Other Reads on Irregular Warfare

By Africa Center for Strategic Studies
Updated: 03/17/2011

African Militaries and Rebellion: The Political Economy of Threat and Combat Effectiveness. By Jeffrey Herbst. Journal of Peace Research, 2004.
Few African armies have shown an aptitude for counter-insurgency strategies. Instead, respones to rebellions are delayed, rely on blunt military strikes and exclude vital political strategies to complement security operations. Competent police forces and domestic intelligence agencies rather than expansion of the military will better enhance counter-insurgency capabilities in Africa’s democracies. Download the article: [PDF]

Why Uganda Has Failed to Defeat the Lord’s Resistance Army. By Robert L. Feldman. Defense and Security Analysis, 2008.
A devastating insurgency against the Ugandan government and people is now well into its third decade. How has the battle between the relatively small and under-equipped Lord’s Resistance Army and the Ugandan People’s Defense Forces continued so long? Several causes for this surprising persistence may lie in the very structures and strategies of the LRA and UPDF as well as the irregular tactics used by both groups.
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Cultural awareness and irregular warfare: French Army experience in Africa. By Henri Bore. Military Review, 2006.
Based on the 40+ years of French military experience, the author discusses the need for cultural knowledge and awareness as militaries in Africa seek to frequently transition between various forms of conventional operations and pacification, psychological, and information operations.
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Counterinsurgency Field Manual (FM 3-24). Department of the Army. 2006.
The “paradigm-setting” revision of U.S. military doctrine published based on the fundamental premise that the key to counterinsurgency operations is protecting civilians. This document is the main reference work informing modern U.S. military operations.
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