
Regional Security Mechanisms in Africa


Prof. Paul D. Williams George Washington University ACSS, June 6, 2017



- 1. APSA started in 2002 but still unfinished.
- 2. Rising number of peace operations in Africa.
- Record numbers of peacekeepers in Africa c.113,000 (UN + others), inc. +11,000 police.
- 4. "Partnership peacekeeping" is now the norm.
- 5. Since 2010, rise in armed conflict in Africa, esp. Mali, South Sudan, CAR, Nigeria, Libya, Somalia.
- 6. AU still divided on some key issues.

Mission	Location	Duration	Size (approx. max)	Main Task(s)
AMIB	Burundi	2003-4	3,250	Peacebuilding
MIOC	Comoros	2004	41	Observation
AMIS (into UNAMID)	Darfur	2004-7	c.7,700	Peacekeeping / PoC
Special TF Burundi	Burundi	2006-9	c.750	VIP Protection
AMISEC	Comoros	2006	1,260	Election Monitor
AMISOM	Somalia	2007-	22,126	Regime Support
MAES	Comoros	2007-8	350	Election Support
Democracy in Comoros	Comoros	2008	1,350 (+450 Comoros)	Enforcement
RCI-LRA (AU-authorized)	Central Africa	2011-	c.5,000	Enforcement vs LRA
AFISMA	Mali	2012-13	9,620	Enforcement / Peacebuilding
MISCA	CAR	2013-14	5,961	Stabilization / PoC / DDR
MNJTF vs Boko Haram (AU-authorized)	Lake Chad Basin	2015-	10,000	Enforcement vs Boko Haram
MAPROBU (not deployed but c.50 observers)	Burundi	2015-	5,000	PoC
G5 Sahel Joint Force (AU-authorized)	Sahel 5	2017-	5,000	Stabilization of G5 area

Challenge 1: Strategic Coordination



Challenge 2: Decision-Making – AU-REC Relations


- AU-REC relations set out in 2008 MoU. But...
- What does the principle of subsidiarity mean?
- Different interpretations has sometimes created friction between AU & RECs in crisis situations.
- AU PSC needs better consultation with RECs.
- AU Liaison Offices in RECs is helpful but not solved all problems.
- Uneven connection between AU & RECs via the CEWS. [Only ECOWAS, EAC & SADC]






Challenge 3: Getting the ASF to FOC

- "Amani Africa 2" exercise (Oct. 2015): 4 regional forces to FOC.
- NARC ineffective. Should move HQ from Libya?
- FOC still untested in reality. Are the forces really ready to deploy?
- Shortage of critical enablers and multipliers e.g. strategic lift, logistics, intelligence, protected mobility, helicopters, field hospitals, engineering, special forces, mission support etc.
- Is it all about initial stabilization before transitioning to UN?



Challenge 4: Finance


- AU lacks sustainable, predictable, & flexible financing for its conflict management activities.
- FY2016 AU budget = \$416m.
 - AMISOM = c.\$1bn per year
- Raises questions of credibility, local ownership and sustainability.
- Kaberuka report Sept. 2016: starting in 2017, the AU will collect a 0.2% levy on all eligible imports to Africa.
- Generate enough to cover AU Commission costs; 75% program costs & 25% peace operations costs?



Alternative Sources of Finance

Challenge 5: Gaps between Institutional Designs and Real Crises

- Standby forces based on static institutional designs.
- They are not "standing by"...
- Real crises do not respect national borders or institutional frameworks.
- e.g. ESF not adequate for either Mali or Boko Haram crises.



Challenge 6: Revising the ASF Framework

- Original six scenarios designed in 2003.
- Military-heavy & focused on traditional civil war dynamics.
- But Africa's current security challenges are broader:
 - Transnational terror networks.
 - Environmental degradation.
 - Transnational organized crime.
 - Maritime (in)security.
 - Health pandemics.
- What roles for ASF in these areas?

Scenario	Description	Deployment requirement (from mandate resolution)
1	AU/regional military advice to a political mission.	Thirty days
2	AU/regional observer mission co-deployed with a UN mission.	Thirty days
3	Stand-alone AU/regional observer mission.	Thirty days
4	AU/regional peacekeeping force for Chapter VI and preventive deployment missions (and peace building).	Thirty days
5	AU peacekeeping force for complex multidimensional peacekeeping missions, including those involving low-level spoilers.	Ninety days with the military component being able to deploy in thirty days.
6	AU intervention, e.g., in genocide situations where the international community does not act promptly.	Fourteen days with robust military force*

Source: Roadmap for the Operationalization of the African Standby Force (AU doc. EXP/AU-RECs/ASF/4(I), Addis Ababa, March 22–23, 2005), section A-1.

Challenge 7: ASF model vs ACIRC model?

- African Capacity for Immediate Response to Crises (ACIRC) created early 2013 after failure to operationalize ASF's rapid deployment concept.
- Reservoir of 5,000 troops (<u>no police</u>), to generate AICRC battle groups (c. 1,500).
 Deployed on a Framework Nation/coalition model.
- <u>Purpose</u>: stabilization & enforcement missions, neutralize terrorist groups, & provide emergency assistance to AU members.
- <u>Volunteers</u>: Algeria, Angola, Burkina Faso, Chad, Egypt, Liberia, Niger, Rwanda, Senegal, Sudan, South Africa, Tanzania and Uganda.
- <u>Characteristics</u>: Authorized by AU PSC; selffunding initially; voluntary; and continentwide scope.

- The official position is that the ASF and ACIRC concepts should be harmonized (according to revised Roadmap III, harmonization should occur 2014-15).
- But are ASF and ACIRC mutually exclusive for purposes of funding/support?
- If ASF reaches complete FOC, will ACIRC really die?

Challenge 8: Political Will to Use Multilateral Mechanisms

- Even if the APSA instruments are completed, will Africa's political leaders choose to use them?
- Tendency to think unilateral first, multilateral a (distant?) second.
- Must sustain these institutions: leaders must put their own resources into making sustainable security services, inc. PME etc.