Session 7: Understanding the Diversity of Violent Extremist Groups in Africa

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Understanding and Addressing the Diversity of Violent Extremist Groups in Africa

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AIM
To Provoke a discussion on understanding and addressing the diversity of VE Groups in Africa

SCOPE
• Introduction – Bottom line Up Front
• A Perspective of VE in Africa & Response shaping Framework
• Major Violent Extremist Groups
• Response and Response Effectiveness
• Key Messages
INTRODUCTION

- Main Diversity: LRA, MNLA, IRSAD & Others - Jihadist.
- State Terrorism/Atrocity: Hissein Habre, Jean Bokassa : R2P

Global UN CT Strategy
A Perspective: Violent Extremism

- **Contending Views:** Scholars, Politicians and Practitioners
- **Extremism:** Rejection of generally accepted societal beliefs, norms, way of life and/or legal framework in preference to an alternative.
- **Response:** Violent or Non-violent. No control measures
- **Violent Extremism:** Justification, Support and use of violence to achieve normally Political, Social, Religious or Ideological goals. Grievance Response to society - Violent/Terrorist acts.
- **Philosophy:** “Good” Ends justify any Means to achieve Goals. VE Groups unwilling to accept criticism - Intimidate & threaten Dissenters & Critics with harm/death.
- **Tools:** Fear, Intimidation, Violence, Terrorist Acts, Harm and Death rather than Peaceful means to seek change.
- **Africa:** LRA, Wahabist/Salafist VE Groups - (MNLA-Tuareg) (IRSAD - Peulh kingdom Djeelgodji)
RESPONSE SHAPING FRAMEWORK

- Compliance with UNSCR 1373 (2001)
- OAU 1999 Convention, AU Legal Framework and Model law
- Regional legal Frameworks and Strategies
- National CT architecture and Strategies
- Operational Harmony of UN CT Strategy: Pillars I, II & IV
- UNSG’s PoA to PVE (Dec 2015)
- UNSCR on Youth Peace and security UNCSHR 2250 (Dec 2015)
- ** AU Convention defines a Terrorist Act
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Group</th>
<th>AO/Org</th>
<th>Ideology/Motivation</th>
<th>Tgts/Goals</th>
<th>Modus</th>
<th>Comment/Financing/Affiliation</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>LRA (1988)</td>
<td>Uganda, DRC, CAR, S-Sudan Hierarchy</td>
<td>Mystic Christianity Political Insurgency</td>
<td>Civ/Mil Rule Uganda by 10 Commandments</td>
<td>Robberies, Oath taking, threat of death Marriage</td>
<td>ICC Arrest Warrant for Kony Ivory trafficking</td>
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<tr>
<td>GIA/GSPC</td>
<td>Algeria – Sahelo-Magreb Hierarchy</td>
<td>Salafist Jihadist /Political</td>
<td>Civi/Mil/ Govt Sharia Law</td>
<td>Seize and control territory/Sabotage</td>
<td>GSPC out of GIA- Attack on Civs Donations, Robberies</td>
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<tr>
<td>AQIM- (3 March Coalition)</td>
<td>Sahelo-Magreb Hierarchy</td>
<td>Salafist Jihadist /Survival</td>
<td>Mil/Govt/West, Sharia Law</td>
<td>KFR, Link with Organized crime, Marriage</td>
<td>KFR, Link with Organized crime, - Drug and cigarette trafficking Al Qaeda Al Murabitoon Ansar Dine, Mujao, Macina</td>
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<tr>
<td>MNLA</td>
<td>North Mali Hierarchy</td>
<td>Political</td>
<td>Govt/Mil Azawad State</td>
<td>Combat seizure and control of territory</td>
<td>Ansar Dine –Tuareg split - Iyad Ag Ghali,</td>
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<tr>
<td>BOKO HARAM/ANSARU</td>
<td>Lake Chad Basin Hierarchy</td>
<td>Salafism; West African Province Islamic Caliphate</td>
<td>Mil/Govt/Church Sharia Law</td>
<td>IEDs, suicide bombing, Abductions, Forced recruitment, Robberies, Donations Marriage</td>
<td>ISIS claim–Al Barnawi new leader BH. Attack on Moslems Powerful propaganda: Video and audio. World’s most deadliest Muslim Interests in Africa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AL-SHABAAB</td>
<td>Somalia, Kenya, Ethiopia, Djibouti Cell Based* H</td>
<td>Wahabist/Jihadist Qutbist, Salafist, Sunni, Takfiri,</td>
<td>Mil/Civ Spread Sharia to Africa</td>
<td>Assassinations, IEDs, Suicide B, Stoning Behead, Amputate, Elaborate training</td>
<td>Al Qaeda Somali Pirates, Charcoal trade, Taxes, Kismayo port External Financiers, Strong recruitment and propaganda</td>
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**Re-enforcers:** Global Networks. Dominate Territorial space – Taxes, Criminality, Symbiotic relationship with TNCGs, FTFs. Al Shabaab & AAP, Multiplicity of Doctrines, Lack of clear Religious hierarchy, Powerful Propaganda, External support Training and funding, Springing of New groups
## Counter Strategies and Lessons

