Africa Center for Strategic Studies

By Dr. Benjamin P. Nickels. Geneva Centre for Security Policy, March 2013 In a March 2013 Policy Paper published by the Geneva Centre for Security Policy (GCSP), Dr. Benjamin P. Nickels, ACSS Chair in Transnational Threats and Counterterrorism, reviewed the complexity of the Mali crisis and recommended a unified vision and strategy to help solidify military advances and bolster the Bamako government’s legitimacy. “Mali faces not one but several challenges which, together, form its current, complex crisis,” Dr. Nickels wrote in the policy paper, titled “Analysing the Crisis in the Sahel.” “The four principal facets of the Mali Crisis are global, ethnic, governmental and environmental in nature,” Dr. Nickels wrote, “and these facets are internally fractured and synergistically interrelated.” According to Dr. Nickels, the crisis in Mali has prompted a diverse set of responses from various domestic and international stakeholders. “Responses to the Mali Crisis occur at three principal levels, namely the international, the regional and the national, with the last being the deepest and most fundamental,” he wrote. “These three levels are internally diverse as well as interconnected, with links visible through both cooperation and disagreement between levels.” “Given the crisis’ complexity and the response’s variety, the most valuable tools for enhancing responses to the Mali Crisis would be a common vision of the problem and a shared strategy for tackling it,” he wrote. “Unity of vision and strategy would help solidify recent military advances, bolster the spread and steadying of Bamako’s sovereignty and legitimacy and stave off potential flashpoints generated by friction between levels of response,” he wrote. “Three such flashpoints concern terrorism designations, hostages and Tuareg nationalism.” Download the Paper [PDF]

(Français) Par Francois Soudan. Jeune Afrique, octobre 2012. Le nord-Mali est actuellement contrôlé par des combattants islamistes, rebelles Touaregs (parfois jihadistes) et des bandits de grand chemin. Avec trois groupes de rebelles islamistes, ils cherchent à implémenter le droit charia et à maintenir l’indépendance du nord. Malgré des punitions comme : flagellations pour relations illégitimes, amputation pour banditisme, et lapidation pour relations hors mariage, le nord survit. Les chefs des trois groupes rebelles ont des désirs compétitives—quelques-uns veulent l’installation d’un califat qui incorpore Bamako, d’autres des façons de protéger leurs trafics illicite, et d’autres de garder le nord comme pays islamique. Trouvez cette article [HTML]

By United Nations Security Council, November 2012. Mali’s crisis has deepened following an initial rebellion in its northern regions followed by a military coup and the seizure of key northern cities by Islamist militias. Draconian punishments and pillaging by Islamists in the north have fed a worsening humanitarian crisis while counter coup attempts and attacks on influential civilians in the capital have weakened a frail political consensus in the transitional government. Meanwhile, a national political dialogue has been repeatedly delayed and boycotted by influential opposition groups and any future electoral process remains unclear. An AU-UN “strategic operational framework” has been devised to intervene in the north and some Malian military units have reorganized themselves, but the composition of the force and role of the government has yet to be delineated. Download the Article: [PDF]

By Andrew Lebovich. Al Wasat, August 2012. Similarly to what was believed about al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) in 2010, the Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa (MUJWA) is thought to be using jihadist activities as a façade for its profitable cocaine and kidnapping business in the Sahel. However, it has several motivations and is not necessarily leaving jihadism for crime. Perhaps its criminal activities allow it to be jihadist, or vice-versa. During the secessionist takeover of the major city of Gao, MUJWA’s policies changed from banning soccer and television to trying to overcome local resistance and recruit supporters. Since consolidating power in Gao MUJWA has begun carrying out an extremist form of Sharia law against popular will possibly to instill belief, settle local scores, or make locals fear MUJWA enough to tolerate their criminal activities. View the Article: [HTML]

By Robbie Watts. Institute of Development Studies, 2012. Long-standing conflicts in Mali, such as the Tuareg rebellion, are complex and highly political and are not readily explained with an environmental security narrative. Since the 1970s, Mali has promoted private land ownership rather than common property rights, resulting in the marginalization of northern pastoralists as agriculturalists cultivate previous migratory routes. Updating conventions on land-use practices would help resolve disputes between the two. Mali’s National Adaptation Action Program has acknowledged the high adaptive capacity and ecological/economic efficiency of mobile livestock systems in the Sahel, but has not reinforced it to prevent famines that are a feature of the northern region’s volatile weather patterns. Current national plans for agricultural expansion must be more resilient, flexible, and diverse given the country’s varied climates and land-use practices. Download the Article: [PDF]

By Peter J. Schraeder. Nordic Journal of African Studies, July 2012. In 2012, a northern rebellion led to the loss of state control of half of Mali’s territory. Northern groups fear the suppression of their nomadic culture and dominance by southern political leaders. Peace approaches used during prior uprisings, including efforts to strengthen interdependent economic relationships between meat- and dairy-supplying pastoralists and livestock-feed producing southern agriculturalists may reverse growing north-south rifts. Likewise, consensus building can be fostered through northern traditions such as the right to voice opinions in open fora and collective community-based decisionmaking. Such approaches can promote dialogue and address some of the roots of northern Mali’s secession. Download the Article: [PDF]

By Bruce Whitehouse. London Review of Books, August 2012. Mali’s reputation as a relatively stable and accomplished democracy was upended by a military coup in March 2012. The coup elicited tempered resistance and its leaders have remained influential, raising questions about the strength Mali’s democratic system. In actuality, the previous regime had in recent years suppressed debate in the National Assembly and had harassed some journalists. Meanwhile, a culture of corruption flourished in the judiciary and millions in foreign assistance in the aid sector disappeared into personal accounts. Key facets of Mali’s democracy had been weakening for some time. A vibrant press and popular expectations for legitimate and representative governance persist, but institutional setbacks create challenges in reviving Mali’s democracy. Download the Article: [PDF]

By Dr. Lori-Anne Theroux-Benoni, Mme Awa Faye Daou, Mr. Paulin Maurice Toupane, et Dr. David Zounmenou. Institute for Security Studies, October 2012. A transitional government in Mali must manage several ethnic and Islamist separatist groups in the north and organize democratic elections in the south following a military coup, but it has largely been hobbled by disagreements between the transitional president and the influential High Islamic Council and ongoing political interference by the coup perpetrators. The transitional government’s mandate expires in April 2013, but preparations for elections have been continuously delayed. Meanwhile, there is little agreement over which groups in the north are priority enemies of the government, and regional interventions have been hampered by competing mediation strategies by Algeria, Mauritania, and the Economic Community of West African States. Serious diplomatic efforts must be made to reconcile the many different approaches to Mali’s dual crises in the north and south. Download the Article: [PDF]