Experts’ Publications

 

Recent publications by Africa Center’s Experts:

Africa Security Challenges

  • U.S. Security Engagement in Africa

    By William M. Bellamy.  Security Brief.  Africa Center for Strategic Studies, June 2009.usarmyafrica A significant development in Africa over the past decade has been the generalized lessening of violent conflict. Revitalized, expanded international peacekeeping, bolstered by a newly launched African Union (AU) determination to tackle security challenges, has reinforced this trend.  But, much more cohesive interagency coordination under strong White House direction is required if the United States is to contribute to Africa’s sustained stability given the region’s persistent conditions of poverty, inequality, and weak governance. [PDF] English; [PDF] French; [PDF] Portuguese For additional reading go to: Africa Security Challenges

  • The Close of the Mugabe Era

    The Close of the Mugabe Era. By William M. Bellamy and J. Stephen Morrison. Center for Strategic International Studies, 2008. [PDF]

Conflict Prevention or Mitigation

Countering Extremism

Democratization

Identity Conflict

Irregular Warfare

Natural Resources and Conflict

Peacekeeping

Piracy

  • Dynamics of Piracy off the Horn of Africa

    piratesPiracy off the Horn of Africa, particularly north and central Somalia, has emerged as a major security issue over the past five years, and poses a major challenge to African and global security strategists in determining and implementing an appropriate response. In 2008, over 110 ships were attacked and over 40 successfully hijacked in the area. As of January 2009, some 15 ships and over 200 crew members remained hostage to Somali pirates. While attacks concentrated in the Indian Ocean area to the east of Somalia since 2004, the pirates shifted their attention northward to ships crossing the Gulf of Aden since late 2007. High-profile hijackings A number of high profile hijackings have placed piracy at the center of international attention. These include the 2005 attack on a cruise ship, the Seabourn Spirit, which was not successful but saw pirates open fire on Western tourists with AK-47s and rocket-propelled grenades. The event was a wake-up call to the international community, highlighting that pirates would brazenly attack any type of vessel, not only fishing trawlers or cargo ships. In April 2008, the French luxury yacht named Le Ponant was seized and held for one week. Immediately after a ransom payment and the release of the ship, French commandos launched a helicopter raid that killed and captured some of the pirates, and reclaimed some of the ransom money. In September 2008, the M/V Faina was hijacked and held ransom until February 2009. The seizure of the Faina was notable due to the sensitivity of its cargo - some 33 main battle tanks and other weapons systems and ammunition - which could have potentially fallen into the hands of warring Somali militia-factions. In November 2008, Somali piracy again hit the headlines when the Sirius Star, carrying some 2 million barrels of oil from Saudi Arabia worth $100 million on the market, was hijacked nearly 450 nautical miles from the East African coast. Who are the pirates? Somali pirates are simply members of clan-based militia that have established a maritime capacity. Rather than conducting kidnapping and extortion efforts on land as Somali militia-factions have done with relative impunity since the collapse of the country's central government in 1991, the pirates have taken these tactics out to sea. While some pirates have claimed grand names for themselves - such as the Central Somalia Coast Guard, the National Volunteer Coast Guard, or the Somali Marines - piracy off Somalia has crystallized around two major networks: one based around the coastal villages of Eyl and Garaad in the semi-autonomous, area of Puntland in northeast Somalia, and one based from coastal villages of Hobyo and Harardhere in the central area of Somalia. The pirates are usually armed with AK-47s, RPG-7s and an assortment of other pistols, rifles and grenades - items which are ubiquitous and easily accessible in the Somali context. The militia are organized and supplied with boats, weapons and supplies by a handful of "pirate bosses" and their financiers based further inland. These sponsors do not engage in piracy directly but, rather, invest in the piracy enterprise in the expectation of sharing in any ransom that is generated. While thousands of able-bodied men are available to serve as pirates, efforts to combat piracy off Somalia may seek to target the smaller number of pirate bosses who are critical to the perpetuation of the two