Regional Security Mechanisms in Africa

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ACSS, June 6, 2017
1. APSA started in 2002 but still unfinished.
2. Rising number of peace operations in Africa.
3. Record numbers of peacekeepers in Africa c.113,000 (UN + others), inc. +11,000 police.
4. “Partnership peacekeeping” is now the norm.
6. AU still divided on some key issues.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Mission</th>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Duration</th>
<th>Size (approx. max)</th>
<th>Main Task(s)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AMIB</td>
<td>Burundi</td>
<td>2003-4</td>
<td>3,250</td>
<td>Peacebuilding</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MIOC</td>
<td>Comoros</td>
<td>2004</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>Observation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AMIS (into UNAMID)</td>
<td>Darfur</td>
<td>2004-7</td>
<td>c.7,700</td>
<td>Peacekeeping / PoC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Special TF Burundi</td>
<td>Burundi</td>
<td>2006-9</td>
<td>c.750</td>
<td>VIP Protection</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AMISEC</td>
<td>Comoros</td>
<td>2006</td>
<td>1,260</td>
<td>Election Monitor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AMISOM</td>
<td>Somalia</td>
<td>2007-</td>
<td>22,126</td>
<td>Regime Support</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MAES</td>
<td>Comoros</td>
<td>2007-8</td>
<td>350</td>
<td>Election Support</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democracy in Comoros</td>
<td>Comoros</td>
<td>2008</td>
<td>1,350 (+450 Comoros)</td>
<td>Enforcement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RCI-LRA (AU-authorized)</td>
<td>Central Africa</td>
<td>2011-</td>
<td>c.5,000</td>
<td>Enforcement vs LRA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AFISMA</td>
<td>Mali</td>
<td>2012-13</td>
<td>9,620</td>
<td>Enforcement / Peacebuilding</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MISCA</td>
<td>CAR</td>
<td>2013-14</td>
<td>5,961</td>
<td>Stabilization / PoC / DDR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MNJTF vs Boko Haram (AU-authorized)</td>
<td>Lake Chad Basin</td>
<td>2015-</td>
<td>10,000</td>
<td>Enforcement vs Boko Haram</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MAPROBU (not deployed but c.50 observers)</td>
<td>Burundi</td>
<td>2015-</td>
<td>5,000</td>
<td>PoC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G5 Sahel Joint Force (AU-authorized)</td>
<td>Sahel 5</td>
<td>2017-</td>
<td>5,000</td>
<td>Stabilization of G5 area</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Challenge 1: Strategic Coordination

CEWS: Continental Early Warning System
APF: Peace Fund
MSC: Military Staff Committee
Challenge 2: Decision-Making – AU-REC Relations

- AU-REC relations set out in 2008 MoU. But...
- What does the principle of subsidiarity mean?
- Different interpretations has sometimes created friction between AU & RECs in crisis situations.
- AU PSC needs better consultation with RECs.
- AU Liaison Offices in RECs is helpful but not solved all problems.
- Uneven connection between AU & RECs via the CEWS. [Only ECOWAS, EAC & SADC]
Challenge 3: Getting the ASF to FOC

- “Amani Africa 2” exercise (Oct. 2015): 4 regional forces to FOC.
- NARC ineffective. Should move HQ from Libya?
- FOC still untested in reality. Are the forces really ready to deploy?
- Shortage of critical enablers and multipliers e.g. strategic lift, logistics, intelligence, protected mobility, helicopters, field hospitals, engineering, special forces, mission support etc.
- Is it all about initial stabilization before transitioning to UN?
Challenge 4: Finance

- AU lacks sustainable, predictable, & flexible financing for its conflict management activities.

- FY2016 AU budget = $416m.
  - AMISOM = c.$1bn per year

- Raises questions of credibility, local ownership and sustainability.

- Kaberuka report Sept. 2016: starting in 2017, the AU will collect a 0.2% levy on all eligible imports to Africa.

- Generate enough to cover AU Commission costs; 75% program costs & 25% peace operations costs?

AU Budgets

Alternative Sources of Finance
Challenge 5: Gaps between Institutional Designs and Real Crises

• Standby forces based on static institutional designs.
• They are not “standing by”...
• Real crises do not respect national borders or institutional frameworks.
• e.g. ESF not adequate for either Mali or Boko Haram crises.
Challenge 6: Revising the ASF Framework

• Original six scenarios designed in 2003.
• Military-heavy & focused on traditional civil war dynamics.
• But Africa’s current security challenges are broader:
  – Transnational terror networks.
  – Environmental degradation.
  – Transnational organized crime.
  – Maritime (in)security.
  – Health pandemics.
• What roles for ASF in these areas?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Scenario</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Deployment requirement (from mandate resolution)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>AU/regional military advice to a political mission.</td>
<td>Thirty days</td>
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<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>AU/regional observer mission co-deployed with a UN mission.</td>
<td>Thirty days</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Stand-alone AU/regional observer mission.</td>
<td>Thirty days</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>AU/regional peacekeeping force for Chapter VI and preventive deployment missions (and peace building).</td>
<td>Thirty days</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>AU peacekeeping force for complex multidimensional peacekeeping missions, including those involving low-level spoilers.</td>
<td>Ninety days with the military component being able to deploy in thirty days.</td>
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<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>AU intervention, e.g., in genocide situations where the international community does not act promptly.</td>
<td>Fourteen days with robust military force*</td>
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</tbody>
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Challenge 7: ASF model vs ACIRC model?

- African Capacity for Immediate Response to Crises (ACIRC) created early 2013 after failure to operationalize ASF’s rapid deployment concept.
- Reservoir of 5,000 troops (no police), to generate AICRC battle groups (c. 1,500). Deployed on a Framework Nation/coalition model.
- **Purpose:** stabilization & enforcement missions, neutralize terrorist groups, & provide emergency assistance to AU members.
- **Volunteers:** Algeria, Angola, Burkina Faso, Chad, Egypt, Liberia, Niger, Rwanda, Senegal, Sudan, South Africa, Tanzania and Uganda.
- **Characteristics:** Authorized by AU PSC; self-funding initially; voluntary; and continent-wide scope.

- The official position is that the ASF and ACIRC concepts should be harmonized (according to revised Roadmap III, harmonization should occur 2014-15).
- But are ASF and ACIRC mutually exclusive for purposes of funding/support?
- If ASF reaches complete FOC, will ACIRC really die?
Challenge 8: Political Will to Use Multilateral Mechanisms

• Even if the APSA instruments are completed, will Africa’s political leaders choose to use them?

• Tendency to think unilateral first, multilateral a (distant?) second.

• Must sustain these institutions: leaders must put their own resources into making sustainable security services, inc. PME etc.