By Wafula Okumu and Augustine Ikelegbe (eds.), Institute for Security Studies, November 17, 2010
Armed nonstate groups able to cultivate disillusionment with existing regimes and successfully evade defense forces increasingly dominate the threat landscape across Africa. Such groups in Nigeria, Sudan, Angola, and elsewhere indicate a need for better policies to reverse emergent violent youth cultures, monitor transborder areas, and population-centric security and governance strategies.
By Robert L. Feldman. Defense and Security Analysis, 2008
A devastating insurgency against the Ugandan government and people is now well into its third decade. How has the battle between the relatively small and under-equipped Lord’s Resistance Army and the Ugandan People’s Defense Forces continued so long? Several causes for this surprising persistence may lie in the very structures and strategies of the LRA and UPDF as well as the irregular tactics used by both groups.
by Paul Jackson, Contemporary Security Policy, August 31, 2007
Kiwanja refugee campFourth Generation Warfare (4GW) – models of asymmetric warfare that emphasize culture, politics, economics, non-state actors, and targeting of civilians – has a growing applicability for understanding Africa’s complex conflicts. In particular, 4GW frameworks underscore the need for comprehensive, as opposed to purely military, solutions to conflict on the continent.
By Henri Bore, Military Review, 2006
Based on the 40+ years of French military experience, the author discusses the need for cultural knowledge and awareness as militaries in Africa seek to frequently transition between various forms of conventional operations and pacification, psychological, and information operations.
Department of the Army, 2006
The “paradigm-setting” revision of U.S. military doctrine published based on the fundamental premise that the key to counterinsurgency operations is protecting civilians. This document is the main reference work informing modern U.S. military operations.
By Jeffrey Herbst, Journal of Peace Research, 2004
Few African armies have shown an aptitude for counter-insurgency strategies. Instead, respones to rebellions are delayed, rely on blunt military strikes and exclude vital political strategies to complement security operations. Competent police forces and domestic intelligence agencies rather than expansion of the military will better enhance counter-insurgency capabilities in Africa’s democracies.
Security Topics: Irregular and Asymmetric Warfare