major piracy syndicates. How attacks happen Somali piracy is brazen, but remains a low-tech affair. Pirates utilize small speedboats which can travel up to 30 knots. Three to five of these speedboats are used at the same time to swarm targeted vessels until the pirates can board a ship with grappling hooks and ladders. Ships that get hijacked are usually slow vessels (traveling 15 knots or less), with low sides (or at least sitting low in the water), with limited crews or crews that do not maintain an effective look-out for pirates in order to undertake prompt evasive measures, and lacking non-lethal protective measures such as water cannons or acoustical devices to ward off attacks. It is often claimed that a pirate attack takes approximately 15 minutes to complete. Once pirates board a ship, they confine the crew and demand at gunpoint that the ship steer a course towards a favored pirate mooring, usually off villages such as Garad, Eyl, Hobyo or Harardhere, in northeast or central Somalia. As piracy in the Indian Ocean became increasingly common, ships have tended to steer well clear of the Somali coast. This has required the pirates to operate further out to sea. To do so, pirates have developed a "mothership" strategy of seizing medium-size fishing trawlers, holding their crew captive, and using the trawler to lay in wait for larger, more lucrative target vessels to pass. If no suitable targets are found in the short-term, there are some reports that pirates may return to shore in northern Somalia or possibly eastern Yemen in order to refuel and resupply, before setting out to sea once more. Ransom payments Hijacked vessels are only released after ransoms are paid. According to press reports, pirates secured ransom payments totaling near $50 million in 2008. Ransoms are delivered directly to the hijacked ships, where the pirates divide their ransom into individual shares immediately before disembarking and freeing the vessel and its captives. The ransoms have mostly been delivered by boats hired by private security companies that report to shipping agents and their insurance companies. Over the past four months, dropping ransoms to hijacked vessels from specially equipped light aircraft has also become a common practice. From 2004-2006, average ransom payments were closer to $500,000. However, during 2008, that number rose significantly, and payments for the release of the Sirius Star and M/V Faina have been reported at $3 million and $3.2 million, respectively. Broader Implications Piracy has a number of direct costs, including the costly disruption of trade passing the Gulf of Aden towards the Red Sea or down the Indian Ocean coastline, the high price of ransom payments, and the trauma inflicted on hostage crews and their families. However, piracy also has broader security and humanitarian implications. These include the disruption of much need foreign aid, particularly UN food relief, to some three million impoverished and displaced persons in war-ravaged Somalia. There is also the danger that funds generated through ransom payments will fuel the Somali war economy, creating new warlords and preventing the consolidation of the country's ongoing peace process. Environmental dangers include the potential for oil and chemical spills that would devastate the coastal ecosystem. The potential that terrorist groups operating from Somalia, including Al Qaeda and Al Shebab, could learn from the pirates and develop their own maritime capacity should also be noted. Finally, the rise of piracy off the Somali coast should not be allowed to obscure a host of related maritime security problems off the Horn of Africa. These include arms trafficking that fuels African civil wars and crime, human smuggling from Somalia to Yemen, the potential for terrorist transit, drug smuggling, illegal fishing and toxic waste dumping. Without a comprehensive approach to maritime safety and security in the Indian Ocean and stability on land in Somalia, it is only a matter of time before new threats emerge in the region to grab media headlines alongside piracy. Further Reading: Middleton, Roger, "Piracy in Somalia: Threatening global trade, feeding local wars," Briefing Paper, Africa Programme, Chatham House (October 2008). United Nations Security Council, "Report of the Monitoring Group on Somalia submitted in accordance with resolution 1811 (2008)", New York (10 December 2008).

  • Diane Rehm Show: Piracy

    Diane Rehm Show: Piracy. Featuring Andre Le Sage. WAMU 88.5 FM, originally aired April 9, 2009. [AUDIO]

Post-Conflict Reconstruction

Regional and International Security Cooperation

Security and Development

Stabilization of Fragile States