vote at UNSC in favor of a Chapter VII peacekeeping operation in Somalia
- **2012:** First deployment of an infantry platoon in South Sudan.
- **2013:** First deployment of an infantry company in Mali.
- **2015:** First deployment of an infantry battalion in South Sudan.

The Strategic Reasons for Increased Chinese Blue-Helmet Deployment in Africa

1. **US Pentagon Perspective:** Improving its international image, obtaining operational international experience for its national army, and gathering security intelligence, 2. **Chinese Perspective:** securing an environment conducive to economic growth, consolidating its international image as a "responsible developing great power", and deepening the "democratization of international relations" and consolidating "south-south cooperation". 3. **Others:** One China Policy, competition with Japan, its interest in contributing to international peace and security, new commitments to protect its interests overseas, new non-interference and no-war activities with Africa as a key theatre.

| What are lessons to learn from development?			
Development*		**Security**	
Poverty of Development Strategies	1. Lack of coherent development policies	**Poverty of Security Strategies**	1. Lack of coherent security strategies, only six African countries have National Security Strategy
	2. Lack of capacity for strategic thinking to consolidate recent gains and harness future megatrends		**2. Lack of critical thinking in security sector**
Manifestations:	1. Economic Advisors becoming Policymakers that restrained "development ambition" and "strategic space"	**Manifestation:**	1. Security Advisors becoming Security Policymakers that restrained "strategic space and security ambition"
	2. Policies focused on poverty reduction have been mistaken for national development policies.		**2. Policies focused on security sector reforms that have been mistaken for national security strategies.**
	3. Free trade and globalization made Africa to focus less on science, technology and innovation as drivers of development in the West and East.		3. Free trade and globalization made security sector not to focus on science, innovation and technology.
	4. Africa is seen as a country leading to dubious one-size-fits-all prescriptions.		**4. Africa is seen as a country leading to dubious one-size-fits-all prescriptions**

Leveraging External Assistance
The Case of South Sudan

Source: Davies et al (ODI), 2011, GoSS, 2011 (www.goss.org)

Leveraging External Assistance
The Case of South Sudan EU Joint Programming

Donor Projections in Gov. Budget, 2007-2010

Legend: 2008, 2009, 2010

EU Joint Programming for South Sudan (EU Millions), 2011-2014

Source: Davies et al (ODI), 2011, German Development Institute Institute (GIE), 2015

Leveraging External Assistance
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## South Sudan's Aid Strategy and National Ownership, 2005-2010

Principles	Targets	Level of Progress
Alignment	• Aid to be aligned with the government six development priorities (security, rule of law, education, health, water and food security)	• Government was having limited influence over aid allocation decisions made in donors capitals • Donors working directly with NGOs to implement projects
Coordination	• Donors participate in budget preparation and implementation and aid coordination mechanisms	• Largely achieved with donors participating budget management and various aid coordination mechanisms as well as sharing information.
Harmonization	• Donors projects and programs to be harmonized.	• Widespread projects proliferation and fragmentation. • Continued use of NGOs to deliver services
Predictability	• Donors to provide their spending forecasts over a multi-year period.	• Donors continued to plan in annual cycle.
Mutual Accountability	• Donors and government to be mutually accountable to each other's through joint projects appraisal, sharing of information and reporting.	• Donors were unable to provide timely data on their actual expenditure. • Absence of mutual results-based reporting and analysis of aid portfolio except for individual projects
Institutional Development	• Aid to enhance government capacity.	• Aid did not use government systems with limited scope to enhance institutional capacity

Source: Davies et al (ODI), 2011

CONFLICT AND FAMINE IN SOUTH SUDAN

OCTOBER 2013

IPC V2.0 Acute Food Insecurity Phase
1: None or Minimal
2: Stressed
3: Crisis
4: Emergency
5: Catastrophe/Famine
! Would likely be worse without current or programmed humanitarian assistance

FEBRUARY-MAY 2017, PROJECTED

IPC V2.0 Acute Food Insecurity Phase
1: Minimal
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5: Famine
! Would likely be at least one phase worse without current or programmed humanitarian assistance

Source: FEWS NET

Key Takeaway

- National Vision and National Ownership
- National Security Strategy and Coordination of External Security Assistance.
- What Africa needs is less of more external assistance but a better management of its resources; particularly in security sector

$162 billion IN

$41 BILLION extracted each year

$203 billion OUT

Source: Independent, May 2017 and Honest Accounts Report, 2017

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