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<tr>
<th>Group</th>
<th>Counter Strategy</th>
<th>Remarks /Lessons</th>
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<tr>
<td><strong>LRA (1988)</strong></td>
<td>Military Crackdown, ICC Uganda and AU</td>
<td>Successful against LRA in <strong>DRC—Maint of Momentum</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>GIA /GSPC</strong></td>
<td>Military Crackdown: <em>Weaken and offer Amnesty</em></td>
<td>Classic example: Remnants moved into Desert - Formed AQIM - Regional Coop Int Sharing</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>AQIM /Ansar Dine/Mujao/ Macina Bde</strong></td>
<td>Military Crackdown &amp; PCVE Combination – Inclusion- Whole-of Society Approach UN/AU/French/Mali etc</td>
<td>MIL crackdown not very successful. March 1 2017 Coalition Vast ungoverned Territory, Inclusion, Tuareg grievances</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>MNLA</strong></td>
<td>Military Crackdown/ AQIM Attack French/Mali</td>
<td>Military crackdown not very successful- supported by AQIM Dormant – Initiative, Pre-emptive action</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>BOKO HARAM</strong></td>
<td>Military Crackdown/ MNJTF/ Local Militia/ Whole-of-Society</td>
<td>MNJTF efforts yielding results: BK On back pedal. Resort to suicide bombing and use of IEDs, Attacks on Isolated Mil posts Latest 5 May attack lost 40 men: Momentum, Int Effort</td>
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<td><strong>AL-SHABAAB</strong></td>
<td>AU Military TASK FORCE, Whole-of-Society Approach Robust P/CVE AMISOM</td>
<td>Renewed AMISOM Mandate, Dislodged in Somalia: Resort to sporadic attacks, Suicide bombing: Early deployment</td>
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Security Sector Leaders: Practical Steps to mitigate/respond to VE

**Shaping Response:** Guided by Pillars I, II & IV UN CT Strategy and UNSCR 1373. Hearts and Minds Approach, involving vulnerable communities. Response is context specific and should be shaped community by community – Kenya. Promote good Security-Civil relations to build mutual trust. Seek to Influence Govt Policy – Architecture, legislation.

**Info/Int collection and sharing:** Dynamic multi sectoral collection effort with vulnerable communities as major source. Need to know vs Need to share – CISSA, CAERT, Neighbouring countries. Create strong mutually supporting Networks.
**Security Sector Leaders: Practical Steps to mitigate /respond to VE Contd:**


- **Denial of Ability to Recruit.** Take steps to identify recruitment grounds and means and suggest policy frameworks to deny VE Groups the ability to exploit those grounds and means means. *Kenya Refugee camp. Private Quranic schools, Scholarships offers*
Capacity building and institution strengthening.

- **AU/CAERT/RECs**: Responsibility of CAERT to assist AU MS in capacity building on request—Explore Avenue—Law, Strategies, PoA, Best Practices, Awareness creation & Early Warning.

- **OTHER INSTITUTIONS - ACSS**: Maintain strong links and build active networks. *Interpol, USDEA* etc.

- **UN SYSTEM**: Avenues for capacity building on request—UNODC, UNCCT, UNCTITF, UNCTED—Assessments with CAERT—Nigeria, Kenya.

- **DEV Partners**: Various support programs for capacity building, Good Governance, Poverty Issues—Need to be assertive.

- **UNCR 2250 and UNSG’s POA**: Various assistance opportunities—PoA dev & Implementation, Whole-of-Society Approach, Bringing role of Civil Society, Women & the Youth to the fore.
KEY MESSAGES ON VE GROUPS

- **Targeting Extremism**: Shaping and adopting a unified Ministry of Education approved national syllabus for Quranic education as part of the education system – Pre-emptive.

- **Promoting non-Extremist Islamic ideology**: Meticulously promote NEIO as an alternative narrative to include taring of Imams and reviewing scholarships for Imam training.

- **Strategic CT & PCVE Approaches**: Combination of Hard and Soft approaches. Maintaining momentum to weaken active VE groups & explore timely Amnesty offer and involving whole-of-Society in planning and implementation of response including conditions conducive for spread of VE.

- **State presence**: Dominating ungoverned territory.

- **Capacity Building and Cooperation**: Capacity building, Intelligence collection and sharing and Regional cooperation are Key elements to weakening VE Groups into submission.
Thank You

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